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“In this terrific book, the psychoanalysts and the queer theo-
rists — who are sometimes the same person, but usually 
not — are less in “conversation” about sexuality than they are 
pondering whether they have the same desires for sexuality. Is 
it perverse enough, is it dirty enough, is it ecstatic enough? Is 
it available to be “used” to cure as well as to make shattering 
bearable; to imagine as well as to capture truth? There is a lot of 
talking across each other in this book — sexual difference takes 
shape so many ways, as does the relation between structures and 
norms. But if interdisciplinarity is rarely achieved, there is also 
a lot of generous listening and imagining on both sides, about 
what it would be like to want cure and care where the object 
sexuality and its subject are only ever provisionally stable. It’s 
thrilling and frustrating to read this, and I am so glad I did. It 
will be great for teaching.” 
— Lauren Berlant, University of Chicago, author of Cruel Opti-
mism, The Female Complaint, and Desire/Love.
“No book in psychoanalysis could be more timely than Clini-
cal Encounters in Sexuality. Here, psychoanalysis, often accused 
of heterosexism, is challenged to rethink its approach to sexu-
alities. The accusation is justified, at least historically, and the 
responses here by leading analysts and theorists from a variety 
of orientations are as diverse as they are illuminating. There is 
the guilty-as-charged response which calls for a rethink of ana-
lytic concepts. There is the response that explores the tendencies 
in new discourses to idealise sexuality and ignore the crooked 
wood from which this most difficult of relationships is carved. 
The collection is very rich and raises the debate over the place 
of psychoanalysis in contemporary sexualities to a new level. 
The book is a must-read for anyone interested in psychoanaly-
sis — clinicians and theorists alike.”
— Russell Grigg, Psychoanalyst in Melbourne, Australia, author 
of Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, and co-editor of Female 
Sexuality: The Early Psychoanalytic Controversies.
“The relationship between psychoanalysis and sexuality has 
long been in need of a shake up. This remarkable collection of 
essays re-draws the lines of this encounter, offering provocative, 
exciting challenges to both its contributing authors and its read-
ers. In a series of deft and insightful moves, Giffney and Watson 
have created a project that dares to speak to complexity by weav-
ing together voices that utter the unexpected and harness expe-
rience to theory and practice. The result is often breathtaking, 
offering a compendium of personal, clinical and critical reflec-
tion that is both charged and compelling. The reader is invited 
in to grapple with the queer imperatives of the volume, so that 
the tapestry becomes ever more intricate. This is an important, 
passionate book, one that, by turns, tantalises and assuages as it 
interrogates the messy intimacies of multiple desire.”
— Caroline Bainbridge, University of Roehampton, author of A 
Feminine Cinematics and The Cinema of Lars von Trier, and Film 
Editor of The International Journal of Psychoanalysis.
“Given the centrality of sexuality to theories of psychoanaly-
sis, it is striking how little it is actually taught in institutes. This 
unique and creatively organized book seeks to remedy this lack, 
by creating a layered dialogue between academics writing queer 
and sexuality theories, practicing clinicians, and psychoanalytic 
theorists. The chapters pull the reader into an exciting liminal 
space where cultural, societal, and clinical discourses intermin-
gle, creating embodied experiences of gender, sexualities, and 
sex. As editors, Giffney and Watson curate an encounter be-
tween queer theorists, clinicians and psychoanalytic theorists. 
But the experience of the encounter includes the reader, who has 
the invaluable opportunity to be a fly on the wall as these cross-
disciplinary conversations unfold chapter by chapter. Reading 
this book is not a passive experience but one requiring active 
participation in an examination of the ways cultural discourses 
of sexuality shape transferences and clinical engagement. Most 
exciting was the historical register, where established theorists 
glance back to their own individual romances with psycho-
analysis, sharing their initial hopes for the radical potentials of 
clinical theory and practice to transform our experiences. This 
radical potential of psychoanalysis is rekindled through the lay-
ered dialogues and passionate encounters captured in Clinical 
Encounters in Sexuality.”
— Katie Gentile, Director, Gender Studies Program, John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice, CUNY and co-editor of the journal 
Studies in Gender & Sexuality.
“This great collection of essays fills an important gap in the often 
contested relationship between psychoanalysis and queer theo-
ry. Clinical cases presented here illustrate how people struggle 
with questions about their sexual identity and how troubles re-
lated to desire, drive, and jouissance attest that there is some-
thing inherently queer in human sexuality as such. For the first 
time we have a volume which opens a dialogue between differ-
ent psychoanalytic schools and its perceptions of sexual identity. 
This book is essential reading for anyone who is dealing with the 
riddle of sexual difference. And who isn’t!”
— Renata Salecl, Professor of Psychology and Psychoanalysis 
at Birkbeck, University of London, and Senior Researcher in 
Criminology in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ljublja-
na, Slovenia. Her books include (Per)versions of Love and Hate, 
On Anxiety, and Tyranny of Choice.
“‘Rightly,’ writes one of the psychoanalysts in this volume, ‘Queer 
Theory has not always been respectful of psychoanalysis, and it 
is laudable that a serious attempt to engage with psychoanaly-
sis has been promoted.’ This book arises from the recognition 
that each ‘partner’ to this engagement is itself based on encoun-
ters — the two-way event of the clinic and the multiple events of 
queer desire. It goes beyond both the couch and the bed. In its 
three sections, queer theorists present key concepts; clinicians 
respond; and ‘leading thinkers’ take an overview. The result is 
a fascinating patchwork of ideas which places reading upon 
reading. Tones of voice, levels of sympathy and understanding 
vary — this may be “a provocatively uneasy intimacy” — but in 
the main this volume is indeed, as a third contributor notes, ‘a 
rich repertoire of possibilities for getting creative with the differ-
ences that divide and connect us.’” 
— Naomi Segal, Birkbeck, University of London, author of Con-
sensuality: Didier Anzieu, Gender and the Sense of Touch and 
translator of Didier Anzieu’s The Skin Ego.
“Psychoanalysis and queer theory have a special interest in 
sexuality but usually follow diverging paths in framing its im-
portance for human subjectivity. This volume brings together 
key scholars from both disciplines and engenders a fruitful en-
counter, with clinical and theoretical papers, as well as reflec-
tive essays. Enthusiasts of queer theory or psychoanalysis will 
find advanced papers relating to their interest, and will also be 
drawn to explore up-to-date viewpoints in each discipline. Stu-
dents and advanced scholars alike will appreciate these subtle 
discussions.”
— Stijn Vanheule, psychoanalyst, clinical psychologist, Profes-
sor of Psychoanalysis at Ghent University, Belgium, and author 
of Psychiatric Diagnosis Revisited: From DSM to Clinical Case 
Formulation, Diagnosis and the DSM: A Critical Review and The 
Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective.
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Clinical Encounters in Sexuality:  
Psychoanalytic Practice and Queer Theory1
Noreen Giffney
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality makes an intervention into the 
fields of clinical psychoanalysis and sexuality studies, in an ef-
fort to think about a range of issues relating to sexuality2 from a 
clinical psychoanalytic perspective. This book concentrates on 
a number of concepts, namely identity, desire, pleasure, perver-
sion, ethics, and discourse. Eve Watson and I have chosen queer 
theory, a sub-field of sexuality studies, as an interlocutor for the 
clinical contributors, because it is at the forefront of theoretical 
considerations of sexuality, as well as being both reliant upon 
and suspicious of psychoanalysis as a clinical practice and dis-
course. The book brings together a number of psychoanalytic 
1 I am grateful to Eve Watson and Nicole Murray for extensive discussions 
about the themes discussed in this Introduction, and for their feedback 
on earlier drafts. An early version of this Introduction was discussed at a 
meeting of the Psychoanalysis Working Group at Birkbeck, University of 
London. My thanks to members of the Group for their comments and ques-
tions, which helped me to extend and develop my original points.
2 A note on terminology: When I use the term sexuality, I understand it to 
be a broad umbrella term which encompasses sexual identities; sex acts; 
sexual thoughts, desires and pleasures; sexual fantasies and daydreams; and 
phantasies that do not make it to consciousness, yet have an effect on the life 
of the person. Eadie (2004) edited an expansive glossary of terms relating to 
sexuality. 
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schools of thought and clinical approaches, which are some-
times at odds with one another and thus tend not to engage in 
dialogue about divisive theoretical concepts and matters of clin-
ical technique. Traditions represented here include: Freudian, 
Kleinian, Independent, Lacanian, Jungian, and Relational. We 
also stage, for the first time, a sustained clinical psychoanalytic 
engagement with queer theory. By virtue of its editorial design, 
this book aims to foster a self-reflective attitude in readers about 
sexuality which historically has tended toward reification, par-
ticularly in clinical practice. The central questions we present to 
readers to think about are:
•	 What are the discourses of sexuality underpinning psychoa-
nalysis, and how do they impact on clinical practice?
•	 In what ways does sexuality get played out for and between 
the psychoanalytic practitioner and the patient? 
•	 How do social, cultural and historical attitudes towards sex-
uality impact on the transference and countertransference, 
consciously and unconsciously? 
•	 Why is sexuality so prone to reification? 
Divided into three sections, Clinical Encounters in Sexuality be-
gins with six chapters on prominent themes in queer theory: 
identity, desire, pleasure, perversion, ethics, and discourse. The 
authors in section one are academic writers, based in the hu-
manities and specializing in theories of gender and sexuality, 
particularly queer theory: Alice Kuzniar, Lara Farina, Kathryn 
Bond Stockton, Lisa Downing, Michael D. Snediker, and Will 
Stockton. When inviting the authors, we asked them to write on 
a particular theme and with the express aim of directing their 
writing towards a clinical audience, who may not be familiar 
with queer theory. We asked them to reflect upon the influence 
of psychoanalytic thinking in the development of queer theory, 
and to consider their own investment in both discourses. We 
did not ask them to draw on any specific psychoanalytic tra-
dition in their chapters. The authors in section one are at the 
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forefront of research in the field of queer theory, and so their 
chapters also display their own particular research expertise. 
Section two includes fourteen responses to the chapters in 
section one by practicing psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists from a number of traditions. They work with 
adults and/or children and adolescents: Robert D. Hinshelwood, 
Abe Geldhof, Paul Verhaeghe, Ann Murphy, Ian Parker, Clau-
dette Kulkarni, Carol Owens, Aranye Fradenburg, Olga Cox 
Cameron, Katrine Zeuthen, Judy Gammelgaard, Ken Corbett, 
Rob Weatherill, Dany Nobus, Ami Kaplan, and Patricia Ghero-
vici. The authors in section two were invited by us to reflect on 
their encounters with the chapters in section one, and to con-
sider whether queer theory might be useful for them in think-
ing about clinical work. The chapters in section two attest to the 
particularity of each individual’s encounter and their different 
approaches and styles when writing of those encounters. Sec-
tion two includes a variety of responses, based on the respond-
ent’s clinical experience, the psychoanalytic tradition within 
which they were schooled, the setting in which they work, and 
their own subjective position. While some writers make direct 
reference to the chapters in section one, others do not. In this, 
contributors address specific themes, ideas, or phrases pre-
sented in the chapters they have read. In order to explore their 
engagement with the material in section one, some authors pre-
sent a clinical case study or discuss a clinical vignette, others 
use cultural texts to address their concerns, while a number of 
contributors reflect on how the chapters have prompted them 
to think about their positioning vis-à-vis clinical psychoanalytic 
theory. Some respondents reflect on the encounter itself and the 
unease generated by it. Whatever their approach to the invita-
tion to “respond,” all display a clinical sensibility to the task at 
hand. 
Section three features seven short commentaries on the na-
ture of the encounters enacted by the book, by leading thinkers 
whose own clinical practice and/or theoretical work engages di-
rectly with both discourses: psychoanalytic and queer. In section 
three, the seven contributors are as well versed in psychoanaly-
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sis as they are in theories of sexuality: Stephen Frosh, Jacqueline 
Rose, Tim Dean, Noreen O’Connor, Mark J. Blechner, Susan 
Stryker, and Ona Nierenberg. We invited them to comment 
briefly on the encounters they witnessed in the book, as well as 
their impression of the book’s overall setup. They were not asked 
to respond to particular chapters.3 Most have responded in a 
brief and broad way to the chapters in sections one and two, and 
their chapters tend to focus on identifying themes or problem-
atics they witnessed, before adding their own thoughts about 
the conceptual encounter between the two discourses. Some 
people have also chosen to take examples from some of the 
chapters to illustrate their points (some to applaud them, others 
to critique them). While authors rarely reflect explicitly on their 
own encounters with sections one and two, their encounters are 
nonetheless present in their pieces. Thus, the chapters in section 
three add a further temporal dimension to the book, in so far 
as the authors are writing about a series of encounters that have 
already taken place, while doing so from the perspective of their 
current preoccupations. 
The cover image for the book is artist Karla Black’s sculpture, 
There Can Be No Arguments, photographed by fine art photog-
rapher Ruth Clark. Medb Ruane, a clinical psychoanalytic prac-
titioner and one of Ireland’s leading writers on contemporary 
art, has contributed a piece to the book on the significance of 
the cover image within the context of the work presented here in 
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality. I first encountered Black’s work 
in her exhibition at the Irish Museum of Modern Art (IMMA) in 
Dublin in 2015. While enthralled by the delicacy of her sculp-
tures, I was also excited to learn that she is interested in, and 
informed by, the work of Melanie Klein (IMMA 2015; Archer 
2008), particularly as I trained and work clinically in the Klein-
ian psychoanalytic tradition. For the purpose of this book, one 
of the things that makes Black’s (2011b) work so interesting is 
her insistence on leaving a space open for an encounter with 
3 One author, Susan Stryker, was invited to respond to the chapters that dealt 
with or mentioned issues relating to trans people.
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the art work, seeing “art in general as a place, a place to behave. 
I think of it as a […] sort of boxed off little bit of civilised so-
ciety where permission is given for us to sort of freely behave 
like the animals we are.” There is an emphasis on the experi-
ence itself, outside of and apart from language; a space where 
preverbal, non-verbal, and unverbalizable aspects of experience 
can emerge. In an interview about her work showing at the fifty-
fourth Venice Biennale, Black (2011a) says: 
My work doesn’t point outside of itself to […] metaphor or to 
the symbolic […] to language, to meaning. Often people say 
what is the meaning of this sculpture? I can’t understand that 
question. I don’t know what that means, and I’m not remote-
ly interested. I think that rather than it having a meaning, it 
has a function […] rather than it having this sort of ephem-
eral sort of relationship to language outside of itself, it exists 
as a physical reality in the world. So, rather than say what is 
the meaning of this sculpture?, I would prefer to ask what are 
the consequences of this sculpture? How does it function?  
How does it operate in the world? What does it do?
The term “meaning” — which I interpret here as the result of 
a premature move towards intellectualization or rationaliza-
tion — can function as a defensive action, which can become 
a barrier to experiencing or getting in touch with the experi-
ence an encounter might provoke. This is particularly relevant 
for Clinical Encounters in Sexuality, as our endeavor has been to 
keep a space open for the reader’s experience, but the reader has 
to be willing to meet us halfway in that. 
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality is edited by two psychoana-
lytic practitioners who work in clinical practice — one Kleinian, 
one Freudian–Lacanian — who also have research expertise in 
sexuality studies. I have written the Introduction in an effort to 
provide a rationale for the book and to open up a space for the 
reader to enter into an engagement with the text. Eve Watson 
has written the Afterword to reflect on the encounter between 
clinical psychoanalysis and queer theory within the context of 
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the material contained in this book, as well as to highlight the 
clinical and theoretical contributions the book makes to the two 
fields. 
I have deliberately avoided summarizing the chapters, as I 
think including my interpretations of the chapters would have 
the potential to close down the reader’s own engagement with 
the text. In place of this, this Introduction offers readers a broad 
overview of each section, keeping the focus on the rationale for 
the book. My aim has been to encourage people to interact with 
the different discourses in whatever way feels right to them, and 
to bring awareness to the ways in which they are reacting to the 
various contributors and their ideas about sexuality.
Psychoanalysis and Sexuality
Psychoanalysis is a clinical practice and a theoretical tool for 
considering how the internal and external worlds of individuals 
and groups meet, diverge, and play out, as well as the uncon-
scious underpinnings of occurrences and their representations 
in societal and cultural contexts. Since Sigmund Freud founded 
psychoanalysis as a therapeutic treatment in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, it has also evolved into a field 
of theoretical knowledge, which influences diverse disciplines, 
such as literature, psychiatry, music, neuroscience, art, psy-
chology, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, nursing, classics, 
social work, film, theater, and so on. Freud’s insights about the 
mind have become significant reference points for talking about 
our feelings, thoughts and behaviors, especially those aspects of 
ourselves which we cannot change or understand. Psychoanaly-
sis has continued to develop over the decades into a number of 
traditions, which take Freud’s work as their grounding and in-
spiration but have different clinical and theoretical foci. There 
are nonetheless important points of overlap between them, such 
as the unconscious, free association, transference, symboliza-
tion, relationality, and desire. The fundamental tenet of all tradi-
tions is a belief in the unconscious, which is situated at the core 
of the psyche. While inaccessible to our conscious minds, the 
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unconscious is dynamic and exerts a formidable influence over 
how we feel, think and behave. Psychoanalysts understand the 
persistent influence of the unconscious in the life of the person, 
and how unconscious elements can become manifest in sexual-
ity. 
Sexuality is crucial to Freud’s formulation of psychoanaly-
sis as a clinical field and to his theorization of the unconscious. 
Whatever he is writing about — the uncanny, hysteria, dreams, 
the death drive, transference, psychosis, the Oedipus complex, 
fetishism, melancholia, jokes, to name but a few — he is atten-
dant to aspects of the sexuality of the person that may be being 
sublimated, protected against or acted out. In the preface to the 
fourth edition of his “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” 
(1905), for example, he writes of his book’s “insistence on the 
importance of sexuality in all human achievements and the at-
tempt that it makes at enlarging the concept of sexuality” (134). 
He critiques assumptions that sexuality is a natural process, 
uninfluenced by the societal or cultural context within which 
an individual lives. He advocates that it is complex, particular 
to each individual and a source of conflict. For Freud, there is 
no one pre-established sexual object or aim. Instead he under-
stands sexuality as being on a continuum — from the polymor-
phous perversity of childhood to the variances of adult sexuali-
ty — which result from the individual’s attempts to constrain the 
drives. So-called “normal” sexuality is as much a construct as 
“perversion”: “even in the most normal sexual process we may 
detect rudiments which, if they had developed, would have led 
to the deviations described as ‘perversions’” (149).
Freud, being a man of his time, nonetheless struggled to give 
all forms of sexuality an equal footing in his writing. His deep 
ambivalence is evident in his instantiation of a sexual norm 
while at the same time challenging the very notion of a nor-
mative conception of sexuality. While employing terms such 
as “normal person” (137), “even the most normal person” (149), 
“normal development” (231), “normal sexuality” (231), “healthy 
people” (160), and “final, normal shape” (207), he sets out that it 
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is his task to investigate “what is assumed to be normal” when it 
comes to sexuality: 
Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds 
the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct 
tends the sexual aim. Scientifically sifted observation, then, 
shows that numerous deviations occur in respect of both of 
these — the sexual object and the sexual aim. The relation 
between these deviations and what is assumed to be normal 
requires thorough investigation. (136–137) 
This appears alongside a more normative, developmentally-ori-
ented path towards reproductive heterosexuality: 
The final outcome of sexual development lies in what is 
known as the normal sexual life of the adult, in which the 
pursuit of pleasure comes under the sway of the reproductive 
function and in which the component instincts, under the 
primacy of a single erotogenic zone, form a firm organization 
directed towards a sexual aim attached to some extraneous 
sexual object. (197)
This split in Freud’s thinking, which lays bare his conflicted at-
titude towards sexual life, has been taken up, interpreted, cri-
tiqued and acted out in a number of ways by psychoanalysts 
over the years. Psychoanalytic theories of sexuality have arisen 
from clinicians interpreting aspects of Freud’s own discordant 
approach to sexuality, as well as experiences drawn from their 
clinical work.4 This is further complicated by the understanding 
4 For a small sample of the extensive work that has been done on sexuality 
by psychoanalytic practitioners, see Birksted-Breen (1993, 2016); White and 
Schwartz (2007); Irigaray (1985); McDougall (1995); Lichtenberg (2008); 
Ettinger (2006); Benjamin (1998); Caldwell (2005); Orbach (2000); Blech-
ner (2009); Corbett (2009); Grigg et al (1999); Watson (2009); Fonagy et 
al (2006); Chodorow (2012); O’Connor and Ryan (2003); Kulkarni (1997); 
Gammelgaard and Zeuthen (2010); Welldon (1988); Stoller (1986); Nitsun 
(2006); Gherovici (2010); Quindeau (2013); Mitchell (1974), Mann (1999); 
27
introduction
that individual psychoanalytic practitioners possess about the 
relation and disjunctions between sexuality, gender and sex. All 
of this has resulted in a disparate set of theories: from the tenta-
tive to the unequivocal; and from those expounding an expan-
sive continuum of sexual possibilities to those that prescribe a 
sharp differentiation between the normal and the pathological. 
In the latter case, curiosity gives way to societal normativity and 
symbolic thinking to concretization. The sexuality of the indi-
vidual is no longer something to be wondered about, because 
the psychoanalytic practitioner already knows the answer, pro-
jecting their own assumptions about sexuality onto the patient 
and judging the patient against such projections. Theory and/
or social prejudice trumps what is going on in the room, and 
in the more extreme cases, the patient becomes someone with 
a sexuality to be altered to fit some narrow definition of sexual 
maturity. 
Charles Socarides (1962, 1968), a psychiatrist and psycho-
analyst who spent much of his clinical career studying homo-
sexuality, co-founded the National Association for Research and 
Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH) in 1992, which proposes re-
parative therapy for homosexuals wishing to change their sexual 
orientation. Reparative therapy, according to NARTH co-founder 
Joseph Nicolosi (2014), uses a number of “interventions” which 
“will result in reducing, and sometimes eliminating, sexual or 
romantic attractions toward individuals of the same sex.” Ho-
mosexuality is perceived as a psychopathological symptom here, 
resulting from an environmental trauma or an internal distur-
bance. In a review of the psychoanalytic treatment of bisexuali-
ty, Esther Rapoport (2009) found that it is “often relegated to the 
realm of fantasy” (286). She argues that psychoanalysts are op-
erating from various “grossly outdated theoretical assumptions,” 
Dimen (2003); Harris (2009); Celenza (2011, 2014); Green (2008); Gyler 
(2010); Giffney (2015); Lemma and Lynch (2015); Benvenuto (2016); Corbett 
(2014); Gabbard (2016). See also the international, peer-reviewed journal 
Studies in Gender and Sexuality (2000- ), which publishes psychosocially-
informed psychoanalytic work that bridges the clinical, social and cultural 
spheres.
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resting on a number of factors, including the inaccurate view 
that “biological sex, gender and object choice imply each other 
and are virtually synonymous” (292). In this case, adherence to 
theoretical doctrine interferes with the clinician’s capacity to re-
main open to their experience with their patients. Elsewhere, 
Shana T. (2014) writes that “The failures of psychoanalysis with 
respect to transgender people are somewhat — and sadly — fa-
miliar” (169), while Patricia Elliot (2014) remarks that “The his-
tory of the relationship of psychoanalysis to transsexuals is one 
that is exceedingly fraught, and trans persons have good reason 
to be sceptical about the potential for reconciliation” (165). In 
certain instances, transsexuals are considered to be unsuitable 
for psychoanalysis because they have sought a solution through 
the body. In this instance psychoanalysis is a method in which 
theory has become more important than clinical experience; the 
patient an inconvenient add-on to theoretical conventions.
Clinical practices like the aforementioned, as well as psycho-
analytic attitudes towards homosexuality as a “developmental 
arrest” (Segal 1990, 253), bisexuality as an immature regression 
to fantasy (Rapoport 2009) and transsexuality as a marker of a 
psychotic structure (Millott 1990), have resulted in uneasy and 
suspicious reactions from those involved in sexuality studies 
(Dean and Lane 2001). Beliefs that some psychoanalytic training 
institutes only accept heterosexuals for clinical training (Rati-
gan 2012, 99; British Psychoanalytic Council 2011) have pro-
voked complaints that homosexuals, bisexuals, and transsexuals 
are good enough to be patients but not colleagues. Criticism has 
been leveled at psychoanalysis as a discipline, and the uncon-
scious motives of psychoanalysts who espouse perceived-to-be 
homophobic, biphobic, or transphobic attitudes have come in 
for scrutiny. For just one example, Stephen Frosh (2006) writes:
The ferocity of psychoanalysis’ attacks on homosexuality 
suggests a deep anxiety, present in individuals and institu-
tions alike — perhaps the anxiety of a profession fearing 
that its interest in sexuality and disturbance will make it an 
outcast from the society out of which it makes its living. By 
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struggling to be acceptable in a conservative environment, 
embarrassed perhaps by the subversiveness of their own dis-
coveries and by the secrets to which they are privy, and trying 
to establish their “professional” credentials, psychoanalysts 
have (as a breed and with exceptions, of course) too uncriti-
cally enacted the homophobia of the dominant culture. (245)
This fraught atmosphere between sexuality studies and psycho-
analysis has been particularly evident in queer theory, where 
theorists are drawn to and make use of psychoanalytic theories 
while being wary of the clinicians who formulate them.5
Queer Theory and Sexuality
Queer theory is an umbrella term used to describe a variety of 
approaches to sexual norms, identities, desires, and pleasures. 
It is also attendant to sexuality’s relation to other identitarian 
regimes governing gender, race, class, and so on (Giffney 2009, 
2013). Queer theory is not a unified discourse and the singular-
ity of its name belies the many different perspectives and con-
flicts present within the field. It is a highly politicized discourse, 
concerned with uncovering, critiquing, and flouting moral im-
peratives underpinning representations of sexuality in societal 
and cultural contexts. Theorists working within the field are 
meticulous in their unpicking of biased attitudes which present 
themselves as neutral while serving unspoken motives. They are 
uncompromising in their rejection of such attitudes. According 
to David Halperin (1995), 
5 For example, see Dean and Lane (2001); Butler (1990, 1993); Bersani (2009, 
1995); Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990, 1993); Dean (2000, 2009); Eng (2001); de 
Lauretis (1994); Frosh (1994); Rose (1986, 2016); Fuss (1995); Thomas (1996, 
2000); Berlant (2012); Edelman (2004); Mulvey (2009); L. Segal (1994); 
N. Segal (2009); Bainbridge (2008); Grosz (1995); Pollock (1988); Probyn 
(1996); Gallop (1982); Silverman (1988); Salamon (2010); Copjec (1994); 
Johnson (2015); Elliot (2010); Freccero (2006); Campbell (2000); Salecl 
(1994), Wiegman (2012). This list is by no means exhaustive.
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“queer” does not name some natural kind or refer to some 
determinate object; it acquires its meaning from its opposi-
tional relation to the norm. Queer is by definition whatever is 
at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There 
is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. (62) 
Writers engage critically and in a provocative way with normative 
or morally prescriptive thinking relating to sexuality, whether it 
is heteronormative or homonormative. In other words, think-
ing that favors either heterosexuality or homosexuality. Theo-
rists enact a confrontational style of engagement, which aims 
to challenge what is societally deemed to be respectable, per-
missible and intelligible. The term “queer” resists conventions 
based particularly upon a heterosexual bias and the privileging 
of certain sex acts, gender performances, sexual identities, and 
relationship styles, while pathologizing others as unnatural, ab-
normal or psychologically underdeveloped. 
Queer theorists believe that there is no “normal” teleology of 
sexual development, and insist that desire and pleasure are both 
fluid and historically contingent. They argue that people cling 
to socially constructed identity categories, rather than accept-
ing the destabilizing and potentially unbearable effects of their 
own desires and pleasures. Proclamations that heterosexuality 
is the one and only endpoint of healthy sexual development are 
understood as a denial of the reality of “the radical impersonal-
ity of desire” (Dean 2000, 17) and the fact that “desire is essen-
tially perverse” (Penney 2006, 1). In Guy Hocquenghem’s (1972) 
words, “Properly speaking, desire is no more homosexual than 
heterosexual. Desire emerges in a multiple form, whose compo-
nents are only divisable a posteriori, according to how we manip-
ulate it” (49). Attempts to set up a “charmed circle” (Rubin 1984) 
or hierarchy of sexual desires, pleasures, acts, and identities are 
perceived as superegoic efforts to keep the sexual realm good 
by splitting off the messiness of the sexual as bad; to reduce dif-
ference to sameness. Theorists argue that queer facilitates a less 
limiting relationship to desire, pleasure, and the choices avail-
able to the subject, by unsettling habits and conventions relat-
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ing to sexuality and gender, on the one hand, while promoting 
people’s capacity for self-reflection, on the other. While the de-
scriptor “queer” functions as an identity category for some, most 
theorists approach the notion of identity with caution, with an 
understanding that while the taking up of identity categories is 
a necessary precondition for societal recognition, identities can 
also constrain and imprison a person, while excluding those 
who feel they do not fit in (Butler 1991). A strong desire exists 
in queer theory to be recognized for oneself with all the messi-
ness and incongruity that entails, rather than being reduced to 
the orderliness and neatness of a category that can never fully 
represent one’s desires, because they are un-representable and 
ultimately unknowable to the conscious mind. 
Queer theory developed as an academic discipline out 
of poststructuralist feminism and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender studies (Haggerty and McGarry 2007), as well as 
being heavily influenced by the work of the philosopher Michel 
Foucault (Spargo 1999). It is an interdisciplinary field, includ-
ing researchers from across the humanities and the social, natu-
ral, and medical sciences (Giffney and Hird 2008; Giffney and 
O’Rourke 2009). The academic component has an activist un-
derpinning, coming into being as it did alongside queer activist 
groups, such as Queer Nation, OutRage!, the Lesbian Avengers, 
and the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), who sported 
slogans such as “Queers Bash Back,” “We Recruit,” “We’re Here, 
We’re Queer, Get Used to It” and “Silence = Death” (Blasius and 
Phelan 1997). These direct-action groups harnessed the rage 
of individuals against government agencies in reaction to gov-
ernmental failures to help gay people during the early years of 
HIV/AIDS, or the perceived refusal to censure the perpetrators 
of homophobic beatings (Crimp 2002). Queer theory also arose 
from bisexual and transgender criticisms of the exclusionary 
politics of lesbian and gay communities, who while claiming to 
be excluded by the heterosexual norm, excluded bisexuals and 
transgender people in turn (Hemmings 2002; Stryker 2004). 
Queer theory is an attempt by theorists and activists to think 
about sexuality outside of identity-based movements, by operat-
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ing on the basis of inclusivity rather than exclusivity. The aim is 
to work towards common goals rather than those based merely 
on the identity one professes. Work in the field is characterized 
by a jubilant disregard for propriety and a deep suspicion of all 
claims to truth or naturalness. 
The development of queer theory as an intellectual mode of 
enquiry has been heavily influenced by psychoanalysis, particu-
larly the works of Sigmund Freud, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, 
Jean Laplanche, Julia Kristeva, Jessica Benjamin, and, to a lesser 
extent, Melanie Klein. Theorists use psychoanalytic concepts to 
help them to think about a variety of topics, for example, practic-
es of reading (Sedgwick 2007); gender identity (Butler 1991); the 
death drive (Edelman 2004); transgender embodiment (Sala-
mon 2010); heterosexuality (Thomas 2000); trauma and lesbian 
public cultures (Cvetkovich 2003); affective relations between 
humans and their dogs (Kuzniar 2006); and sexual practices 
(Bersani 1995; Dean 2009). Psychoanalysis is used to explore the 
psychic life of subjects, sometimes together with a Foucauldian6 
approach to the environmental discourses that shape contem-
porary attitudes towards sexuality. This approach can be more 
properly described as psychosocial, which is concerned with the 
interrelation between internal and external worlds. In the words 
of Stephen Frosh and Lisa Baraitser (2008), 
the concern of psychosocial studies with the interplay be-
tween what are conventionally thought of as “external” social 
and “internal” psychic formations has resulted in a turn to 
psychoanalysis as the discipline that might offer convincing 
explanations of how the “out-there” gets “in-here” and vice 
versa. (347) 
Within the field of queer theory, psychoanalytic concepts are 
often chosen for their use value — how they can be applied to 
enact change — for conscious outcomes. There is a concerted ef-
6 Foucauldian refers to the work of Michel Foucault. See, for example, Fou-
cault (1998, 2002, 1992, 1990).
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fort made to take psychoanalysis outside of the clinical setting 
and adopt it for political purposes. Queer theorists focus on the 
latent, normative underpinnings of discourse. These latent un-
derpinnings might be consciously put there by the subject or the 
person may be unaware of what they are saying, due to their be-
ing so immersed in normativity. The focus for queer theorists is 
to uncover and discredit the latent inferences contained within 
the manifest material.7
While some queer theorists are rigorous in their close read-
ing of psychoanalytic material, there is an inclination in the 
field to read the works of writers, like Judith Butler, Leo Bersani, 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, or Tim Dean,8 and rely on their inter-
pretations of psychoanalytic texts rather than reading what the 
psychoanalysts have to say for themselves. In spite of claims of 
an expansive inclusivity, the focus on a critique of normativity 
tends to produce a split between heteronormativity/heterosexu-
ality as bad and everything else as good (Wiegman and Wil-
son 2015; Halberstam 2015). Writers have a propensity towards 
idealizing acts or positions that are deemed to be radical, while 
denigrating those that are considered to be conservative. The 
always-in-opposition to the norm stance of many queer theo-
rists is sometimes accompanied by a self-righteous attitude, and 
lofty claims as to what queer theory can achieve. In cases such 
as the aforementioned, certainty gives way to wondering, and 
the word “queer” becomes another concrete object to protect 
against the difficulty of experiencing uncertainty. Grandiose 
fantasies of the power of queer theory might arguably serve to 
7 This is quite different from psychoanalytic understandings of, for example, 
“unconscious phantasy,” “reverie,” “dreaming the session” or clinical prac-
titioners’ attendance to experiences of “projective identification” in their 
countertransference. There is insufficient space to discuss these concepts 
here, except to say that clinical practitioners will find scant consideration 
of the aforementioned in queer theoretical writings. Those wishing to learn 
more about the aforementioned four concepts might start with Grotstein 
(2009, 143–54); Ogden (1999); Levine (2016); Spillius and O’Shaughnessy 
(2012).
8 See, for example, Butler (1990, 1993); Bersani (1995, 2009); Kosofsky Sedg-
wick (1990, 1993); Dean (2000, 2009).
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split off feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness, and the po-
tentially painful reality that these exciting thought experiments 
are unlikely to produce the kind of social change theorists might 
hope for. 
In spite of their many differences and points of conflict, 
queer theory and psychoanalysis both have important things to 
say about sexuality, independently and to each other, and ulti-
mately together.
Psychoanalytic Practice and Queer Theory
This Introduction functions as a frame for the encounters to 
follow. In psychoanalytic treatment, the frame is the setting or 
holding environment for the work (Eichler 2010, 29–34): the 
practical arrangements for the session, including the physical 
environment within which the treatment takes place (Schinaia 
2016), the frequency of the sessions, the fees, and the analyst’s 
maintaining of a space free, as much as possible, from intru-
sions or interruptions, including in their own mind. Without 
the frame, there would be no space within which to conduct 
analytic work. Without the analyst, there would be no frame. As 
Dana Birksted-Breen (2010–2011) explains: 
The setting is more than a reference to the physical layout 
and the practical arrangements. The analyst’s attitude is part 
of the setting. This attitude includes an openness to the pa-
tient and whatever the patient is bringing, refraining from 
action, judgment and retaliation, a desire to understand the 
patient’s point of view, actions and phantasies within the 
context of what that person has experienced and the ways in 
which the patient has had to deal with those experiences, as 
well as the recognition that all emotions, however abhorrent, 
exist in all of us, including the psychoanalyst. (56)9 
9 Various contributors refer to the person who comes for treatment as the 
“patient,” “client” or “analysand,” and identify themselves using the terms 
“psychoanalyst,” “psychoanalytic psychotherapist” or “psychoanalytic prac-
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The frame represents the reality principle, in incorporating the 
beginning and ending of sessions, the fees, the analyst’s breaks 
and so on. It is a reminder to the patient that they do not con-
trol the setting; it exists independently of their wishes or de-
mands (Lemma 2003). The setting, while sometimes perceived 
as persecutory by patients who find the boundary difficult, also 
provides holding and containment.10 This is because the consist-
ency and regularity of the analytic environment, together with 
the analytic attitude and behavior of the analyst, keep a space 
open for the unexpected to emerge in the analytic work itself. 
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality is framed around the notion 
of “encounter.” Eve Watson and I used the phrase “in sexuality” 
in the book’s title rather than “on” or “with” or “about.” This is 
because we wanted to situate the encounters within the messi-
ness of sexuality, to configure the term as a space for thinking, 
but not an easy space that reduces complexities, differences, or 
tensions. The subtitle employs the terms “psychoanalytic prac-
tice” and “queer theory.” We thought through a number of dif-
ferent configurations and whether to use “psychoanalysis,” “psy-
choanalytic practice” or “practices,” “psychoanalytic theory” or 
“theories,” “queer,” “queer theory” or “theories,” or “queer prac-
tice” or “practices,” and whether to make them equivalent, e.g., 
“psychoanalytic practice and queer practice” or “psychoanalytic 
theory and queer theory.” We settled on “psychoanalytic prac-
tice and queer theory,” because the two fields are not equiva-
lent. They are very different in how and where they operate. This 
is not to say that psychoanalytic clinical practitioners are not 
theorists and queer theorists are not practitioners. It is rather to 
emphasize the different functions they perform in this book and 
to highlight, however open we hope the space we have provided 
titioner.” These are discursive terms that have a long and fraught history, be-
ing the site of fierce border wars on some occasions and used interchange-
ably at other times. See, for example, Eisold (2005); Kächele (2010); Blass 
(2010); Busch (2010); Widlöcher (2010). 
10 Holding and containment are clinical concepts introduced by the psycho-
analysts Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion respectively. On the former, 
see Boyle Spelman (2013, 13–28) and on the latter, see Britton (1992).
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contributors is, that our positioning of the book is firmly within 
the discursive space of the clinical practice of psychoanalysis. 
This is because a book like this — focusing squarely on psycho-
analytic practitioners’ views about sexuality and their impact on 
practice — is sorely needed in clinical training and further pro-
fessional development training. It is our belief that the book will 
find a warm welcome among queer theorists and within sexual-
ity studies more broadly, but that its content might prove more 
challenging within clinical circles.
We became involved in Clinical Encounters in Sexuality be-
cause we saw it as an opportunity to explore the transferences to 
sexuality that circulate between individuals and among groups, 
and how such transferences become intermingled with cultural 
and societal discourses, before ending up embedded in clinical 
practice. We presented contributors with “sexuality” — a frame, 
an object, a signifier — and left them to interact with it, in the 
process inviting them into an experience with the concept and 
their own transferences and countertransferences to the mate-
rial before them. While opening up a space for thinking about 
sexuality through the establishment of a theoretical frame, we 
have given minimal direction to authors as to how they might 
use that space or how they might approach the discursive ob-
jects they encounter. One set of contributions leads on to the 
next but no contributor gets to respond to those who responded 
to their writing.11 So, we have not given anyone a “right of reply,” 
because the book is set up as a series of encounters in which 
contributors engage with discourses they have read, rather than 
it being a dialogue between the contributors. This is deliberate. 
We have worked very hard to keep a space open, so that one 
discourse is not used to cancel out another discourse. Thus, the 
11 There are also a series of missed encounters in this book: The ten people, 
whom we invited, accepted our invitation and withdrew from the project 
at a later date, without contributing a written piece. One person withdrew 
after submitting a piece. This has also had the effect that there are more 
Lacanian voices present in section two. We will leave it to readers to think 
about how the over-representation of one particular psychoanalytic dis-
course impacts on their reading experience.
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book brings together a number of psychoanalytic and queer dis-
courses and facilitates them being able to speak together with-
out one or other of them silencing the others. 
This is a book about psychoanalytic technique as much as a 
meditation on sexuality. Queer theory facilitates an encounter 
between different traditions of psychoanalysis, not to get them 
to agree but to encourage them to address common themes 
alongside one another. It is unusual for so many different psy-
choanalytic traditions to be brought together in one volume. 
This book illustrates similarities and differences between the 
various approaches, which coexist here, not in harmony but in 
difference. Our primary aim in this book has been to keep a 
space open for different views existing alongside one another, 
even when contributors have been unable to do so in their indi-
vidual contributions. The idea of encounter provides space for 
new creative ideas and critical points of engagement to emerge. 
Every encounter has many levels: practical, professional, per-
sonal, and political. It encompasses both a conscious and an un-
conscious engagement; one that is arrived at through, in spite of, 
and apart from the words on the page. The concept of encounter 
is crucial to psychoanalytic practitioners because it is the clini-
cal condition that facilitates the emergence of things that cannot 
be known in advance in an analysis. 
Structured as it is around a series of encounters, Clinical En-
counters in Sexuality points to the fact that all writing-encoun-
ters are temporal — moments that are contingent, provisional, 
and dependent upon the context within which the person is 
writing. Each chapter in the book also constitutes an experience 
in reading. As readers we engage with texts relative to our past 
experiences and our current preoccupations. The text points to 
a number of impasses, and why it is neither possible nor desir-
able to have agreement. Clinical Encounters in Sexuality brings 
psychoanalytic and queer discourses together to see what hap-
pens, nothing more. It is readers’ task to complete the meaning-
making process by deciding, for themselves, why the encounters 
do or do not play out in ways they might expect, wish or need. 
This is a book of “and” rather than “either/or.” It is not demanded 
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of readers that they choose psychoanalysis over queer theory or 
vice versa, or one psychoanalytic tradition over another, though 
they might choose to do so. We remind the reader that the fram-
ing of the book does place other demands on readers, in asking 
people who read this book to reflect on their encounters with 
each of the chapters and to think about why they might be react-
ing to authors and ideas in particular ways. The book is, above 
all, an opportunity for readers to engage in an experience with 
their own views on sexuality and how they might be bringing 
pre-determined beliefs into the consulting room unbeknownst 
to themselves, if they work in clinical practice. So, while we as 
editors can open up a space between two discourses, each reader 
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Queer Challenges to Psychoanalytic and  
Social Identity Categorization
Alice A. Kuzniar
In the essay “The Theory of Seduction and the Problem of the 
Other” (1997), Jean Laplanche writes of a concept that attrac-
tively resonates with the term queer, insofar as queer sexuality is 
quintessentially defined by its inexplicability, incoherence, vola-
tility, and contingency in contradistinction to a sexuality whose 
owner would claim is stable, fixed, and identifiable as an integral 
part of the self. Destabilizing claims to an abiding, undisturbed 
notion of the self, Laplanche speaks of das Andere — the other-
thing in us, the otherness of our unconscious — that all attempts 
at psychoanalytic interpretation cannot master. Laplanche pos-
its that sexuality is an enigma, both for the child confronted 
with the riddle of sexuality that the adult represents and for the 
adult who can never master the uncanny as first encountered in 
childhood. The parent in turn unconsciously transmits an aura 
of sexual mystery to the child, perpetuating and completing the 
cycle. Das Andere is hence the internal otherness that we perpet-
ually carry within us and that de-centers us, but that is founded 
by contact with an external otherness. 
“Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, 
the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to 
which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence” 
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(Halperin 1995, 62). As David Halperin here suggests, queer is 
“das Andere” and, as such, resists the very labeling that society 
demands. Indeed, queer theorists have time and again insisted 
on the necessity of rewriting “queer” anew so as to prevent it 
from becoming an identity marker that would become yet an-
other category of the sort it opposes. As Judith Butler (1993) has 
written, “[i]f the term ‘queer’ is to be a site of collective contes-
tation, the point of departure for a set of historical reflections 
and futural imaginings, it will have to remain that which is, in 
the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, 
twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of ur-
gent and expanding political purposes” (19). Or, as Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick (1993) has famously put it, “queer” is “a continuing 
moment, movement, motive — recurrent, eddying, troublant”; 
ideally it represents an “immemorial current” (xii). I want to 
propose in this chapter that the qualities of oddity, hybridity, 
and transgression that “queer” has captured can be reframed, re-
called, and revitalized through reference to Laplanche and other 
similar accounts of psychic life that underscore the precarious-
ness of any attempt to decipher oneself and to label one’s sexual 
identity. Such an approach refuses to ignore the insistence of das 
Andere in erotic magnetism. Insofar as “queer” can encapsulate 
or sum up the unfinishedness and perpetual enigma of sexuality 
that Laplanche speaks of — that sense of an internal otherness 
that we always carry within us and that comes as a gift from oth-
ers — it promises to offer a unique approach to psychoanalytic 
inquiry. In conclusion, I want to push the envelope further to 
pursue how das Andere can even be embodied in the household 
companions whom we love — those whose strangeness comes 
from being of another species. The cost to psychoanalysis of 
seeing our erotic attractions as unidentifiable and perpetually 
enigmatic would be the abandonment of its classic attempt to 
narrativize psycho-sexual life. In other words, the analyst could 
venture neither to reconstruct the etiology of psychic develop-
ment nor to offer closure to the narrative by assigning an iden-
tifiable label (for instance, heterosexual or homosexual) that 
would purport to erase the troubling, ongoing riddle of sexual-
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ity. Or to put it yet another way, traditionally psychoanalysis has 
been quick to accept the pathologizing identity label of “homo-
sexual” only to search for the developmental factors leading to 
that result. How, then, if at all, can we instrumentalize psychoa-
nalysis to do the opposite? 
Laplanche’s (1997) argument runs as follows: in the bodily 
care of the child, the parent transmits to the child various sensu-
ous signals or messages (Botschaften) that the child cannot de-
cipher. These pure perceptual indices (Wahrnehmungszeichen) 
are destined to remain ambiguous, leaving the child open and 
vulnerable to the Other. The origin of fantasy resides in the 
child’s trying to make sense of such perceptions, indeed to cre-
ate a story around them. Meanwhile, the adult’s relation to his 
or her own sexual unconscious continues to be baffling. In fact, 
it is this mystery that is transmitted as a message or oracle, caus-
ing the child to sense that the parent addresses it: the parent is 
“the other who ‘wants’ something of me” (661). Laplanche thus 
speaks of the “[i]nternal alien-ness ‘held in place’ by external 
alien-ness; external alien-ness, in turn, held in place by the en-
igmatic relation of the other to his own internal alien” (661). It 
follows that all identity, seen as an attempt at self-centering, will 
necessarily be destabilized by the unconscious and the arcanum 
that sexuality always represents. Laplanche wishes to preserve 
this openness, this “relation of address to the other and of vul-
nerability to the inspiration of the other” (665) precisely because 
it can serve as the source of creativity in individuals. 
There are three moments in this description that I wish to 
draw out with the purpose of aligning it with the anti-identi-
tarian thrust of queer theory. First, Laplanche never specifies 
the gender of either parents or child, moving his discussion 
away from the gendered Oedipal scenario that dominates psy-
choanalytic discourse. He thus deliberately leaves open to gen-
der variation the fantasies that arise in the child’s imagination 
in response to the enigma. What this absence suggests is that 
Laplanche discounts the possibility of the development of a con-
crete, fixed sexual orientation in the individual or that the sexu-
ality of the parents would predetermine the eventual sexual ori-
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entation of the child, since, regardless, sexuality is inherently an 
enigma. Secondly, Laplanche further queers sexual self-identity 
by stressing that the “adult’s relation to his own unconscious, by 
unconscious sexual fantasies” (661) is not transparent. Moreo-
ver, this lack of intelligibility is why the child senses that it is ad-
dressed to begin with. Laplanche thus can be aligned with queer 
theorists such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick who wish to break away 
from a minoritizing view of homosexuality, which is to say, from 
it as a category restricted to a sexual minority. Although he does 
not say so explicitly, Laplanche implies that for all individuals, 
at the very least in their fantasy, there resides the potential for 
same-sex attraction or erotic excitability. The queerness of these 
fantasies — above all, the fantasy of seduction that the child 
harbors — is precisely why sexuality remains perplexing to the 
adult. Queer, in this case, cannot be limited to homosexuality or 
bisexuality but, in Ellis Hanson’s (1993) words, is “wonderfully 
suggestive of a whole range of sexual possibilities (deemed per-
verse or deviant in classical psychoanalysis) that challenge the 
familiar distinctions between normal and pathological, straight 
and gay” (137–38). Or, as Alexander Doty (1995) has put it, queer 
“marks a flexible space for the expression of all aspects of non 
(anti-, contra-) straight production and reception. As such, this 
cultural ‘queer space’ recognizes the possibility that various and 
fluctuating queer positions might be occupied […] within the 
nonqueer” (73). Thirdly and finally, Laplanche’s essay stresses 
the importance of the Other in the seduction of the child, mov-
ing the focus away from a settled sexual identity unique to the 
individual; in fact, by virtue of this preeminence of the Other, 
his theory could be said to be anti-identitarian at its very base. 
In other words, Laplanche reminds us that it is something off, 
oblique, ambiguous, or “verquer” — das Andere in the Other 
that is at the source of the child’s attraction. What seduces the 
child is a certain queerness. 
A few years before queer theory hit the academic scene in the 
early 1990s, as a scholar in German and comparative literature I 
had become enamored with psychoanalysis. It tantalizingly in-
vestigated those “deviant” and “perverse” possibilities that Han-
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son later referred to as “queer.” Above all, I found in psychoa-
nalysis the appealing exploration of the inherently pathological 
dimensions to the normative heterosexual family romance with 
which I could not begin to identify. But in the years since queer 
theory’s genesis, although there have been challenges to the tra-
ditional psychoanalytic explanation of homosexuality as failed 
Oedipal development (as I shall rehearse later in reference to 
the writings of Martin Frommer, Noreen O’Connor, Joanna 
Ryan, and Teresa de Lauretis), these criticisms have not come 
from a self-consciously queer theoretical camp. Queer theory’s 
most momentous work has been that of Judith Butler’s (1990, 
1993, 1997) Freudian-inspired challenge to heterosexual ego 
formation. But there are very few psychoanalytically-informed 
theories of queer sexuality, indicating that queer theory has not 
explored the full potential psychoanalysis has to offer it, such as 
Laplanche’s recognition of the incoherence, inexplicability, and 
precariousness in sexuality. Nor has psychoanalysis benefited 
from the potential insights offered by definitions of queer as a 
sexuality deviating from a simplistic homosexual-heterosexual 
binary. I want to discuss other recent models (put forward by 
Leo Bersani, Tim Dean, and Lisa Diamond) that rethink sexual-
ity outside of identity labels, followed by a consideration of pet 
love. But first I want to review briefly how psychoanalysis has 
classically examined the “homosexual” as an object of study in 
the very terms of “identity” that queer has called into question.
Psychoanalytic Identifications
The Oedipal structure of psychosexual development presumes 
as its telos a stable, fixed identity of personhood that rests sol-
idly within a unitary gender role and unwavering sexual object 
choice based on the opposite of one’s own gender. At the heart 
of the problem with the Oedipal narrative of identity forma-
tion — together with its pathologized deviations for homosexu-
als as well as for women in general — is that it assumes closure: 
In the end the individual has arrived at a fixed sexual identity 
in accordance with a categorizable gender identity. It is incon-
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ceivable that developmental models of psychoanalysis, given 
their mission of archeologically excavating and reconstructing 
psychic Bildung, would even approach sexuality as queerly in-
coherent — unless from the outset, as with Laplanche, sexuality 
is conceived as being mystifying and unexplainable. The classic, 
prescriptive course of maturation (parenthetically aside let it be 
noted that belief in this prescription is widely adopted by society 
despite its general scorn for Freudian concepts) calls for the child 
to identify with the parent of the same gender, with this identifi-
cation then facilitating or grounding the desire for the opposite 
sex (see Fuss 1995). Identification and desire are thus 1) set up 
as binary, mutually exclusive opposites from each other and 2) 
seen to be determined exclusively by genital anatomy. In homo-
sexuals, so the argument goes, the proper identifications are not 
lined up, resulting in a botched or counterfeit man or woman. 
Homosexuality thus becomes pathologized as a deviation from 
this identity formation and is considered to be a type of arrested 
development resulting in sexual immaturity. But when a failed 
Oedipal trajectory is claimed to be at the root of pathological 
resistance to heterosexuality, what is not recognized is that this 
trajectory itself is highly problematic. As Nancy Chodorow 
(1992) has pointed out, heterosexuality itself is a compromise 
formation. She suggests that psychoanalysts treat “all sexuality 
as problematic and to be accounted for” (104), not just homo-
sexuality. All erotic passions, involving such characteristics as 
compulsiveness, addictiveness, humiliation, and so forth, ap-
ply to both sexual orientations. Moreover, she asks the striking 
question: “How do we reconcile a complex and varied view of 
the multiplicity of sexualities and of the problematic nature of 
conceptions of normality and abnormality with a dichotomous, 
unreflected upon, traditional view of gender and gender role or 
an appeal to an undefined ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’?” (97).
I want to single out two challenges that have been mount-
ed to the simplistic binary juxtaposition of identification and 
desire and what its implications have been for gay and lesbian 
life — by Noreen O’Connor and Joanna Ryan in their book with 
the telling title Wild Desires and Mistaken Identities (1993) and 
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by Martin Steven Frommer in his essay “Offending Gender Be-
ing and Wanting in Male Same-Sex Desire” (2000). Frommer 
criticizes the binary because of the stereotypes it creates about 
homosexuality as well as heterosexuality. The heterosexist nor-
mative assumption about love is that opposites attract (mas-
culine men desire feminine women), with the correlative sup-
position being that gay male desire, which is to say the desire 
for likeness, must be aberrant and narcissistic. Frommer argues 
that “identity categories impose commonality and coherence by 
ignoring the actual diversity and ambiguity of lived life” (192). 
He intends to complicate these identity categories by adopting a 
“postmodern perspective regarding gender and sexuality which 
challenges the heterosexual–homosexual binary and the result-
ing discourse that has been used to define two different kinds of 
men: those who are straight and those who are gay” (192). He 
observes that the pursuit of likeness and difference are common 
to gays and straights and that the pull toward difference is not 
invariably benign or natural, for it can be an expression of de-
fensive, rigid complementarity that reifies one’s narcissism. To 
give an example of how the latter works, he refers to an article 
by J. Hansell who suggests that underlying male heterosexual-
ity is the anxiety of being too much like women, a fear that can 
be allayed by underscoring the gender difference by having sex 
with them instead. In other words, any feminine identification 
or homosexual feelings must be disavowed via reconsolidation 
of one’s biological gender, facilitated by espousing desire exclu-
sively for the opposite sex. Women can be the object of sexual 
desire provided they are considered to be inferior and hence 
nonthreatening to masculinity. Frommer then gives an equiva-
lent example of a gay male patient who sought out sexual rela-
tions with men he could regard as inferior to himself, in other 
words, by reifying difference: “Since with these men he most of-
ten played the role of the top sexually, he maintained a sense of 
himself that was protected from feelings of humiliation. Stuart’s 
ability to objectify hustlers allowed him to fend off anxiety and 
humiliation. He could ask for what he wanted sexually without 
fearing that he would be thought of as ‘a little girl’” (200). In 
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other words, anxiety about being identified with women could 
be equally present in both gay and straight men — as well as the 
capacity to pursue difference to shore up one’s narcissism.
What Frommer does not address in this essay is that psy-
choanalysis itself has traditionally propagated the notion that 
gay men are feminized — a stereotype that Stuart himself fears 
and that likewise fuels straight male homophobia, as Hansell 
indicates. Frommer points out only one negative implication 
for gay men of the identification-desire or being-wanting dyad, 
namely that to desire someone of the same sex (with whom you 
identify) means you must be narcissistic. The converse model is 
to say that to desire someone of the same sex, you must there-
fore identify with the opposite sex: lesbians are masculinized 
women, while gays are feminized men. Same-sex object choice 
hereby becomes tethered to the overriding binaries of masculin-
ity and femininity as well as activity and passivity. As Stephen 
Frosh (2006) summarizes in For and Against Psychoanalysis: 
“This line of thought, that sexual object choice is an aspect of 
gender identity, has been swallowed by most post-Freudian an-
alysts, despite the obvious category confusions it involves and 
the everyday evidence that there is no necessary connection be-
tween object choice and gender identity” (236).
Successive generations of psychoanalysts (Karen Horney, 
Ernest Jones, Jeanne Lampl de Groot, Joan Rivière, and Joyce 
McDougall) have generated competing narratives about psy-
chosexual development in order to invent explanations for 
this cross-gender identity. In fact, in so doing they hark back 
to gender inversion theories put forward by such pre-Freudian 
German sexologists as Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, Carl Westphal, 
and Magnus Hirschfeld, who in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century described and classi-
fied various sexual and gender orientations. Westphal, in fact, 
coined the word “homosexuality” in 1869, whereas Hirschfeld 
can be called the first homosexual rights activist (see Bland and 
Doan 1998). Previously I referred to Frommer’s clinical investi-
gation of gay men; now I would like to turn to studies by Noreen 
O’Connor/Joanna Ryan and Teresa de Lauretis for their trench-
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ant criticism of these post-Freudian psychoanalytic hypotheses 
regarding gender inversion that purport to structure lesbian 
identity. 
In her influential study on the castration complex in female 
homosexuality, Karen Horney (1924) surmises that, on having 
to abandon the father as love-object, the young girl substitutes 
the object-relation to him with identification instead, replacing 
the earlier bond with the mother. To play the father’s part con-
sequently means to desire the mother (in a strange reversal of 
the notion that what prompted her desire for him and to have a 
child by him in the first place was envy of the mother). Similarly, 
Lampl de Groot in 1928 sees the young girl as going through the 
Oedipal renunciation of the mother in loving the father. Only 
when she is rejected by him does she regress to her previous 
love for the mother: female homosexuality is thus seen as a re-
gression to an earlier state. Ernest Jones’s contribution in 1927 
to this masculinity complex thesis is his explicit phallocentri-
cism: lesbians have “penis identification,” while their “interest 
in women is a vicarious way of enjoying femininity; they merely 
employ other women to exhibit it for them” (cited in O’Connor 
and Ryan 1993, 52–53). 
In their review of the psychoanalytic literature on homosex-
uality, O’Connor and Ryan report on how pervasive this theory 
of conflicted gender identity has been. Even as late as 1979, more 
than one hundred years after Ulrichs began writing on gender 
inversion, Joyce McDougall (1989) writes that the homosexual 
version of the Oedipal complex involves “having exclusive pos-
session of the same-sex parent and […] being the parent of the 
opposite sex” (206). O’Connor and Ryan (1993) trenchantly crit-
icize the inflexibility and persistence of this gender bifurcation: 
[…] there is no other alternative, no other way in which dif-
ficulties with femininity can be seen, except as a recourse to 
masculinity. Furthermore, to be like a man in these respects 
means that desire will inevitably be for a woman, if only un-
consciously; there is no possibility of desiring a man from 
this position, or of desiring a woman from a “feminine” iden-
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tification. The homosexual position is cast as an inevitably 
masculine one, involving a repudiation of femininity. (51) 
Highly suspicious of the problematic concept of “gender iden-
tity” they observe that this formulation of “deviant” identity 
“blocks the exploration of what it means to desire another wom-
an from the position of being a woman, what the nature of this 
desire could be” (120). Moreover it ignores the “huge range and 
diversity of conflicts that lesbian patients may have in relation 
to themselves as women, or about their bodies […] [which] do 
not invariably amount to serious gender identity conflicts, and 
[…] are not necessarily specific to lesbians; they may also be ex-
perienced in various ways by some heterosexual women” (124). 
Both O’Connor/Ryan and Teresa de Lauretis find more con-
genial the work by Helene Deutsch for her move away from the 
masculinity complex as well as her rejection of the notion that 
masculine and feminine roles govern lesbian relations. Equally 
troubling for them, however, is the centrality of motherhood in 
Deutsch’s (1933) focus on the mother/child dyad. They do per-
ceive, though, a note that points beyond infantile oral attach-
ments: Deutsch observes in mature interactions of one of her 
patients “no sign of a ‘masculine-feminine’ opposition of roles,” 
but a vivacious oscillation between active and passive antitheses 
in her sexual relationships: “One received the impression that 
what made the situation so happy was precisely the possibil-
ity of playing both parts” (40). Deutsch here hints at a flexible 
adoption and reversal of mother-child re-enactments, a play-
ful taking on of various roles that suggest that ego formation 
is not a matter of simplistic identification with one, immovable 
gendered position. De Lauretis (1994) also finds suggestive in 
Deutsch the notion of “consent to activity” offered by the moth-
er/female partner: “encouragement given by a partner’s physical 
participation in the sexual activity itself would then provide a 
knowledge of the body,” contributing “to the effective reorgani-
zation of the drives” (75). In the rest of The Practice of Love, de 
Lauretis goes on to argue that what is required are a prolifera-
tion of visual, verbal and gestural representations and fantasies 
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that “may serve as an authorizing social force” for lesbian sexual 
practices (76). To summarize O’Connor/Ryan and de Lauretis, 
then: what they seek is a move away from the constricting, Oe-
dipally determined, dual-gendered identity configurations that 
have defined much psychoanalytic thought on homosexuality 
and that see it as re-enacting primitive or infantile attachments. 
Instead they envision a discovery of a variety and coexistence of 
positive identifications that would explore shifting erotic desires 
and fantasies. 
The Need for Dis-identification
It is this line of reasoning that I wish to develop in the remain-
der of this chapter. What other ways do we have of conceiving 
identity formation for GLBTIQA+1 persons outside of traditional 
psychoanalytic Oedipal accounts? And what models does psy-
choanalysis provide in order to think through these alternative 
imaginaries? As we have seen, queer thought resists the notion 
of a predictable narrative of psychogenesis that can be general-
ized to fit all homosexuals. But it cannot, of course, abandon 
the psychoanalytic notion of ego formation in the process. This 
being the case, is it not possible to loosen the constraining, self-
assertive demands of the ego in order to respond more sponta-
neously — more queerly — to das Andere? Judith Butler (1993) 
has adopted Freudian tenets to outline the melancholic het-
erosexual ego formation, establishing how normative identity 
arises out of the reiteration or what she terms performativity 
of societal gender norms. However much she complicates and 
adds to the Oedipal trajectory toward heterosexuality, though, 
it could be argued that she also maps out a predictable path of 
development based on disavowal of love for the same-sex parent 
(71–72). Would it not be possible, by contrast, to wish a utopi-
cally queer ego formation for purported heterosexuals as well 
1 GLBTiQa+ is an acronym that stands for gay–lesbian–bisexual–transgen-
der–intersex–queer–asexual and allies. Plus (+) indicates adding such sexu-
al orientations as pansexual or polysexual.
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as for queers? Is there evidence of a queer potential in hetero-
sexuality, so as to recognize how all intense, passionate sexual 
experiences and fantasies transcend ego boundaries that cling 
to social norms? Is not all sexuality, to speak with Laplanche, an 
ongoing enigma? Without denying in the least the social stig-
matization of homosexuality and the lack of entitlement that 
queers face that straights can take for granted, can it not be said 
that the process of ego formation is a difficult, compromised 
journey for all? 
In today’s society, identity functions to provide coherence 
to the subject for the purpose of self-presentation to others. In 
consumerist culture, identity serves the purpose of controlling, 
commodifying, and marketing the subject; it is assumed like a 
menu of options chosen in a Facebook profile. In being, as they 
must, adopted and acquired through imitation, all identities will 
fail to satisfy and will be constituted by loss, hallmarked by their 
fragility, and segregate the individual into discrete categories. As 
Jacqueline Rose (1986) poignantly observes: 
The unconscious constantly reveals the “failure” of identity. 
Because there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no 
stability of sexual identity, no position for women (or for 
men) which is ever simply achieved. Nor does psycho-anal-
ysis see such “failure” as a special-case inability or an indi-
vidual deviancy from the norm. “Failure” is not a moment to 
be regretted in a process of adaptation, or  development into 
normality […] “failure” is something endlessly repeated and 
relived moment by moment throughout our individual his-
tories […] there is a resistance to identity at the very heart of 
psychic life. (90–91) 
Yet, despite such inevitable “failure,” is it not possible to speak 
positively of identification and identity formation as adapta-
tion — as harboring the potential for a productive resistance to 
the very norms that determine restrictive ego boundaries? For 
if our identities are the repository of abandoned ego cathexes, 
it does mean that various Ichideale can be introjected and as-
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similated over time, and that these must be welcomed and they 
will be multiple and contradictory. To give an example, to do 
so would be to take up Teresa de Lauretis’s encouragement to 
artists to produce counter-hegemonic images of lesbian identity 
that will deviate from those that circulate in mass media and 
thereby provide alternative imaginaries for women. Identity in 
this case could mean the embrace of forms of difference rather 
than similarity and sameness. Yet, also, insofar as such images 
can never overlap with the self and will be rejected and aban-
doned, so too will they leave behind traces of loss and mourn-
ing. 
What models do we have, then, of identification based on 
desire and love that are open to ambiguity and change — that 
take into account unpredictability and incoherence? Could it be 
that the queerly self-identified individual has less defensive ego 
boundaries open to such possibilities? To return to Laplanche’s 
notion of enigmatic sexuality: sensitivity alone to this enigma 
means the recognition of an irreparable misfit. Dis-identifica-
tion from heterosexuality and the constraints it imposes is im-
portant because it entails retaining a sense of openness to das 
Andere. Thus, rather than seeing, in the classical psychoanalytic 
interpretation, the homosexual as someone who has failed to 
adopt a heterosexual identity, I would argue that s/he produc-
tively dis-identifies with heterosexuality and the coerciveness 
and predictability of the Oedipal ego formation, all while ac-
knowledging the pain it produces. This dis-identification would 
pave the way for more gender-variable identifications and intro-
jections that occur queerly or verquert across any clear dividing 
line between homosexuality and heterosexuality or female and 
male. Openness to the incomprehensibility and enigma of sexu-
ality is, to recall Laplanche, the source of creativity. 
Judith Butler (1997) has theorized the repudiation of identifi-
cation with homosexuality, followed by overcompensation by a 
masquerading of gender-normative behavior (132–66). Clearly, 
queer dis-identification likewise cannot arise as well without 
ambivalence and defensiveness, the anguish of having to for-
feit and not be able to assimilate standardized, heteronormative 
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identities. One needs to stress here that insofar as psychoanaly-
sis forthrightly acknowledges the pain resulting from the aban-
donment of former ego cathexes — as Rose puts it the “failure” 
of identity — it challenges those theories by Gilles Deleuze, Rosi 
Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Elizabeth Grosz that celebrate 
the volatile, deterritorialized, nomadic subject whose mobility 
occurs largely without the trace of trauma, loss, and resistance. 
At the root of this ambivalence is the contradictory coexistence 
of diverse identifications within the ego. Yet it is this multiplic-
ity, incoherence, transitoriness, and impossibility that make 
the term “queer” helpful for those individuals trying to find a 
language to reflect their disjointedness. The task of current psy-
choanalysis would be not simply to acknowledge the failure of 
previous conceptual psychic models but to adopt or develop hy-
potheses such as Laplanche’s that would help articulate why one 
feels queer. Here it is crucial to keep in mind the uniqueness of 
every individual’s circuitous path, which resists generalization 
into a theorem. As Eve Sedgwick (1993) notes: “‘Queer’ seems 
to hinge much more radically and explicitly on a person’s un-
dertaking particular, performative acts of experimental self-per-
ception and filiation […] there are important senses in which 
‘queer’ can signify only when attached to the first person” (9). I 
want to examine now a few recent forays that take as their start-
ing point queer resistance to identity labels and to the impervi-
ous ego that clings to them. They then offer models for rethink-
ing desire. In conclusion I want to contribute my own response 
to what these models imply, namely a queerly theorized pet love. 
A Singular Love
In his contributions to Intimacies, co-written with Adam Phil-
lips, Leo Bersani (2008) formulates what he calls “virtual being,” 
a part of ourselves that is psychically anterior to “the quotid-
ian manifestations of our individual egos” and that is “unmap-
pable as a distinct entity” (86). He claims that it is this virtual 
being that is in ourselves that responds in love to the same 
quality in others. This love replies to the “universal singular-
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ity” in the beloved (“and not his psychological particularities, 
his personal difference”), as a potentiality of his own being (86). 
The emblematic advocate of such a love is Socrates. The same-
ness to which the lover reacts designates not a narcissistic love 
that bolsters the ego’s boundaries and would be “driven by the 
need to appropriate the other’s desire.” (29) Instead it signifies 
“the experience of belonging to a family of singularity without 
national, ethnic, racial, or gendered bodies” (86) or, as Bersani 
and Ulysse Dutoit (1999) state elsewhere, “a perceived solidarity 
of being in the universe” (80). What is crucial about Bersani’s 
formulations in terms of my previous discussion is his effort to 
frame this love for another person not based on particularities 
that would comprise his/her identity. He redefines this differ-
ent sort of subjecthood as “a hypothetical subjectivity,” in other 
words not a self that would be defined, constrained in terms 
of its identity, desires, or its acts (2008, 29). The words “hypo-
thetical,” “virtual,” and “unmappable” indicate that this love is 
unmoored from both gender and sexual identity. At the same 
time, they also resonate with the “enigma” that Laplanche sees 
the Other representing. Love can be defined as the open, non-
defensive, vulnerable response to this enigma, to das Andere, or, 
cast differently, to the ideal possibility that another person in 
their very being represents. And, likewise importantly, despite 
its resistance to identity labels, Bersani’s “virtual being” charac-
terizes what is quintessentially singular and unique in each and 
every individual, a point to which I want to return in discussing 
the work of Lisa Diamond. 
One of the most articulate scholars forging new paths in the 
area of queer theory via psychoanalysis has been Tim Dean 
(2000). His research is significant because, via reference to 
Jacques Lacan, he more directly than Bersani casts desire as 
largely unbound by the gender of one’s object choice. Because 
he dares to conclude that desire can be neither homosexual nor 
heterosexual — that it is “beyond sexuality,” as the title of his 
book indicates — his work has been highly controversial espe-
cially among gay scholars. He writes: “By describing sexuality in 
terms of unconscious desire, I wish to separate sexual orienta-
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tion from questions of identity and of gender roles, practices, 
and performances, since it is by conceiving sexuality outside the 
terms of gender and identity that we can most thoroughly de-
heterosexualize desire” (222). As this excerpt indicates, desire 
would be fundamentally anti-identitarian and anti-normative, 
rendering, to quote Jacques Lacan (2001), the “‘normality’ of 
the genital relation” is “delusional” (187). The Lacanian psycho-
analytic categories that Dean (2000) finds productive for un-
derstanding desire outside socially rigid identitarian categories 
are the “real” and “objet a.” As “a conceptual category intended 
to designate everything that resists adaptation” (230), the real 
moves our understanding of sexuality outside the framework 
of the imaginary and symbolic, hence outside the realm of “im-
ages and discourses that construct sex, sexuality, and desirabil-
ity in our culture” (231). In a passage that echoes Laplanche on 
the child’s sexual incomprehension, Dean explains how the real 
arises and why it is linked to an enigmatic sexuality: 
Freud’s claims on behalf of infantile sexuality entail recogniz-
ing that sex comes before one is ready for it — either physi-
cally or psychically. In the case of children it seems relatively 
clear what being physically unprepared for sex means: psy-
chically it means that the human infant encounters sexual 
impulses — its own as well as other people’s — as alien, un-
masterable, unassimilable to its fledgling ego, and hence 
ultimately traumatic. As a consequence of this capacity to 
disorganize the ego or coherent self, sexuality becomes part 
of the unconscious; and it is owing to this subjectively trau-
matic origin that Lacan aligns sex with the order of the real. 
The real — like trauma — is what resists assimilation to any 
imaginary or symbolic universe. […] [H]uman sexuality is 
constituted as irremediably perverse. (232)
Following the same reasoning, Dean (2001) concludes that “in 
the unconscious heterosexuality does not exist” (138) and that 
“[o]ur identities, including sexual identity, invariably conflict 
with our unconscious” (133). 
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Dean (2000) then finds in Lacan’s notion of the “objet a” a 
means to articulate how this unconscious, enigmatic desire 
finds representation. Objet a is “a term intended to designate 
the remainder or excess that keeps self-identity forever out of 
reach, thus maintaining desire” (250). It is associated with vari-
ous, multiple erogenous zones on the surface of the body that 
displace and substitute for the original erogenous focus on the 
mouth. In the very multiplicity, excess, or polymorphous per-
versity that it comes to signify, objet a becomes decoupled from 
any gender bias or organization and thus is instrumental for a 
queer, anti-heteronormative reassessment of sexuality. But it 
also queers any domestication of homosexuality. Dean summa-
rizes thus: “what psychoanalysis considers essential to desire is 
precisely that it obtains no essential object: desire’s objects re-
main essentially contingent” (239).
Dean’s statement is both confirmed and challenged by a fas-
cinating study outside the arena of psychoanalysis that none-
theless has strong repercussions for its clinical practice — Lisa 
Diamond’s (2008) book Sexual Fluidity: Understanding Women’s 
Love and Desire. A professor of psychology and gender studies, 
Diamond interviewed numerous women belonging to a sexual 
minority (lesbian, bisexual, and nonspecific) and found that the 
persons to whom they were attracted depended on circumstance 
and varied over time: in other words, their objects of desire were 
radically contingent. They were also largely independent of gen-
der. But these desires were not so conditional as to be independ-
ent of specific persons, suggesting that Dean’s (2000) conclusion 
on the “impersonality of desire” (240) is male-oriented and un-
true to women’s experiences. Nonetheless, Diamond’s research 
on female sexual fluidity has vast implications for a queer theo-
rization of desire and substantiates the anti-identitarian, queer 
academic scholarship of Bersani and Dean.
If queer theory has been accused of erasing and marginaliz-
ing female specificity, for instance, in its focus on “camp, tradi-
tionally a gay men’s paradigm” (Wilton 1995, 7), then Diamond 
rewrites a queer component back into women’s sexuality, albeit 
exclusively cis-gender women. She deliberately maintains how 
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female sexuality differs from male sexuality, with the implicit 
critique that female same-sex desire has been cast according to 
a male-centered model that strictly divides same-sex from op-
posite-sex orientation. She also notes how the label queer feels 
comfortable for many women who wish to eschew sexual iden-
tity labels and to better account for the fluidity of their desires. 
But the terms Diamond (2008) uses herself are quite unique and 
specific to her study. Her findings are nothing short of astonish-
ing: after interviewing over the course of ten years close to nine-
ty women belonging to a sexual minority (along with a smaller 
heterosexual comparison group), she discovered that more than 
two thirds had changed their identity labels from the time of 
the first interview (65). Diamond prefers her term “nonexclu-
sivity” to bisexual to characterize this fluctuation in attraction 
to or relationships with both sexes, because the bisexual label 
presumes a significant, steady, and equal degree of interest in 
both men and women rather than the openness to the option 
or prospect of a relationship with someone of either sex. Not 
only did the women she interviewed acknowledge this flexibil-
ity but they also “underwent identity changes (such as adopting 
bisexual or unlabeled identities) specifically to accommodate 
such possibilities” (83). The heterosexual comparison group also 
demonstrated similar results: “fluidity appears to manifest itself 
similarly in both heterosexual and sexual-minority respondents, 
the primary difference being that heterosexual women take the 
gap between their physical and emotional attractions more se-
riously than do sexual-minority women: in their estimation, if 
their attractions to women are exclusively emotional, then they 
are probably not gay” (79). Indeed, Diamond later notes, physi-
ological studies done on women’s sexual arousibility indicate 
that women regardless of their acknowledged orientation un-
consciously respond to erotic images of both men and women. 
Diamond’s study is fascinating for its other results as well. 
First, she found that early experiences do not predict later ones: 
being in a heterosexual or homosexual relationship earlier in life 
is no guarantee of gender attraction at a different stage in life, 
nor can either be regarded as a transient phase towards a more 
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stable sexual orientation. Though not random, a woman’s sexual 
desires remained fluid over her lifetime. Although she could not 
intentionally change her orientation, her desires would be sen-
sitive to situation and context. Secondly, Diamond came to the 
conclusion that the majority of her interviewees were attracted 
to a person independent of that person’s gender. In fact, she 
proposes that “the capacity for person-based attractions might 
actually be an independent form of sexual orientation” (186) or 
adopted as an additional aspect of sexual variability. 
How, then, do these findings line up with the various queer 
psychoanalytic theories discussed previously? Diamond’s de-
duction that women fall in love with the person rather than 
gender contradicts Dean’s claim about the “impersonality of de-
sire,” indicating that his Lacanian model might not be adequate 
for describing female desire. One can conceivably attribute this 
difference to how men and women are socialized: women are 
taught to be more attentive to others and consequently less in-
clined to claim the prerogative of the impersonal. Be that as it 
may, Diamond’s theories do align with Lacan’s (1975[1972–73]) 
notion that “quand on aime il ne s’agit pas de sexe” (27) in both 
meanings of the term “sexe”; the phrase could be translated as 
either “when one loves it’s not about having sex” or “when one 
loves, the sex of the person one loves is immaterial.” Further-
more, Diamond’s work confirms Dean’s emphasis on the contin-
gency of desire. She also substantiates Bersani’s notion that one 
falls in love with another person for the possibility, virtuality, 
and singularity that he or she represents regardless of and in 
the face of the particularities of that person’s identity, whether 
these are related to gender, sexuality, nationality, and so on. Dia-
mond’s claim that women’s sexuality and arousability are vari-
able, unpredictable, and gender-indeterminate likewise overlaps 
with various aspects to the enigma of sexuality that Laplanche 
addresses. Above all, women’s preference for de-labelling along 
with the realization that to assume a sexual identity would be to 
compromise a sense of self-integrity ring true to the anti-identi-
tarian tenets of queer theory. 
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Other questions arise, however, for practicing psychoana-
lytic clinicians on the basis of Diamond’s work. What new vo-
cabulary does psychoanalysis need to adopt to adequately help 
either cisgender or transgender individuals organize fluid sex-
ual desires? How would one, for instance, begin to reconstruct 
an etiology of a patient’s variable desire given that there is no 
obvious developmental path to chart? If a woman can switch 
affections at any point in her life and this fluidity is regarded as 
normal and pervasive, to what extent are foundationalist narra-
tives of psychosexual life, especially the Freudian or Lacanian 
psychogenesis of hysteria, misleading if not downright harm-
ful? Butler, too, has formulated a hegemonic, normalizing nar-
rative for the development of gender and sexual identity: how 
would her narrative of ego formation accommodate Diamond’s 
findings? Or would Diamond corroborate Butler’s (1993) find-
ing that the ego can be an ongoing, volatile, fragile composite, 
especially across gender boundaries? Butler moreover has simi-
larly challenged the notion of lesbian sexuality as “an impossible 
monolith” (85). Finally, to what extent would Diamond concur 
with Helene Deutsch’s study of one female patient that indicated 
she derived pleasure from adopting various role-playing with 
her lovers, in other words, that she found happiness is escap-
ing the pre-patterning of identity strictures? Diamond seems to 
indicate that risking the incoherence of identity is liberating for 
the women she interviewed, insofar as they are involved in an 
ongoing process of acknowledging and affirming their fluctuat-
ing desires. Her findings indicate that queer love is actually the 
norm of sexuality for sexual-minority women — even possibly 
for those with a heterosexual orientation. “Queer,” “person-
based attraction,” and “nonexclusivity” as anti-identitarian cat-
egories offer these women the possibility for better grasping the 
intricacies and vitalism of their psychic life. Would individuals 
who self-identify as asexual then also find such anti-identitari-
an categories attractive and appropriate? Why or why not? The 
larger issue at stake here is that, if psychoanalytic theory and 
practice cannot offer GLBTIQA+ individuals flexible, enriching 
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support, simplifying identitarian categories will step in to nor-
malize, regulate, supervise, and police.
Beyond Sexual Identification: Pet Love
In concluding I briefly want to draw out the queer implications 
of Bersani’s, Dean’s, and Diamond’s work but move in a different 
direction; I want to propose that one’s sensual and emotional life 
is non-exclusionary in other ways that dualistic identity catego-
ries do not grasp. In thinking over the last several years about 
how my life has been enriched by my canine companions, I have 
frequently wondered about the queer consequences of that at-
tachment. To queerly embrace dog love means exploring a sen-
suality, pleasure, comfort, and commitment consciously outside 
the norms of heterosexual cohabitation. Put differently, dog love 
has the potential of continuing and furthering the work of queer 
studies that interrogates the binaries — you are either masculine 
or feminine, gay or straight — that arise from inflexible gender 
and sexual identity categories. Our life with its fluctuating sen-
sual needs, devotions, and obsessions can be complex and in-
consistent in ways that call into question self-definitions based 
primarily on sexual preference. When the object of affection is a 
pet, male–female or hetero–homosexual binaries used to define 
one’s intimate self become less relevant. In other words, to admit 
that one’s object choice might not always be human diminishes 
the power of sexual identity categories that socially regulate the 
individual. As Kathryn Bond Stockton has written, “[t]he family 
pet swerves around the Freudian Oedipus in order to offer an 
interval of animal and thus a figure of sideways growth” (113). 
To cast the matter in another light, perhaps the reassurance 
and calm a canine companion brings arise precisely because 
transspecial love rises above the constrictions that gender and 
sexuality place upon the human body. Pet devotion has the po-
tential to question the regulating strictures and categories by 
which we define sexuality, eroticism, family, and love, though 
not in the banal sense that it offers different forms of genital 
stimulation, indeed quite the opposite. Dog love corroborates 
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Lacan’s dictum: “quand on aime, il ne s’agit pas de sexe.” Those 
who have an ardor for dogs know that their passion is unavail-
able and inaccessible elsewhere. Being independent of gender 
and sexuality, which is to say freed from either loving or being 
loved in terms of identity, this affection is cathartic. Because in 
one’s emotional life the dog plays out various “roles” — friend, 
parent, child, lover, sibling (think pack member) — it cannot be 
restricted to any one of these. Hence the companion species is 
more than just a substitute, for it transcends these very categori-
zations. Even over the course of a day, the role the human being 
assumes in the relationship varies and mutates. Moreover, for 
the pet devotee the singularity or uniqueness of that one specific 
animal is what constitutes the bond as one of love, recalling Dia-
mond’s theory that attraction is individual-based not gender-
based. Yet despite such particularity, insofar as this love beto-
kens a profound kinship between species, in Bersani’s words, it 
is founded on the consciousness of shared being in the world.
“O Lord, let me be the person my dog thinks I am.” This pop-
ular bumper sticker expresses the unconditional nature of the 
dog’s affection for its human companion. In other words, the 
dog loves us apart from our identity — whether this is defined 
by gender, race, class, or age. To be so loved also means we are 
loved, in Bersani’s terms, for our virtual, ideal self that the dog 
perceives, responds to, indeed creates in us, freeing us from ar-
bitrary social identities. Pet love can also be liberating because 
it redefines what we usually understand by the term “intima-
cy.” Clearly, to love one’s dog means to enjoy the sensuality of 
stroking and petting it. But this closeness means something far 
more profound. By virtue of its companionship, the pet offers 
nearness to one’s very self, a certain calmness or equilibrium. 
This private, quiet, deep-seated familiarity and co-situatedness 
indicate a type of “intimacy.” Synonyms for intimate include not 
only “close” and “dear” but also “innermost” and “intrinsic.” In-
timacy allows the bond with the animal to be affirmed. It en-
tails a self-exploration whereby one opens oneself to life with a 
wholly different species. Not only is this other species ultimately 
foreign to us, but the connection, however quotidian, is mysteri-
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ous too insofar as it miraculously arises between species. It is an 
intimacy that is also an “extimacy” (Lacan 1999[1959–60], 139), 
an openness to das Andere. 
I have deliberately used the word “pet” here as opposed to 
the rather ungainly term “companion species.” “Pet” evokes the 
gentleness and soft sensation of stroking fur, but more impor-
tantly it is a term of endearment and affection. We often give 
the people we love pet names, and frequently these will be those 
of smaller animals, such as “mouse.” Paradoxically, pet names 
seem somehow to signal the singularity of the beloved one, 
more so even than his or her personal name. They represent 
the attempt to get away from social regulations and the con-
straining roles that stifle the expression of feeling. Pet names 
thus raise the question of whether people can have pet love for 
each other! Could it be that human relations are happiest when 
people reach the stage of viewing each other as beloved animals? 
An example of such intimacy would be when one does things 
together without feeling the need to converse.2 Whatever form, 
then, “pet” love assumes, be it for a human or nonhuman be-
ing, and as long as the term “pet” does not imply a structure of 
domination and control, it has the potential of freeing one from 
identity strictures. 
Although one of the most beautiful and sensitive dog sto-
ries, Topsy, was written by Marie Bonaparte (1940) and trans-
lated into German by Sigmund and Anna Freud while they were 
awaiting their exit visas to England, not one of these psychoana-
lysts delved in any great detail into the theoretical implications 
of their love for chows. Although animals have famously played 
a role in Freud’s case studies of the Wolfman and the Rat Man, 
psychoanalysis has been oddly quiet on the topic of pet love. A 
queer perspective, however, offers an illuminating angle from 
which to consider the psychic complexities of pet love, above all 
its capacity to loosen the “regulatory regime” of identity catego-
rizations (although one must avoid reducing this love to some-
thing therapeutic). 
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Given that a particular configuration of sexual desire is the cen-
tral emphasis of terms like “queer,” “homosexual,” “heterosexu-
al,” “lesbian,” and “gay,” it is a somewhat odd fact that theoriza-
tion of non-normative desire(s) has been outpaced by scholarly 
work on sexual identity. In the humanities, the overwhelming 
interest in identity has been furthered by two important influ-
ences. The first is the work of Michel Foucault, whose multivol-
ume History of Sexuality (1990, 1990, 1988) argued for the his-
torical variability of identity-categories and, in doing so, shaped 
a field of study devoted to understanding the various configu-
rations of sexual identity in particular historical moments and 
locations. The second is the challenge to lesbian and gay studies 
posed by scholars of race, class, and ethnicity, who have right-
fully drawn attention to the varying intersections of identity 
previously obscured by analysis that assumes but does not ac-
knowledge its own white, middle-class perspective. Still, even 
the most identity-focused work either presupposes or points to 
models of desire, and analysis of these models is necessary not 
just for understanding the sexual self but for thinking about the 
affective communities available to that self. 
A “queer” take on desire may mean several things. We could, 
for instance, attempt to describe, theorize, or trace the effects of 
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the desire of queers, where we understand “queer” to be a sexu-
ally non-normative self, and thus a kind of identity. Such work, 
however, has the effect of inscribing and normalizing a queer 
sexual identity and, consequently, limits the radical potential of 
“queer” as a method of critique. This critical potential is more 
available if we take our task to be the queering of desire, for there 
the dismantling of sexual norms, rather than their mere exten-
sion to include homosexuality, is the aim. Yet this tactic, which 
is indebted to the methods and politics of deconstruction, can 
leave us bereft of alternative models. As Margrit Shildrick (2007) 
writes of her own queer/crip critique of psychoanalytic theory, 
“although the value of investigating normative [sexual] anxiety 
[…] is undeniable, it scarcely yields a positive account for those 
who wish to celebrate sexuality and sexual expression” (237). 
The choice of approach to queer desire is not merely a matter of 
deciding which is most logical or productive, it is, as Shildrick’s 
sentiment makes clear, also a matter of critical ethics. The value 
of each approach is to a large degree dependent on who it serves 
and to what ends.
The prevailing Western theories of desire, psychoanalytic 
theory included, have not served many of us well. Although 
many queer critics have now revisited Freud’s hypotheses about 
homosexuality, the post-Freudian institutionalization of psychi-
atry has a history of isolating and denigrating non-normative 
desire, representing it as a disease to be confronted and cured. 
The account of desire that I will give here attempts to resist the 
medical model of homosexuality and perversion (which aims 
at a cure/normalization). I concur with Tim Dean and Chris-
topher Lane’s (2001) sentiment that “the problem is not homo-
sexuality but social attitudes toward it […] homophobia, rather 
than homosexuality, makes people ill” (4). Accordingly, I will 
revisit some historically influential narratives of desire together 
with the work of several queer theorists in the interests of sug-
gesting models of desire that do not frame non-normative sexu-
al desires as uniquely pathological, regressive, under-developed, 
or incomplete. The task, that is, is to think about the desires that 
have been excluded from sexual norms but to do so without un-
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derstanding them as defined by lack (i.e., their “missing some-
thing” that a normate sexual subjectivity supposedly possesses). 
Doing this, I argue, requires that we think about the very long-
standing place of lack itself in theories of desire.
In the Beginning, There Was a Void
The analysis of desire always finds its stories, from Oedipus and 
Narcissus to the narratives of Genesis. Though Oedipus may 
have claimed the starring role on the psychoanalytic stage, I will 
begin with another classical text just as profound for its setting 
a template for desire in Western thought, and one that has had 
an important place in histories of sexuality (See Halperin 1990; 
Boswell 1992, 163–164).
Plato’s Symposium (1999) is both story and theory in uneasy 
embrace, a multi-layered meditation on the nature and habits of 
desire. Here Plato, the philosopher who would ban poets from 
the ideal Republic, indulges in some fiction-making of his own 
in the form of a framed narrative. The text opens by eavesdrop-
ping on a conversation between one Apollodorus and an un-
named interlocutor, in which the anonymous character begs 
Apollodorus to recount the speeches delivered at the hippest 
dinner party in memory. This legendary gathering was a tribute 
to eros attended by the leading lights of Athens, including, of 
course, Plato’s beloved Socrates. The discussion at this all-male 
affair was devoted largely to love between men and, in particu-
lar, to the proper place of sexual desire in the pederastic system 
for educating the male youth of Athens. The Symposium would 
thus seem an ideal text to look for a theorization of same-sex de-
sire, and, consequently, to hold some promise for a queer injec-
tion of past narratives into present ones (especially into modern 
pathologizing discourses). Ironically however, the Symposium’s 
legacy has largely functioned to naturalize an implicitly hetero-
sexist understanding of desire.1
1 “Heterosexism,” broadly defined, refers to any practice that privileges an 
idealized heterosexuality, making it a standard by which other sexual prac-
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Plato’s text repeatedly represents desire as rooted in lack. The 
role of lack is of crucial importance in the defense of the man/
boy relationships of the pederastic system. Early in the Symposi-
um, the character Pausanias argues that the desire of older man 
and younger boy for one another relies on their complementa-
rity: the young boy has beauty but lacks and wants wisdom; the 
older man has wisdom but lacks and wants beauty. Significantly, 
desire for Pausanias is a matter of ethics rather than ontology; 
educative pederasty is normalized as the most socially benefi-
cial form for sexual desire to take, not as the most instinctual. 
But the two speeches following his give the principle of com-
plementarity first an anatomical basis then a mytho-ontological 
one. Eryximachus, the doctor, argues that the body’s desires are 
best understood in terms of “filling and emptying” (19) and that, 
when properly ordered, are desires for the meeting/balancing 
of opposites, the redressing of any perceived deficiency. Aris-
tophanes the comedian, in the most narrative speech, imagines 
the human species, divided into three types, as instinctively de-
sirous of a previous wholeness, one that has been missing ever 
since the gods split originally four-legged, two-faced humans in 
half. Our sexual desires, Aristophanes states, are for our missing 
“other halves” and reside in a kind of Unconscious where they 
evade self-understanding: “It’s clear that each [half] has some 
wish in his mind that he can’t articulate; instead, like an ora-
cle, he half grasps what he wants and obscurely hints at it” (25). 
Although Aristophanes’s three types (male homosexuals, het-
erosexuals, and female homosexuals) promise to diversify the 
possible configuration of desire depending on object-choice, 
his narrative actually elides the challenge that same-sex desire 
might pose to the principle of complementarity. Male and fe-
male homosexuals, rather than wanting a person like them-
selves, are represented as wanting a missing piece, their physi-
tices are judged, usually to the disadvantage of those who deviate from the 
imagined ideal. Few people perfectly match a normative idea of heterosexu-




cally opposite half, and in this way, their desire is structurally no 
different than heterosexual desire. 
The idea that lack is the essential precondition for desire 
receives its most authoritative endorsement in the Symposium 
from none other than Socrates, who makes the point a foun-
dation for his further discourse on love, beauty, and wisdom. 
His argument responds to a prior speech made by Agathon, the 
popular young tragedian of the group. Agathon’s reflections on 
eros are markedly different than those in the other speeches. 
Rather than argue that erotic desire has as its aim the coming 
together of opposites, Agathon fashions an enamored portrait 
of the God of Love, who he portrays as an idealized version of 
himself: young, beautiful, and sensitive. Agathon’s speech both 
understands desire’s operation as a form of self-copying and 
is itself an exercise in narcissism, as the other members of the 
party clearly understand: “there were shouts of admiration from 
everyone present, because the young man had spoken in a way 
that reflected well on himself and the god” (32). Socrates, how-
ever, quickly demolishes Agathon’s poetic fantasy, arguing first 
that love must be love of something, then that love must be of 
something the lover needs. Since we do not need what we al-
ready have, desire must always be directed at what we lack: “so 
this and every other case of desire is desire for what isn’t avail-
able and actually there” (35). As Leo Bersani (2001) notes, this 
is the only argument that Socrates himself makes in the Sym-
posium; the rest of the philosopher’s contributions are ostensi-
bly his repetition of arguments made to him by the visionary 
Diotima, though those are characteristically Platonic in their 
focus on Ideal Forms (1999, 360). That desire is always desire for 
“what isn’t available and actually there,” leads Socrates/Diotima 
to outline a progression to the ultimate form of love in which 
we, mere material mortals, know that what we really love/need 
is our opposite, the perfect, eternal Form of Beauty.
The principle of opposition outlined by Socrates and his fel-
low discussants has some important consequences for under-
standing the place of gender in models of desire. Although the 
subject of the Symposium is men’s love for other men (and then 
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men’s love of the Ideal through loving other men), the principle 
of opposition requires that partners embody different gender 
roles. The lovers of young boys are the active partners, whose 
masculinity is established in their higher status, older age, and 
developed intellect. The young boys themselves are the pursued, 
socially unformed, passive partners, lacking everything except 
for youth and beauty. Their reduction to a pleasing corporeality 
locates them in a feminine position, if we recall the understand-
ing of gender that Plato himself develops in his Timaeus. There, 
the masculine force of “heat” creates new beings by acting upon 
feminine “matter,” which is passive and lacking its own genera-
tive vitality (1977, 69). The young boys are not women: they will 
not forever be passive bodies to be shaped by the attentions of 
older men. But it is their femininity in their youth that makes 
them appropriate partners for masculine citizens. Once they 
themselves become masculine adults, they must switch to the 
opposite role in coupling. The desire among the Symposium’s 
participants to maintain this gender binary is evident in the 
consternation caused by the example of Achilles and Patroclus, 
where the idea that the younger and more beautiful Achilles 
might be the active lover is dismissed as “nonsense” (1999, 30). 
This dismissal is, in effect, an attempt to “straighten” the more 
queer representations of the literary tradition inherited by the 
Symposium’s Athenians.
What may have given rise to a theory of queer desire, i.e., a 
conversation in which men discuss their love for one another, 
largely stresses the need for gender opposition that also grounds 
claims that heterosexuality is natural, instinctive, and proper. 
Now, the text of the Symposium may be read differently, as Ber-
sani has done (and to which I’ll return below), but the legacy of 
Plato’s story, which largely resides in the arguments I’ve outlined 
above, matters as much as the work itself for understanding, and 
intervening in, Western models of desire. The understanding of 
desire as springing from lack, and specifically from lack of a 




The Persistence of Absence
Neither Sigmund Freud nor his major post-structuralist inter-
preter, Jacques Lacan, work extensively with Platonic philoso-
phy, and at least one recent reading of Lacan argues that his 
thought is “anti-Platonic” and more in keeping with the writings 
of the Pre-Socratics (Badiou 2006). Nonetheless, their referenc-
es to Plato are provocative. Lacan on more than one occasion 
compares the psychoanalyst to Socrates (2006[1966], 310), and 
Freud (1905) prefaced “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexual-
ity” with a nod to the Symposium’s author, writing in his work’s 
fourth edition, “anyone who looks down with contempt upon 
psycho-analysis from a superior vantage-point should remem-
ber how closely the enlarged sexuality of psycho-analysis coin-
cides with the Eros of the divine Plato” (xix). Plato thus provides 
an intellectual heritage and authority for the psychoanalytic sci-
ence of desire.
It is odd, however, that Freud should see in Plato’s eros an 
“enlarged sexuality,” given his rather disingenuous allusion 
to the Symposium itself at the beginning of the “Sexual Aber-
rations” section of “Three Essays” (22). Freud rewrites Aris-
tophanes’s myth so that gender coincides more neatly with sex 
difference, giving us a story exclusively focused on an original 
heterosexuality. Although Aristophanes does maintain the mas-
culine/feminine binary in the love couple, in his account the op-
positional structure is manifest in three possible arrangements: 
man/boy, man/woman, and (the barely discussed) woman/
woman. Freud’s claim that readers may find it a “great surprise” 
that there should be a “very considerable” number of cases of 
same-sex desire, belies his expectation of an audience already 
familiar with Plato, and seems aimed, rather, at holders of the 
“popular opinion” against whom he argues for his theory of in-
fantile sexuality (21).
Freud argues for the prevalence, even the normality, of same-
sex desire in “Three Essays,” and in doing so, he re-presents 
what he perhaps thought to be the true Platonic eros against its 
popular heterosexualization (64). Nonetheless, Plato’s principle 
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legacy in Freud’s writing is an account of human development 
in which desire is seen to result from the lack of an opposite, 
principally in the domain of gender. The Oedipus complex, of 
course, locates this account in the triadic familial arrangement 
of father/mother/child rather than in the dyad of man/boy. 
Sexual desire, conceived largely as experienced by a male child, 
is born of the trauma of losing the mother’s body, under the 
threat of the father’s competition for it. The mother is further 
not only the forbidden/missing object of desire but is the signi-
fier of absence itself because of her lack of a penis/phallus. The 
mother, famously, is perceived as castrated, lacking, when the 
child comes to realize she has no penis. The child’s forced sepa-
ration from the mother and recognition of her as lacking brings 
about a subsequent identification with the father, instituting 
what Carla Freccero (2006) terms “the hegemonic heterosexual 
matrix (whereby gender, desire, and sex are imaginarily uni-
fied according to the desire/identification split)” (22). The child 
comes to identify with his proper gender (via the father) and to 
distinguish himself, and thereby come to desire, the “opposite” 
gender (via the mother); indeed, the Oedipus complex, which 
Freud sees as a foundational structure of modern Western so-
ciety, produces the opposition of gender and the experience of 
desire as lack.
Of course, perverts (homosexuals, fetishists, pedophiles, and 
others) and women of all kinds don’t fit neatly into the most 
simple formulation of Oedipus, but Freud largely tries to ac-
count for the “considerable” numbers of these while keeping the 
oppositional structure of desire intact. Women get the Electra 
complex, which tries, rather unconvincingly, to explain why a 
female child would not also desire the mother’s nurturing body 
and regard the father as competition for it — why, that is, wom-
en should “normally” come to desire men. The answer is again 
that desire is for what one does not have, in this case, the phal-
lus/penis; if a woman cannot have the phallus, she can at least 
try to be the phallus for a man (hence her narcissistic self-ab-
sorption in her own body) (Freud 1914, 1931). Male homosexuals 
also pose a problem, and, as Tim Dean (2001) notes, “though 
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Freud rarely stops talking about homosexuality, he never actu-
ally theorizes it as a distinctly psychoanalytic idea” (121). None-
theless, Freud does not take the prevalence of homosexuality to 
indicate that the universal experience of Oedipus may not be 
so universal, but, rather, that the male homosexual accedes to 
Oedipus in a different way. Rather than take psychic measures 
to prevent castration, the homosexual boy accepts castration in 
advance of the fact, identifying with the feminine mother and 
mimicking her desire for the masculine father. Why this should 
happen is unclear, but Freud (1910) suggests that the work of 
Oedipus in creating a socially acceptable heterosexual becomes 
undone by competing desires to return to a pre-Oedipal state 
(100). Homosexual desires, while common, are regressive, “an 
atavism, in which the child gets stuck — fixated — at some more 
primitive stage of psychic evolution, whether it be narcissistic, 
oral, or anal” (Robinson 2001, 92). Fetishists, too, dabble in the 
pre-Oedipal, for their object attachments are substitutes for the 
mother’s lost penis. Although they are aware of the mother’s 
castration, their fetishes allow for a disavowal of her lack and a 
return to the phantasmic perception of the pre-Oedipal mother 
as “phallic” (1927).
Lacan’s parsing of Freudian desire is notoriously complex. 
Suffice it to say here that Lacanian psychoanalysis preserves and 
even magnifies the role of lack in desire. Lacan sees the crucial 
moment in identity-formation as that in which a child realizes 
a distinction between self and other, thereby forming a notion 
of the self based on a visual (specular) body image rather than 
on its earlier, unbounded physical sensation. This process allows 
the child entrance to the realm of the Symbolic, organized by 
language, which Lacan understands as operating on the prin-
ciple of difference (words convey that something is this and 
not that). Riven by difference, the Symbolic is haunted by the 
“Other,” and the Other, is, in turn, the site of lack, since the end-
less chain of difference that structures language will never find 
the completion that the child experienced early in its life when 
it did not distinguish itself from anything else. Desire is moti-
vated by this lack, as the subject strives (unsuccessfully) to fill 
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the void with an endless series of objects. If this lack were to be 
satisfied, which it cannot be, desire would cease, as presumably 
would our participation in the Symbolic. If we are to maintain 
our participation in the realm of language then, ultimately what 
we must desire is to keep desiring (see Lacan 2006[1966], 3–9, 
31–106).
Whether Lacanian theory just as powerfully re-inscribes the 
importance of gender complementarity as it does the place of 
lack is the subject of some debate. Tim Dean (2001) has argued 
that Lacan enables us to think about the relation of self and other 
without automatically conflating this psychic development with 
the recognition of sex difference: “Lacan sees in Freud’s theory 
of narcissism the possibility of a relation to otherness before any 
relation to difference” (126). More typically, however, queer and 
feminist theorists have found in Lacan, as in Freud, an unpalat-
able reliance on the opposition of masculine/feminine and the 
equation of the feminine with the negation of a privileged mas-
culine (see Grosz 1995, 177). The relation between lack and the 
feminine is established in Lacan’s writing, as it is in Freud’s, in 
the representation of the inaccessible body of the Mother, which 
Lacan (1992[1959–60]) terms “the absolute Other of the subject” 
or “das Ding” (the Thing) beyond signification (70). Though the 
Other is what motivates desire, the mother cannot be a positive 
locus of a Platonic Ideal such as the Good or the Beautiful be-
cause the subject is barred from enjoying her, thereby contami-
nating the Good with the taboo. An example of the deformation 
of the feminine can be seen in Lacan’s reading of courtly love 
lyrics as paradigmatic of “the madness of love.” The central fea-
ture of the troubadour lyrics cited by him is their idealization of 
the beloved Lady by her male lover and their sharp contrast in 
gender attributes: he is hot, active, and passionate; she is cold, 
passive, and unfeeling. She is a path toward the Ideal but with a 
distinctly Lacanian twist, for as the psychoanalyst perceives, “In 
this poetic field, the feminine is emptied of all real substance” 




As might be expected, any contact with this terrifying, inhu-
man Other, with, that is, the true focus of desire, threatens to 
annihilate the masculine subject. Lacan notes that the best that 
the courtly lover could hope for would be a mere signal, a vague 
salutation emanating from the Other’s position (152). Anything 
more might well obliterate the ego. Lacan’s yoking together of 
desire and death is indebted, of course, to the Freudian death 
drive, but it also borrows from the work of Lacan’s friend and 
fellow theorist of desire, Georges Bataille, who doubtless influ-
enced Lacan’s reading of the troubadour lyric (Holsinger 2005). 
Bataille’s (1986) work has many continuities with Lacan’s, and 
its central thesis is that eroticism, which is independent of the 
social imperative to reproduce, always aims at the “continuity 
of being” (13) to be found in death. Bataille sees in sexual re-
production not an extension of the self but a reminder that we 
are isolated beings: children may be similar to their parents, but 
parent and child are not one. Eroticism, though linked to sexual 
reproduction, is in fact a refusal of its imposition of discontinu-
ity. It is a radical urge to break down the “established patterns” 
that define us as separate individuals (18). Such ego-dissolving 
practices as poetry, religious mysticism, and “primitive sacri-
fice” are for Bataille paradigmatically erotic. Bataille’s theory of 
eros as the pursuit of interpersonal “continuity” might seem to 
hold promise for thinking about queer desire, since a shatter-
ing of ego-stabilizing patterns would presumably make gender 
identity irrelevant. However, passages like the following set us 
back within oppositional gender roles: “When I come to reli-
gious eroticism which is concerned with a fusion of beings with 
a world beyond everyday reality I shall return to the significance 
of sacrifice. Here and now, however, I must emphasize that the 
female partner in eroticism was seen as the victim, the male as 
the sacrificer, both during the consummation losing themselves 
in the continuity established by the first destructive act” (18).
If the feminine role is to be a sacrificial victim, and masculine 
desire is a desire to be continuous with the sacrificed, we might 
understand why Lacan thought that the masculine subject must 
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content himself with a mere nod from the Other. For in Bataille’s 
account, the consummation of true desire demands one’s death.
Queer Interventions
So what can queer theories of desire take from psychoanalysis 
and related inquiries into eros? The writing of desire as mas-
culine desire for the feminine Other, and the equation of, on 
the one hand, desire with lack, and on the other, the feminine 
Other with lack and death seems nearly unworkable for empow-
ering models of same-sex eroticism. While some queer theorists 
trace out a radical vision of embracing the death drive (Edelman 
2004), it is hardly surprising that others feel only frustration 
with the continued status of psychoanalysis in critical narratives 
on the subject: “given that for most contemporary readers the 
idea that a woman is either castrated, or that her clitoris is really 
an atrophied and inferior penis is unbelievable, then why, one 
could ask, does this ‘myth’ continue to play such a central role in 
psychoanalytic accounts of sexual difference and so-called sex-
ual perversions?” (Sullivan 2003, 181). Quite apart from a more 
careful working out of the relation between penis and phallus, 
we might answer the above question thus: because theorizing 
desire without lack is hard to do. Western philosophy has been 
re-writing the story of desire as lack for at least 2,500 years, and 
Freud re-positioned it into the realm of the domestic privileged 
by twentieth-century culture. Therein lies the power of psycho-
analytic narratives. Further, the perception of a gender binary 
in which masculine and feminine are opposed and complemen-
tary is so entrenched that it is prevalent in not only the “straight” 
world but in lesbian and gay cultures as well. Top versus bottom, 
butch versus femme, daddy versus twink, dom versus slave (see 
Hogan and Hudson 1999) are all iterations of this arrangement 
of gender and are often so normative that a person identified as 
one of these types may feel the need to write to advice columns 
for assurance that it is not pathological to be attracted to one of 




This does not mean, however, that no other stories have been 
told or that even the iconic stories may not be read differently. 
The literature of “courtly love,” for example, when viewed more 
broadly than the canonical texts with which Lacan was familiar 
(and this canon was itself of twentieth-century making), con-
tains a diversity of gender representations and desiring subjects. 
The troubadour lyrics themselves can be easily read as more 
about the masculine subject’s desire for other (masculine) men 
than they are about heterosexual eros, given the prevalence of 
the “senhal,” or dedication to another man, at the end of poems. 
When the poet Peire Vidal, for example, laments the pain of his 
love for the lady “Vierna,” he does so by addressing his fair lord 
(bel senher) Raymond V of Toulouse, who he nicknames “Cas-
tiat.” The poem’s conclusion, including the senhal “Vierna, I walk 
bright in loving you/ lacking only the sight of Castiat, my lord,” 
leaves open the question of who provides the poet greater “joy,” 
lady or lord or even perhaps the two together (Proenza 1978).
In her work, Queer/Early/Modern, Carla Freccero (2006) 
takes up precisely the task of reading the canonical love lyric 
differently. Using the example of Petrarch’s Canzioniere, a classic 
of Western poetry, she argues that the love lyric is shot through 
with “the trace of something queer,” noting that the poet’s de-
piction of his love for the inaccessible Laura actually portrays 
a relation of both desire for and identification with the beloved 
Lady. This collapsing of desire and identification is further ap-
parent in the love poems of the Renaissance writer Louise Labé, 
who “articulates the predicament of occupying both sides of the 
subject/object split but only one side of the sexual difference di-
vide.” (22) Labé’s desiring female subject is her own object, she 
receives the wound of love from her own projection/voicing of 
desire: “Those shafts of mine those same eyes of mine undid.” 
(23) Freccero reads this self-circling love as a demystification of 
“the blatant pretext” that the love lyric’s traditionally masculine 
subject addresses a feminine other when in fact he is the origin 
of both male lover and beloved Lady. 
We might describe this desire, though Freccero does not, as 
narcissistic. And, indeed, queer theorists are revisiting the con-
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cept of narcissism, from both within and without psychoana-
lytic paradigms (the myth of Narcissus far predates Freud). In 
his attempts to take up Michel Foucault’s challenge of theoriz-
ing “new ways of being together,” Leo Bersani (2001) returns to 
Plato’s Symposium, “the founding text of desire as lack” (359), to 
offer a different reading than the one I outline above. Arguing 
that “Socrates’ coercive move” against Agathon’s poetic speech is 
enabled by “a logical confusion that makes us glimpse the pos-
sibility of love, or desire, as including within itself its object” 
(360), he notes that the philosopher’s logic performs something 
different than it ostensibly describes. While Socrates’s argument 
is for desire as lack, the examples he uses actually suggest that: 
“Presence is always relational; desire would be the affective rec-
ognition of something like our debt to all those forms of being 
that relationally define and activate our being. Desire mobilizes 
correspondences of being” (361).
This understanding of desire as productive, rather than the 
result of negation, is further supported by Diotima’s teaching 
(as repeated by Socrates) that what desire wants is not a lack-
ing Ideal like Beauty or Goodness, but rather “reproduction in 
birth and beauty,” whereby the subject more or less becomes a 
channel for Beauty or Goodness by authoring/birthing beautiful 
things — art, poetry, and philosophy among them. Thus, Ber-
sani argues that the important thing about Platonic eros in the 
Symposium is its “replicative structure,” whereby the self both 
longs for and produces its copies. While this may sound like 
a re-valorization of biological reproduction (and the hetero-
sex needed for it), begetting children, which is associated with 
women, ranks rather low in Socrates/Diotima’s vision of desire 
as cultural project. Bersani argues that “the philosophical lesson 
of the fable is that we relate to difference by recognizing and 
longing for sameness. All love is, in a sense, homoerotic” (365). 
As per Socrates’s emphasis on beautiful discourses, the replica-
tive structures Bersani emphasizes largely occur in the domain 
of the aesthetic, and here we should recall the uncharacteristi-
cally literary form of the Symposium, with its frames, multiple 
and overlapping points of view, and interest in re-presenting 
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its characters for future generations. Indeed, we might wonder 
whether Agathon’s narcissistic paean to the God of Love might 
not, after all, be exactly what Diotima’s vision ultimately vali-
dates: an embodiment of Beauty (Agathon) desiring and creat-
ing a beautiful copy of itself in language. 
Of course, the endorsement of a model of eros based on 
narcissism raises some troubling ethical questions. To say that 
a loving relation must be based on a recognition of sameness 
outside of the self risks promoting a kind of affective clannish-
ness, and homosexual communities are hardly immune to an 
ethically dubious policing of the boundaries of the self-same, 
as Jasbir Puar (2007) has demonstrated in her recent work on 
“homonationalism.” Returning to the text of the Symposium, it 
is impossible not to note that its network of loving relations still 
extends only to the masculine citizenry of Athens. Foreigners, 
slaves, and women are pointedly excluded from the party. If, fol-
lowing Bersani’s reading, we do not see desire as originating in a 
ghastly, feminized lack, what we witness is instead the rendering 
of women as unnecessary for civilization, which can erotically 
reproduce itself in Beauty better without them. 
Both Bersani and Tim Dean have tried to confront narcis-
sism’s ethical dilemma by working on a concept of “impersonal 
narcissism.” While in his article on the Symposium, “Genital 
Chastity” (2001), Bersani dismisses psychoanalytic discourse as 
unhelpful in thinking about “new ways of being together,” he 
returns to a dialogue with psychoanalysis (via his co-author, 
the analyst Adam Phillips) in his more recent work, Intimacies 
(2008). There, Bersani and Phillips return to another Platonic 
text, Phaedrus, to suggest ways in which desire might have as its 
object a, its object cause, the recognition of one’s potential being 
in others. Such an expansive form of narcissism, which does not 
need to solidify the self as it is, but rather postulates new forms 
of being, would be non-appropriative, eschewing the acquisi-
tion or mastery of one’s object of desire. Working more firmly 
within psychoanalytic theory, specifically with Lacan’s version 
of it, Dean (2001) has also argued for “an ethics of sexuality that 
does not reduce Otherness to personhood or [sex] difference” 
92
queer theories
(128). Lacan places the subject’s navigation around the Other in 
the unconscious, Dean notes, arguing that doing so allows us to 
confront the Other’s “inhuman strangeness” in a venue that pre-
cedes gender. Thus Dean’s work in Beyond Sexuality attempts to 
envision a desire for the Other disentangled from object-choice 
or even personhood altogether.
Still, as Dean himself acknowledges, the conflation of the 
Other with the recognition of sex difference is hard to avoid in 
Lacanian theory (137), and, ultimately, it may be impossible or 
undesirable to use psychoanalysis to theorize female sexuality 
independently of masculine desire. In her work on lesbian de-
sire, Elizabeth Grosz (1995) comes to the same conclusion (via a 
critique of Teresa de Lauretis [1994]), and she suggests another 
tactic entirely for understanding the work of eros in same-sex 
relations. Grosz notes that de Lauretis’s thorough-going attempt 
to modify psychoanalytic theory to better account for lesbian 
desire still leaves intact its central postulate about desire as lack. 
Moreover, Grosz questions the ethics and politics of arriving at 
a unified theory of lesbian desire, one that leaves little room for 
the variety of relations clumped together under the term “les-
bian” or for historical and cultural specificity. Her response is to 
dispense with the ontology of desire. Drawing inspiration from 
the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and the “anti-Oedipal” 
theory of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Grosz writes: “I 
don’t want to discuss lesbian desire in terms of a psychical depth 
or interiority, in terms of a genesis, development or process of 
constitution, history, or etiology. I am much less interested in 
where lesbian desire comes from, how it emerges, and the way 
in which it develops, than where it is going, its possibilities, its 
future” (174).
Grosz’s approach, which privileges the analysis of “becom-
ing” over the understanding of “being,” does for desire what Ju-
dith Butler’s work (1990, 1993), with its argument that difference 
is “performative,” does for gender. It does not deny that persons 
come to adopt identities, or that gay and lesbian collectivities 
may need to embrace such identities for political reasons, but it 
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tries to decouple desire from identity in order to envision desire 
as productive rather than reactive. 
In looking at eros as essentially creative, Grosz’s work has 
continuities with Bersani’s. However, her eschewing of psychic 
interiority and focus on the desiring body is more explicit. She 
proposes we think about desire “as a mode of surface contact” 
in which bodily regions become covetous of the intensity and 
excitation of other, adjacent bodily regions. The erotic is a mani-
festation of an excessive materiality, of “libidinal zones [that are] 
continually in the process of being produced, renewed, trans-
formed, though experimentation, practices, innovations, the 
accidents or contingencies of life itself ” (199). This is not just 
an argument against the privileging of genital sexuality over the 
pleasures sought by other bodily locations. It is also a way of 
thinking about desire in which the body (which is not reducible 
to a singular body-image) comes first, leading the “self ” along 
with it as a current of “continuous excitation” constantly re-
makes it. Grosz portrays desire not as lack, but as an exuberant, 
expansive fullness in perpetual movement and transformation. 
One might well observe that Grosz, whose ostensible subject is 
lesbian desire, offers a model of eros without any specific ties to 
lesbian or even same-sex sexuality. By disaggregating the self in 
the focus on the shifting contact between bodily zones, Grosz 
portrays the operation of desire as having little to do with gen-
dered object-relations. But her aim is to offer not a diagnosis of 
same-sex desire so much as an account that can be of service to 
lesbians, among others, via its refusal to repeat and thereby au-
thorize a gender binary in which the feminine can only shadow 
the masculine.
Beyond Sobriety, a Queer Intoxication with Desire
We are drunk with love and intoxicated and cannot be still. 
— Jalal al-din Rumi, Lyric 141, 1968, 118
Socrates is the only participant in the symposium who remains 
sober. His nearly inhuman capacity to remain level-headed 
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amidst all sorts of chaos — Bacchic frenzies, war, political witch 
hunts — is legendary and attested to in the Symposium by his 
soused admirer Alcibiades. But the rest of the party’s members 
are drunk, very drunk. Their intoxicated movements around the 
couches at Agathon’s house, getting up to be close to new arriv-
als, shifting places as desiring relations must be re-negotiated 
(Who gets to be closer to Socrates? To Agathon? Where should 
Alcibiades go? Who should occupy the speaker’s place?) echo 
Grosz’s portrait of the repositioning of the body by the con-
tinuous productions of desire. The bodies at the symposium, 
in restless motion, are drunk with love. Socrates the sober one, 
however, does not want this. Responding to Agathon’s invita-
tion to share his seat, the philosopher sarcastically replies “How 
splendid it would be, Agathon, if wisdom could flow from the 
fuller to the emptier of us when we touch, like water, which 
flows through a piece of wool from a fuller cup to an emptier 
one. If wisdom is really like that, I regard it as a great privilege to 
share your couch” (1999, 7). Socrates does not want to be moved 
by those proximate to him; his remark distances himself from 
the amorous Agathon and insists that his desire, which is for 
wisdom, cannot just “flow” into the other, into the site of lack. 
There will be no easy equalization of subject and object. Sobri-
ety wants fixity; it wants boundaries; it wants to maintain the 
purity of the Truth. I mentioned earlier that we might perhaps 
think of Agathon’s narcissistic speech as an example of precisely 
the “giving birth in Beauty” that Socrates appears to endorse. 
But Socrates himself does not respond to it this way, because the 
speech, though beautiful, is not true; “I was so naïve, I thought 
you should tell the truth about the subject of the eulogy,” he 
carps. Party pooper. Asserting the truth, in contra-distinction 
from mere poetic eloquence, allows Socrates to dismiss Aga-
thon as intellectually inferior and to put everybody else in their 
proper place as well. 
What are the risks of tipsy perspectives on desire? I ask this, 
in part, because psychoanalysis itself is often given the role of po-
licing giddiness in queer theory. Even in the alternative-seeking 
work of Bersani and Grosz, Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
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with its emphasis on the original trauma of subjectivity (forced 
detachment, castration, loss of the Other), is hailed as a neces-
sary agent of sobriety (Grosz 1995, 242, n. 1). Bersani (2008), 
for his part, writes that the “greatness” of Lacanian theory “may 
lie in its insistence on a human destructiveness resistant to any 
therapeutic endeavors whatsoever” (60). Why is it so necessary 
to be sober, even pessimistic, when thinking about queer desire? 
Why is it “great” that we theorize aggression as inevitable for 
jouissance?
We return here to the ethics and politics of queer theory, and 
to Margrit Shildrick’s (2007) opinion that queer-as-critique (as 
opposed to queer-as-identity) can be depressingly “gloomy.” 
Shildrick herself ultimately finds Lacanian theory unsalvageable 
for theorizing the desire of “disabled” bodies, an affective col-
lectivity from whom queer theory has much to learn. Bersani 
and Grosz both caution against “Utopian” narratives, and the 
former argues that adherence to these allows us to overlook or 
even validate contemporary political atrocities. Perhaps it is just 
my perspective, here in West Virginia, with its endemic poverty, 
ravaged environment, and ingrained (but historically justified) 
mistrust of collective enterprise, but Utopian thinking hardly 
seems to be the greatest liability for counter-hegemonic politics. 
Frustration, depression, and inertia seem far more powerful ob-
stacles. So it is not surprising that I find Grosz and Bersani most 
inspiring when they are least sober. When Bersani writes about 
the pleasurable multiplication of potential selves in art or when 
Grosz’s own language for describing desire vaults from meta-
phor to metaphor, these writers make room for their reader’s 
experience of affect, an improper pleasure in the conversation 
about eros. The theoretical Truth about desire becomes contam-
inated with a little poetry. The philosopher is a little besotted 
with eros. 
A popular legend about Socrates’s philosophic predecessor, 
Thales, depicted the logician falling into a ditch, after being so 
taken up in the contemplation of philosophy that, not heeding 
where he is going, he bumbles and reels around, eventually top-
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pling over.2 Interestingly, Socrates applies the story of Thales to 
himself in the dialogue Theaetetus, stating “that same gibe [about 
Thales] will do for everyone who spends his life in philosophy.” 
(1973, 51) Rather than mere anti-intellectual mockery, then, this 
figuration of the reeling philosopher perhaps reveals the further 
implications of the Symposium’s associations between love, phi-
losophy, and intoxication. Socrates desires wisdom; to experi-
ence desire is to be drunk on love; therefore Socrates is drunk 
on love. Talking about eros is participating in eros, even if that 
talk aims at knowledge. So perhaps what “queer” theorization of 
desire needs is not to remain sober, or to retain the pessimism 
of Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, but to allow for ways in 
which the analyst, too, can be drunk on love rather than remain 
at a remove from the erotic object of analysis. How splendid it 
would be to rejoin the party, sitting at the side of beauty, among 
all the others.
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the Gash of Bliss
Kathryn Bond Stockton1
… that moment when my body pursues its own ideas — for 
my body does not have the same ideas I do […] I need to 
distinguish euphoria, fulfillment […] from shock, distur-
bance, even loss, which are proper to ecstasy, to bliss.
— Barthes 1975, 17, 19.
It is the same as for Saint Theresa — you only have to go and 
look at Bernini’s statue in Rome to understand immediately 
that she’s coming […]. And what is her jouissance, her com-
ing, from? It is clear that the essential testimony of the mystics 
is that they are experiencing it but know nothing about it.
— Lacan 1985, 147.
Jouissance is the strangest glistening, a dark glamour of rap-
ture and disruption. It shines and cuts and leaves its bearer not 
knowing what to make of herself — or her pleasure. She is left 
beside herself, feeling ecstatically severed from herself, seized 
by subtleties, strange to say, even though bliss is an overwhelm-
1 I gratefully acknowledge Stanford University Press and Duke University 
Press for kindly permitting me to draw some materials for this chapter from 
my books (2009, 2006, 1994).
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ing force. (“Spiritual joy,” says American Heritage; “paradise,” 
“seventh heaven,” “cloud nine,” adds Roget’s.) Bliss is a word for 
impossibilities, felt and grasped as such. Something (im)possible 
coursing through the body, bending the mind. Then, on a dime: 
rapid, luminous deteriorations.
If per chance it didn’t exist, queers would invent it. Along 
with irony, bliss is a quintessential queer accouterment. It’s he-
donistic and wedded to pain. It’s clearly buoyant, yet it is dark. 
It’s provocatively sexy, intimate, scandalous, and bodily, while 
it’s evasive of capture and speech. Beyond the reach of words, it’s 
both spiritual and material — spiritual materialist — a material-
ity that is ineffable and escapes norms. It’s the perversion every-
one shares, no one knows, and, with its shadows and ties to loss, 
society denies in favor of “pleasure.”
The psychoanalysis, then, that jibes with queer theory’s 
thought and brio — its scandalous eruptions — sees jouissance 
as a means of naming explosive, infinite, unsolvable desire 
(not the imagined serenity of plenitude), which requires us to 
reconceive relationships around such oddities as caressing lack, 
embracing shame, and flirting with the cutting force of beauty 
(Bernini’s Saint Theresa). Psychoanalysis, for this reason, ben-
efits from having bliss (as a concept) go on tour, swerve toward 
queer theoretical contemplations, which themselves have been 
shot through with psychoanalytical suggestions and perspec-
tives. When it comes to jouissance, one can’t always tell one body 
of thought from the other, as it happens. One can only say that if 
there are writings sacred to queer theoretical minds on the gash 
of bliss, they are Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text (1975), 
Georges Bataille’s Visions of Excess (1985), Leo Bersani’s “Is the 
Rectum a Grave?” (1987), Jacques Lacan’s Écrits (1977), and Luce 
Irigaray’s spectacular Speculum of the Other Woman (1985a) and 
its companion, This Sex Which is Not One (1985b).
And there are myriad texts momentarily capturing bliss in 
singular ways, queer aesthetic ways, conveying the shock and 
disturbance of joy that is bound up with unwilled insight. Bliss 
in the fiction of Jean Genet (1974) is a buggered sailor think-
ing for the first time he is a “faggot” and finding this “quite de-
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pressing thought” sending “up his spine [a] […] series of vibra-
tions which quickly spread out over the […] surface of his black 
shoulders and covered them with a shawl woven out of shivers” 
(88). Bliss in Charlotte Brontë (1979) is finding that one can’t kill 
desire, can’t make quiet violent longings; that even if you drove 
an iron stake through them, “they did not die but […] turn[ed] 
on the nail with a rebellious wrench”; “then did the temples 
bleed and the brain thrill to its core” (176). Bliss in Toni Morri-
son (1973) is liquid, hypnotic, and mysterious, tied to the climax 
a woman rides to thoughts of death, where sex becomes her way 
of feeling sorrow, hollowing a space in which she “leap[s] from 
the edge into soundlessness and [goes] down howling, howling 
in a stinging awareness of the endings of things” (123), which 
has communal, even political, value for her. Bliss as awareness? 
What can it know? That all ecstasy lies adrift in a sea of emotions 
that surrounds and colors it, joins with it, abrades it. Roland 
Barthes explores this drift. 
The Drift of Bliss
We are scientific because we lack subtlety […] (that the 
voice, that writing, be as fresh, supple, lubricated, deli-
cately granular and vibrant as an animal’s muzzle).
— Barthes 1975, 61, 67
To Barthes’s way of thinking, subtlety and vibrancy signal aware-
ness and emerge with bliss — which itself results from the in-
eluctable erotics of reading. Strange, you might think, that queer 
theory should so fetishize the thoughts of a writer describing 
how we read. But might the goal of psychoanalysis be to pro-
duce Barthes’s kind of reader, his anti-hero, who snubs the prat-
tle of logical consistency for the liquid subtleties, the flash force 
of dreams? 
Richard Howard’s (1975) foreword to The Pleasure of the Text 
(his set-up of Barthes as writer and reader) beats Barthes to 
noting the intrigue of words: the word jouissance, in particular, 
which makes “pleasure” inert and disappointing: 
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The French have a distinguishing advantage which Roland 
Barthes […] has exploited in his new book […]. In English, 
we have either the coarse or the clinical […] so that if we 
wish to speak of the kind of pleasure we take — the supreme 
pleasure, say, associated with sexuality at its most abrupt 
and ruthless pitch — we lack the terms acknowledged and 
allowed in polite French utterance; we lack jouissance and 
jouir, as Barthes uses them […]. The nomenclature of active 
pleasure fails us […]. The Bible […] calls it “knowing” while 
the Stuarts called it “dying,” the Victorians called it “spend-
ing,” and we call it “coming” […]. Roland Barthes, in any 
case, calls it jouissance. (v–vi) 
Indeed, this drift from “pleasure” to “bliss” (the translator’s term 
for Barthes’s jouissance) indicates queer theoretical values and 
investments. Awash in words, we read for bliss, for “pulsional 
incidents,” “language lined with flesh” (66), “the cohabitation 
of languages working side by side” (4), leading to a “layering 
of significance” (12). This tiered building of word upon word, 
to the point of bliss, culminates not in clarity or meaning in 
some sharp sense. At best, it senses subtleties — fine distinc-
tions, fleeting and slight, but no less alluring for their evasions. 
And, paradoxically, no less smiting or forceful for their fineness. 
No wonder Barthes terms this kind of layering — characteristic 
also of analysis? — a “vertical din” (12), “a sanctioned Babel” (4), 
productive of “the site of a loss” (7) because it makes use of the 
seams between one word and the other words needed to define 
it, making meaning a set of gaps, a blissful grasp of this set of 
seams (like those occurring between latent and manifest con-
tent in the work of dreams). 
Why bliss here? “Is not the most erotic portion of a body,” 
Barthes analogizes, “where a garment gapes?” (9). “It is inter-
mittence,” he submits, “as psychoanalysis has so rightly stated, 
which is erotic: the intermittence of skin flashing between two 
articles of clothing (trousers and sweater), between two edges 
(the open-necked shirt, the glove and the sleeve); it is this flash 
itself which seduces” (10). And so this flash-based-on-loss is 
105
jouissance
what we read for (“I am interested in language because it wounds 
or seduces me” [38]), and “it produces, in me,” says Barthes, “the 
best pleasure if it manages to make itself heard indirectly” (24). 
We read a text of bliss “the way a fly buzzes around a room: 
with sudden, deceptively decisive turns, fervent and futile” (31). 
Moreover, “you cannot speak ‘on’ such a text, you can only speak 
‘in’ it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterical-
ly affirm the void of bliss” (22). Jacques Lacan apparently agrees: 
“What one must bear in mind is that bliss is forbidden to the 
speaker, as such, or else that it cannot be spoken except between 
the lines” (quoted in Barthes, 21). 
Later, we’ll return to the bliss of speaking and relating in-
between and to the analysts, Lacan and his challenger, Luce Iri-
garay, who have queerly shaped it. But there’s a strand of queer 
jouissance that conveys forcefully the power of loss and the de-
pendence of bliss upon disruption — and destruction. This line 
of thought can be traced to Georges Bataille.
Bliss as Blast
Georges Bataille’s visions of excess are gnarled contemplations 
and gnostic provocations on the topics of violence and debase-
ment. Someone seen as perverse by surrealists, someone deemed 
an “excremental philosopher” by André Breton (the chief surre-
alist in the 1920s and 1930s when Bataille is writing; Breton 1969, 
184), and someone who writes a novel entitled W.C. (with its 
heroine Dirty), Bataille is known for attacking dignity.  There-
fore, his essays, with their cryptic titles — “Mouth” (1985[1930]), 
“The Solar Anus” (1985[1931]), “The Big Toe” (1985[1929]), “Rot-
ten Sun” (1985[1930]); with their crazed analogies — “an aban-
doned shoe, a rotten tooth, a snub nose, the cook spitting in the 
soup of his masters are to love what a battle flag is to nationality” 
(1985[1931], 6); with their yoking of physical explosions and po-
litical rebellions, comparing a volcano, which he deems an anus, 
to the “scandalous eruption” of erotic movements and of work-
ers fighting their masters; with Bataille’s fixation on a monkey’s 
bottom: those “filthy protuberances, dazzlingly colored excre-
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mental skulls, sometimes dappled, going from shocking pink to 
an extraordinarily horrible […] violet” (“The Jesuve” 1985[1970], 
75); with this kind of ferment, these essays seem removed from 
what we know as joy.
Or…not at all. In “The Big Toe,” Bataille (1985[1923]) reminds 
us of the ‘sacrilegious charm” (23), the dirty ecstasy, as it were, 
of touching something as revered as the queen’s foot: “Here one 
submits to a seduction radically opposed to that caused by light 
and ideal beauty; the two orders of seduction are often confused 
because a person constantly moves from one to the other, and 
[…] seduction is all the more acute when the movement is more 
brutal” (23; my emphasis). One specific rendering of this brutal, 
blissful movement is central to Bataille. It is a myth one often 
learns in childhood, largely in Anglo-American schooling. The 
myth of Icarus and his father, Daedalus. To craft their escape 
from the island of Crete, Daedalus designed for them feathery 
wings held together by wax. And though he warned his child 
not to fly too close to the sun, lest the sun melt the wax, Icarus, 
filled with the joy of flying, flew too close and fell from the sky. 
Presumably, we are told this myth about a youth, especially 
in our youth, so as to cultivate a sense of moderation. (Listen 
to your parents: don’t fly high). Predictably, Bataille, in Visions 
of Excess, sees a different point. In Bataille’s (1985[1930]) way of 
thinking, ideal joys are “rotten sun” (57). They contain the dou-
bleness of an elevation we blissfully seek (in Icarean flights) and 
the guarantee of a violent fall (courtesy of the ideal itself). As 
Bataille words it: “The myth of Icarus is particularly expressive 
from this point of view: it clearly splits the sun,” our most joyful 
and elevated concept, into “two — the one that was shining at 
the moment of Icarus’s elevation, and the one that melted the 
wax, causing failure and a screaming fall when Icarus got too 
close” (58). Human life, as Bataille conceives it, is about watch-
ing our flights fall to earth, dropping down in real time. Nothing 
is more violent than the gash of bliss.
Given his propensity to praise destructive flight, we are not 
surprised that, famously, Bataille ([1985]1933), in “The Notion 
of Expenditure,” speaks to what he calls “the insufficiency of the 
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principle of classical utility” (116), a principle he is unhappy to 
find upheld by Sigmund Freud. By “utility,” Bataille means the 
goal, which he doesn’t like at all, of taking one’s “pleasure” in 
“moderate form,” while one aims at the “acquisition,” “conser-
vation,” and “reproduction” of goods and life. And though this 
moderation forms the basis of the “struggle against [human] 
pain” (116), Bataille proceeds to say that “personal experience” 
proves the falseness of this view. “Human society,” Bataille goes 
on to claim, has “an interest in considerable losses, in catastro-
phes that, while conforming to well-defined needs, provoke tu-
multuous depressions, cries of dread, and, in the final analysis, 
a certain orgiastic state” (117; emphasis in original). Here, loss 
and orgasm are companion states. And perhaps thinking once 
again of Icarus, Bataille produces a father/son example: “the fa-
ther may provide the son with lodging, clothes, food, and, when 
absolutely necessary, a little harmless recreation”; “but the son 
does not even have the right to speak about what really gives 
him a fever”; “humanity recognizes the right to acquire, to con-
serve, and to consume rationally, but it excludes in principle 
nonproductive expenditure” (117; emphasis in original).
What, exactly, is this nonproductivity, this kind of “spending,” 
that Bataille embraces? Any outlay (Bataille in no way minds 
the word “wasting”) of money or energy or even life — outlays 
that (happily) do not serve production. These would be wast-
ings such as “luxury,” “mourning,” “competitive games,” “artistic 
productions,” and “perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from 
genital finality)” (118). For Bataille, the ultimate question thus 
becomes: who has this power to lose and destroy, ecstatically, 
defiantly? With undeniable Marxist strains running through his 
thoughts, Bataille scorns forms of “conspicuous consumption” 
(xvi). As his translator, Allan Stoekl, tells us: ‘“Conspicuous con-
sumption’ for Bataille is not a pernicious remnant of feudalism 
that must be replaced by total utility; instead, it is the perversion 
of man’s ‘need to destroy.’ The noble, and even more hypocriti-
cally the bourgeois, use this ‘destruction’ not to destroy com-
pletely, but simply to reaffirm their place in the hierarchy” (xvi). 
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What Bataille affirms as the blast of bliss is the wish to create so 
as to destroy — and to lose anyone who would lose loss. 
The Most Debased Bliss
Loss may plausibly tie to jouissance because one must descend 
from bliss eventually, even rapidly. And one “loses” oneself in 
joy, as is often said. But bliss as shame, emerging from debase-
ment, or constituting a joyful destruction? Are these views ex-
cessive? Bataille hopes they are. 
Leo Bersani, avowedly thinking through Bataille, writing out 
of the depths of theory in its psychoanalytic and deconstructive 
forms, and also out of the bowels of public animus against “ho-
mosexuals,” supremely embraces debasement in his essay “Is the 
Rectum a Grave?” To put it more specifically, Bersani embraces 
debased and debasing, violent joy. That is to say, the aim of his 
piece, from 1987, written during the height of AIDS for (white) 
gay men, appears to be two-fold. First, Bersani’s essay explores 
a malignant aversion to gay male sexuality — and thus he ex-
plores a shaming of gay men and their pleasures — in public dis-
course when he is writing. Second, he explores the debasement 
and violence that are fundamental to sexual pleasure, anyone’s 
pleasure-unto-climax, odd as that may seem. 
On the first score, Bersani explains that public discourse, 
with denigration as its purpose, closely associates gay men with 
women by associating gay men with anal penetration — and 
thus with feminine sexual passivity, since “to be […] penetrat-
ed,” even going back to the days of the Greeks, is presumably “to 
abdicate power” (212), according to Michel Foucault. More pre-
cisely, public discourse about gay men, in the 1980s’ age of AIDS, 
resembles public depictions of prostitutes in the nineteenth cen-
tury, conceiving of them as contaminated vessels of sexual dis-
ease and sexual pleasure, thus as the sign of “an unquenchable 
appetite for destruction” (211).
Rather than counter these prejudicial views, which make the 
rectum a literal grave, Bersani finds a more extraordinary aver-
sion — to sex itself — in this invective. And this aversion, this 
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unwillingness to embrace debasement, we might say, is some-
thing Bersani discovers in various kinds of thinkers, along the 
spectrum of homophobic moralists to radical theorists of sexu-
ality. Never mind the homophobes, the problem with the sexual-
ity theorists (from Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin 
to Michel Foucault — unlikely bedfellows, as he notes) is that 
they all seek “to alleviate” “the problem” of the passive role in sex 
as “demeaning” (though in quite different ways, to say the least). 
Bersani, by contrast, wants to affirm the so-called passive and 
therefore demeaning aspects of sex, to stop denying the “equally 
strong appeal of powerlessness […] in both men and women,” 
and to recognize the “self-debasement” fundamental to sexual 
“ecstasy” — what he deems a “jouissance of exploded limits […] 
the ecstatic suffering into which the human organism momen-
tarily plunges when it is ‘pressed’ beyond a certain threshold of 
endurance” (213; 217). In other words, the act of sexual pleasure 
(for either penetrator or penetrated — or, presumably, someone 
reaching climax by other means) is a “self-shattering,” “a kind 
of […] self-debasement,” “a radical disintegration and humili-
ation of the self,” in which “the sexual itself [is] the risk of self-
dismissal,” since “the self ” is psychically overwhelmed at climax 
(217). 
Bersani explains, drawing on both Bataille and a somewhat 
reluctant Freud: 
For there is finally, beyond the fantasies of bodily power 
and subordination […] a transgressing of that very polarity 
which, as Georges Bataille has proposed, may be the pro-
found sense of both certain mystical experiences and of hu-
man sexuality. In making this suggestion I’m also thinking 
of Freud’s somewhat reluctant speculation, especially in the 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, that sexual pleasure 
occurs whenever a certain threshold of intensity is reached, 
when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed 
by sensations or affective processes somehow “beyond” those 
connected with psychic organization. (217)
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This intriguing link between the mystical and the sexual will 
appear again in Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray — and appear 
full-blown, as opposed to Bersani’s quick and glancing mention 
of it. Here, that is, the sexual trumps the mystical as a point of 
focus. And “reluctant” Freud gets more attention than Bataille. 
What Bersani takes as Freud’s reluctance has to do with Freud’s 
frequent emphasis on the relational, genital, normative coupling 
of men and women: the “post-Oedipal, genitally centered de-
sire for someone of the opposite sex” (217). Against this Freud, 
Bersani posits a different Freud, a radical Freud, for whom the 
thing called jouissance, “sexual pleasure,” shatters the very self 
that would relate. Men, more than women, are apt to deny these 
effects of jouissance, according to Bersani, to misrecognize sexu-
al climax as self-inflating pleasure, as a “phallicizing of the ego,” 
though “neither sex has exclusive rights to the [mistaken] prac-
tice of sex as self-hyperbole” (218). And, most importantly, “it is 
perhaps primarily the degeneration of the sexual into a relation-
ship that condemns sexuality to becoming a struggle for power” 
(his emphasis). 
This explanation of sexual pleasure fascinates for a few key 
reasons. First, it makes climax — sexual bliss — a pleasurable de-
basement that is largely willingly pursued and widely practiced. 
Secondly, Bersani never clearly tells us whether this jouissance 
causes or simply reveals self-dismissal. I suspect he means the 
latter: that sex is a kind of intensification or a mode of revelation 
of an already-shattering self. Thirdly, because the self is shat-
tered, says Bersani, so, also, the supposed relationality or com-
munity of the couple (which depends upon selfhood) is undone. 
Sex, in this way, Bersani claims, keeps one free from the “vio-
lence” of relationships and so should be seen as an odd “ascetic” 
practice, a sexual instead of a religious self-denial (222) — and 
one that “male homosexuality,” in his view, helpfully “advertis-
es,” since “it never stops re-presenting the internalized phallic 
male as an infinitely loved object of sacrifice” (222).
But the measure of this sacrifice and of destruction remains 
elusive in both Bersani and Bataille, for all their talk of one’s 
destructions. How does one embrace their view of bliss and 
111
jouissance
still survive so as to live through loss? Can bliss amount to one’s 
close shave, grazing but missing full-on destruction so that one 
can continue to approach it? Might analysis help us to learn to 
shave our loss? Irigaray, writing against Lacan, envisions rela-
tions of blissful losing. 
Shaving Loss, Finding Bliss
Woman “touches herself ” all the time, and moreover no one 
can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of two 
lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already 
two — but not divisible into one(s) — that caress each other […] 
Woman derives pleasure from what is so near that she can-
not have it, nor have herself […] And she never ceases to look 
upon his nakedness […] upon the gashes in his virgin flesh.
— Irigaray 1985b, 24; 1985a, 31
Lacanian theory lies at the heart of much queer thought. Espe-
cially where desire and pleasure are conceptualized, Jacques La-
can’s analytic pronouncements are likely to be cited. With his se-
miotic grasp of Freud, stressing the role of signification over (or 
deeply entwined with) biology, and his emphasis on the uncon-
scious as that psychic structure that splits us (“I think of what 
I am where I do not think to think” [1977, 166]), Lacan lends 
lines of thought to queer thinkers who contest arguments based 
on naturalness, reproductive logic, or self-fulfillment through 
self-realization and romantic coupling. For queer theorists, sex 
is queer — riddling, elusive, excessive, and estranging — for any-
one, for everyone. 
Still, it may surprise us to learn that Lacan’s take on bliss is 
bound to mysticism (which is riddling, elusive, excessive…), as 
is that of his feminist critic, Luce Irigaray, who is an analyst, 
philosopher, and linguist, nurtured at the breast of Lacanian 
analysis before being jettisoned from Lacan’s school when her 
book was published. In fact, these analysts, Lacan and Irigaray, 
make a queer couple as they deem “the sexual relation” — La-
can’s phrase for hetero-coupling — lacking on the front of de-
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sire, strange to say. Stranger still, an unexpected, even peculiar 
image and metaphor of genital lips figures for Irigaray her own 
vision of sexual relations. This is a vision that turns the slit of 
loss — two lips touching because they are slit, because they can-
not fuse — into an erotics of fracture-as-bliss. To track these 
moves, we must enter into arguments between Lacan and Iri-
garay as they circle around two terms, “man” and “woman,” 
that many queers would now regard as absurdly blocky, even 
totalizing, in their absence of further and finer specifications, 
never mind blurrings and bleedings between them. Nonethe-
less, for each of them, Lacan and Irigaray, these two positions, 
as we might term them, are distinct orientations toward de-
sire. “Man” designates a drive toward fulfillment and satiating 
pleasure (as Bersani lamented). “Woman” is the word for an 
entrance into jouissance as a separation-from-oneself-unto-joy 
(“so near that she cannot have it, nor have herself ” [Irigaray 
1985b, 31]). In what looks like a lesbian tryst, Irigaray envisions 
a person positioned as a “woman” approaching another person 
so positioned, thus crafting erotic exchanges around the crack 
of desire between them. Whatever their given or even chosen 
“sex,” and whatever their play of genders might be (at the level of 
dress, mannerisms, sex acts), the crucial factor in this exchange 
is stance on loss. Do they make forms of incompletion (non-
possession, loneliness, separateness, sorrow, pain, debasement) 
and impossibility (non-knowledge, non-closure, non-fusion) 
central to their bliss and to their sexual nearness to each other? 
Do they caress desire-as-lack as the force shaping their sexual 
burn, as the very spacing that makes approach possible? Cru-
cially, jouissance arises in-between. 
Lacan to a great extent agrees. But you might not know 
it — Irigaray proceeds by decidedly not knowing it — given the 
tone he strikes on desire. Lacan’s tragic tone is now familiar. 
“The subject is split and the object is lost,” says Juliet Mitchell 
(1985, 25), recapping Lacan in a motto or maxim. Fracture and 
loss stand as twin pillars of Lacanian tragedy. They shade the in-
fant’s development from birth, when the subject who is sexed by 
the outside world is sent down the path of a split destiny, seeking 
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its lost “other half ” it will find only in the glaze of romance. Suit-
ed up in the armor of its “outsides” — the mirror image it mis-
takenly takes for its bodily identity, and the language by which 
it is gendered and ushered into culture — the subject, separated 
from its first beloved (the body that mothered it), seeks satisfac-
tion in substitutions, in a range of people and objects that might 
satisfy. Desire is the lack that propels the subject along the track 
of these substitutions, according to Lacan, never to arrive at a 
destination that solves its sense of “original misery” (Ragland-
Sullivan 1986, 22) 
Appropriating this sorrow for sex, Irigaray converts lack into 
loss-productive-of-bliss. As if healing the subject’s splits by ca-
ressing the slit between her lips, Irigaray nurtures self-parting 
for pleasure. As if disdaining Lacan’s tragic tone, contemptuous 
of his confidence that lack must spell tragedy, Irigaray cradles 
the lack that Lacan deems original misery. Irigaray, we may say, 
“shaves” his desire: approaches his lack to graze it in passing; 
makes small cuts at the surface of his theory; buys desire at re-
duced rates (against his law); eludes Lacan’s tragedy by a narrow 
margin.
For Lacan, the sexual relation is the lover’s dodge of desire, as 
I’ve stated, since this relation purports to solve it. Lacan strictly 
states that nothing will satisfy insatiable longing — especially 
not sex or love. Taunting those who would make sex suffice, La-
can (1985) broadly questions, “For what is love other than bang-
ing one’s head against a wall, since there is no sexual relation?” 
(170) Lacan insists that we cannot “disguise this gap” (81) with 
love’s fantasy of two-become-one, substituting finite objects for 
the infinite object of desire.
In “God and the Jouissance of The Woman” (1985), followed 
by “A Love Letter” (1985), Lacan ridicules “man’s” fantasy that 
makes “woman” be God for “man.” Seeking to give his lack the 
slip, “man” (em)beds in “woman” his Other: whatever escapes 
him about himself, whatever might stroke and hold his self-
truth, which he then thinks he confronts and conquers in the 
sexual relation. Seeking to rupture this kind of fantasy (“it is 
here that severance is still needed” [154]), Lacan must address 
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himself to “the good old God of all times” (140), whose face 
“woman” is required to wear. “God has not made his exit,” says 
Lacan, since “woman” is still made to bear his place, for “when 
one is a man, one sees in one’s partner what can serve, narcis-
sistically, to act as one’s own support” (154, 157). What “man” 
seems to finger in “woman,” what she is a “symptom” of, and 
why he tries to finesse what he feels with the “good old God,” 
is his own hole, his impossible conquest of a lost complement. 
It is the Symbolic — Lacan’s name for language, law, and cul-
ture — that poses this impassable barrier to completion, as if, by 
means of the cultural garments the Symbolic requires people to 
wear (indeed, by making them wear “man” and “woman”), they 
cannot get naked.
This far into his essay, Lacan plays his role as cynic, exposing 
what snares human subjects into fantasy. Rounding the bend of 
critique, however, he tumbles into the lap of the mystics. Star-
tling his reader by a sudden shift in tone, he now affirms the 
mystics’ caress of something along the lines of material opacity. 
The mystics suggest themselves to Lacan as those who “sense 
that there must be a jouissance which goes beyond,” for “that is 
what we call a mystic” (147). Beginning with a joke, Lacan slides 
into what unfolds as his serious appreciation of mysticism:
Naturally we ended up in Christianity by inventing a God 
such that it is he who comes! All the same there is a bit of a 
link when you read certain genuine people who might just 
happen to be women […] The mystical is by no means that 
which is not political. It is something serious, which a few 
people teach us about, and most often women or highly gift-
ed people like Saint John of the Cross — since, when you are 
male, you don’t have to put yourself on the side of [all]. You 
can also put yourself on the side of not-all. There are men 
who are just as good as women. It does happen. And who 
therefore feel just as good. Despite, I won’t say their phal-
lus, despite what encumbers them on that score, they get the 
idea, they sense that there must be a jouissance which goes 
beyond. That is what we call a mystic …It is the same as for 
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Saint Theresa — you only have to go and look at Bernini’s 
statue in Rome to understand immediately that she’s com-
ing, there is no doubt about it. And what is her jouissance, 
her coming from? It is clear that the essential testimony of 
the mystics is that they are experiencing it but know nothing 
about it. (146–47)
The mystics, male and female, lining up “on the side of not-all,” 
allow themselves to be shaken and split by a lack-turned-opac-
ity, obscure pleasure that refuses translucence. Lacan concludes 
with a joke that again returns him to God. Not the “good old 
God,” but a “God” who courts “woman’s” jouissance as “wom-
an’s” material complaint against her culturally-constructed, gen-
dered place in the so-called straight relation:
These mystical ejaculations are neither idle gossip nor mere 
verbiage, in fact they are the best thing you can read — note 
right at the bottom of the page, Add the Écrits of Jacques 
Lacan, which is of the same order. Given which, naturally you 
are all going to be convinced that I believe in God. I believe 
in the jouissance of the woman in so far as it is something 
more […] Might not this jouissance which one experiences 
and knows nothing of, be that which puts us on the path of 
ex-istence? And why not interpret one face of the Other, the 
God face, as supported by feminine jouissance? (147)
Lacan’s jocular gambit is clever. Men can be mystics and so can 
Jacques Lacan. His passage, however, exceeds his cleverness. 
Read generously, it may bespeak his desire to depart from phal-
locentrism and the binding anguish of its conventions. At the 
very least, Lacan seems eager not to be abandoned by “woman” 
and mystics who go (and come) beyond. Here is “woman,” then, 
“woman” along with her mystic partners, who are on her “side,” 
teaching men (and women, for that matter) to find bliss in lack. 
This is to read Jacques Lacan straight-faced, to grant him his 
“ejaculation” not his joke.
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As is her way, Irigaray (1985b) complains most against La-
can when she most follows him. Thus she makes her displeasure 
known at Lacan’s assigning pleasure to a statue: “In Rome? So 
far away? To look? At a statue? Of a saint? Sculpted by a man? 
What pleasure are we talking about? Whose pleasure? For where 
the pleasure of the Theresa in question is concerned, her own 
writings are perhaps more telling” (91). Along the axis of access, 
Irigaray splits from Lacan. She reads him straight-faced when 
he is joking, mocks him when she most repeats him. Irigaray 
generally castigates Lacan, as if he were a sly gynecologist: hand-
in-glove with “man’s” symbolic fantasies that Lacan would say 
require rupture. Lacan, says Irigaray, even “silences” (as if he has 
slipped his hands over) “woman’s” jouissance in the act of posing 
its “discovery.” Irigaray on Lacan on “woman”: “Pleasure with-
out pleasure: the shock of a remainder of ‘silent’ body-matter 
that shakes her at intervals, in the interstices, but of which she 
remains ignorant. ‘Saying’ nothing of this pleasure after all, thus 
not enjoying it” (96).
Though it might appear that Irigaray also rails against Lacan 
for assigning an opacity to “woman’s” bliss, she is really pro-
voked by something subtler: that he takes in stride the limit that 
he hits. Lacan is not shaken by his inability to locate “woman’s” 
active pleasure. There is no reason, no way, he would say, to pur-
sue this limit (a jouissance that goes beyond) beyond the limits 
of discourse as we know it. This impossible status of “woman” 
and “woman’s” bliss — the good news, something of her “es-
capes,” the bad news, “she” does not fully know it nor does “she” 
exist — provides the limit to Lacanian theory at the same time 
that it sketches a fix. In its role as limit, the concept of this jouis-
sance touches upon what Lacan calls the Real: the unapproach-
able, ungraspable, algebraic x. Since a difference in urgency 
cracks her congruence with Lacan, Irigaray urgently desires to 
pursue beyond the limit of not speaking — to listen to Theresa, 
her writings, her thoughts, even to conduct us to what we might 
feel beyond the fall of words.
Irigaray listens, ironically, by writing. She composes a mysti-
cal, critical, poetical essay, mimicking female mystic concerns 
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so as to reveal their analytic insights and her own conceptual 
schemes. Thus, in her lyrical “La Mysterique” she imagines “God” 
between “woman’s” lips, using the “God” term under erasure to 
mark the mystic’s lover. “God,” she writes, “knows women so 
well that he never touches them directly, but always in that fleet-
ing stealth of a fantasy that evades all representation: between 
two unities who thus imperceptibly take pleasure in each other” 
(1985a, 236). This declaration implies “God’s” touch between the 
autoerotic lips. Given that this touch is not direct but involves a 
“fleeting stealth,” and given that the lips only touch by means of 
a crucial apartness, “God,” by this logic, becomes spacing. “God” 
is the space between (two) lovers. “God” is the gap, at the gap, 
in the gap. “God” is also the gap of “woman’s” pleasure between 
the lips, “opening up a crack in the cave […] so that she may 
penetrate herself once more” (192).
Irigaray’s mystical interests, then, are strongly staked to lack: 
who wears it, who suffers for it, and who envisions economies 
based upon it. For Irigaray plays with jubilation upon the mys-
tic’s holiness, celebrating “God’s” holes that tell “woman” glori-
ous things about “her” own: 
And that one man, at least, has understood her so well that he 
died in the most awful suffering […] And she never ceases to 
look upon his nakedness, open for all to see, upon the gashes 
in his virgin flesh […] Could it be true that not every wound 
need remain secret, that not every laceration was shameful? 
Could a sore be holy? Ecstasy is there in that glorious slit 
where she curls up as if in her nest, where she rests as if she 
had found her home — and He is also in her […] In this way, 
you see me and I see you, finally I see myself seeing you in 
this fathomless wound which is the source of our wonder-
ing comprehension and exhilaration. And to know myself I 
scarcely need a “soul,” I have only to gaze upon the gaping 
space in your loving body. (199–200)
This is Irigaray making the Christian tradition give back what 
Christ on the cross has borrowed from “woman”: a “gaping 
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space” in the body worth gazing upon. “Woman’s” “slit,” here 
pronounced “glorious,” mirrors Christ’s “fathomless wound.” 
The wound itself acts as a mirror, enabling “woman” to reflect 
upon her folds. Irigaray takes on castration, then, to its most ex-
treme degree, complete with Freud’s fatal look upon nakedness 
that reveals the “shameful” “secret” of the “gaping space” — a se-
cret and a sacred lack that “woman” shares with Christ, reminis-
cent of the mystics’ stigmata that function as speaking wounds. 
Irigaray takes castration to the crypt, where she makes castra-
tion convert into autoerotic confessions. And “He” bleeds into 
“you” bleeds into “her” bleeds into “me.” 
We are back to Irigaray’s shaving of desire. Irigaray’s trick is to 
steal Lacan’s desire: she shaves it and thus puts a new face on it. 
The new face she puts on desire is bliss. The way she does this, as 
we have seen, is by focusing on an image of female genitalia. At 
the lips, that is, Irigaray figures a touch that constitutes a mirror-
ing touch: an identification that enjoys its own splitting, a failure 
to fuse that enjoys impossibility: “Thus, within herself, she is 
already two — but not divisible into one(s) — that caress each 
other” (1985b, 24). The mirrored images of genital lips recon-
ceptualize the mathematics of division. Clear accounts escape 
calculation, and all because of a division that does not divide 
clearly. If Lacan’s version of desire is a division and a lack — and 
one that “costs” the subject — then Irigaray shaves desire in that 
other sense of “shave” as well: “to lower (a price, etc.) by a slight 
margin”; “to purchase (a note, draft, etc.) at a discount greater 
than the legal or customary rate of interest.” Irigaray has cut the 
cost of desire against the Lacanian law of tragedy. Irigaray’s de-
sire, in this respect, is not a wholly other desire, but a different 
orientation to lack that makes desire its own kind of bliss. This 
desire, as Irigaray fashions it, is desire with a different valence 
and a different tension. It is a lacking that is a having. In this 
sense, this desire is jouissance — a restless pleasure that is not 
limited to a single object or a single organ. Perhaps, most im-
portantly, and quite differently than Bersani, Irigaray imagines 
this pleasuring (around the crack of desire) as a lacking shared 
between desiring bodies. By virtue of this move — a relocation 
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of lack and holes to the space between bodies — “woman” ceas-
es to be a lack or “hole-envelope”: “With you, I don’t have any 
[‘holes’]. We are not lacks, voids awaiting sustenance, plenitude, 
fulfillment from the other” (209). 
“God,” in Irigaray’s theories, plays a vital role in this regard. 
“God,” as we have seen, is figured as the material resistance of 
bodies to the cultural constructions that have barred their pleas-
ure. More daring yet, because Irigaray locates this material re-
sistance (this opacity) in “woman’s” hole (where she is said to 
lack), “God,” not “woman,” is a crack, a gap — the fracture we 
need for conceiving new pleasures. In this respect, “God” is the 
wound of our relations but also the only hope for the lack that, 
fracturing us, allows us to touch ourselves. 
But “God” is more than divine lack or an elegant figure for 
material opacities. In Irigaray’s rendering, “God” also figures 
the body of a lover who, while coming close to “woman,” nur-
tures the fracture that keeps “him” from possessing “her”: “Thus 
‘God’ will […] have been her best lover since he separates her 
from herself only by the space of her jouissance where she finds 
Him/herself. To infinity perhaps, but in the serenity of the spac-
ing that is thus projected by/in her pleasure” (1985a, 201). What 
looks like Irigaray’s vision of lovers reveals her potent fracture 
of dyads (mother/child, husband/wife, two genders, two lovers). 
Irigaray, I suggest, splinters dyads and their unities into excess 
when she slips “God,” and thus “infinity,” between one and two. 
Here the necessity of conceiving two mirrors dramatically ap-
pears. Positioned, culturally, as a mirror (specifically, familiarly, 
and largely to men), “woman,” when turned upon herself or her 
other, figures the turning of mirror upon mirror. Here, between 
mirrors, images are split from themselves to infinity. There are 
many bodies between these mirrors, in the gap of (her) desire. If 
she infinitely approaches her other, she comes nearer — as if she 
is always dividing the remaining distance between them — infi-
nitely approaching, never reaching, becoming asymptotitc (as-
ymptote: “tangent to a curve at infinity”). 
Sex, then, is fracture. Sex, understood as bodies at a brink, 
demands the attempt to keep closing the gap while nurturing 
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the lack. This contradiction, lying at the heart of sex, stimulates 
ill-conceived attempts to close the space that shapes its burn — a 
movement which, if two could perform it, would annihilate oth-
erness, make sex void. Irigaray’s erotics of fracture, conversely, 
counsels embrace of this space that makes the sexual relation 
(im)possible: “The sky isn’t up there: it’s between us” (1985b, 
213). She seeks to cure the sexual relation by putting divine ob-
stacles to it. She affirms the obstacle and deems it “God,” so that 
the obstacle is a fracture is a lover who spreads for “woman” 
“his” own gash.
Cleaving (to) the glassed surface of mirrors, Irigaray writes 
with incandescence a seemingly heterosexual embrace modeled 
on an erotics of fracture. For if Irigaray preserves “God” as “he,” 
she does so only by conceiving the pleasures of the sexual rela-
tion as a queer, lesbian-seeming, erotic, hetero–homo inflation 
soaked in loss: “Her” (auto)-eroticism swells to recognition by 
touching “his” body that mirrors “her” wounds:
Thus (re)assured of the complicity of this all-powerful part-
ner, they/she play(s) at courtship, kneeling in self-abase-
ment at one moment, adorning themselves with gold and 
diamonds the next, touching, smelling, listening, seeing, 
embrac(s)ing each other, devouring, penetrating, entering, 
consuming, melting each other. She is trusting as a dove, ar-
rogant as a queen, proud in her nakedness, bursting with the 
joy of such exchanges. Her divine companion never tires of 
praising her and encouraging her (auto)eroticism that has so 
miraculously been rediscovered. (1985a, 201–2)
Subtleties and vibrancy abound in this bliss. Who wouldn’t pre-
fer to desire this desire over the staid nature of pleasure? 
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Perversion and the Problem  
of Fluidity and Fixity
Lisa Downing
It is a commonplace to state that the problem of sexuality is cen-
tral to the endeavors of both psychoanalysis and queer theory. 
Whereas for psychoanalysis, traditionally at least, sexuality has 
an etiological status as the nexus of f/phantasies underlying an 
analysand’s symptoms and behaviors, for queer theorists, espe-
cially following Michel Foucault, sexuality is a constructed epis-
temological category that functions to normalize the behaviors 
and bodies of social subjects. In the former, it is a source of truth 
to be tapped; in the latter it is a pervasive and power-laden lie to 
be exposed. Whereas psychoanalysis relies on a developmental 
model of sexuality (Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein and so on) 
or a structural one (for example, Jacques Lacan), “queer” takes 
the theory of performativity as its explicatory model to account 
for the ways in which subjects learn to “do” their genders and 
sexualities. Moreover, the category of “perversion” has central 
import for theorizations of sexuality within both psychoanal-
ysis and queer theory. For clinical psychoanalysts, perversion 
is sexuality gone awry; the failure of the subject to attain adult 
genitality. For queer theorists, on the other hand, perversion 
may be construed as a defiant performance of excess that shows 
up the constructedness and arbitrariness of the category of the 
“normal,” and it is centrally implicated in queer’s rejection of 
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the meaning of identity in favor of the politics of practice. In 
what follows, however, I will focus on a pair of concepts that are 
central to both psychoanalytic and queer thinking on sexuality 
and its perverse forms — namely fixity and fluidity — in order 
to trouble certain orthodoxies within both bodies of thought. 
In this way, I will neither pathologize queer in the name of psy-
choanalysis, nor accuse psychoanalysis of reactionary politics in 
the name of queer. Rather I shall highlight — and challenge — a 
logic that is surprisingly shared by both systems. 
In particular, this will involve examining how the theory of 
performativity has been used to privilege the status of the idea 
of fluidity in queer studies. I shall critique this as a deficiency 
within the body of thought, after Brad Epps (2001) who has 
pointed out, in an essay that uses a concept borrowed from psy-
choanalysis to critique “queer,” that fluidity can be thought of as 
the “fetish” of queer theory. Privileging the ideal of fluidity leads 
to a concomitant stigmatization of the idea of fixity, establishing 
an unhelpful binary (fluidity or fixity) in a body of thought that 
usually attempts to deconstruct such dualities. The maintenance 
of this binary also perpetuates some of the most damning and 
pathologizing ideas that run through the history of knowledge 
about sexuality, featuring prominently in the very authority dis-
ciplines that queer exists to call into question — for example, 
sexology, some forms of psychoanalysis, and psychiatry. I argue 
that this imposes on queer thought a programmatic tyranny that 
runs counter to the epistemological and political aims of queer 
theory — in Michael Warner’s (1993) words, to “oppose […] the 
idea of normal behaviour” (xxvii). I want not only to show how 
this undesirable programmatic agenda works, but also to try to 
suggest some ways of overcoming this, of thinking outside of 
the paradigms that are becoming established. 
Performativity
It may be productive to begin by thinking about the concept 
of performativity and its specific meanings for, and function 
within, queer theory. The term “performativity” is associated 
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primarily with the work of English philosopher of language, J.L. 
Austin, whose How to Do Things with Words (published 1975, 
based on lectures given in the 1950s) influentially argued that 
some acts of language, called “speech acts,” do not simply de-
scribe things but rather do things. They are performatives. Ex-
amples Austin gives are: “I pronounce you man and wife” and “I 
name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,” These acts of speech alter 
something in the world — after the pronouncement, the couple 
is legally married, the ship officially named — so long as the con-
text is “appropriate” and the person doing the speaking is im-
bued with legitimacy. Austin writes: “in these examples it seems 
clear that to utter the sentence, in, of course, the appropriate 
circumstances, is not to describe […] it is to do it” (8).
The work of deconstructionist feminist and queer theorist 
Judith Butler has adapted, via Michel Foucault and Jacques Der-
rida, the idea of a “performative” in Austin’s sense, to describe 
the workings of both speech about sexuality and gender, and 
the workings of gender and sexuality themselves. In Excitable 
Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997), she looks at the 
function of hate speech as a type of performative, constitut-
ing subjects as injured parties. Terms such as “slut,” “cripple,” 
“queer” and so on, hurled as injurious insults, bear the “hey, 
you!” function of Althusserian interpellation — they construct 
specific types of social subjects from a position of oppressive 
authority. However, as a thinker interested in the flexibility of 
the power of resistance, Butler explores the capacity within po-
litical discourse for recuperative uses of hate speech — for what 
she calls “resignification.” The most obvious example of such 
resignification is “queer,” a homophobic slur turned radical po-
litical slogan during the 1980s AIDS crisis by groups such as ACT 
UP and Queer Nation. More recently, along the same lines, the 
academy has seen the adoption of the term “crip” by disability 
studies scholars such as Robert McRuer. For Butler, resignifica-
tion rather than repression or censorship are the most politically 
expedient responses to acts of hate speech.
Excitable Speech comes relatively late in Butler’s corpus. It 
is for Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 
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first published in 1990, and Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive 
Limits of “Sex” (1993) that she is perhaps best known, particu-
larly in queer theory circles. In these two books, and in her es-
says and lectures on gender and sex, Butler has argued that, like 
performative language, the gestures and roles of gender we per-
form daily are what constitute us as gendered subjects. Rather 
than reflecting a feminine or masculine essence, behavior that is 
encoded as masculine or feminine creates what Derrida would 
call a trace, the inscription into the social world of something 
that appears to have already been there, waiting to be represent-
ed. Gender is a series of citations that reinforce the impression 
of the natural pre-existence of a binary order of sex. In Gen-
der Trouble (1990), Butler writes: “the presumption of a binary 
gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation 
of gender to sex” (10). In good postmodernist mode, she seeks 
to dismantle this mimetic fallacy. If gender performances are 
imitations, then they are imitations for which there is no origi-
nal referent; citations that accrue meaning — and shore up their 
“truth” value — via the simple means of their being repeated ad 
infinitum. What they are definitely not for Butler are neutral, 
natural or inevitable extensions of biological or genetic facts 
about a person’s gender, sex and sexuality. They do not convey 
our subject positions, but rather construct them. Carefully dis-
sociating performance from performativity (a distinction that 
is often elided in postmodern criticism), Butler opines in an in-
terview from 1993: “It is important to distinguish performance 
from performativity: the former presumes a subject, but the lat-
ter contests the very notion of the subject” (Osborne and Segal 
1994, 36). In performativity then, the subject appears as the effect 
of the performance rather than the subject being a fixed agent 
who — consciously or otherwise — performs a given act. Or, as 
Butler (1990) puts it in Gender Trouble, “gender is always a do-
ing, but not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist 
the deed” (33). To put it another way, then, gender is certainly 
not ontology; but nor do we only “do” it. Rather, it “does” us. 
Crucially for Butler — and lending political weight to the 
assertion that gender is performative, since gender and for 
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that matter sexuality are a series of performances that habitu-
ally do us — we can turn around and do them back. When we 
understand that gender is a matter of doing rather than being, 
we can also transform the meaning of gender, by performing 
it self-consciously, playfully and with self-awareness — rather 
than unconsciously and in ways that shore up the idea that gen-
der emanates naturally from an essentially sexed subject. This 
conscious gender performativity is termed “drag.”1 However, the 
capacity of self-conscious gender performativity to transform 
meaning must not be understood via the idea of straightfor-
ward “choice” in the neo-liberal sense. Butler explains: “One of 
the interpretations that has been made of Gender Trouble is that 
there is no sex, there is only gender, and gender is performative. 
People then go on to think that if gender is performative it must 
be radically free […]. It is important to understand performa-
tivity — which is distinct from performance — through the 
more limited notion of resignification (subversive repetition)” 
(Osborne and Segal 1993, 32). This adoption of performativity 
theory for queer allows both for an analysis of the normalizing 
effects of regimes of knowledge about sex and gender and for a 
limited strategy of resistance. Using a model of power relations 
borrowed primarily from Foucault, in which power is a force 
field of relations surrounding us, and in which we are always 
implicated, rather than a uni-directional operation of oppres-
sive force from the top downwards, Butler demonstrates that 
gender performativity — literalized in her idea of “drag” — has 
1 “Drag” in Butler’s sense is any putting on of the gestures, clothing and ac-
cessories attributed to one or the other gender by a person of either — or 
any — sex. Thus, it constitutes the performance of femininity by a biologi-
cal, cisgendered woman as well as what would traditionally be thought of as 
“cross-dressing.” Re-defining drag in this way entails a rejection of the no-
tion that particular forms of gendered presentation correctly or inevitably 
“belong to” biologically binary sexed bodies. Understood in this light, drag 
also suggests the possibility for parodic repetitions of gender as the self-
conscious subversion of gender norms. See Butler 1999, 174–80.
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an inbuilt mechanism of resistance to normative meanings, by 
means of a parodic resignification.2
Although Butler has stated that she sees herself primarily as 
a feminist and a gender theorist, rather than as a queer theorist, 
her work has been constitutive within that field of thinking in 
the 1990s. One of Butler’s key contributions to queer theory is to 
shift the focus from sexuality (so prominent in the analyses of 
Foucault and in many post-Foucaldian theorists) onto gender. 
She makes the claim, echoed by other feminist queer theorists, 
such as Marie-Hélène Bourcier in France, that Foucault’s work 
—and much queer theory — sidelines questions of gender in 
its focus on the constructed nature of sexuality.3 Butler states: 
“insofar as some people in queer theory want to claim that the 
analysis of sexuality can be radically separated from the analysis 
of gender, I’m very much opposed to them” (32). While consid-
ering this an important point, I want to consider how Butler’s 
oft-discussed theory of gender performativity might intersect 
with the project of deconstructing both sexual identity catego-
ries and diagnoses of sexual abnormality, and how this move 
helps us get to grips with the role played by ideas of fluidity and 
2  In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault (1990) writes of power: “In short, it is a 
question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power which replaces the 
privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of pro-
hibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty 
with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein 
far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of domination are pro-
duced” (102). For more on Foucault’s notion of power, see Downing 2008, 
esp. 86–117.
3  Bourcier (2006) writes: “Foucault isn’t interested in undoing gender — or 
gender-fucking. That is to say in a political and parodic game with the signs 
of masculinity aiming to critique the sexual and social roles attributed to 
the masculine and the feminine. This avoidance of gender is, moreover, 
one of the problematic limits of Foucault’s thought. Everything happens 
as if, for him, there were only one gender — homoerotic masculinity” (my 
translation). [“Foucault ne s’intéresse pas à la dé-genrisation — ou gender 
fucking — c’est-à-dire à un jeu parodique et politique avec les signes de la 
masculinité, valant pour critique des rôles sexuels et sociaux impartis au 
masculin et au féminin. Cet évitement des genres est d’ailleurs l’une des 
limites problématiques de la pensée de Foucault. Tout se passe comme si, 
pour lui, il n’y avait qu’un genre, le masculin homoérotique …” (80–1)].
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fixity in relation to “perversion” and queer. Butler wishes pri-
marily to destabilize notions that the ways we perform gender 
reveal the truth of our sexual identity and/or orientation. (One 
thinks of historically ingrained clichés such as the lesbian who 
is inevitably butch in appearance or the effeminate man whose 
mannerisms reveal the secret of his homosexuality). Rather, for 
Butler (1993): “there are no direct expressive or causal links be-
tween sex, gender, gender presentation, sexual practice, fantasy 
and sexuality. None of these terms captures or determines the 
rest” (315). This idea of a series of interrelating, resignifying per-
formative lines running between gender and sexuality deliber-
ately highlights elements of play, fluidity and interchangeability 
at work in sexual behavior and sexual orientation. Butler’s use of 
performativity, then, as we have seen, relies on an implicit logic 
of fluidity — but not of choice — as its central tool of resistance. 
As Brad Epps (2001) argues in his psychoanalytically-in-
formed essay, “The Fetish of Fluidity,” to which I referred in the 
introductory section above, “Queer theory tends to place great 
stock in movement, especially when it is movement against, 
beyond, or away from rules and regulations, norms and con-
ventions, borders and limits.” He goes on to state that it “pre-
sents movement, fluid movement, as the liberational undoing 
of regulatory disciplinarity.” In short, “It makes fluidity a fetish” 
(413). While Butler — after Foucault — has cautioned against the 
association of fluidity with a too-simple idea of free will, and 
while both are, in fact, famously suspicious of the discourse 
of liberation that Epps rather unfairly ascribes to them, Butler 
nevertheless reinforces the idea that it is via a movement away 
from expected chains of signification towards motile ambiguity, 
that queer theory offers an alternative to normalization. Eve Ko-
sofsky Sedgwick (1993) echoes this idea of queer as perpetually 
and essentially in movement: “Queer is a continuing moment, 
movement, motive — recurrent, eddying, troublant. The word 
‘queer’ itself means ‘across’ — it comes from the Indo-European 
root — twerkw, which also yields the German quer (transverse), 
Latin torquere (to twist), English athwart” (xii; cited in Epps 
2001, 425). Brad Epps’s argument against the “fetish of fluidity” 
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in queer is that it ushers in a “degaying and delesbianising agen-
da” (417). The movement against identity in queer — its strategic 
non-identitarian agenda — does indeed risk (more than risk; it 
courts) this de-specification of sexual identity labels. And this 
has to be understood as a deliberate response to, and rejection 
of, the “specification of individuals” that Foucault (1990) de-
scribes in 1976 as an effect of the technologies of scientia sexu-
alis that began to name the “inverts” and “perverts” in the mid-
nineteenth century (42–43; italics in original). 
A parallel concern to Epps’s cry against the “degaying” of 
queer comes from feminist writer, Biddy Martin (1997). She 
worries about “defining queerness as mobile and fluid in rela-
tion to what then gets construed as stagnant and ensnaring, and 
as associated with a maternal, anachronistic, and putatively pu-
ritanical feminism” (110). Epps and Martin isolate as a problem 
of queer theory the very anti-identitarian energies which feed 
it. Indeed, queer texts often express concern that as soon as an 
identification is taken up, that identification stagnates into rec-
ognizable meaning. This idea is found in work of proto-queer 
thinker par excellence, Foucault. In an interview conducted in 
1982, which first appeared in 1984, for example, Foucault opined: 
“[T]he relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones 
of identity, rather, they must be relationships of differentiation, 
of creation, of innovation. To be the same is really boring. We 
must not exclude identity if people find their pleasure through 
this identity, but we must not think of this identity as an ethi-
cal universal rule” (2000, 166). In “Friendship as a Way of Life” 
(2000), he writes along the same lines: “another thing to distrust 
is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the 
problem of ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is the secret of my desire?’” 
(135). For Foucault, then, operating before the establishment of 
queer (if such a deliberately unstable body of thought as queer 
can be said to have been established), the temptation to see one’s 
sexual desire as the path to the secret of the truth of identity is 
a lie of modernity; one of the grand narratives of post-enlight-
enment scientific thinking about the subject. Seeing identity as 
a truth about the self was a trap, as it fixed one’s sense of self in 
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pre-existing — and often unsympathetic, pathologizing or de-
rogatory meanings. 
My own concern with the rejection of fixity in queer theory 
has much less to do with Epps’s and Martin’s worries about the 
potential loss of an identity label to rally around (whether gay, 
lesbian, bi, feminist, or whatever else it may be) that is entailed 
by a deconstructive, anti-identitarian epistemology. For, as But-
ler contends convincingly, there is no reason why one cannot 
provisionally rally around an identity that is threatened or at-
tacked, even while questioning the universality or singularity of 
the meaning of that label. She writes in “Imitation and Gender 
Insubordination” (1991): “This is not to say that I will not ap-
pear at political occasions under the sign of lesbian, but that I 
would like to have it permanently unclear what precisely that 
sign signifies” (308). Rather, my worry about queer’s rejection 
of fixity and embrace of fluidity directly concerns the question 
of what this means for the status of non-normative erotic prac-
tices or — to put it in Foucault’s (1990) language — “bodies and 
pleasures,” which he proposes as the utopian alternative to the 
psychoanalytic logic of “sex-desire” (157). Queer theory has al-
ways had an ambivalent relationship with what — in a different 
discourse — would be called the perversions or paraphilias, and 
it is in respect to these that the fetishization of fluidity and the 
scapegoating of fixity risk being most damning. In some ways, 
non-normative bodily practices (what I do), rather than identi-
ties (how I define myself in terms of gender or sexuality) and 
orientations (whom I desire; my sexual object choice), are the 
very stuff of queer, the launchpad for its non-normalizing ener-
getic trajectories that confound conservative discourses about 
sexuality as reproductive, productive, life-affirming, functional, 
and socially useful for maintaining the status quo.4 Foucault 
4 Such critiques of the (re)productive, utilitarian connotations of “sexuality” 
are found especially in those queer texts associated with the “anti-social” 
turn in queer theory. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death 
Drive (2004), which presents, using a Lacanian theoretical framework, an 
indictment of the ideology of “reproductive futurity” has been particularly 
influential in this regard. More recently, Tim Dean’s Unlimited Intimacy 
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chose largely not to talk about being a homosexual but rather 
to talk about the bodily practices and new forms of erotic rela-
tionality that he espied in subcultural communities, such as the 
San Francisco SM scene and which he harnessed as “the rallying 
point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality” 
(157). Other writers, however, such as Elizabeth Grosz (1994), 
have worried about the extent to which “perversions” should 
be included under the term “queer” since, she argues, it would 
be wrong to see — for example — heterosexual “sadists” benefit-
ing from the same depathologizing energies as lesbians and gay 
men — the “properly” oppressed (in a rather un-queer gesture of 
hierarchy-of-oppression-building).5 
Tim Dean’s Beyond Sexuality (2000), which attempts not 
only to write queer psychoanalytic theory, but to substantiate 
the claim that psychoanalysis is a queer theory, tries to move 
away from such binaristic — and covertly identitarian — ways 
of thinking about forms of desire that we see in Grosz. Here it 
is argued that within Lacanian theory, desire — that errant, dis-
sident, anarchic force — is always perverse rather than identi-
tarian. He stresses how, for Lacan, diversity is all: “there is no 
privileged sexual activity or erotic narrative to which we should 
all aspire, no viable sexual norm for everybody, because desire’s 
origins are multiple and its ambition no more specific than sat-
isfaction” (196). The aim of Dean’s work is to conceptualize an 
impersonal account of desire by marrying Lacan’s insistence 
(2009) considers “barebacking” subcultures and their practices of volun-
tary HIV transmission as an alternative model of queer kinship, “breeding” 
bugs rather than children. 
5 Grosz (1994) writes: “‘Queer’ is capable of accommodating and will no 
doubt provide a political rationale and coverage in the near future for many 
of the most blatant and extreme forms of heterosexual and patriarchal pow-
er games. They too are, in a certain sense, queer, persecuted, ostracized. 
Heterosexual sadists, pederasts, fetishists, pornographers, pimps, voyeurs, 
suffer from social sanctions: in a certain sense they too can be regarded 
as oppressed. But to claim an oppression of the order of lesbian and gay, 
women’s or racial oppression is to ignore the very real complicity and phal-
lic rewards of what might be called ‘deviant sexualities’ within patriarchal 
and heterocentric power relations” (154). 
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that in the unconscious there is no gender and no “proper” ob-
ject of desire, with the Foucauldian ambition to “shift beyond 
sexuality as the primary register in which we make sense of our-
selves” (88).
It is this enlarged sense of queer that Tamsin Spargo (1990) 
celebrates — in contradistinction to the worries expressed by 
Grosz — when she writes: 
[A]s Foucault’s history had shown, […] object choice had 
not always constituted the basis for an identity and, as many 
dissenting voices suggested, it was not inevitably the crucial 
factor in everyone’s perception of their sexuality. This model 
effectively made bisexuals seem to have a less secure or devel-
oped identity (rather as essentialist models of gender make 
transsexuals incomplete subjects), and excluded groups that 
defined their sexuality through activities and pleasures rath-
er than gender preferences, such as sadomasochists. (33–34)
Perverse bodily practices, then, seem to be close to the heart of 
queer’s concerns, yet — as I shall explain — they are one of the 
subjects it treats most problematically, often unwittingly imi-
tating rather than countering the language and terms in which 
perversion has been historically conceptualized in the discours-
es of sexology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. 
Perversion
Sexologists of the late-nineteenth century, most famously 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing whose Psychopathia sexualis of 1886 
is commonly seen as the bible of sexology, first posed the per-
versions — conditions of being responsive to non-normative 
stimuli or unusual sexual practices — as a social problem. Per-
verse sexuality was seen as the symptom of a morally corrupt 
state, in keeping with the sexually, ethnically, and nationalisti-
cally normative dominant discourse of the period: the threat of 
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degeneration.6 In the first of the “Three Essays on the Theory 
of Sexuality,” Freud (1905) “worked hard to de-couple perver-
sion from degeneration by introducing a developmental and 
unconscious model of sexuality.7 He argued that perversion was 
one outcome of a failed Oedipal resolution, not the symptom of 
inherited degeneracy or a corrupt environment. What is more, 
with his model of infantile sexuality, primary bisexuality, and 
polymorphous perversity, Freud argued that all of us, at some 
time in our lives have desired perversely, enabling queer theorist 
Jonathan Dollimore (1991) to quip that, for Freud, “one does not 
become a pervert, but remains one” (176). 
It is in this remaining that the trouble lurks from the point 
of view of the present argument. Freudian theory describes two 
models of perversion. First, it describes the free-floating, mul-
tivalent, polymorphous pleasure of infancy (that is lost forever 
after the trauma of Oedipus and the un-innocent “forgetting” 
of the latency period). Secondly, it describes adult perversion, 
defined according to the mechanism of what is, for Freud, the 
archetypical perversion of fetishism: namely, a mechanism of 
fixation. Freud comments that if we take as “perverse” any act 
that is not heterosexual intercourse — such as kissing, caressing 
and so on, then hardly anyone shall fail to avoid making an ad-
dition to their sexual life that may be called perverse. However, 
an adult is only to be clinically diagnosed as a pervert if their 
non-normative sexual practice is carried out to the exclusion 
of all others. In the first of his “Three Essays” he writes: “if […] 
a perversion has the characteristic of exclusiveness and fixa-
tion — then we shall usually be justified in regarding it as a path-
6 For more on Krafft-Ebing’s sexological method, see Oosterhuis 2000. For 
more on Degeneration theory, and its application to theories of sexed and 
racial bodies, see Pick 1989. For more on nineteenth-century sexology’s 
foundational contribution to “perversion theory,” see Bristow 1997, 1–61; 
Hekma 1991; Nobus 2006, 3–18. 
7 Even arch detractor of psychoanalytic method, Foucault (1990), acknowl-
edged that Freud, unlike the sexologists he came after, “rigorously opposed 
the political and institutional effects of the perversion-heredity-degenera-
tion system” (119).
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ological symptom” (161). The irony of the logic will not be lost 
on us: the quality of fixity is both the definition of the desired 
norm (the “healthy” adult pursues only heterosexual genital in-
tercourse rather than bisexual plural polymorphous pleasures) 
and yet it is also the definition of aberration (if the adult were to 
practice several perverse acts alongside genital intercourse — if 
he were to be more fluidly perverted — he would, for Freud, es-
cape pathologization). Let us bear in mind that fixity, then, ap-
pears to be the aim of both the normalizing social order that 
would fix adult sexuality in genitality and the single-minded 
pervert, whom we might call the most creative of Freud’s cast 
of characters by dint of his writing a more alluring alternative 
to the dull Oedipal “truth” of sexual difference.8 It is by bear-
ing this in mind that we begin to understand how the latter can 
have been collapsed onto the former, such that fixity appears as 
always already conservative and normative.
Most psychoanalytic thinkers and clinicians, following 
Freud’s own description and understanding of perversion in 
1905, draw a distinction between perverse elements of behavior 
or fantasy that may occur in any subject alongside more “nor-
mal” or socially acceptable sexual behaviors on the one hand, 
and a perverse structure, implying a sclerotic rigidity of psychi-
cal organization on the other. Authors of canonical studies of 
perversion, Robert Stoller and M. Masud R. Khan, writing in 
the 1970s, and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel in the 1980s, have ar-
gued, respectively, that elements of hatred, aggression and inti-
macy-inhibiting alienation underlie the fixated perverse struc-
ture, leading the “pervert” to find difficulty in many aspects of 
social life and relationship-formation, not only those directly 
associated with their sexual life. The “being” of “being a pervert” 
8 The idea that perversion is close to creativity and may be the foundation of 
political utopia is discussed in some works of psychoanalytically-informed 
theory, such as Whitebook 1995. Published clinical work, on the other hand, 
tends to be much less laudatory of perversion’s creative potential. One study, 
Chasseguet-Smirgel 1985 takes account of this idea, but still pathologizes 
perversion and perverts. For more on these two strands of psychoanalytic 
work on perversion, see Downing 2006, 149–63.
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in psychoanalytic ontology — or at least diagnostics — signifies 
beyond what is done by that person in bed and describes a ty-
pology of character, as much as of behavior. For Robert Stoller 
(1986), for example, the pervert is a deceptive, deluded figure, 
split against himself in his attempt to keep believing in the per-
verse script which he has written as a result of having “connived, 
pandered and dissimulated” (95). In classic psychoanalytic the-
ory, moreover, the pervert is inevitably male, given that perver-
sion in its archetypical form of fetishism can only be attained by 
a very particular male response to the Oedipus complex.9 It is 
against this mapping of both sexed and character-based essence 
onto practice that queer theory after Foucault has insisted on the 
importance of dissociating what I do from who I am. Right up to 
the present day, then, persistent practitioners of non-normative 
bodily practices are pathologized by psychoanalysts as suffering 
from broader mental disorders particularly, or uniquely, where 
they present as fixated upon those practices. Generalizations 
about personality are adduced from facts of sexual behavior. 
In contemporary Anglo-American sexology and psychiatry, 
the term “perversion” has been replaced by “paraphilia” (liter-
ally: that which lies alongside love) after a suggestion made by 
Wilhelm Stekel in 1909, with the rationale that the latter term is 
less judgmental than “perversion,” whose roots lie in religious 
moral discourse and which signifies a turning away from the 
“right” path. Moreover, the assumption that a paraphiliac will 
be of the male sex is not a given in the logic of this nosology. 
However, the notion that fixity defines perversion — or para-
philia — and determines what is unhealthy about it persists in 
the psychiatric model. The previous edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), asserts that “fantasies, behav-
iours, or objects are paraphiliac only when they […] are obliga-
9 Some psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically influenced cultural critics 
have challenged and nuanced the Freudian notion that the fetishist in par-
ticular and the pervert in general is always already male. See, for example, 
Kaplan 1991; Apter 1991. 
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tory” (DSM-iv-tr, 525), while the most recent edition, the DSM 
5, published in 2013, which introduces a distinction between 
“paraphilias” which may be “discerned” in clinical practice and 
“paraphilic disorders” which are to be “diagnosed” as mental 
disorders, describes paraphilias as a “persistent sexual interest 
other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory 
fondling with phenotypically normal, consenting adult human 
partners” (DSM 5th ed., 285).10 Thus, the notion that variety makes 
sexual behavior and identity acceptable is consistent in mental 
health discourse from the early-twentieth- to the twenty-first 
centuries. Worryingly, however, it is also — implicitly — a tenet 
of queer theory (even if psychoanalysis and psychiatry require 
that the “variety” include heterosexual penetration, while queer 
theory obviously does not). 
For example, queer theorist Moe Meyer (1994) defines queer 
as an “ontological challenge” to concepts of sexual subjectivity 
that are “unique, abiding and continuous,” favoring instead sex-
ualities that are “performative, improvisational, discontinuous” 
(2–3). This rhetorical privileging of discontinuity suggests that, 
for Meyer, those who are fixated in their practices are in thrall to 
a bourgeois and reactionary ideology of selfhood, to ontologi-
cal staleness. Even in Tim Dean’s (2000) ambitious work which 
valorizes perversion as the very stuff of dissident desire, the lan-
guage of fixity and exclusivity borrowed from medicine disturb-
ingly haunts the rhetoric: “the process of normalization itself 
is what is pathological, since normalization ‘fixes’ desire and 
generates the exclusiveness of sexual orientation as its symp-
tom” (237). It is the polymorphousness of infantile perversion 
persisting in the unformed, unconscious model of desire — not 
the adult’s fixated narrative of perversion — that is valorized by 
Dean here as being sexually radical. Thus, this bold attempt to 
write against the psychoanalytic orthodoxy (by pathologizing 
10 For a discussion of the ways in which the move from “paraphilia” to “para-
philic disorders” is not quite so radical a depathologization of non-norma-




the social imperative to reach hetero-genitality rather than by 
pathologizing perversion) risks taking the structure of fixity or 
“exclusiveness,” rather than the political content of the impera-
tive of compulsive heterosexuality, as the target of its attack. 
In a similar vein, Butler ascribes to any exclusive sexual prac-
tice the status of normativity: “It’s not just the norm of hetero-
sexuality that is tenuous. It’s all sexual norms. […] If you say ‘I 
can only desire x,’ what you have immediately done in render-
ing desire exclusively, is created a whole set of positions which 
are unthinkable from the standpoint of your identity” (Osborne 
and Segal 1994, 34). According to Butler, self-subversion is es-
sential for avoiding this identitarian trap, and it can be achieved 
by “occupying a position that you have just announced to be 
unthinkable” (34). Butler goes on: 
I think that crafting a sexual position, or reciting a sexual po-
sition, always involves becoming haunted by what’s excluded. 
And the more rigid the position, the greater the ghost, and 
the more threatening in some way. I don’t know if that’s a 
Foucauldian point. It’s probably a psychoanalytical point, but 
that’s not finally important to me. (34)
This logic — proposed by one of the most influential voices 
in “queer” — is indeed a Freudian point. It is the logic of pure 
Freudian pathological perversion. The archetypical pervert, the 
fetishist, is haunted by the loss of his belief in mother’s phal-
lus that he displaces onto his fetish object or act, and thereby 
gets to keep in another form: the high-heeled shoe; the shine 
on the nose and so on. Queer theory repeats wholesale here the 
psychoanalytic rhetoric which holds that the fixated perverse 
structure is inferior to more “discontinuous” forms of sexuality. 
As a theoretical prescription about how our desire should work, 
how we are supposed to conduct our bodily practices, and how 
we should construe the idea of “fixated singularity” philosophi-
cally — as always-already normalizing — this is itself a strikingly 
normative directive. 
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Moreover, it becomes a discourse in which the ghost of what 
it disavows — normalization — returns surreptitiously in the 
prescription to desire appropriately plurally, fluidly and openly. 
The embalmed object of fixity haunts the queer position behind 
the shiny fetish of fluidity that it promotes. It is extremely prob-
lematic that queer should ape epistemologically the model of 
disavowal (based on a logical rigidity) that it scapegoats in its 
rejection of the figure of fixity. For this suggests a residual fear 
of, and belief in, an origin, rather than a defiant demonstration 
of the lack of origin beneath our performativity. If “queer” and 
“crip” are recuperable labels, how strange that being “fixated”; a 
“pervert’” a “‘proper’ pervert” — enjoying the same bodily prac-
tice time and again, however queer that practise may be in its 
anti-heteronormative energies — should be seen to lie so entire-
ly beyond the pale. Queer theory would do well to harness its 
celebrated energies of motility and resignification in the service 
of re-inscribing fixated desire differently. This would be a more 
creative agenda than the construction, and reification through 
the repetition of discourse, of an unhelpful binary, which risks 
appearing as an archaic and originary truth: fixity is always a 
problem; fluidity is its “cure” (whether the antidote is political 
or clinical). 
Instead of constructing its own type of exemplary plural sub-
ject, performing the right number of appropriately dissident 
and different sexual practices, in the correctly plural and queer 
relationship configuration, then, queer theory might do better 
to concentrate on challenging the meaning of such paradigms. 
It would be in keeping with Warner’s description of queer as 
opposing “the idea of normal,” with which I began, if queer 
theory were carefully to avoid the tyranny of all prescriptions 
and norms. This would include an avoidance of imputing nor-
mativity to the repetition of the same in the sphere of sexual-
ity, where the same is a perverse practice enjoyed, not in the 
service of shoring up an identity, but simply in the service of 
enjoyment — useless, excessive enjoyment that is not recuper-
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able for its utilitarian value or its meaning.11 Radical theories of 
sexuality, then, might avoid echoing canonical psychoanalytic 
perspectives by giving up the commonplace assertion that fix-
ity is somehow pathological or inferior to plurality — that fixity 
“means” anything very specific at all — and work to legitimize 
both plurality and singularity, not in a dialectical configuration, 
but as infinitely equal and different. 
I hope to have shown that, while polemically valid and rhe-
torically empowering in places, the queer strategy of valorizing 
fluidity through its association with the transformative pow-
ers of performativity nevertheless falls into serious logical and 
ideological traps when applied to the problems and pleasures 
of perversion. I would go further and opine that a queer theory 
that does not embrace the energies of the “perverse” is missing a 
trick in failing to celebrate the “twistedness,” the “athwart-ness” 
of which perverts have long been accused and which, as Eve Ko-
sofsky Sedgwick has reminded us, are etymologically enshrined 
in the very notion of “queer” itself. Finally, I would suggest that 
psychoanalysts ask themselves whether historically ingrained 
orthodoxies about the meanings of fixated behavior are really 
11 The notion that sexuality has a “function” (reproduction) is an inheritance 
of biological (as well, arguably, of theological) discourses that influenced 
nineteenth-century sexological and medical accounts of perversion. The 
idea that the human sex instinct is identical with an instinct for repro-
duction can be found in the work of Pierre Cabanis (1757–1808) and Paul 
Moreau de Tours (1844–1908), as well as in Krafft-Ebing’s famous Psycho-
pathia sexualis. See Nobus 2006, 6; Davidson 2001). The understanding of 
sexual desire as identical with the desire for reproduction is a logic that 
underpins the history of modern scientific thinking about sexuality. Queer’s 
attempts to render sexuality as doing something other than serving a utili-
tarian biological and social aim are in direct response to such discourses. 
Foucault and Lacan, as Tim Dean has shown in Beyond Sexuality (2000), 
both characterize desire as useless, as refusing to serve the aims of the social 
imperative. Another important twentieth-century philosophical name in 
this debate is Georges Bataille, whose notion of sexuality as a limit-expe-
rience — as allied to death and dissolution rather than life, selfhood and 
continuity — has been underused by critics of utilitarian ideas of sex since 
Foucault’s essay of 1963. This is regrettable as he is, in many ways, a natural 
ally to queer agendas. See Bataille 1962; Foucault 2000. 
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capable of accounting for the multiplicity of types of fixation 
that clinical practice yields, and — even more urgently — what 
investments are really at stake in making a symptom out of a 
pleasure. 
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5 | ethics
out of Line, on hold:  
D.W. Winnicott’s Queer Sensibilities
Michael Snediker1
Ethics beyond Reciprocity
This chapter situates its discussion of ethics in the work of the 
mid-twentieth century British psychoanalyst, D.W. Winni-
cott. Winnicott’s theorization of transitional objects and good-
enough mothers has inspired the scholarship of thinkers such 
as Mary Jacobus (2005) and Adam Phillips (1989); at the same 
time, Winnicott’s output figures, in Deleuzian terms, as a minor 
literature in the larger psychoanalytic landscape. The sympatico 
of Winnicott’s work with many recent queer-theoretical investi-
gations of intersubjectivity alone necessitates our continued re-
appraisal of what he may teach us. Unlike that of Jacques Lacan, 
who devoted a seminar to the ethics of psychoanalysis, Winni-
1 I wrote most of this essay five years ago or so. Life is full of entropy (even 
without the bedragglement of degenerative chronic pain) and had there 
been world enough and time, I would have revised it from start to finish. As 
it stands, however, the present version is a testimony to an earlier moment 
in my thinking. I accept responsibility for its faults (including its penchant 
for over-writing) and only hope my decision to publish it, as is, is more use-
ful than not. For a revision of these pages, see my forthcoming book, Con-




cott’s contribution to psychoanalytic ethics must be trawled in 
pieces, and culled without prior sense of what that ethics might 
eventually resemble. In this sense, the very practice of returning 
to Winnicott resembles the non-paranoid reading position of 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, a queer theorist who taught, more than 
anyone I can think of, the inseparability of ethics from the sur-
prise of not knowing in advance where desire might converge 
with rigor, gauziness, creativity, and or delight. To read Win-
nicott alongside Sedgwick is to aspire toward for an ethics freed 
from the normatively non-contingent, but no less predicated on 
the contingencies of availing dislocation.
“Let us treat the men and women well; treat them as if they 
were real; perhaps they are” (Emerson 1983, 479). Ralph Em-
erson’s exhortation surfaces near the mid-point of his essay, 
“Experience,” a sustained meditation on the grief of not only 
having lost his son to scarlet fever, two years prior, but of what 
he describes as the grief that he cannot grieve. Emerson’s for-
mulation laconically introduces some of the terms that inform 
my understanding of ethics as it bears on queer theory’s rela-
tion to psychoanalysis. In its echo of analogously stated scenes 
of exhortation in the poems of Catullus and Herbert, the wishful 
élan of the opening two-word rejoinder illuminates one’s wish 
for ethics to provide some version of clearing, of collectivity 
capable of moving between thought and action. Not unrelated, 
ethics takes as its object less the fact of relation than some rela-
tional hypothesis of care: not only how we ought to treat each 
other but how we might. The temporally indefinite processes of 
analytic treatment take as foundational that our “actual” — con-
stative, physical, etc. — position in the world is at best a small 
percentage of all the equally incontrovertible forces by which we 
are constituted: contra conventional (e.g., non-psychoanalytic) 
standards, these latter, psychoanalysis has shown, are often one’s 
most resistant, least remediable elements. A person’s realness, by 
Emerson’s formulation, isn’t what justifies or necessitates one’s 
care for them. The latter arises in the generative, literally creative 
space between what could be real and what “is.” We find here a 
productive syncope between ethical treatment and the latter’s 
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implicit ontological grounds. That the former might arise in the 
temporary suspension rather than demand of the actual opens 
onto queer theory’s own pre-occupations with the question 
rather than fact of the real as it might open onto rather than op-
pose the unreal, and by extension, the ways in which the literal-
ness of our selves (our lives and their relations, centrifugal and 
centripetal alike) opens onto rather than opposes the figurative.
How have we moved so quickly from ethics to this notion 
of the figurative? For one, I think of the incessantly indetermi-
nate relation between analogy and simile, and the ways that the 
action if not being of both categories explicitly depends on a 
precipice or imaginative leap internal to each. The leap — the 
willingness of what it is to recognize itself (if only reductively) 
in what isn’t as a capacity for hypothesized being — lodges in 
the little auxiliary idiom of “as if.” To return our attention to 
Emerson, however, it’s not that creative believing is in service or 
otherwise subordinate to fact, but that the inhabiting of possi-
bility suggests an indefinite, un-ending end in itself. Somewhat 
differently put (and in ways both informed and illuminated by 
Winnicott and Sedgwick alike), the queer psychoanalytic ethics 
imagined in these pages takes as its own point of departure that 
believing in something isn’t inferior or prior to the fact of it, 
but a form of being unto itself: unwavering, as though we might 
treat the men and women well in a perhaps whose virtue lies in 
its ultimate non-equivalence to its nominal object.
The difference, then, between a belief and a fact wouldn’t only 
be that one is whereas the other might be, or even that one exists 
in the orbit of abstraction whereas the other exists as a thing in 
the world, but that one is still becoming or, more simply, is be-
coming. When I call this becoming figurative, I therefore wish 
to invoke figurative as an affective, and affectively vital, motion. 
To be figurative is not only not to be less real but maybe, more 
so. This account of queer theory’s resistance to the facticity of 
being isn’t meant to displace earlier accounts of queer theory’s 
differently calibrated identitarian investments, or the fact if not 
of bodies or gender than that of the realness of desire itself. For 
one, I think of the flexible spaciousness of the former in many 
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ways as a quiescence of displacement as such; and in this re-
gard, I understand the queer modality of possibility (“perhaps”) 
along the lines of Roland Barthes’s meditation on the Neutral, a 
porous category of resistance (such as it’s possible) to resistance 
qua resistance. At least among more recent generations of queer 
persons in certain cosmopolitan spaces, we’ve come a long-ish 
way since the euphemistic language of gays interpellated less in 
terms of their lives than their lifestyles. At the same time, this 
leaning of “life” into “style” anticipates some of the ways that 
queer theory explores living as it opens onto what Foucault 
(1997), in “On the Genealogy of Ethics: A Work in Progress,” 
calls “an esthetics of existence.” Such a project is inseparable 
from the ways both homosexual persons and acts — “acts,” a eu-
phemism to which we shall return, as we further consider the 
impactions and instabilities of action qua category — have until 
recently (and as often, to this day) been subject to omission, de-
grees of censorship, compunctions of translation and mistrans-
lation. In this respect, a certain strain of queer ethics begins not 
in the fact but the belief that the survival of such failed efforts 
at performative extermination depends first on a commitment 
to the unmistakeable life of persons so unremittingly denied the 
rights of the living. This is to say that queer theory’s contribu-
tion to ethical thinking involves an expansion of the vocabu-
lary by which we locate and articulate queer phenomena as real, 
visible, conversible. Counterveiling such an enterprise has been 
queer theory’s wish to differently reclaim the slippery potency 
of queer volatility, and in so doing, complicate any person’s wish 
to seem real. 
It bears reminding that there is no more a single, monolithic 
queer theory than there is a monolithic psychoanalysis; queer 
theory, as a moniker for a constellation of disparate thinking, 
invariably only sometimes barely does justice to the important 
self-contradictions and auto-corrections it contains. Still, queer 
theory, as cultivated, taught, and practiced for the past decades, 
is remarkable for its simultaneous claims toward realness and a 
politically informed wariness of it. The wariness arises from a 
suspicion of realness as inextricable from ideological pulsions 
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that will always jettison some form of personness as its sacrifice. 
For instance, in the work of Lee Edelman (2004), the dubious-
ness of realness blooms into suspicion of a desire for realness: 
“a refusal — the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes 
queer theory — of every substantialization of identity, which is 
always oppositionally defined” (4). Ethics, for Edelman, requires 
the eschewal of humanness as we know it, an uncompromising 
accession to the inhuman, which Edelman aligns with Lacan’s 
account of the death drive: “the death drive refuses identity or 
the absolute privilege of any goal” (22). Set alongside an under-
standing of ethics as a care for “substantialization[s],” Edelman’s 
work puts us in a bind of either/or. Either we avow identity, or 
we disavow it. This present chapter wishes differently to think 
about ethics in terms of the equivocation between avowal and 
disavowal; even as equivocation, for my purposes, mischar-
acterizes an interpersonal regimen that more precisely renar-
rates the relation between ethical and aesthetic contemplation. 
Aesthetic vitality, here, resonates with what the queer theorist, 
Judith Butler (2005), has described as “an experiment in living 
otherwise”: “What might it mean to undergo violation, to insist 
upon not resolving grief and staunching vulnerability too quick-
ly through a turn to violence, and to practice, as an experiment 
in living otherwise, nonviolence in an emphatically nonrecipro-
cal response? What would it mean, in the face of violence, to 
refuse to return it?” (100).
Catherine Mills (2007) challenges Butler’s aspiration toward 
such an ethics of non-violence in part because a passage such as 
the above “stands in tension, if not contradiction, with other as-
pects of her theorization of normativity and subjectivity” (134). 
Succinctly, even reductively, Mills calls attention to queer theo-
ry’s own earlier and extant understanding of itself not only as a 
kind of violence, but as a certain necessary response to violence. 
What Mills in part wishes, reductively speaking, is for Butler’s 
ethics not so quickly to give up on an Edelmanian aggressivity 
willing to eschew even antagonism (the returning of violence) 
for a sedulous white noise extrinsic to a normativity dictating 
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from outset the terms not just of its own call but of our limited 
sense of responses to it.
Can ethics be separated from norms, and can norms be sepa-
rated from the latter’s withering repertoire of abusiveness? In 
the words of a magic 8 ball, answers would seem to point to “no,” 
to the extent to which our psychoanalytic or queer-theoretical 
purview is a Lacanian one. If ethical choreography is a feat of 
the Symbolic, then it goes nearly without saying a constitutive 
normative violence, as Mills writes, would be irreducible (155). 
An ethical turn to D.W. Winnicott, on the other hand, salutar-
ily moves us from the grounds of the inexorable to a stage of 
improvisation no less instructive for its extemporaneousness. If 
ethics for some time has subsisted on a sense (earned or oth-
erwise) of what it is or is not doing, Winnicottian ethics might 
well inhabit the space of not knowing if one is being or not, act-
ing or not — of non-anxiogenically not knowing, and learning 
to undo the sequestering spaces of ontology and action. 
Ethics beyond Action
Queer theory, like psychoanalysis, optimally illuminates the 
modes in which we relate to other persons and ourselves. Nei-
ther field ultimately is able or willing to describe any given mo-
dality in advance as erotic or non-erotic, as kind or unkind. The 
difficulties of legibility, for psychoanalysis, arise most saliently 
in the intractable and wily “fact” of an unconscious. The difficul-
ties of legibility, in queer theory, sometimes arise in the wiliness 
of an unconscious (to the extent that so much of queer theory, 
including the work of Leo Bersani (1986), Judith Butler (1997, 
1999, 2002, 2005), Tim Dean (2000), and others is indebted to 
psychoanalytic thinking), and sometimes in the wiliness of ide-
ology — an apparatus, through dramas of internalization, itself 
only sometimes distinguishable from the Symbolic, itself only 
sometimes distinguishable from an unconscious. Queer theory, 
like psychoanalysis, optimally affords new vocabularies for ru-
minating instabilities of affect and epistemology as feeling and 
thinking negotiate and jostle the ossifications and eidolons by 
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which they’ve been displaced. I betray my own thinking’s insta-
bilities, here, in conjuring a sort of psychoanalytic macaronic 
to which practitioners of a given school rightfully might balk. 
Ditto a queer-theoretical macaronic that potentially whiplash-
es from the hyperbolic to the synecdochal. The investigation 
at hand lays out these fields as such for the sake of a terrain’s 
outlines, but my own argument will hew to a vocabulary in-
creasingly less promiscuous. For instance, I admit great inter-
est — as a reader of both queer theory and psychoanalysis — in 
those moments when it seems unclear as to whether sex is a 
literalization of a certain acuity of interpersonal joy and travail, 
or a metaphor for differently recognizable and unrecognizable 
modes of joy and travail. As both literalization of relation and 
figure for it, sex potentially rewrites ethical pause not merely 
as a question of getting fucked or fucked over (or conversely, a 
wish to fuck with others), but more specifically as a question of 
how one crosses metaphorical and literal lines. Winnicott seems 
especially luminous in helping us to think about ethics in terms 
of linear surprise and conundra. 
Sex, at its most banal, imputes the possibility of being one 
with another. Sex, on a differently banal register, assumes an 
anonymous aggressivity played out between bodies. But if sex 
is both literalization and metaphoricity, where elsewhere might 
considerations of interpersonality lead? In terms of queer-the-
oretical ethics, the dangerousness of sex — as either Freudian 
aggressivity or Lacanian jouissance — arises in the drama of in-
ternalization, by which we become our own worst nightmare 
which we act out on others. If subjectivity is read, following 
Michel Foucault and Leo Bersani, as the fruition of normativity, 
then subjectivity is the problem that sex brings to a head, and 
which sex has the potential to dismantle (Bersani 1986; Foucault 
1997). This is to say that one of the ways ethics surfaces in queer 
theory is in the problematic of being a person but not wanting to 
be a person. Abdication of a subjectivity to which one is more or 
less is attached. What follows doesn’t extend a counterargument 
so much as ask what is differently queer in interpersonality: all 
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the more so, when an ensuing ethics honors the difficulty, in 
Winnicott, of that prefixial “inter.”
It behooves us to begin with Jacques Lacan, before Winnicott, 
for several reasons. For one, Lacan has written more on ethics, 
titularly speaking, than most psychoanalysts. Second, Lacan not 
only has energized much queer theory, but in many ways has 
provided the grounds from which to distinguish queer theory 
from queer studies. If the latter takes seriously the sympathetic 
responsibility of reading the empirical, the former presumes the 
hermeneutic difficulty of approaching the empirical. Hence La-
can’s subtle distinction between action and the measure of ac-
tion: if action is presumed as lost to the immanent thresholds of 
the signified, we might well less compunctiously trust our grasp 
of action’s measurement, belated signifier of action, but at least 
in belatedness less of a mirage. To begin, that is, with Lacan, is 
perhaps to wish for a different beginning, which we might then 
find in Winnicott. Even as ethics, more generally, might de-
scribe the wish for both different beginnings and different ends.
Jacques Lacan (1992) writes, “If there is an ethics of psychoa-
nalysis — the question is an open one — it is to the extent that 
analysis in some way or other, no matter how minimally, offers 
something that is presented as a measure of our action — or at 
least it claims to” (311). Following Lacan’s reservations, we might 
well consider what this “something” is, or how this “something” 
is offered, how it is presented. The measurement of action — of 
the ways in which a person participates in or withdraws from 
the world — presumes, as Lacan nearly implies, that action it-
self might be intelligible enough for calibration if not valuation. 
While ethical involvement presumes some degree of purposive 
vocation, it remains unclear in Lacan’s treatment of ethics how 
we might know action when we see it, or when we ourselves are 
acting. Already we find ourselves in the vicinity of ethical the-
atrics, as action slips despite itself into acting, which slips into 
the form of action without necessarily its consequence (even as 
ethics would conventionally insist on some assertion of conse-
quentiality). 
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As queer theorists, including Judith Butler (2002) and Lee 
Edelman (2004, 102–11), have noted, Lacan’s figure for psycho-
analytic courage is Antigone, who — unlike Oedipus, who acts 
on misprision — acts in principle. In terms of ethics as it relates 
and does not relate to theatrics, it’s worth noting that Lacan turns 
to a Sophocles character, turns inaugurally to theater. This is a 
move differently made by Winnicott, although as we shall see, 
when Winnicott turns to the theatrics of tragedy, he acknowl-
edges the medium, the apparatus of genre, rather than eliding 
distinctions between persons and characters. This is an elision 
made by Lacan, which we need not, reading Lacan, repeat. Anti-
gone, as figure, arises for Lacan and others as an instantiation of 
a theory — of her own theory — as much as she enables theories 
(of activism, feminism, kinship, politics) that follow. Needless to 
say, to speak of instantiations of figures too quickly glosses the 
“measure” of this instantiation, not to mention the theoretically 
vast (and ethically fecund) differences between being a charac-
ter and being a person. 
Ethics, following the example of Antigone, traces a circular 
movement from theory to action and back again. In the circu-
larity, the distinctions blur not only between thinking and do-
ing, but between activity, passivity, being, and feeling. Perhaps 
this blur in part explains why Lacan speaks of the measure-
ment of action rather than of action qua action. Returning to 
Lacan’s quotation, in “offer[ing] something that is presented as 
a measure of our action […] or at least it claims to,” we are at 
least thrice-removed from the domain of action itself, as though 
analysis could at best only approach, in the manner of Zeno’s 
paradox, what otherwise might be most at hand. Again, how 
Antigone acts or doesn’t act mustn’t overshadow that she is 
scripted, that her actions have been repeated, one production 
after another. 
It is in the drama of drama (to risk tautology) that psycho-
analytically-informed ethics finds itself in the domain of queer 
theory, specifically, in the domain of dubious ontologies. Is An-
tigone merely an example from which persons might learn, or 
is she a character played by an actor, from whose staged actions 
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we might learn. The degree to which her actions are her own or 
already scripted returns us obliquely to questions of normativ-
ity and nonviolence, as invoked by Judith Butler. In Winnicott, 
however, doing and being differently solicit queer theoretical 
attention, since the distinction between the two is itself a gen-
dered one. The blur of being and doing likewise describes some 
of Judith Butler’s most influential work on gender performativ-
ity. Doing’s floundering, flamboyant confusability with being is 
its own gender trouble — to recall the title of Butler’s early work. 
Or as Winnicott (1992[1966]) appositely writes two decades ear-
lier, “The male element does while the female element (in males 
and females) is” (178).
These confusions of the ontological and the aesthetic in-
form nearly all of Winnicott’s contributions to psychoanalytic 
thought and practice. Furthermore, these confusions suggest 
that ethics (how one acts, as illuminated by what one thinks) and 
queer theory, via Winnicott, already are structurally analogous. 
I would be inclined to think of Winnicott, in this context, as 
the father of queer theory, were he not so under-estimated and 
under-invoked in queer-theoretical enterprises, and were the 
bestowal of paternity so variously, ideologically fraught. If not 
the father of queer theory, then to use Winnicott’s (1992[1964]) 
own self-identification, in the context of a clinical session: “I am 
still being used as a brother-mother.” (340) As brother-moth-
er of queer theory, Winnicott teaches us that subjectivity is as 
much a fiction as it is an aspiration, that creativity is far more 
psychical necessity than filibuster of the empirical. The dubi-
ousness of self-identificatory credulity — evident in rumina-
tions as different as Butler’s (1999) accounts of performativity as 
destabilization of gender; Edelman’s (1994, 3–31) study of meto-
nymic slippage as a rhetorical heroism against the oppressive 
identity politics implied in the essentialisms of metaphor; Ber-
sani’s (1986) innovation suggestion of masochism as Darwinian 
solution to the world’s barrage of instability (Bersani) — can be 
found, with great intelligence and compassion, in Winnicott’s 
work (see, in particular, 1971).
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Reading Lines
Winnicott’s interest in the variousness of dubiousness matches, I 
think, that of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, denominated the mother 
of queer theory, to whose work we shall turn in the next sec-
tion. Although in the spirit of Winnicott’s own identifications, 
perhaps Sedgwick might no less be imagined as sister-father. 
Alongside Winnicott’s clinical cross-identifications, transferen-
tial ebullience arises in Winnicott’s thoughts on William Shake-
speare, which perhaps only now can be felt and understood as 
the radical, enabling tentativeness that they are. Earlier in his 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan (1992[1959–60]) opines that 
“Hamlet is by no means a drama of the importance of thought 
in the face of action” (251). Lacan perhaps unsurprisingly turns 
to Hamlet in the context of ethics — “Hamlet’s apathy belongs to 
the sphere of action itself ” (251). Winnicott, anticipating Sedg-
wick, turns to Hamlet for the ways epistemological contretemps 
dovetail with an insolubly inadequate gender-system, itself the 
convoluted return of, if not materialization, of a certain Carte-
sian breakdown. Winnicott’s (1992[1966]) Hamlet isn’t inert on 
account of too much thinking, but rather on account of his in-
ability to think sufficiently, deeply, enough: “It would be reward-
ing to hear an actor play Hamlet with this in mind. This actor 
would have a special way of delivering the first line of the fa-
mous soliloquy: ‘To be, or not to be….’ He would say, as if trying 
to get to the bottom of something that cannot be fathomed, ‘To 
be, …or…’ and then he would pause, because in fact the char-
acter Hamlet does not know the alternative. At last he would 
come in with the rather banal alternative ‘…or not to be’; and 
then he would be well away on a journey that can lead nowhere” 
(179). Winnicott’s account of what I shall call Hamlet’s queer-
ness accrues to the factitiousness of reasoning as placeholder for 
a more satisfying sense of veracity:
Hamlet is depicted at this stage as searching for an alterna-
tive to the idea “To be.” He was searching for a way to state 
the dissociation that had taken place between his male and 
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female elements, elements which had up to the time of the 
death of his father lived together in harmony, being but as-
pects of his richly endowed person. Yes, inevitably, I write as 
if writing of a person, not a stage character. (181)
How quickly we move from Hamlet’s endowments to Winni-
cott’s treatment of Hamlet as though he were a person. How 
quickly, that is, we move from a rift between “male and female 
elements” to a rift between ontology (“a person”) and aesthetics 
(“a stage character”). It likely is more accurate to note that Ham-
let’s queerness — as the simultaneous volatility and recalcitrance 
of gendered pulsion — is inseparable from the “awful dilemma” 
of existing in and out of the aesthetic, of being and not being a 
person at all. Hamlet’s exploration of ethics cleaves to Hamlet’s 
own exploration of ethics, which might no less be described as 
Hamlet’s queerness or Hamlet’s aesthetic predicament. Of less 
interest, for Winnicott, than Hamlet’s relation to his father, 
Gertrude, Claudius, or even himself, is Hamlet’s queer relation 
to Hamlet. Winnicott is self-conscious of Hamlet as both text 
and production (“it would be rewarding to hear an actor play 
Hamlet with this in mind…”), as Lacan similarly is attuned to 
the textuality of Antigone. Unlike Lacan’s readings of tragedy, 
however, Winnicott can’t help but conjure the counterfactual of 
Hamlet’s own awareness of himself as text. In Lacan’s vocabu-
lary, Hamlet’s queerness may reside in the near-recognition of 
oneself as one’s own object petit a — an asymptote brushing up 
alongside the Symbolic, but more than anything else arising as 
the stuttering unavailability of the very signifier one most, in 
the moment, needs. Winnicott more straightforwardly offers 
the following — again, as though aesthetic traversal were ineluc-
tably coextensive with problematics of gender.
In this way it is the play (if Hamlet could have read it, or 
seen it acted) that could have shown him the nature of his 
dilemma. The play within the play failed to do this. It could 
be found that the same dilemma in Shakespeare provides the 
problem behind the content of the sonnets. But this is to ig-
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nore or even insult the main feature of the sonnets, namely, 
the poetry. Indeed, as Professor L.C. Knights (1946) specifi-
cally insists, it is only too easy to forget the poetry of the plays 
in writing of the dramatis personae as if they were historical 
persons. (1992[1982], 182)
The ease with which we (or Lacan, or Winnicott) might confuse 
dramatis personae with historical persons is countered by the 
difficulty of dramatis personae actually learning from their mise-
en-scène as though simultaneously inhabiting and estranged 
from it. How to be historical and aesthetic at once? How to 
weather not only the aesthetic architecture by which one is sur-
rounded, but the aesthetic quiddity one is? Hamlet’s only pos-
sible means of insight — the search for an alternative to being 
more persuasive than not being — resides in the impossibility 
of reading one’s own aesthetic inevitability. Hamlet’s problem, 
to return to Lacan, is less about action versus thinking, than the 
queer misfortune of being aesthetic but misrecognizing how 
such a circumstance might be mobilized. Winnicott invokes the 
pathos of performativity decades before queer theory imagines 
performativity as activism.2 Pathos, insofar as Hamlet’s particu-
lar performativity luxuriates, dolorously, in its own bristling en-
nui. 
Winnicott’s interest extends not only to literary characters 
perceived and misperceived as persons, but also to persons, in 
clinical practice, oppositely unable to feel real. If doing and be-
ing signal a psyche’s choreography of gender, the sense of one’s 
inauthenticity or self-depletion signals a psyche’s queer stum-
bling. Winnicott’s psychoanalytic work thus ballasts a form of 
queer theory predicated on aesthetics rather than desire. Or, on 
2 Queer theory’s understanding of performativity is indebted to J.L. Austin’s 
sense, in How to Do Things with Words (1962), of performative utterances, 
i.e., words that are able to perform actions as potently as they are imagined 
to describe them. Words are actions. The paradigmatic performative utter-
ance is the conjugal “I do,” in which saying those words renders one, in 




the simultaneous attractions to and fears of desiring one’s own 
aesthetic status. A sense of being in the world but not of it is 
not unto itself innovative, but Winnicott’s engagement of self-
distancing, through the duration of his career, is jarring for both 
its ubiquity and its particular psychoanalytic context.
If, as Lacan notes, the unconscious is structured like a lan-
guage, then a psychoanalytic ethics might well be imagined not 
only as the presentation of a measure of action, but as the in-
cessantly difficult project of staging a dialogue with one’s self, 
the nurturing of untethered soliloquy into interlocution. As M. 
Masud R. Khan (1994[1986]) suggests, in his introduction to 
Winnicott’s Holding and Interpretation, Winnicott found him-
self in Hamlet’s non-feasible hypothetical vantage as much as 
did his patients. “Like the patient,” Khan writes, “[Winnicott] 
too became partially an observer of the clinical process” (15), 
which is to say that clinical practice for Winnicott afforded, if 
only obliquely, better and for worse, a form of Hamlet reading 
Hamlet. 
The collusion of queerness and self-perceived fictiveness in-
forms at outset the experience of the patient whose analysis fills 
Holding and Interpretation’s pages. “In the first phase, he came 
in a state of depression with a strong homosexual colouring, but 
without manifest homosexuality. He was in a bemused state and 
rather unreal” (Winnicott 1994[1986], 19). Said patient “admit-
ted into an institution himself because of unreal feelings” (19). 
Once again, we find queerness “colour[ed]” by the weather of 
non-reality. Feeling unreal, versus bearing “unreal feelings.” 
Contra various homophobic narratives of homosexuality’s ge-
netic realness or non-realness, Winnicott’s practice takes homo-
sexuality as a problematic of incredulousness; a hermeneutics of 
suspicion turned psychically inward. Again, it merits repeating 
that homosexuality, in Winnicott’s studies, accrues as much to 
questions of ontology as such, as it does to normative concep-
tions of erotic attachment. Survival of distance, for Winnicott, 
describes a fundamental impediment and requisite of subjectiv-
ity. Distance, for Winnicott, collects most movingly, around the 
balletically strenuous hocus pocus between mother and infant. 
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As often, however, distance describes the aesthetic disjunct of 
auto-affection. He writes, “The excitement in relation to me had 
only been indicated and had not appeared” (29). Or as the same 
patient offers, from the same analysis, “I feel that you are intro-
ducing a big problem. I never became human. I have missed it” 
(84).
Clinically, it isn’t entirely reasonable to suppose Winnicot-
tian practice as the therapeutic catalyzing translation of expe-
riential fraudulence into ontological veracity—such an account 
underestimates Winnicott’s non-pathologizing interest in phe-
nomena of fraudulence; and too quickly presumes that an ex-
perience of veracity would could as fraudulence’s “cure.” Such a 
misprision falls under what Leo Bersani has in several instances 
denominated the normative pastoral impulse of unrigorous de-
formations of Freudian and Lacanian therapy. More precisely, 
Winnicottian practice delineates a constellation of fraudulence, 
as much as the conundrum of veracities by which the former 
are adumbrated. Speculatively, Bersani’s myriad accounts of the 
intractability of aggression (Bersani and Dutoit 2004, 124–25), 
keep their distance from Winnicott’s own theory of aggression 
for similar reasons, the extent to which Winnicottian aggression 
would seem either banal or falsifyingly roseate (see Winnicott 
1971, 89–90). Bersani’s career-long investigation of aggression in 
no way amounts to simple advocacy of aggression; aggression’s 
recalcitrance and often capricious materializations compel Ber-
sani’s more recent work on forms if not of “solving” aggression, 
than circumnavigating it. Winnicott (1971), with wonderful 
counter-intuitive verve, insists on aggression as an act of love:
A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating. 
The subject says to the object: “I destroyed you” and the ob-
ject is there to receive the communication. From now on the 
subject says: “Hullo object!” “I destroyed you.” “I love you.” 
“You have value for me because of your survival of my de-
struction of you.” While I am loving you I am all the time 




Such an account of aggression neither circumnavigates nor 
solves a Freudian or Lacanian embeddedness of aggressivity, so 
much as dispense with its vexing permanence altogether, a nee-
dle in a balloon. At the same time, Winnicott’s theory of aggres-
sion arises only after an infant has discovered his separateness 
from the world (which is to say, his mother). Before this initial 
estrangement, the mother and child are bound in what Christo-
pher Bollas (1987), following Winnicott, describes as the infant’s 
first aesthetic situation (32). This is to say that aesthetic being, 
in Winnicott, precedes all other forms of being. Any sense of 
being real is subsequent to the largesse of shared fictiveness. 
Such a scenario both resonates with and complicates Bersani’s 
(2008) and my own recent work on aesthetic subjectivity and 
aesthetic personhood, respectively. We might, in the anteriority 
not of violence or aggression but of aesthetics, think of an ethics 
predicated on the latter. 
Arts of Losing: Winnicott with Sedgwick
This primal aesthetic moment, unlike, for instance, a Freudian 
primal scene, is predicated on the non-distance between subject 
and object: more radically, on the non-distinguishability of sub-
ject and object. We may call, for present purposes, our subject 
the infant. The infant has desires and needs that he is altogether 
unable to satisfy. In this limited sense, the infant is purely fe-
male, pure being without the capacity to do, in the Winnicottian 
sense of “a male element.” The infant, however, has no sense of 
this incapacity, and no sense of a difference between being and 
doing, because the mother — specifically, what Winnicott calls 
the good-enough mother — supplements the infant’s purely on-
tological and non-transitive vacancy with action choreographed 
as the infant’s own. The infant is hungry and before the recog-
nition of hunger, the mother nurses him. The infant wishes to 
be placed in a different position and before the registration of 
discomfiture settles, the mother repositions him. I am reminded 
here, of the distinction between being real and feeling real, in 
the above clinical study. 
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I am reminded of simultaneously immense and minimal 
distance between veracity and non-veracity; or less cynically 
posed, of the possible irrelevance of the distinction in a subject 
whose first memory — were the memory ever accessible, which 
it is not — would be of this exceedingly subtle drama without 
roles. Beyond the infant’s incapability of so early a recollection, 
it seems plausible that there would in fact be nothing to remem-
ber, insofar as the materfilial economy’s success is the semblance 
of having exchanged nothing. One remembers what no longer 
is there, but there was, on many registers, nothing there to lose. 
Never loved, never lost, the paradigm that structures Judith But-
ler’s account of Freudian melancholy, has no place in Winnicott’s 
version of never loved/never lost, if only because the success of 
the good-enough mother will have assured the infant that there 
was never a mother, per se, to have lost in the first place. Recog-
nition of the mother, and concomitantly love of the mother, only 
would occur in the first pang of unsatisfied infant need. Prior 
to this, even as the infant at this stage cannot understand love 
beyond a barely burgeoning narcissism, and never lost, to the 
extent that his matrixial sustenance depends on a sense of their 
having been nothing to lose. I think here, of course, of the work 
of psychoanalyst and artist Bracha Ettinger (2006).
The mother’s efforts are devoted to the infant’s sense of om-
nipotence — that whatever he needs might be availed nearly 
before even the recognition of need (Winnicott 1971, 285). This 
maternal aesthetic, which is an environment the infant habits 
without perception of its difference from himself, seeks to nul-
lify the boundary between the imagined and the actualized. The 
mother (more specifically, the mother’s breast) arises as the in-
fant’s first encounter not with the female element (he already is 
this), but the male element (the mother’s unceasing doing for the 
sake of doing’s own evaporation in the field of what the infant 
rudimentarily is). Such a formulation suggests the residuum of 
this primal aesthetic implication which leads to weaning and 
autonomy but unsurprisingly remains as ghost-structure; that 
which was never there remains never there. Beneficently haunt-
ing and heuristically audible in least discernible of whispers, the 
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aesthetic unconscious subtends any subsequent form of ontol-
ogy, betrays the extent to which being and doing can’t help but 
braid and unbraid subjectivity’s nostalgia for and unawareness 
of its fundamentally aesthetic condition.
Winnicott’s contribution to an ethics of psychoanalysis 
would therefore complicate Lacan’s account of measurement of 
action, at very least because of action’s insolubly confused rela-
tion with being, of the salutary and ingenious insistence on an 
ethics necessarily predicated on a psychoanalytic aesthetics in 
excess of the rhetoric of dreamwork, the artistic permutations 
of a repetition compulsion’s serial structure, the inaccessible 
Platonic figura from which the empirical, in most contexts, de-
pressively is withdrawn. If ethics, in our current political du-
ress, conjures an agonistic relation to omnipotence, Winnicott 
clarifies an omnipotence beholden less to ideology or hegemony 
than to aesthetic fragility. Omnipotence, for Winnicott, quite 
literally (and figuratively) is work in progress. 
Winnicott’s insights illuminate the thinking of Eve Kosof-
sky Sedgwick (2008), whose most recent work gravitated to the 
idea, in both Marcel Proust and C.P. Cavafy (2006) of queer lit-
tle gods. Conceived on some level as a form of Roman penates, 
Sedgwick’s queer little gods, nominally and otherwise, speak to 
the condition of Winnicott’s aesthetically enabled infant, whose 
queerness resides in both the factitiousness of its omnipotence, 
as well as in the veracity of that factitiousness: the queerness of 
being without capacity, of belief in capacity without conscious 
cognizance of omnipotence’s own complicated repertoire. Con-
scious cognizance, even as an unconscious organized in aesthet-
ic terms would both harrowingly and/or ebulliently remonstrate 
any form of autonomy unaware of its own contingency. 
There is, alas, not enough of Sedgwick’s work on queer lit-
tle gods. After many years living with cancer, Eve died in the 
summer of 2009. I wish there were more, as a way of wishing 
Eve were still here. As a good-enough mother — father of queer 
theory, incessantly doing in such a manner that we might think 
we were doing; doing so much that we ourselves felt enabled by 
her own luminous industry — Eve has been teaching us her im-
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minent withdrawal for several decades. What will we do with-
out her, as succinct and inadequate formulation of theoretical 
weaning. I shall not be here forever, as perhaps the most awful 
and important of her points of departure. I both thought of and 
think of Eve as good-enough mother, allowing me in fleeting, 
miraculously irrational moments, to feel like a queer little god, 
the Winnicottian infant for whom aesthetic play arose as ethi-
cal lynch-pin. Eve’s consideration of queer little gods is as non-
ideological as Winnicott’s sense of unduly (or, ethically, duly) 
empowered infants, for whom delusion is synonym for safety, 
for whom delusion never encounters the normative binary of 
the veritable. Non-ideological, to the extent that Eve’s doing in-
spires her queer infants (myself included) to become queer little 
gods aspiring to become good-enough mothers. If there were a 
way to mourn Eve’s awful extrication from the empirical world, 
it would be in the sense that her mode of imaginative capacity, 
in producing us, has become our world, such that an imagined 
Eve might approximate the Eve we have lost. Eve, nominally, of a 
sudden feeling as allegorical as Henry James’s naming May Bar-
tram, May. Eve on the brink, and in following her into a world 
of aesthetics and figuration, we realize that we were as much 
enabling as we were enabled. 
That queer little gods might dream of becoming good-enough 
mothers describes a queer pedagogy for which Winnicott paves 
the way. Way and away, utility and distance, brought together 
by somatic exhaustions and sublimations recalled as axiomati-
cally aesthetic. To mourn the loss of a good-enough mother 
(and here I defer to Freudian melancholy, or at least some less 
strictured version of it) is to find a good-enough mother inhab-
iting one’s own egoic vantage. Weaning (of the Winnicottian 
mother, of Eve) would in the most sublimely ethically fashion 
guarantee one’s own balletic instruction as element of one’s own 
eventual doing, borne of one’s own floundering but hopeful be-
ing. The incorporated object isn’t chiding so much as inspiring. 
If weaning, following Winnicott, is a form of never loved/never 
lost, we have here, between Winnicott and Sedgwick, a form of 
melancholy so magnificently capacitating to deserve another 
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word. The Roman lares, watching over the family. We are both 
the family and the watchful. We tend and are tended, touch and 
are touched. Taken-for-grantedness in the infantile regime is the 
precondition for allowing into one’s psyche the cultivation and 
care that made this take-for-granted possible in the first place. 
Melancholy isn’t the suspension of work, but the non-shatter-
ing inheritance of unfinishable labor. Unfinishable, partly be-
cause it is a fiction borne of fictive premises. And simultane-
ously, because the good-enough definitionally soars far beyond 
“enough’s” own limited expectations.
Drawing Lines
Again, the implausible extricability of ontology and aesthetics 
describes the domain of both Winnicottian theory and ethics, 
writ large. Aesthetics recalibrates ethics as the hinterland be-
tween being and doing, subject and object. If to speak of an eth-
ics of psychoanalysis compels reconsideration of an aesthetics 
of psychoanalysis, then it is necessary to consider further how 
aesthetics informs Winnicott’s clinical practice, as metaphor 
and technique. Much has been made of Winnicott’s maternal 
aesthetics (and this art’s coextensive relation to the aesthetic 
desiderata of an analytic session3) even as this form of environ-
mental holding has yet adequately to be imagined in the con-
text of Winnicott’s clinical predilection for what he called the 
squiggle game (Winnicott 1992[1964–68], 299–317). The squig-
gle game goes as follows: Either Winnicott or his patient makes 
a squiggle on a sheet of paper. Whoever makes the first squig-
gle passes the paper to the other person, and that person sees 
in the squiggle something — a woman wearing a rakish hat, a 
bird in a nest — which, through additional lines is realized. The 
person who has “realized” the first squiggle then is responsible 
for enacting the next doodle, which is passed for “realization” 
to the person who initiated the prior doodle. The rules of the 
game are succinct. Someone begins. Someone turns the squig-
3 See Mavor (2007).
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gle into something more or less intelligible; in either an additive 
fashion, or (in the spirit of Michelangelo’s sculptures) in having 
discovered in the squiggle something that already had resided 
within it. Winnicott distinguishes, throughout his papers, be-
tween games and play, the former as the inhabiting and nego-
tiation of pre-conceived structure, versus the latter as fruitful, 
digressive loss in imagination freed from structure. The squiggle 
transaction is posited as a game whose implicit goal is to free its 
participants from the game, to free the two into play. 
Squiggle, an excellent, childish word for a mode of commu-
nication Winnicott forged with his child patients. There is none-
theless more to the squiggle game than its childishness, or even 
its analytic utility. The squiggle game, as I shall argue, literalizes 
interpersonal necessity as aesthetics distilled to irrevocable con-
tingency. And the multiple mobilities of this aesthetic humbly 
offers a model of aesthetic ethics from which both psychoanaly-
sis and queer theory might learn. The squiggle literalizes what 
Sedgwick, in the context of Cavafy’s queer little gods, imagines 
as ontological indeterminacy — the squiggle simultaneously is 
and is not. While the squiggle’s completion may seem the more 
conventionally aesthetic gesture, the production of the squiggle 
itself is the more aesthetically demanding. Where is the pencil 
headed, and how to defer the pencil’s vagrancy from prema-
turely understanding its possible pulsions toward intelligibility, 
when the latter, strictly (and non-strictly) speaking, is the re-
sponsibility and pleasure of the initiator’s artistic participant? 
How to withstand the desire for completion, and how to leave 
open what might be foreclosed, for the sake of the other per-
son’s imagination. The squiggle game relies less on artistic prow-
ess than on a particular form of self-withholding imagination 
predicated on the eventually generous gift of its own motivated 
or happily self-abandoned incompletion. The squiggle is aes-
theticized by its inscriber’s collaborator. The relational energies, 
here, recall those of both the Winnicottian maternal aesthetic 
apparatus, as well as the more familiar affective particularities 
of analytic transference and counter-transference. What will 
one person give the other? How to share in the creative phe-
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nomenon of the squiggle-transformation having been offered as 
either incomplete or ineluctably implicit, or some unspeakable 
conjunction of the two?
The squiggle game replicates on a graphic level the transac-
tions of infant and good-enough mother, transactions them-
selves replicated in the analyst’s role as good-enough mother. 
Beyond this, the squiggle game allows the child analysand, 
graphically, to assume the role of mothering to Winnicott’s 
own squiggles. The analysand, that is, realizes what Winnicott’s 
squiggle already needed, or on only a slightly different register, 
already potentially was. The aesthetics of holding and being held 
are materialized in literal aesthetic venture, even as the squig-
gle itself suggests the mother herself, shared by two queer little 
gods. As Winnicott writes, “the mother (or part of the mother) is 
in a ‘to and fro’ between being that which the baby has a capac-
ity to find and (alternately) being herself waiting to be found” 
(47). The squiggle, as correlative to both materfilial magic and to 
the mother without whom that magic is possible, always nearly 
exists on several personificatory registers, even as its avowed in-
nocuousness (innocuousness in part dependent on the aesthetic 
production’s contingency) relies on its sheer materiality, passed 
between persons. Nearly existing as personification coincides 
with the squiggle’s nearly existing as art, as communication. The 
virtue of the squiggle in part lies in its nearliness, in which ap-
proximation brings persons and aesthetics closer together than 
definitiveness could. The squiggle in its metaphorical and literal 
traversals, offers the possibility of psychoanalytic subjectivity as 
the nearliness of being a person as that approximateness moves 
toward adjacent proximities of being art. We find ourselves in 
this juncture removed from Bersani’s account of pastoral thera-
pies attached to the corrective realization of clinical accounts of 
fictiveness. The squiggle, at its most certain, remains a squig-
gle, even as what it might be flourishes in multiple simultaneous 
directions. This approximateness importantly revises accounts 
of incoherence and ontological dubiousness espoused as queer 
theory’s ethical aspirations. Incoherence can’t help but lean on 
a fiction of coherence. This binary dissolves (what Bersani re-
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cently has called conversation’s liquifying speech) in the field 
of approximateness, in which one cannot choose between fab-
rication and non-fabrication because each category is equally 
approximate to the other.
Winnicottian nearness (only nominally distinguishable from 
Winnicottian spaciousness) arises in a form of graphic collabo-
ration that enriches our understanding of Lacan’s account of 
the unconscious as being structured like a language. Language, 
syntactically, is governed by rules, capable of evasion as much 
as confession, of succinctness (the Freudian joke) as much as 
volubility (free-association). Language, likewise, minimally is 
shared between two people, and like a Freudian joke, achieves 
greatest intensity in the confluence of lucidity and surprise, or 
what Freud (1990), in the context of jokes, calls bewilderment 
and illumination (9). The squiggle, as a form of language, re-
writes talk of the unconscious as predicated on memory insepa-
rable from its immanent or futural materialization as something 
else. I think, here, of Bersani’s account of subterfuge in the work 
of Henry James: the possibility of a lie living long enough in 
its particular environment to justify if not erase its own open-
ing prevaricatory gambit. The squiggle’s linguistic bravura — the 
following of non-syntactic rules for the sake of flirting with a 
syntax of association inseparable from the disarticulation from 
those original rules — resides in its humility, and in the strange-
ness of the squiggle only barely existing, communicatively 
speaking.
In this sense, the squiggle recalls the graphically, fastidi-
ously dalliant works by Cy Twombly. Following Roland Bar-
thes, Twombly’s graphic executions — like Winnicott’s squig-
gles — both precede and follow methodologies of intelligible 
writing: Twombly’s graphemes anticipate writing in their stern 
incompleteness and solemnly mark what of writing remains, 
in the wake of its own foundering. An unconscious structured 
like a language, versus a squiggle, versus a Twombly. In the lat-
ter two examples, the unconscious — what can be imagined in 
ethical terms — withholds itself on the brink of volubility; is 
interested in the rhetorical plethora onto which it opens, with-
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out committing to it. We are approaching and even caring for 
something like an unconscious without presumption, prima fa-
cie, of its architecture or contents. We return, again, to Bersani’s 
account of psychical virtuality, in which the strength and utility 
of an unconscious depends on its inability to see beyond its own 
immanent and futural opacities. A psychoanalysis wed to this 
literally sketchy psychical landscape would require an exegeti-
cal language as mutational as the unconscious’ own fitfulness, a 
language or repertoire always on the verge, whose veracity falls 
toward the plausibility of veracity. The fictive is won from itself 
only in the offing, rather than being embedded in a psychical 
lexicon which it can only bolster or betray. In lieu of Hamlet’s 
inability to read his own lines in advance of speaking them, we 
have fallen into the near-coterminous formation and deforma-
tion of lines being read across two persons. 
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Discourse and the history of Sexuality
Will Stockton1
Following the French historian and philosopher Michel Fou-
cault, contemporary queer scholars frequently maintain that 
sexuality is a product of discourse. At its most basic, discourse 
means speech, but for Foucault (1972) discourse is “the gener-
al domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable 
group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that 
accounts for a number of statements” (80). In the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1990a) frames the relationship 
between sexuality and discourse in this way: sexuality is “the 
correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice which 
constitutes the scientia sexualis” (68) — the Western “regulated 
practice” of classifying, monitoring, and disciplining individu-
als based on what Freud would call their choice of sexual objects 
or the directions of their sexual aims. The scientia sexualis has 
its roots in the Catholic practice of confession, which from the 
Middle Ages enjoined people to speak about sex in extraordi-
1 I wrote this chapter in 2009, and since then have come to dislike it. This 
chapter is dated, overly quotational, and altogether inadequate in its read-
ing of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 20. For many years, I believed Clinical Encoun-
ters in Sexuality to be defunct, and in truth, I would prefer this piece remain 
stuck in a desk drawer. I agree to its publication now, in relatively unrevised 
form, only because I realize that the volume as a whole depends on it, and 
may indeed depend (although I am not sure, as I have not read the respons-
es) on the way I originally expressed ideas.
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nary detail, to seek out “all insinuations of the flesh: thoughts, 
desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined move-
ments of the body and soul” (19). In the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, psychiatry and psychoanalysis contributed to the 
secular appropriation of the church’s insistence that each person 
transform his or her sex into discourse. As Foucault wryly notes, 
“Ours is, after all, the only civilization in which individuals are 
paid to listen to all and sundry impart the secrets of their sex: as 
if the urge to talk about it, and the interest one hopes to arouse 
by doing so, have far surpassed the possibilities of being heard, 
so that some individuals have even offered their ears for hire” (7).
For many queer scholars, Foucault’s location of psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis in the history of sexuality undermines the 
claims of both discourses (or regulated practices) to speak uni-
versal, often plainly heterosexist, “truths” about sex. From 1952 to 
1973, for instance, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) classified homosexuality as a 
mental disorder, effectively exempting homosexuality from his-
tory by ignoring the different ways that other cultures have un-
derstood and evaluated same-sex desire. (The DSM still includes 
sexual sadism, sexual masochism, and transvestic fetishism 
among the sexual disorders or “paraphilias,” and it pathologizes 
one’s identification with the opposite sex as “gender identity dis-
order.”) Psychoanalysis, especially in Anglo-American practice, 
has not necessarily been any more historically self-aware. The 
work of Sandor Rado (1940 and 1949), Edmund Bergler (1956), 
and Irving Bieber (1962), among many others, advanced sexual 
conversion therapy, predicated on the idea that homosexuality 
is an aberration, a curable mental condition, rather than some-
thing invented by the very disciplines that aimed to treat it. To 
be sure, many psychoanalysts have worked over recent decades 
to develop more queer-friendly practices (Dean and Lane 2001). 
Yet the conversation between queer historians and psychoana-
lysts remains underdeveloped, and the image many of the for-
mer have of the latter — an image perpetuated by figures such as 
the late, vocal advocate of conversion therapy Charles Socarides 
(2005) — remains one of homophobia and ahistoricism. 
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This chapter’s effort to foster the conversation between queer 
historians and psychoanalysts begins with an invitation to con-
sider the history of the term “sexuality.” According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1989), the use of the term to mean “sexual 
identity in relation to the gender to which [one] is typically at-
tracted” dates from late in the nineteenth century (specifical-
ly, from Havelock Ellis’s 1897 Studies in the Psychology of Sex), 
while the use of the term to mean the possession or expression 
of “sexual nature, instinct, or feeling” is only fifty years older. As 
David Halperin (1998) writes, without the nineteenth-century:
[C]onception of the sexual instinct as an autonomous human 
function […] our heavily psychologized model of sexual sub-
jectivity — which knits up desires, its objects, sexual behav-
ior, gender identity, reproductive function, mental heath, 
erotic sensibility, personal style, and degrees of normality or 
deviance into an individuating normativizing feature of the 
personality called “sexuality” or “sexual orientation” — is in-
conceivable. (96–97)
The fact that sexuality does not, as a term or a psychological 
model, exist in pre-nineteenth-century contexts is one reason 
Foucault (1990a) argues that the “history of sexuality […] must 
first be written from the viewpoint of a history of discourses” 
(69). To historicize sexuality is to historicize the discours-
es — medical, theological, judicial, ethical, philosophical, peda-
gogical, popular, etc. — that underwrite a concept of relatively 
recent advent. 
Foucauldian historicism thus opposes itself to the “essen-
tialist” assumption that sexuality is a transhistorical feature of 
human beings, something that can be analyzed without atten-
tion to cultural, linguistic, and ideological differences. Indeed, 
from this Foucauldian perspective, the effort by some contem-
porary scientists to locate a “gay gene” is not unlike the effort 
of some psychoanalysts to locate the cause of homosexuality 
in a “perverse” deviation from a “normal” path of psychosocial 
development: neither the geneticist nor the psychoanalyst ac-
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knowledges or attempts to explain homosexuality’s (and hetero-
sexuality’s) historical belatedness. Like sexuality, homosexuality 
first appears in sexological discourse in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and only enters into popular discourse in the twentieth. 
Furthermore, what most people now mean by homosexuality 
can often be quite different from what was earlier meant by in-
version (a woman’s soul in a man’s body, or a man’s soul in a 
woman’s body) or sodomy (a broad category of deviant, usually 
non-reproductive sexual acts, not simply male–male anal sex). 
By focusing attention on such differences, Foucault’s historicist 
calibration of sexuality as a product of discourse unsettles — or 
queers — essentialist discourses of sexuality, including the often 
essentialist discourses of psychoanalysis. 
Rather than advocate historicism at the expense of psychoa-
nalysis, however, I want in this chapter to distinguish a psycho-
analytic approach to sex and discourse that could itself be useful 
in historicizing sexuality. This approach differs from Foucault’s, 
but it is not simply ahistorical, nor should it be understood as 
entirely antithetical to the Foucauldian project. To accomplish 
this task, I need to define sex and sexuality, like discourse, in Fou-
cauldian terms. Sex includes “anatomical elements, biological 
functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures” (154) — a set of 
acts and experiences deemed relevant to sexuality: a “historical 
construct […] in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensifi-
cation of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation 
of special knowledge, the strengthening of controls and resist-
ances, are all linked to one another” (105–6). In the modern and 
perhaps only historically accurate sense of the term, sexuality is 
frequently synonymous with sexual orientation, understood as 
central to individual identity. When I speak anachronistically 
of sexuality, I am therefore referencing an organization of erot-
ic meanings that are comparatively less identitarian. Foucault 
points out — and I will return to this point — that discourses of 
sexuality often determine what qualifies as sex in the first place 
(54–57). Yet as a queer literary critic and historian, I am particu-
larly invested in a line of Lacanian criticism that maintains that 
discourses of sexuality are always failed discourses, or discours-
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es that fail to secure sex’s significance. I will illustrate this failure 
by way of short survey of the critical controversy surrounding 
Shakespeare’s famously “perverse” Sonnet 20. In the chapter’s fi-
nal section, I outline a specifically Laplanchian approach to sex-
uality’s discursivity that contributes to the current queer theo-
retical conversation about “temporality,” or the demarcations of 
historical time that regulate the significance of sex (what can be 
said about it and how it can be understood). I premise this ap-
proach on Laplanche’s concept of the enigmatic signifier, which 
I will also suggest is useful in theorizing the similar historical 
work of queer literary studies and psychoanalysis. 
Ahistorical Psychoanalysis
By training, I am a scholar of English Renaissance literature. As 
an undergraduate student in the late 1990s, when queer theory 
was reshaping the study of sex in literature, I was drawn to this 
field in part by my desire to historicize my own subject position 
as a gay male. More specifically, I was drawn by my desire to 
historicize this subject position with reference to the emergence 
of “modernity” — “Renaissance” and “early modern” often be-
ing synonymous terms. From a reading of the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality, I understood that historicizing homo-
sexuality meant tracing the relationship between the modern 
discourse of sexual identity and Renaissance discourses that 
governed the meaning of “sexual” acts. Especially pronounced 
among these Renaissance discourses was the Christian dis-
course of fallen humanity. This discourse made no distinction 
between the types of people who committed sexual sins, as it 
held that everyone was potentially vulnerable to the same temp-
tations. As the historian Alan Bray (1995) writes, “To talk of an 
individual in this period [the Renaissance] as being or not be-
ing ‘a homosexual’ is an anachronism and ruinously misleading. 
The temptation to debauchery, from which homosexuality was 
not clearly distinguished, was accepted as part of the common 
lot, be it never so abhorred” (16–17).
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As one of the most influential discourses in the modern “de-
ployment” of sexuality, psychoanalysis represented for many 
scholars in the 1990s the discourse from which Renaissance 
discourses had to be distinguished. An extensive consideration 
of such critical attitudes towards psychoanalysis lies outside the 
scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that many Renaissance 
scholars have dismissed psychoanalysis as a monolithic dis-
course historically suspect at its Freudian core. In Homosexual 
Desire in Shakespeare’s England (1991), for instance, Bruce Smith 
writes, “In the standoff between essentialists and social con-
structionists Freud figures as the most important and influen-
tial essentialist of them all. He assumes that the human psyche 
has an existence outside history and that human sexual devel-
opment follows the same pattern in all times and in all places” 
(25). From Smith’s perspective, Freud’s ahistorical approach to 
psychic and sexual development fundamentally undermines the 
interpretive portability of psychoanalytic concepts. As variably 
defined as the concepts may be among psychoanalysts them-
selves, and as applicable as they may be to modern, Western 
subjects (two concessions that Smith himself actually does not 
grant), psychoanalytic concepts are almost or entirely useless 
when it comes to the task of “analyzing” Renaissance subjects 
and their “sexualities.” To psychoanalyze the pre-psychoanalytic 
subject is to distort that subject in its historical specificity, to ob-
scure the historically available network of discourses that pro-
duce a historically specific form of subjectivity and sexuality.2 
2 For an example of such distortion, one has only to think of Freud’s (and 
Ernest Jones’s 1910) interpretation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In The Interpre-
tation of Dreams, Freud (1900) asserts that the solution to the problem of 
Hamlet’s delay lies in Hamlet’s Oedipal jealousy of Claudius (265). For many 
Renaissance scholars, such a claim is hermeneutically simplistic and his-
torically problematic. It relies on the anachronistic importation of interper-
sonal dynamics that Freud observed in late-Victorian bourgeois families. It 
overlooks, or reduces to the level of a symptom, Hamlet’s concern that the 
ghost might be a demon. And it assumes that Hamlet’s delay even is a prob-
lem — an assumption that Margreta de Grazia (2007) has shown originates 
only in the early eighteenth century. 
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Although most historians of sexuality continue to distance 
themselves from psychoanalysis, arguing that Renaissance dis-
courses “speak sex” in ways that psychoanalysis silences, I was 
drawn towards the historiographic possibilities of psychoanal-
ysis by a graduate school encounter with a 1977 conversation 
between Foucault and a group of analysts. In the middle of this 
conversation — or discourse — published in English as “The 
Confession of the Flesh,” the Lacanian analyst Jacques-Alain 
Miller objects to Foucault’s assertion that sexuality has a history. 
In Miller’s words, “Sexuality isn’t historical in the sense that eve-
rything else is, through and through from the start. There isn’t 
a history of sexuality in the way there’s a history of bread” (Fou-
cault 1980, 213). Miller makes this claim by way of explaining 
the Lacanian axiom that “there is no sexual relation” — a claim 
of which Foucault claims to be unaware. Foucault then states 
that the history of sexuality is a history of discourses about sex 
as the “truth” of the subject (as the core of the self, the deter-
minant of who one is), and the conversation moves on. Yet this 
instance of discursive collapse (as Miller fails to explain himself 
and Foucault fails to address the objection) flagged an alterna-
tive, Lacanian approach to sexuality’s history. 
In Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists (1994), Joan 
Copjec elaborates on this alterative approach as follows:
Sex is the stumbling block of sense. This is not to say that sex 
is prediscursive; we have no intention of denying that human 
sexuality is a product of signification, but we intend, rather, 
to redefine this position by arguing that sex is produced by 
the internal limit, the failure of signification. It is only there 
where discursive practices falter — and not at all where they 
succeed in producing meaning — that sex comes to be. (204)
In other words, the Lacanian axiom that “there is no sexual rela-
tion” speaks to “the radical antagonism between sex and sense,” 
to the fact that “sex is never reducible to any discursive con-
struction” (204; emphasis in original). This translation makes 
sense of the fact that Jacques-Alain Miller invokes the axiom as 
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support for Foucault’s (1980) claim that psychoanalysis trans-
forms the study of sexuality by formulating “the logic of the 
unconscious” (213). In Miller’s Lacanian terms, the sexual rela-
tion — not simply between man and woman, but also between 
sex and discourse — is purely symbolic, and its inevitable failure 
is properly attributed to the order of the real. At the same time, 
Miller also invokes the axiom to suggest that Foucault denies 
the “reality” of the unconscious by focusing only on sexuality’s 
emergence as a discourse of human “truth.” By historicizing 
sexuality as if there were nothing outside of discourse, Foucault 
misses the Lacanian point that sex itself is not simply discur-
sive — that in its relation to the unconscious, sex rather con-
founds the discourses of sexuality that mark its presence and 
delimit its significance. 
To be clear, I do not understand Miller to mean, baldly, that 
there simply is no history of sexuality. Overstatement is, after 
all, a key element in Lacanian rhetoric. Rather, I understand 
Miller to mean that sexuality is not simply historical. As Charles 
Shepherdson (2000) has argued, we need to “distinguish be-
tween the particular historical forms that a given culture may 
institute for sexuality (that is history), and that inevitability of 
symbolic inscription that is constitutive of the human animal” 
(34; emphasis in original). For Lacan, all human beings are sub-
jects of sexuality, irrespective of their place in history or cul-
ture, for all human beings are subjects of language. As Foucault’s 
work illustrates better than Freud’s or Lacan’s, however, sym-
bolic inscription takes different forms, and the terms of each 
inscription do not necessarily translate into other discourses. 
These two approaches to sexuality and history need not be set in 
irreducible opposition. Indeed, the tendency of many literature 
scholars (like Smith) and psychoanalytic critics (like Copjec) to 
exacerbate the differences between psychoanalysis and “histori-
cism” works against the formation of mutually informative ana-
lytical methods. I seek in the next two sections of this chapter 
to illustrate one such method with reference to Shakespeare’s 
Sonnet 20. While contextualizing the sonnet within particular 
Renaissance discourses of sexuality, I will also use the sonnet to 
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illustrate the Lacanian point that sex is always in part inimical 
to symbolic inscription.
The Indeterminacy of the Sexual
First published in 1609, Shakespeare’s 154 sonnets have long 
been recognized as literary heirs to the medieval confessional 
practices that are so instrumental for Foucault in constructing 
and regulating sex as the truth of the self (Smith 1991, 232–3). 
In these highly introspective sonnets, the confessional becomes 
fourteen lines of verse, the theological imperative a literary one: 
“Not only will you confess to acts contravening the law, but you 
will seek to transform your desire, your every desire, into dis-
course” (Foucault 1990a, 21). Much of the critical conversation 
about these sonnets has focused on the type of relationship the 
speaker has with the young man who, in the first 126 poems, oc-
cupies the place generally reserved in sonnet sequences for the 
mistress.3 Much of the critical conversation about Sonnet 20 in 
particular has focused on the extent to which it, more than any 
other sonnet, reveals a specifically sexual relationship. Here is 
the sonnet in its entirety: 
A woman’s face with nature’s own hand painted
Hast thou, the master mistress of my passion;
A woman’s gentle heart, but not acquainted
With shifting change as is false women’s fashion;
An eye more bright than theirs, less false in rolling,
Gilding the object whereupon it gazeth;
A man in hue, all hues in his controlling,
Which steals men’s eyes and women’s souls amazeth.
And for a woman wert thou first created,
Till nature as she wrought thee fell a-doting,
And by addition me of thee defeated
By adding one thing to my purpose nothing.
3 The assumption that the young man is the addressee of all 126 sonnets has 
been challenged. See Dubrow 1996.
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But since she pricked thee out for women’s pleasure,
Mine be thy love and thy love’s use their treasure. 
The difficulty critics have making sense of this sonnet is a dif-
ficulty making sense of its puns, especially those in the third 
quatrain and couplet, beginning with “for” in line 9: the youth 
was created to be a woman’s lover or (and?) as a woman. If one 
reads “for a woman” as “to be a woman’s lover,” the speaker seems 
to be saying that nature’s “addition” of a penis (line 12’s euphe-
mistic “thing”) ensured that the youth and the speaker could 
not be lovers. Yet the pun on “pricked” (line 13) complicates this 
gloss. On the one hand, the youth was given a prick to pleas-
ure women, such that the final line’s distinction between “love” 
and “love’s use” is the distinction between same-sex friendship 
and opposite-sex love, the latter of which is associated with the 
genitals, reproduction, and, in the sequence’s economic lexicon, 
“use”/usury and financial accrual. On the other hand, recalling 
the pun on “for” as “as” in line 9, the couplet also allows that 
the youth was “pricked […] out”/indented so that he could be 
pleasured/penetrated like a woman. (The couplet’s opening con-
junction might thus be read as a negation of the admission of 
defeat. It is also tempting, though anachronistic, to hear “But” as 
an anatomical reference that follows on line twelve’s “nothing,” 
a euphemism for the vagina.) In a sequence that later explores 
“heterosexual” non-monogamy between the speaker and his fe-
male mistress, this sonnet may suggest that the speaker and the 
youth have (or at least the speaker wishes they had) a sexual 
relationship that does not conflict with women’s “treasure” of 
the youth’s “use” (his semen). 
As cryptic as these lines are, they provide a particularly good 
example of Bruce Smith’s (1991) claim that “sexual experience in 
the sonnets resides largely in puns” (252). To amend this claim 
somewhat, I would argue that these lines more pointedly ex-
emplify the way the sonnets both attempt and fail to translate 
sex into discourse. Certainly, Sonnet 20 can illustrate Foucault’s 
argument that sexuality is a product of discourse. Sexuality is 
an organization of erotic meanings, and notwithstanding the 
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fact that such meanings here are multiple, any argument about 
sexuality in the sonnet must attempt to make the puns mean 
something. Yet the sonnet’s refusal to specify who is having sex 
with whom (and how) also illustrates the Lacanian qualification 
of sexuality’s discursive production. This qualification is two-
fold. First, the sex in Sonnet 20 is not simply ambiguous. This 
ambiguity rather points to the difference between discourses 
of sexuality and what James Penney (2006) calls “‘the real of 
sex’ — actual sexual behaviors in concrete sociohistorical situ-
ations” (3–4). The real of sex is ultimately “unavailable to the 
epistemophilic sexological gaze” (4); it is, in short, the sex the 
sonnet does not reveal the speaker and the youth as having or 
not having, the sex the reader ultimately cannot “see.” Apro-
pos of Miller’s objection to Foucault, the second qualification 
of sexuality’s discursive production requires hearing “the real 
of sex” as a reference to the unconscious — to that opacity, that 
void of signification, around which the poem’s proliferation of 
possible readings takes shape. Shakespeare’s sonnets speak sex 
in a network of interconnected discourses (of economics, the-
ology, friendship, etc.), as well as through puns and other rhe-
torical devices that “play off experience itself against the words 
that would inscribe it” (Smith 1991, 252). Confusing rather than 
clarifying the speaker’s relationship to the young man, however, 
Sonnet 20 and its enigmatic ilk also gesture towards the gap 
between discourses of sexuality and the real of sex. In Copjec’s 
terms, they gesture towards the fact that sex is or “comes to be” 
where discourse falters: in the disjunction between the symbolic 
and the real.
Shakespeareans usually approach the ambiguity of the son-
nets by locating them within particular homoerotic discourses 
that allow for historically informed speculation about what the 
sonnets might “really” be saying, to whom, and how. Kather-
ine Duncan-Jones (1997), the editor of the Arden edition of the 
sonnets that I use here, contextualizes their “compromising or 
‘disgraceful’ elements” (xiii) within the political discourse of the 
court of King James I — a homoerotic discourse of male men-
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torship and patronage.4 Gregory Bredbeck (1991) maintains that 
the final lines of Sonnet 20 “mean too much” (177; emphasis in 
original) to be reduced to a single interpretation, and he argues 
that their semantic profusion reflects Shakespeare’s poetic rela-
tionship to what Foucault (1990a) called the “utterly confused 
category” (101) of sodomy: “For Shakespeare, the sodomite de-
stroys or uses up language and thereby establishes a space differ-
ent from language for the poet” (Bredback 1991, 180). For Bruce 
Smith (1991), these sonnets are somewhat ahead of their time. 
He argues that Sonnet 20 and the sequence itself exhaust period 
discourses for policing male bonds and distinguishing them 
from transgressive homoerotic affections. Folding sex back into 
discourse, however, he also argues that as “expressions of desire” 
that were “highly idiosyncratic to its author and its historical 
moment,” these sonnets participate in the invention of “a new 
mode of discourse about sexual desire” (267) now recognizable 
as the discourse of modern homosexual subjectivity: a discourse 
of secret confession, of “the love that dares not speak its name.” 
I share such contextualizing aims, and I would argue that 
Bredbeck’s and Duncan-Jones’s readings are especially impor-
tant correctives to the assumption that the sonnets speak sex in 
the contemporary discourse of homosexuality. Jones’s reading 
additionally pressures the supposed perversity of the sonnets by 
locating them within a relatively normative political discourse. 
Yet I am arguing that the sonnets, and Sonnet 20 in particular, 
also redirect the critic’s “sexological gaze” to something outside 
discourses entirely: the “real of sex” that no discourse can trans-
late. Bredbeck suggests that the space outside discourse may it-
self be historically accessible through the discourse of sodomy, 
and I think he is correct. But that claim in itself does not answer 
the question I now want to pursue: the question of what qualifies 
as sex, and thus as sexual, in the first place. Is “master-mistress” 
4 See also de Grazia (1994), who argues that the sonnets to the young man 
were not nearly as scandalous in the period as those addressed to the Dark 
Lady. In the Renaissance, interracial eroticism was much more controver-
sial than homoeroticism. 
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simply an ironic, not a sexual, notation of the young man’s status 
as the sonnet’s addressee? Is there actually a pun on “pricked,” or 
am I hearing something that is not there? These questions speak 
not only to Foucault’s claim that the discourses of sexuality de-
termine sex’s definition and the conditions of its representation, 
but also to what the Renaissance scholar Mario DiGangi (1997) 
calls the “indeterminacy of the ‘sexual’”: “[W]e cannot always 
be entirely confident that we know which bodily acts count as 
‘sexual.’ When is kissing an expression of sexual desire, of affec-
tion, or of a social bond? Under what circumstances might our 
ability even to distinguish these realms be frustrated? In a patri-
archal culture, is intercourse always more ‘sexual’ than kissing? 
Is it more erotic? Might nonpenetrative eroticism, such as kiss-
ing between women or ‘sport’ between men, subvert patriarchal 
sexuality? These questions cannot be answered outside of par-
ticular contexts, and even then with reservations” (11; emphasis 
in original).
By scrupulously attending to “particular contexts” to answer 
such questions, DiGangi himself practices a kind of skeptical 
historicism. He foregrounds his reservations about his entire 
critical project (on the homoerotics of early modern drama), 
cognizant of his inability to definitively distinguish sexual de-
sire from affection and social bonding, or to classify and render 
fully — discursively — significant acts such as kissing. Even as I 
therefore want to claim that in DiGangi’s cautionary notion of 
the “indeterminacy of the ‘sexual’” lies Joan Copjec’s claim that 
“sex comes to be where discursive practices falter.” DiGangi’s 
questions also cast into relief the difference between his own 
and a Lacanian approach to sexuality. Whereas DiGangi offers 
reserved interpretations of signifiers within particular discur-
sive contexts, Lacanian psychoanalysis posits that by definition 
sex and the sexual exceed these contexts. After all, any critical 
effort to actually determine the sexual status of friendly affec-
tion and social bonding, or the difference between sexuality and 
eroticism, in pre-nineteenth-century contexts cannot ultimately 
escape the anachronistic assumption a definition for the sexu-
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al — an assumption that relocates outside history the very thing 
it attempts to analyze. 
Enigmatic historicism
In Sexuality and Form: Marlowe, Caravaggio, and Bacon (2000), 
one of the first books in Renaissance Studies to challenge his-
toricist efforts to analyze sex within singularly Renaissance dis-
courses, Graham L. Hammill argues that “the reduction of sex 
to historical information does not constitute interpretation as 
such” (2). Instead, sex constitutes “a horizon of interpretation 
and a threshold of thinking” (1), and it “urges the problem of 
historiography” (2), calling “for modes of critical analysis that 
maintain external relations with the historical” (3). Hammill’s 
own mode of analysis effects a careful rapprochement between 
Foucauldian historicism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Both, 
Hammill demonstrates, avoid reducing sexuality to sexual iden-
tity, and the history of sexuality to the history of the homosexu-
al’s invention. Both also avoid reducing the history of sexuality 
to the history of what has previously been thought about sexual-
ity: Foucault and Lacan evince “a passion for producing as such 
the unthought (or the unhistorical)” (19). (Foucault’s [1990b] 
description of the goal of his history could apply equally well 
to Lacan’s own efforts to cast the history of sexuality in terms of 
the impossibility of the sexual relation. Both histories aim “to 
learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can 
free itself from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think 
differently” [9].) In the spirit of finding similar common ground 
between psychoanalysis and Foucauldian historicism, I would 
like to demonstrate how Jean Laplanche’s particular recovery of 
Freud’s seduction theory also distinguishes sex from “histori-
cal information,” affording analysts and literary scholars alike a 
series of conceptual tools for studying sex’s queer temporality.
Over the last decade, an increasing number of queer literary 
scholars (Renaissance and otherwise) have begun to argue, like 
Hammill, that sex challenges “conventional” historiographic 
models. This argument emerges in part from historicist cri-
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tiques of the “supersessionist” (and ostensibly Foucauldian) dis-
tinction between a pre- and early modern discourse of sexual 
acts and a modern discourse of sexual identity. Invariably, this 
distinction simplifies a much more complex and uneven his-
torical shift (For a critique of supersessionist historicism, see 
Sedgwick 2008, 44–48). The argument that sex challenges con-
ventional historiographic models also emerges from the critical 
sense that a dually temporal and discursive distinction between 
sexual acts and identities is thoroughly inadequate to contain-
ing the analytic of queerness, which Judith Butler (1993) defines 
as a “collective contestation, the point of departure for a set of 
historical reflections and futural imaginings” (228). Most recent 
works of queer historicism utilize queerness as a vehicle for con-
testing discourses of the normal and the natural rather than as 
a synonym for gay and lesbian identity. Similarly positioning 
queerness in opposition to “official” sexual and historiographic 
discourses, queer histories also now frequently contest the dis-
course of the modern divide so often coterminous with the divi-
sion between acts and identities. The result has not only been 
a wider attention in queer studies generally to the conceptual 
work of terms like modernity, but an arguably belated recogni-
tion (relative to other sub-disciplines of critical theory and cul-
tural studies) that time is always, as Shakespeare’s Hamlet says, 
“out of joint” (2008, 1.5.189). 
Introducing a 2007 special issue of GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Sudies entitled “Queer Temporalities,” Elizabeth Free-
man takes Hamlet’s expression of time’s “heterogeneity” and 
“asynchrony” as her own point of departure in contemplating 
the future of queer studies: 
If we reimagine “queer” as a set of possibilities produced out 
of temporal and historical difference, or see the manipulation 
of time as a way to produce both bodies and relationalities 
(or even nonrelationality), we encounter a more produc-
tively porous queer studies […]. Indeed, this queer studies 
meets critical race theory and postcolonial studies in its un-
derstanding that what has not entered the historical records, 
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and what is not yet culturally legible, is often encountered in 
embodied, nonrational forms: as ghosts, scars, gods. In this 
sense we are also (re)turned to a queer studies among whose 
definitional moves has been a turn to the “premodern,” not 
only to moments in time before the consolidation of homo-
sexual identity in the West but also to how the gaps and fis-
sures in the “modern” get displaced backward into a hyper-
sexualized or desexualized “premodern.” (159–60)
This rich provocation potentially resonates with the psycho-
analytic project in several significant ways. We can think, for 
instance, of the focus in queer studies on issues of (non)rela-
tionality and the body, issues often framed in conversation with 
psychoanalysis, and which are discussed in other essays in this 
volume. My interest here lies in how Freeman’s description of 
the turn of queer studies towards “what has not entered the 
historical records,” towards what is “culturally illegible” but “en-
countered in embodied, nonrational forms,” resonates particu-
larly with psychoanalytic historiography. For many queer crit-
ics, this turn will seem distinctly Derridean — a turn towards 
the practice of “hauntology,” which Derrida elaborates apropos 
of Hamlet in Specters of Marx (2006). Hauntology is the study of 
the way the past presents itself in the present, often in the form 
of a demand (as, in Shakespeare’s play, the ghost of Hamlet’s 
father demanding revenge). Carla Freccero (2006) has related 
this Derridean practice to queer historicism’s “affective invest-
ments of the present in the past,” an investment that “harbors 
within itself not only pleasure but also pain, a traumatic pain 
whose ethical insistence is ‘to live to tell’ through complex and 
circuitous processes of working through” (79). I claim that pre-
cisely because queer historicism is a “working through” of the 
relationship between past and present discourses of sexuality, 
the turn of queer studies towards what has not yet entered the 
historical records can likewise correlate with a turn towards the 
enigmatic signifiers with which the historical work of psychoa-
nalysis begins. 
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In his essay “Time and the Other,” Jean Laplanche (1999) 
writes that “thinking about time, whether philosophical or sci-
entific, develops on four levels”: (1) “cosmological time,” or “the 
time of the world”; (2) “perceptual time,” or the time “of im-
mediate consciousness”; (3) “the time of memory and of the in-
dividual project, the temporalisation of the human being”; and 
(4) “the time of history,” which entails not only “temporalisation 
[…] but recapitulation” (237–38). The Foucauldian work of his-
toricizing sexuality generally operates at the fourth level, “reca-
pitulating” a network of evolving and interrelating discourses, 
while psychoanalysis operates most immediately at the second 
and third levels, relating consciousness to memory and to the 
history of an individual’s development. Psychoanalytic histori-
cism is not limited to these levels, however, or to individuals. 
Psychoanalysis also operates at the fourth level by developing 
“case-histories” of individuals as social, collective beings — as 
subjects within a larger discursive milieu. Texts like Freud’s To-
tem and Taboo laid the foundation for considerable psychoana-
lytic work at the fourth level as well: work with “nonrational” 
cultural phenomena like taboos set against the names of the 
dead. The continuing relevance of psychoanalysis to cultural 
studies suggests that despite its relatively recent arrival on the 
historical scene, psychoanalysis is uniquely situated to join the 
level-four history of sexuality with the history of an individual’s 
sexuality, with his or her entry into the symbolic order of a giv-
en culture. Differences between symbolic orders should prompt 
consideration of the portability of particular psychoanalytic 
concepts, but the potential jointure I have in mind hinges pre-
cisely on the temporality of sex as such, on the level-three tem-
porality of the enigmatic signifier.
Laplanche locates the origin of human sexuality at the mo-
ment of the enigmatic signifier’s reception — a moment Freud 
frequently found impossible to fix in his recapitulation of a sub-
ject’s history. As is well known, the enigmatic signifier is most 
immediately the “seductive” signifier: adult gestures, words, 
and looks not understood by the child (nor even by the adult), 
but later subject to a coming-into-sense as the child matures. 
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The persistent elusiveness of these originating moments, the 
way one recovered scene simply revealed itself through further 
analysis as the translation of another scene, was partly respon-
sible for Freud abandoning seduction theory and replacing it 
with the more universal theory of human sexual development 
that he outlines in “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexual-
ity” (1905). Yet besides demonstrating that traces of seduction 
theory nonetheless remain in Freud’s case histories (and in the 
“Three Essays” themselves) Laplanche (1976) argues that in se-
duction theory resides Freud’s original, most revolutionary idea: 
that the unconscious, as the repository of the enigmatic signi-
fier, operates like an “alien internal entity” in the subject (48). 
The unconscious is fundamentally other, and human sexuality 
originates in the self ’s relationship to this other. As is perhaps 
equally well known, this recovery of Freud’s most radical idea 
also leads Laplanche (1999) to translate Freud’s Nachträglichkeit 
as “afterwards ness” rather than as James Strachey’s “deferred ac-
tion.” In their relation to consciousness, enigmatic signifiers are 
subject to both deferred and retroactive understandings. They 
constitute both the “deposit of something which will only be re-
activated later” and something “registered in the first time and 
then understood retroactively” (261). Akin to Butler’s “queer,” 
they are objects of both “historical reflections” and “futural im-
aginings.”
Despite the practices of psychoanalysis that have reduced ho-
mosexuality to a curable or manageable perversion, Laplanche 
queerly recognizes that the meaning of sex is not straightforward 
(pun intended). Rather, the meaning of sex — which as a signi-
fier is ciphered at its moment of origin — partially results from a 
preposterous reconstruction, the work of a certain type of ana-
lytical and historical inversion. For the historian whose task has 
long been understood as the repudiation of anachronism — the 
scrupulousness of one’s repudiation being directly proportional 
to one’s success in distinguishing the discourses through which 
different cultures speak sex — approaching sex as an enigmatic 
signifier reconfigures anachronism as a structural condition of 
historicism, subordinating the search for a given signifier’s first 
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or nascent discursive appearances to the recognition of the al-
ways enigmatic signifier’s temporal movement from present to 
past and past to present. (As Valerie Rohy [2006] has argued, 
“[A]nachronism represents not a foreign threat or radical alter-
native to queer historicism, but an inherent aspect of it” [71]). 
Laplanche’s account of the enigmatic signifier has also led me to 
argue, in my own work (2011), that queer historicism is less the 
work of interpretation than detranslation — the reiteration, for 
present but never complete clarification, of an enigmatic mes-
sage in another discourse. This difference between interpretation 
and detranslation is central to Laplanche’s (1996) understanding 
of the psychoanalytic method as one of tracing the transmission 
of messages, the other’s message being the “object of the proto-
comprehension or proto-translation” (11). As Laplanche states in 
an interview, “Interpretation may mean that you interpret some 
factual situation. Translation means that there is no factual situ-
ation that can be translated. If something’s translated, it’s already 
a message” (Caruth 2001). 
Texts like Sonnet 20 bear these messages: hence the potential 
for a productive collaboration between what Laplanche (1996) 
calls “anti-hermeneutic” (or anti-interpretative) psychoanaly-
sis” and queer literary-historical criticism. In the Lacanian and 
Laplanchian approaches that I have sketched here, the signifiers 
of sex are distinct from the real of sex, whereas Foucault’s pro-
ductive model of sexuality risks foreclosing this distinction. But 
recognizing the limits of Foucault’s model does not prevent the 
practice of a mutually informative approach to the history of 
sexuality. Indeed, the value of Foucauldian historicism for psy-
choanalysts lies in the former’s effort to historicize the proce-
dures of the latter, beginning with its demand that analysands 
speak about sex. A history of psychoanalysis also has the po-
tential of placing psychoanalytic approaches to homosexuality 
and perversion in the much broader context of power’s produc-
tion of sexuality as a mechanism of social control — a context 
in which psychoanalysis often appears complicit with the pro-
duction of heterosexuality as a normal, natural, and thoroughly 
ahistorical form of sexuality. The value of psychoanalysis for 
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Foucauldian historicists lies in turn in the unique attention psy-
choanalysis gives to what lies outside discourse — an outside 
variously demarcated as the unconscious and the real. Whereas 
Foucault erects a theoretical apparatus for historicizing the in-
junction to transform sex into discourse, psychoanalysis argues 
that sex is not fully discursive, that sexuality is a network of en-
igmatic signifiers. As something subject to repeated translation, 
to continuous comings-into-sense, the enigmatic signifier is 
also always out of place, always throwing time out of joint.
Indicative of Freeman’s observation about the sexually po-
larized construction of the pre-modern is the critical tradition 
of defending against the “hypersexual” detranslation of Sonnet 
20. My students sometimes object that I am “reading the poem 
wrong,” for the speaker’s suggestion of having or wanting to have 
sex with his “friend” does not make sense within their own os-
tensibly asexual discourse of amity. In response, I usually point 
to hundreds of years of critical unease with these lines, citing 
in particular Edmund Malone’s 1790 pronouncement, quoted in 
Smith (1991): “Such addresses to men, however indelicate, were 
customary in our author’s time, and neither imported crimi-
nality nor were esteemed indecorous” (230). Malone would be 
right that certain expressions of affection were common be-
tween men, especially male friends, but one can hardly agree 
that addresses like the one in Sonnet 20 are “customary.” At the 
same time, Malone’s efforts to de-sexualize these lines admits 
that they have “crossed the line” — making nonsense of the dis-
tinction between “friendly” and “sexual” relations. Bruce Smith 
similarly observes that as the speaker attempts to describe his 
feelings for the young man throughout the sequence, he appro-
priates and exhausts three “heterosexual” discourses: Horation 
eroticism, courtly love, and Christian marriage. At the moments 
where these discourses falter, the sonnets call our attention to 
“the void between sexual experience and the metaphors we have 
to talk about it” (266) — a void in which Smith locates the emer-
gent discourse of homosexual identity. My point here is that 
regardless as to whether one follows Smith in enlisting these 
sonnets in the invention of the homosexual, this new discourse, 
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like the period discourse of friendship, cannot make complete 
sense of the enigmas they present. To whatever interpretation is 
offered, the psychoanalytic critic can only respond, “That is not 
it.” No interpretation can itself resolve these enigmas to identify 
what the speaker is really saying, how he really conceives of his 
relationship with the young man, and what he is really experi-
encing. The poem’s message, the sex it translates into discourse, 
remains irreducibly enigmatic.
If this anti-hermeneutic thesis sounds like the translation of 
a cautionary statement made by any responsible literary histo-
rian, then this essay has succeeded in one of its goals: demon-
strating that psychoanalysis should not simply be juxtaposed 
to historicism in the analysis of sex, and that psychoanalysis 
can inform, rather than oppose, the study of sex’s transforma-
tion into discourse. To translate Smith’s historicist reading into 
Laplanchian terms, the meaning of Sonnet 20 is both deferred to 
a future discourse of homosexuality that develops to make sense 
of it, and is retroactively understood in light of this discourse. 
In light of more anti-identitarian discourses of queerness — for 
example, Lee Edelman’s (2004) claim that “queerness can never 
define an identity; it can only ever disturb one” (17) — the poem 
might also be read for the ways it defers its opposition to, and 
in retrospect seems opposed to, clarification of “the sexual.” Ide-
ally, both readings recognize that they do not establish what the 
poem is definitively saying, though they are no less useful as 
readings (as detranslations) for that reason. What I call enig-
matic historicism simply foregrounds Hammill’s (2000) critical 
gesture of “fracturing relations between the phenomenon and 
the supposed nomenon” (19), between the discourses of sex and 
the real of sex, so as to sustain queer criticism’s orientation to-
wards producing the “unthought.” 
By way of again distinguishing the unique contribution 
psychoanalysis makes to historicizing sexuality, I will suggest 
in closing that the persistent resubmission of the sonnets to 
critical detranslation is itself sufficient grounds for thinking the 
history of sexuality as something that includes but exceeds the 
history of discourses. The history of sexuality is a history of dis-
courses, and psychoanalysts need to be cognizant of this history 
as a check on their field’s tendency towards essentialism. Yet 
into this conversation about sexuality’s history psychoanalysts 
should interject an awareness of the way sex comes to mean in 
something other than straight(forward) time. With respect to 
Sonnet 20, one should not be required to deny the critical util-
ity of the discourse of homosexuality. Nor should one deny the 
equally useful historical discourses of sodomy, political patron-
age, and friendship. When these contexts are provided, however, 
the truth of the sonnets is not simply “outed.” The real of sex is 
always something different from the discourses of sex — some-
thing, the psychoanalytic historian can point out, that Sonnet 
20, like any utterance, ultimately fails to speak.
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on Not Thinking Straight:  
Comments on a Conceptual Marriage
R.D. Hinshelwood1
[T]he engagement of queer theory with psychoanalysis […] is pre-
dominantly critical, psychoanalysis being seen as a theory and set 
of practices that rigidify rather than open up the sexual field. 
— Frosh 2006, 248
It is ironic. Psychoanalysis was born in the context of sexual 
transgression — the theory of seduction, and the Oedipal theo-
ry. The plethora of sexualities was suddenly open to be known, 
and in principle to be known in all of us. But, for normative 
reasons, powerful a hundred years ago, in no time at all, that 
opening door spawned the “Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality” (Freud 1905); it became a classic that could easily be 
read as experts in the clinic normalizing categories of sexual-
ity, and defining the abnormal. No wonder queer theory has a 
thoroughly mixed reaction — but to be fair, the selection in this 
book is a respectful one. On being asked to add a comment on 
the chapters in section one, I looked forward to the challenge. 
They amass a “report” on the progress of the two innocent suit-
1 I need to acknowledge the help of Aaron Balick’s comments on a previous 
version of this chapter.
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ors in finding a way forward together. What can one add to the 
promise of their new relationship?
Changing Tack
The emphasis on sexuality and libido was solidified in the dis-
pute with Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, so that sexuality and the 
Oedipus complex were promoted as the exclusive foundation 
of the human personality, transcending culture and history. 
However from 1911, Freud’s trajectory was already changing. His 
analysis of the Schreber “case” had led him to pursue an increas-
ing interest in identity, the ego, and the reality-principle. More 
recently, with the demise of ego-psychology and drive theory, 
and with the increasing importance of Kleinian psychoanalysis, 
self-psychology and the relational turn in general, the psychoa-
nalysis of sexuality has become secondary, or at least contingent 
on the analysis of narcissism, personal identity, and the related-
ness to others. This does not mean that orgasmic and non-or-
gasmic sexualities lack attention, but that sexuality is an ingredi-
ent, rather than the whole cake-mix. What is foremost now in a 
psychoanalysis is to outline the shape of a human personality, its 
coherence and its inner core of identity.
In this book which questions the nature of desire, it might be 
worth considering a move towards an object-relations approach 
and relinquishing the territory occupied by desire theories. Sex-
uality is nothing if not desire and ecstasy, but that is not at issue. 
It is the paraphernalia of identity that goes with it, both personal 
identity and social identity. For these purposes it is necessary to 
be clear about the postulate on which object-relations theory is 
grounded — the libido is primarily object-relating, rather than 
drive satisfying (Fairbairn 1944).
As a Kleinian, the consistent resort to Lacanian psychoanaly-
sis and some post-Lacanians (notably Jean Laplanche and Luce 
Irigaray) in these texts seems a little one-track, all the eggs in 
one basket — almost equivalent to a straight phallic identity! A 
degree of flexibility might be warranted. Jacques Lacan and his 
audiences were molded in the climate created by Michel Fou-
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cault and the post-war suspicion of social engineering in France. 
But across the Channel, welfarism in Britain implied a very dif-
ferent view of the individual within his society — perhaps a ma-
ternal view of a nurturing culture (Zaretsky 1999). A different 
psychoanalysis burgeoned. 
Fluid identities
In the object-relations approach, identity is a matter of relations, 
and to a degree follows Freud’s (1921) view that psychology is 
more or less always social psychology; i.e., it is always about 
relations with the family, first, and then expanded into social 
relations growing out of those early ones. Freud quoted Gustave 
LeBon (1895) to the effect that a person is not quite the same in 
a group as he is when alone. The fact that social relations affect 
personal identity therefore has a long history in classical psy-
choanalysis. Freud (1921) put a lot of effort into understanding 
how this happened. He used his notion of introjection, which 
at the time he called “identification” (Freud 1917). Something of 
society, in the form of the people to whom the subject relates, 
gets inside the person, and significantly affects the way that 
person feels, thinks, and behaves. Not only is personal identity 
influenced by a group, but it is influenced in different ways ac-
cording to the group of which one is presently a member. Thus 
personal identity has a potential to reshape itself as one moves 
from group to group during one’s day. I can say that when I write 
my academic papers sitting in my sun-lounge, I am reaching for 
a particular identification, and that is somewhat modified from 
the “me” that goes and feeds the horses in the stables, or the 
“me” that reads a bed-time story to one of my grand-children. 
These are performances; the fluid movement between each is 
absolutely in line with the queer theory proposition about the 
fluidity of human sexuality. Thus identifications may be chosen, 





The dominant notion of the individual is a discrete, stand-
alone individual, with satisfactions to satisfy, and ambitions to 
achieve. No matter that the nature of this identity has varied 
from the rationalist “Cogito ergo sum” to the consumerist, “ I 
am what I buy,” the individual is expected to experience himself 
as a relatively inflexible monument of human nature. In con-
trast, since 1917, when Freud used the term “identification,” a 
psychoanalytic version of a highly flexible inner world of iden-
tifications has become relatively commonplace. A kaleidoscopic 
representative world inside each person, suggests that psychoa-
nalysis is counter-cultural, not positing a from-the-beginning 
unitary individual. Freud (1923) referred to the ego as “a precipi-
tate of abandoned object-cathexes” (29), a kind of psychic ward-
robe of potential identities. Through the day I am selecting from 
the “identity-wardrobe” of my unconscious, what I will “be” for 
the moment. There is a sense in which the individual is a truly 
disaggregated person.2 Psychoanlysis never developed this into 
a proper theorization that could have helped queer theory.3
Within and amongst this whirlwind of possible identifica-
tions where is “identity” found? A sense of personal identity 
is socially prescribed out there; and at the same time, psycho-
analytically-speaking, there is a churning mass of possibilities 
inside here. And yet, for most of us, some “thing” holds all the 
possibilities together, and for that we might continue to use the 
term “identity,” as opposed to the separate potentialities of the 
identifications. Through all these variegated identifications, 
there is a thread which knows it is me all the time. There is a 
kind of “core” left, which keeps safe the knowledge of who it is 
that performs unconsciously in these identification roles (Hin-
shelwood 1989, 1997). One might think of Donald Winnicott’s 
2 The serial assumption of identifications might be better called multiple 
rather than fluid (Balick 2008)
3 Judith Butler (Salih 2002) has made significant headway in thinking 
through this notion of internalized identities. 
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(1960) phrase, a sense of “the continuity of being” (591), which 
if interrupted leads potentially towards psychosis. This is a very 
slimmed-down role for the notion of “identity,” the stability of 
which is an existential necessity. In this sense identity is to be 
distinguished from “identification.” Identity is thus a potential-
ity, a hitching post onto which different identifications may be 
hung, according to the unconscious influencing of social groups 
and relationships.
I offer this as a working model to render the war between es-
sentialism and constructivism more manageable then it normal 
is between disciplines across the social/individual boundary. As 
Ian Craib (1995) remarked:
My professional life is divided between sociology and psycho-
analysis (as a group psychotherapist) and I have become used 
to the idea that these two worlds know nothing about each 
other and that when sociologists comment on emotion, they 
do so with the same sensitivity and understanding that psy-
choanalysts display when commenting on society — which is 
(to put not too fine a point on it) none at all. (151)
This book is dedicated to straddling the disciplines and there-
fore the antagonism of the essentialist/constructivist battle-
ground. In the formulation in this section, there exists some sort 
of essential experience of identity — though at the outset it is 
empty; whilst there is no doubt that what fills in the empty cat-
egory of identity is a set of multiple identifications, precipitates 
of relational experiences as they have been performed and expe-
rienced, and moreover as they have been implicitly required by 
the prevailing discourse. The value of such a distinction between 
identity and identifications has not, to my knowledge, been as 
productively explored in queer theory as it might.
Sexuality and Stability
However if the stability of personal identity is necessary to avoid 
consequences as bad as psychosis, then fluidity is likely to be 
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personally threatening. The nature of the ego and other aspects 
of personal identity have become the focus of psychoanalytic 
examination since Freud’s (1911, 1914) consideration of narcis-
sism, and have over the years become a more dominant tradi-
tion. The stability of the ego has taken precedence in the treat-
ment situation over the conflicts within it.
In some cases, sexuality may be a support to an identity 
where it is felt by the subject to be weak or inconstant or frag-
mented. Certainly, sexual identity is a common enough notion, 
and something which many people feel a need to be sure of in 
themselves and others (Balick 2010). It can bolster the sense of 
self, and the relatedness in one’s environment. Perhaps the sex-
ual revolution of the twentieth century, which psychoanalysis 
helped to promote, may have in fact enhanced the need in many 
quarters for a clear sexual identity. To adopt a strategy of fluid 
sexual identity may therefore be problematic by undermining 
some more foundational sense of stability and inner security. 
One major support to stable identity is the physical entity of the 
body. This might be less well expressed by, “who am I?” than if 
we changed it to, “where am I?” I am where this organic, lump-
ish body of mine is. My sense of being is indissolubly glued to 
this physical mass. So, one of the massive resources for bolster-
ing a sense of identity is one’s body, its felt existence, and most 
intensely, the sexual feelings which are as glued to the body as 
the sense of identity. 
The view of identity as a core element of psychological stabil-
ity is essentialist, and so works against the basically Foucauldian 
notion of the social construction of identity. One problem is that 
social constructionism equates identifications (performances) 
with identity. On that score, its undermining of enduring iden-
tifications with specific sexual performances makes sense as 
a campaign against sexual prejudices of various kinds. At the 
same time it threatens the sense of identity. But if we unhook 
identity from identification, then a campaign against a stable 
identification does not destabilize a core sense of identity. 
I would claim in fact that I am following Freud by describ-
ing identifications as fluid, whilst identity is a stable fulcrum. It 
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is important therefore in promoting a “fluidity of sexual iden-
tity,” that it is sexual identifications — i.e., performances — that 
should be fluid. Such a conceptual strategy entails acknowledg-
ing an essentialist basis for identity; it is an innate potential, a 
given; but in the formulation I propose, identity is content free. 
That is, the ego may freely explore a wide variety of identifica-
tions (including sexual performances) without loss of its needed 
stability.
Freedom and Ethics
Identifications are mostly constituted by performance. And sex-
uality is a performance with another who is equally performing 
within an identification. So, sexual identifications are performa-
tive and relational. Because they are actions in the context of 
relationships with other sexual “actors,” they therefore have an 
integral ethical aspect. Thus an identification sought by one per-
son, implies a complementary identification accepted by their 
partner. As a result good/bad evaluations creep back into sexual 
preferences and performances. What does one partner press his 
other to perform? It is unrealistic to plead for a non-judgmental 
attitude to all sexual acts since, clearly, some sexual relations can 
be violating, either bodily, financially or psychologically. 
And license for even straight sex can only be seriously allowed 
between consenting adults. In addition, some relations, even 
when sexual satisfactions are freely agreed, e.g., extra-marital 
affairs, have to be carefully negotiated with an eye to the benefits 
and deficits for all concerned. In short, the identifications taken 
up require the consenting agreement of partners to reciprocate. 
In many cases of course — no problem. Very many straight cou-
ples are happy enough to divide up the binaries: active-passive, 
thrusting-receptive, etc., etc., in a relatively long-standing ar-
rangement — though some couples will alternate in various im-
aginative inventions. However such performative compliance 
could be forced on the partner — and sado-masochism is a case 
in point. In the extreme, a rapist will automatically require his 
“other” to suffer the identification of a rape victim. As is well 
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known, the fantasy of being a rape victim is not uncommon at 
all, but the ethical situation makes the actual performance of 
such an identification very problematic. 
So there are inevitably limiting conditions to performative 
identifications since they require compliance with a comple-
mentary identification. This ethical aspect to sexuality as rela-
tional may not sit well with the standard notion of self-actual-
ization for everyone. But self-actualization carried to extremes 
can warrant exploitative violations of others.4 Identifications 
which require the other’s compliance with a complimentary 
identification should be limited by the usual informed consent. 
Finally, there is a question if sexual performers should be fluid, 
and whether that is already a directive on the way to a sort of 
rigid counter-prejudice. Such a requirement needs to be permis-
sory, not obligatory — that is to say, society could permit fluid 
sexualities, rather than oblige people to be more fluid.
Inner Performance and Ethical Boundaries
Even with solitary masturbation, there is invariably an accom-
panying “masturbatory phantasy” about some sexual object 
however inanimate or fetishistic. The adoption of an identifica-
4 The severe restriction of identification, including sexual identifications, is a 
violation of the personality. Such constriction of others into performances 
could be the basis of a psychoanalytical formulation of unethical action at 
an unconscious level. That is a principle of personal integration, and can be 
a basis for professional and general ethics (Hinshelwood 1997), as well as 
being applicable to an ethics of sexual roles and performances. A Kleinian 
version of this principle would involve the notion of splitting; the comple-
mentary identifications are separated (split) apart. The phenomenology of 
unconscious splitting in a Kleinian mold would allow more subtle under-
standing of the adoption of one or other complementary identifications. A 
splitting that is permanent and unhealing, leaving the partners wedded to 
a particular identification, would probably be unethical, whereas a splitting 
in which the identifications are fluid would be ethical (perhaps even iden-
tification with non-compliance). Whether such a principle of unconscious 
splitting could ever be part of a formal ethics is debatable; as is the question 
whether (given the human unconscious) such an unconscious principle 
could even be completely excluded from a workable ethics.
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tion implies at the outset an inner performance with an other 
(internal object). Inward performances are potentially as arous-
ing and as satisfying as proximity with an actual other. In fact, 
no sexual action takes place without it being action with the 
“other in the mind.” In the inner arena, the ethical constraints 
are relaxed. Murder in the mind is not murder. So too are ex-
ploitation and violation in the mind. Ethical issues arise when 
inner fantasy is transferred to an actual partner. Then freedom 
and ethics may clash. 
However this “innocent” internal activity becomes an impor-
tant consideration because some people may have a weak sense 
of that boundary between inner and actual. For them it is easy to 
overstep the mark. And it may be the case that for most of us, at 
high levels of intense arousal, the boundary is much more easily 
breeched — people are tempted to “let go” if extremely excited. 
As a result, society has taken on itself a policing function as a 
means of protecting the vulnerable. And perhaps it should, but 
it seems to have stepped from policing a boundary to control-
ling the inner life of personal fantasy. Maybe that inward polic-
ing is exemplified in the actual policing of sexual material on 
the internet.
However the social policing job is strongly assisted by the 
subject himself. Even to imagine oneself a homosexual can be-
come a self-loathing. This is understood by psychoanalysts as 
the function of the super-ego. However, on occasions — and 
non-straight sex is one of those occasions — the super-ego over-
functions through being socially supported. Both internal fac-
tors and external social forces aim at “civilizing” individuals. 
Excessive policing over and above the real requirement is not 
uncommon, and was termed “surplus repression” by Herbert 
Marcuse (1955). This civilizing principle seems to derive from 
the economic requirements of society — and repression of sexu-
ality is sublimated in labor activity. The apparatus of the super-
ego appears to be the point of access by which the social exerts 
its intrusive influence over the individual, whether economic or 
ethical. The essential plasticity and polymorphous nature of hu-
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man sexuality is the site upon which social forces most easily 
and frequently play.
Queer theory engages with the judgmentalism about sexual 
performances, and it can deploy a counter-judgement, a preju-
dice against prejudice! It requires a stronger theory of prejudice. 
Invalid evaluations of conduct, normalizing and pathologizing 
need some reference to the psychoanalytic theory of the super-
ego. That is to say we need to understand exactly how social 
norms get inside the individual. A straightforward appeal to 
the pressurizing effects of power may not be sufficient. It would 
seem at least necessary to consider that there are internal mech-
anisms for receiving and accepting such socializing pressures. 
It would seem at least necessary to consider that such a two-
sided knife sustains the wounds of prejudice. Given the resist-
ance that prejudice always displays towards dissolving away, it 
would seem a little lacking in flexibility not to consider all the 
possibilities.
Prescription versus Description
Restricted to a social power theory of personality construc-
tion, there are therefore equally restricted possibilities for ac-
tion. Power theories are one of the reasons for the temptation 
to counter-judge others, and to attempt to create a “powerful” 
restatement of sexual norms and mores, in order to change the 
dominant class and the dominant language traditions. Such a 
prescriptive approach is understandably tempting. But queer 
theory itself is culture-bound and socially located. Are there al-
ternatives to a confrontation of power — a frequently sterile con-
frontation between the traditional and the progressive?
A kind of praxis that is not prescriptive — for instance, de-
scriptive — must be a possibility. At its best psychoanalysis it-
self is a descriptive “science,” not a prescriptive brainwashing 
(though psychoanalysis can often seem so). In fact, what psy-
choanalysts do is to give a description as best they can of inter-
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nal states, addressed to the very state of mind itself.5 There is a 
power in simply revealing the state of affairs. To turn once again 
to the old-fashioned terminology of Western Marxism, pointing 
out the falseness of a false consciousness is empowering (Lukács 
1920); and this prompted the development over the years of a 
strategy for “consciousness raising.” Queer theory might adopt 
such a program of its own; that is to gain the conscious aware-
ness of at least a Western population, of the polymorphous na-
ture of human sexuality. This is the message of Freud’s (1905)
early ambiguous book, “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexual-
ity.” There is passivity buried in the most active of sexual ac-
tors, there is sado-masochism in all-loving encounters, there are 
aspects of homosexuality that are foundational in heterosexual 
relationships.
Conclusions
Queer theory applies where queer prejudice is. Psychoanalysis 
has not always been a solid ally. But there is a radical and criti-
cal leverage in the British object-relations tradition. It brings 
the pre-occupations with relationships into the inner reality of 
the individual, and at the same time, a much closer correspond-
ence with the social relatedness of human beings to each other. 
The notion results in a picture of a changing, fluid world of un-
conscious connections to others, to groups. That this everyday 
journey around one’s inner population is relatively freer as far 
as non-sexual living is concerned should promise the possibility 
of a continual loosening up of the sexual identifications. This 
implies a stabilized identity (without specific characteristics) 
within a world of identifications.
As Stephen Frosh (2006) concluded in his not-unsympathet-
ic critique of psychoanalysis, “That psychoanalysis has a long 
5 It is true that psychoanalysts do not address themselves to the social in-
fluences of power and privilege in the context in which their analysands 
live, but that is because psychoanalysis is not about that. It is about internal 
states. That is what psychoanalysis is good at, but analysts should not deny 
the impact of factors and forces outside their own ken.
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road to travel before it comes to terms with homosexuality can 
hardly be in doubt, but perhaps the journey begins here” (250). 
He meant that sexuality should allow for differences and mul-
tiplicity. The fact that the broad potential for sexualities may be 
prematurely and unnecessarily cut off in many people, seems to 
be a matter of social prescription, and psychoanalytic descrip-
tion. 
Though psychoanalysis has a reflective and descriptive in-
tent, this has not prevented it being used in that normalizing 
way — given the powerful prejudicial tendencies in all mem-
bers of (at least Western) society. Nor have psychoanalysts been 
particularly reticent about the use of psychoanalysis itself as 
gatekeeper to the profession and its Institutes. Instead of the 
knee-jerk reaction, homosexuality bad, heterosexuality good, it 
would be better to investigate if there are patterns of unhealth 
specific for homosexuality, and moreover the patterns of un-
health specific for heterosexuality, as well. Don’t we need the 
courage to explore on either side?
Rightly queer theory has not always been respectful of psy-
choanalysis and it is laudable that a serious attempt to engage 
with psychoanalysis has been promoted. Psychoanalysis has 
become accustomed now, like queers, to the odium of being so-
cially off-center. There appear to be grounds for an encounter 
between the two which might give both more substance, or will 
each continue to emphasize the other’s oddity? Psychoanalysis 
when abroad from the treatment situation, needs the reminder 
that we are all social beings; whilst queer theory needs the help 
to understand the disavowed “essence” of people’s identity. We 
can hope with the help of this book that the mutual sensitivity 
and understanding that Craib called for might be forthcoming.
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Queer as a New Shelter from Castration
Abe Geldhof and Paul Verhaeghe1
Introduction
Somewhere in his diaries, Søren Kierkegaard (1998) wonders 
about how Jesus Christ would react when asked to prove that 
he is really the son of God. If he really is, Kierkegaard says, then 
he would not prove it, because his existence is the proof. If Je-
sus were to comply with the request to prove it, he would make 
himself appear not to be the son of God. Lacan (1986[1959–60]) 
says something similar about the perversion of Sade. In his sev-
enth seminar on ethics he notes that the more Sade shouts not 
to be bound by any law, the more it becomes clear that the Law 
remains indestructible at its core (225–41).
Jesus Christ doesn’t prove he is Jesus Christ because he is Je-
sus Christ: his existence is the proof. Sade, on the other hand, 
has to prove ceaselessly that he is not bound by any law, but in 
producing transgression after transgression, it becomes obvious 
that his pleasure is only possible because of the law. Without the 
law no transgression is possible. The silence of being contrasts 
sharply with the shrieking noise of discourse.
This train of thought is very instructive for queer theory and 
for psychoanalytical practice. If somebody were to be really 
queer, then he would have no reason to prove it. The fact that 
1 We would like to thank Sue Feldman, who was our first reader. 
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some people try to prove to others they are queer, again and 
again, only reveals ever more sharply that they aren’t. They only 
work their fingers to the bone for some obscure Other. They 
remain bound to some queer God.
To be or not to be, that’s still the question. Different ap-
proaches are proposed through the different chapters in the first 
section of Clinical Encounters. Queer gives some people an iden-
tity. Queer is also a discourse that started as an underground 
movement, and that in the meantime has been recuperated by 
the university discourse. For others, queer is a name for their 
perversion. Other perspectives are possible. We put ours for-
ward in a deliberately provocative way: queer is a new shelter 
from castration. Just as Lacan (1973[1964]) says on atheism in 
his eleventh seminar that the myth that God is dead is noth-
ing but a shelter from castration (29; 45), queer also is a way 
to refuse castration, proving how speaking beings are bound to 
castration.
People who identify with the signifier queer can only love 
queer because it’s a name for their jouissance. What else is queer, 
if it is not jouissance? It is the jouissance of the body that is con-
sidered to be queer. One can never fully identify with one’s own 
body and can never totally control the jouissance that erupts 
from this body. One’s body remains always to some extent 
strange to oneself, it remains heteros. Using the word queer for 
one’s identity seems to be nothing more than a failing attempt to 
control one’s jouissance (Lacan 1986[1959–60]; Declercq 2004; 
Verhaeghe 2001, 65–132).
Queer as one of the Names-of-the-Father
This is one of the most important aspects of queer: it’s all about 
the act of naming. In this sense queer might be considered one 
of the Names-of-the-Father. It gives a name to one’s jouissance. 
By saying this, we must realize that the act of naming in itself is 
not “good” or “bad.” Sometimes it can have pernicious effects 
when naming pins one down to the signifier. Nevertheless, eve-
rybody (every body) needs to be named via the Other, or oth-
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erwise no subjectivity is possible. Still, the radical split between 
the Symbolic and the Real remains. The act of naming always 
fails at a certain point. In the case of the signifier queer we must 
ask where the act of naming fails. While the ordinary signifiers 
of homosexuality and heterosexuality refer to an object choice, 
queer is a signifier used for another kind of identity, one that 
tries to escape being defined by this object choice. The signifier 
queer refers to a choice for an enjoyment; implicitly, queer is 
opposed to “the straights” who are often seen as people who do 
not enjoy.
Queer theory therefore seems to have enlarged Immanuel 
Kant’s three fundamental philosophical questions: What can I 
know? What do I have to do? What may I hope? Queer theory 
doesn’t answer Kant’s questions, but adds a fourth one: How can 
I enjoy? And more specifically: How can I reach my enjoyment?
The question is interesting, but by giving an answer to it 
we find ourselves immediately in a deadlock. There lies an im-
portant difference between queer theory and psychoanalytic 
practice. Queer theory tries to sell itself as a new answer to a 
question that is not explicit in Kant, although it is as old as hu-
manity itself. Psychoanalysis for its part does not answer this 
question, but tries to make it conscious while accepting that ab-
solute enjoyment is not attainable for any speaking being. Lacan 
(1966[1960]) insists a lot on this impossibility: “jouissance is 
forbidden for the one who speaks” (821).
Today, it becomes clear that people have abandoned the old 
ideals, seen as conservative. Ideals are normative, and thus they 
are bad. In the place of the ideal, the contemporary subject has 
the object a that steers his life, which is typical for a capitalistic 
era. This is a remark Lacan (2001[1970]) made in Radiophonie. 
He called this switch “the rise at the social zenith of the object 
called by me small a” (414). Jacques-Alain Miller (2002) formal-
ized this as follows: I < a. With these remarks in mind, we can 
consider Queer as one of the Oedipal vicissitudes in an era dur-
ing which the belief in the Other of the Other declines, and in 
which as a consequence the object a emerges.
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Being born as a male or female is one of the most contin-
gent factors in life, but no matter how obvious this contingency 
might be for some subjects, one still has to do something with it. 
Even more so: it is a necessity to do something with the contin-
gencies of life. And one always clashes with the impossibility of 
a final answer. With this, we have introduced three terms Lacan 
(1975[1972–73]; 1991[1969–70]) places in mutual relation: con-
tingency, necessity, and impossibility.
Necessity is, so to speak, the upper layer. Every speaking be-
ing is confronted with the Real of the drive and the question of 
how to handle the jouissance of the body. Gender is already an 
answer to this question, and thus a defense to the impossibility 
that lays beyond. Introducing gender as a solution is thus noth-
ing but another formulation of the same problem (Verhaeghe 
2004). Impossibility therefore can be considered as the lower 
layer and is much more difficult than necessity.
Some extreme representatives of the queer movement seem 
to refuse the classical distinction between man and woman. 
By doing this, they avoid not only the impossibility, but they 
also avoid the necessity to set about the task of doing some-
thing with the contingency of gender. Meanwhile they install, 
in their refusal of this classic dichotomy of man and woman, a 
new dichotomy, the one of straight and queer. In this way queer 
is nothing other than an illustration of its own failure. One dif-
ference between two categories is replaced by another difference 
between two categories. While in the first dichotomy the identi-
fication with one of the sexes is central, in the second dichotomy 
the identification with a way of enjoying is central. But both of 
them show the same deadlock of every binary dichotomy. To 
say it simply: the first element needs the second element to be 
placed in opposition to it.
Other binaries that have been made in psychoanalytical the-
ory are the ones between passive and active, and between Eros 
and Thanatos. Both of these binaries introduce more problems 
than solutions. Lacan’s critique of the active/passive opposition 
is that in identifying masculinity with activity and feminin-
ity with passivity, one tries to make man and woman a com-
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plementary couple. Implicitly this distinction hides a belief in 
such things as a sexual relationship between man and woman. 
For Lacan (1966[1958]) femininity must not be thought of as 
complimentary to masculinity, but as a supplement, what is 
also referred to as the not-all (“le pas tout” of Lacan). As for the 
distinction between a life drive and a death drive, Lacan says 
the opposition is true as long as it is considered two aspects of 
the same drive. For Lacan (1966[1960]) there is only one drive 
and this drive is virtually a death drive. When pushed through, 
every drive is a death drive.
As several authors in the book note, the attempts to define 
what queer means conflicts with what queer would like to be. 
The attempts to define something undefinable show us how 
radically we are cut off from it. Queer is an impossible position. 
We can redefine it with Lacan’s terminology where he distin-
guishes subject and object. The subject is radically cut off from 
the object, i.e., from the jouissance of his body. Psychoanalysis 
now defines its position in the failure of the identification of the 
subject with his body, while queer theory attempts to identify 
the subject with his body, i.e., its jouissance.
Symbolic Castration and the Logic of the Not-All
By choosing not to identify with the symbolically determined 
difference between man and woman, one tries to hide from cas-
tration. Here one has to distinguish between real, imaginary and 
symbolic castration. Real castration is something Lacan focuses 
on in his tenth seminar. It points to the fact that the body has its 
limits, with the penis as paradigm, in which it’s clear that men 
can’t enjoy without limit because the orgasm is at the same time 
typically its limit. Imaginary castration is stressed by Lacan in 
his fourth seminar. It is the classic neurotic fantasy about the 
father frustrating the child by taking away his object of jouis-
sance. This is a fantasy in which neurotics often believe in order 
to avoid a primordial symbolic castration. The latter is the effect 
of the Symbolic: the subject ex-sists outside the Real. As a result, 
every discourse is ultimately a semblance. To understand the 
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discussion about queer we must remember that the Symbolic or-
der with its castrating effect is already there, before the entrance 
of any subject. By refusing the phallic distinction between man 
and woman, it’s this symbolic castration that is whisked away. 
“Not choosing is not losing,” might be their hidden motto. Iden-
tifying with one signifier within a binary reasoning automati-
cally means the impossibility of identifying with the opposite 
signifier. Identifying as a man means you’re not a woman. This 
interpretation of queer now creates the illusion of mending the 
not-all. At least that is the hope. But for queer subjects, jouis-
sance is just as unreachable as it is for others. The fact that they 
have to affirm over and over again that they are queer shows 
us that they are not that queer after all and that jouissance slips 
through their fingers as it does for everyone.
In this line of reasoning, queer does not indicate the presence 
of a perverse structure. Queer is just a signifier that can be used 
by every subject, whatever its structure: neurosis, psychosis or 
perversion. Identifying with the signifier queer doesn’t say any-
thing about the structure of the subject.
In a certain sense the discourse about queer is both the op-
posite of and the same as the scientific discourse. Whereas the 
scientific discourse believes fully in biological determinacy, the 
queer discourse stresses that everything is socially constructed. 
In both cases there is a tendency to a logic of the “all.” The scien-
tific discourse tends to put all belief in a biological cause, while 
the queer discourse tends to place their bet fully on cultural 
constructions. This leads queer theorists to invent concepts 
like “determined indeterminacy,” to recover the deadlock in 
their theory. But just because everything is socially constructed 
doesn’t mean that there are no real limits that the sexed subject 
must recognize. Both these discourses can’t be maintained. Not 
all is biological, not all is socially constructed. 
Clinical Illustration: The Case of Michel h.
To illustrate our line of reasoning and its implication for psy-
choanalytic practice, it is interesting to refer to one of Lacan’s 
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lesser known case studies, the case of Michel H., a psychotic 
transsexual man. Michel H. is presented in the same period as 
his seminar on the sinthome, in a clinical presentation at which 
Lacan (1996[1976]) assisted. Michel H. would not have called 
himself queer, nor would Lacan have done so, but we introduce 
this case study because it is clear that Michel H. is at odds with 
himself at the point of sexual identity and object choice, and 
because his solution is not a typical one.
Michel H. tells Lacan that from infancy he has been jealous 
of his sisters. He would have liked to have been in their shoes, 
or even more particularly, their clothes. Secretly he dressed up 
as a woman, and upon Lacan’s questioning, he clarifies that the 
accent is on the underwear. “Having clothes on my body, gives 
me pleasure. Not a sexual pleasure, but a pleasure at the level 
of the heart, for my inner self ” (313). He stresses that he has the 
character of a woman and enumerates some stereotypical char-
acteristics, like “I am soft” and so on. According to his own ac-
count, he has botched up his school time, because he always had 
to think about “that problem there.” Once he tried to castrate 
himself literally with a rusty knife, but he didn’t dare to. “After 
all,” he says, “I didn’t have such a bad infancy because I could 
dress up secretly” (313).
On his sexual relations with men or women, he says he 
couldn’t feel like a woman in the arms of a man, nor could he 
feel like a man in the arms of a woman. Finally he had to con-
clude that he didn’t feel attracted to men or women. He describes 
sexual acts as pleasures he cannot refuse. Once he is driven into 
the arms of a woman, he gets in a spiral he can’t get out of any-
more and he must go on. It’s a point of no return for him. “You 
don’t get out of it anymore. I had to do it” (329). When asked 
by Lacan who primed this spiral, he answers: “both,” but then 
he thinks for a moment and answers that she might be the one 
who started it. We can see illustrated here how in his sexual re-
lations the initiative comes from the Other. It’s the Other who 
starts an act that is experienced by the subject as pressing and 
difficult to stop. An intervention of the analyst could be at this 
point to say that he doesn’t have to comply with the demand of 
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the Other. At first sight one could see a similarity here between 
psychoanalysis and queer theory. Queer theory is saying that 
subjects do not need to organize their sexuality around the de-
mand of a contingent, socio-historical construction of sexuality 
by foregrounding different ways sexuality has been or could be 
conceived. The point we must stress here is that this interven-
tion doesn’t aim arbitrarily at a social construction, but at the 
jouissance of the Other. For this psychotic subject the jouissance 
of the Other is traumatic, and the intervention aims at emptying 
out the jouissance of the Other. 
Masturbating is something he doesn’t do in a typical male 
manner, but rather in a female way. He can only come to a cli-
max by keeping his hand between his thighs and pushing on 
his penis. Twice in his life he tried to masturbate in a male way, 
but this had hurt him too much. For the same reason he doesn’t 
slide the prepuce backwards. In this phenomenon we can see 
that there is no libidinal investment in the organ, but rather 
there is a radical foreclosure of the phallic function. Hence, jou-
issance remains all around the body, and is not regulated by its 
openings.
“I never felt as a male […] I only live to be able to be a wom-
an, I’m not interested in anything else” (317, 331). To be able 
to feel more like a woman, he takes all kinds of drugs. Being 
slightly doped helps him to better feel his character. “I forgot 
everything, except that I was a woman” (325).
His attempts to create a sexual identity are very unstable. The 
only options that remain after many years are an operation or 
suicide. He is quite radical in this. If he cannot become a wom-
an, he chooses to stop his life. Earlier he had actually tried to 
commit suicide, and at the time of his interview with Lacan, he 
had stopped almost all social interaction. Because people jeered 
at him too much, he didn’t come out anymore. Once he stayed 
in his room for a week, and as a consequence he didn’t eat, even 
though there was a store nearby. One day, dressed as woman, he 
smashed a mirror to pieces.
Lacan seems to be pessimistic about a psychoanalytic treat-
ment for this man, but that doesn’t mean one can’t do anything. 
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The analyst might function as a guarantor for castration, as a 
guarantee for what Lacan calls the “pas-tout,” the “not-all.” In 
this case, one can confirm that the body and gender identity is 
problematic for everyone, and that an operation will not solve 
everything, let alone provide a final solution. Other, less radi-
cal solutions might be invented, even though one doesn’t think 
about them immediately. The expectation that a surgical treat-
ment at the level of the real of the body can solve everything is 
very pernicious for the subject. If this expectation is not fulfilled 
after the operation, nothing remains. An analyst shall therefore 
never subscribe to this hope, but places himself at the side of the 
“pas-tout” to help the subject to find other solutions, without the 
certainty or the finality.
Conclusion
What is really queer, is jouissance. In the last resort the whole 
discussion about gender and queer is nothing but a defense 
against the queerness of jouissance and the contingencies of 
life. Beyond gender and queer, a much more difficult problem 
hides. Lacan’s differentiation between the other jouissance and 
phallic jouissance permits us to rethink the classic mind/body 
deadlock in a larger topological structure. There is no binary 
opposition between body and soul, between being and Other, 
between man and woman, between phallic jouissance and the 
other jouissance. In each case there is a gap between the two that 
causes a further evolution to yet another binary, in which one of 
the terms tries to regain the other but never succeeds because of 
a structural incompatibility, thus forcing this attempt towards 
yet another level. 
In this way, the gap between being and signifier is repro-
duced in the gap between woman and man. In our opinion, 
what we have here is the complete elaboration of the ontological 
structure announced by Lacan in 1949 in his paper on the mir-
ror stage. Human beings are always divided between something 
that they are not or do not have, and something that they will 
never be or never have. The Lacanian subject lacks all substance 
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and its supposedly underlying “being” is always lost at the very 
moment it is supposed to appear. That is why it is condemned to 
a structurally-determined form of never-being-there. Hence the 
paradoxical fact that the essence of the Lacanian subject comes 
down to its lacking any kind of essence whatever, and that the 
whole accent has to be put on its divided character.
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The Redress of Psychoanalysis
Ann Murphy
Poetry does not intervene in the actual, but by offering conscious-
ness a chance to recognise its predicaments, foreknow its capacity 
and rehearse its comeback in all kinds of venturesome ways, it of-
fers a response […] which has a liberating and verifying effect upon 
the individual spirit. 
— Heaney 1995, 2.
Seamus Heaney’s eloquent apologia on behalf of poetry cap-
tures more accurately than most psychoanalytic texts my own 
way of thinking about the practice of psychoanalysis. Thinking 
through poetry may be my antidote to some tendencies in psy-
choanalytic theory, language and practice towards institutional-
ized rigidity, with its focus on the adaptive and the normative, as 
opposed to the radical sense of the singularity and uniqueness 
of the individual, which is the gift of psychoanalysis at its best. 
Postmodern, social constructionist critiques of gender, sexu-
ality, and identity have challenged essentialist psychoanalytic 
notions of psychosexual development, fixed gender identity, 
and stable sexual orientation. Such critiques challenge psycho-
analysts to recognize and interrogate assumptions that we hold 
about sexuality, identity, gender, and subjectivity, and to address 
the contradictions that have permeated psychoanalytic think-
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ing on these questions, all the way back to Freud’s radical, con-
flicted, disorderly, multiply revised, and exuberantly footnoted 
“Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905).
The first part of this volume offers an exploration of queer 
theory ranging from considerations of identity, desire, and 
pleasure, through perversion, ethics, and discourse. These texts 
invite the practicing analyst to engage in a dialogue with queer 
thinking on gender, sexuality, and identity, to explore the poten-
tial insights offered by the undermining of simplistic binaries, 
and to question familiar narratives of psychosexual life. My ini-
tial encounter with the ideas that have informed queer theory 
was in Gender Trouble (1990). Judith Butler’s text had usefully 
challenged the simple binaries of sexual and gender identity, 
and argued that, far from being natural or inevitable expres-
sions of an essential femininity or masculinity, gender roles are 
performative, a series of citations that constitute us as gendered 
subjects — “gender is always a doing, but not a doing by a sub-
ject who might be said to pre-exist the deed” (33).
From the point of view of a clinician, while aptly critiquing 
the exclusionary impact of restrictive and oppressive gender 
normativity, the apparent political voluntarism of her position 
appeared to leave little space for a concept of the unconscious, 
and seemed to announce a utopian project for a new, gendered 
way of life promising freedom from constraint. It appeared to 
propose a menu of options to be consumed, gender as commod-
ity, with the implicit specter of this newly gendered subject as 
commodity par excellence. While challenging simplistic duali-
ties and binaries within psychoanalytic and cultural narratives 
of identity, she proposed the alternative norms and binaries of 
fluid versus fixed, incoherent versus coherent. In her preface to 
the 1999 edition of the text, she addresses some of these criti-
cisms, stating that “the positive normative vision of this text […] 
cannot take the form of a prescription: ‘subvert gender in the 
way that I say and life will be good’” (xxi), and further that “sub-
versive performances always run the risk of becoming deaden-
ing clichés through their repetition and, most importantly with-
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in commodity culture where ‘subversion’ carries market value” 
(xxi).
It was of great interest to me to have this opportunity to 
encounter a range of contemporary thinking on queer theory. 
Rather than attempting, in this brief response, to address the 
richness, diversity and complexity of the papers individually, I 
have opted to pick up certain of those strands I found most rel-
evant to my thinking and practice, addressing from time to time 
some of the individual contributions. 
Alice A. Kuzniar, in her chapter on identity, “Precarious 
Sexualities,” maps the contested territory between classical psy-
choanalytic conceptions of sexuality as “stable, fixed and […] 
identifiable as an integral part of the self ” and a definition of 
queer sexuality as “quintessentially defined by its inexplicabil-
ity, incoherence, volatility, and contingency.” There has been an 
uneasy oscillation and contestation between similar paradigms 
within psychoanalysis itself, dating back to Freud’s “Three Es-
says” (1905). He states here that “what is known as normal sexu-
al life” is a consequence of “effective restriction and other kinds 
of modification” (172), and that heterosexual object love is by no 
means a natural, inevitable development, but a learned, unstable 
process (223), and that “the exclusive sexual interest felt by men 
for women is also a problem that needs elucidating and is not 
a self evident fact” (145–46). He further challenges common-
ly-held notions of masculinity and femininity, claiming that it 
“is essential to understand that the concepts of ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary 
people, are among the most confused that occur in science” 
(219), that “pure masculinity or femininity is not to be found ei-
ther in a psychological or biological sense,” and that bisexuality 
is the decisive factor” (220) in understanding human sexuality. 
He startlingly backtracks from these radical insights, however, 
in proposing the desiring subject as exclusively masculine, and 
giving an account of female sexuality defined by a shift from ac-
tive to passive, thus rendering the woman acceptable and desir-
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able to men, who idealize “a woman who holds herself back and 
denies her sexuality” (221).1
Adam Phillips (1996) elaborates the disjunction between 
what he terms “the Enlightenment Freud,” in search of a univer-
sal theory of human development and committed to the project 
of building a strong and undivided ego in his patients, and the 
“post-Freudian Freud,” who “was questioning the very idea of 
the self as an object of knowledge” (7). The latter was the poet of 
the divided self, of the unconscious which perpetually destabi-
lizes us and makes us strangers to ourselves. Many other writers 
have commented on the oscillation between the radical Freud 
and what we might think of as the panicked Freud, who did not 
have the courage of his most revolutionary ideas (Dimen 1999; 
Bersani 1986).
Kuzniar’s juxtaposition of such binaries as stable versus mo-
bile and fixed versus fluid, raises again the extraordinary dif-
ficulty of escaping the tyranny of binary thinking, and the sense 
in which queer theory is haunted by the very dualities it seeks 
to deconstruct. I wonder whether they are inescapable because 
they form the basis and bedrock of our early mental process-
es, and carry the traces of the development of our capacity for 
thinking and representation. Melanie Klein’s (1946) concept of 
the paranoid-schizoid position, which posits a constellation of 
anxieties and defenses characteristic of early mental life, sug-
gests that such binaries represent the most primitive attempts 
at differentiation and serve to locate us vis-à-vis the other and 
the environment. And while we may develop more subtle and 
complex ways of representing ourselves and our experience 
with what Klein (1935) describes as the depressive position, the 
capacity to appreciate the ambiguity of the twenty-first century 
novel co-exists with the enduring appeal in popular culture of 
1 Many of these quotations appear as footnotes, added at various dates. There 
is something extraordinary about the abundance of footnotes in this text 
(88 in a work of 125 pages), perhaps revealing something of Freud’s struggle 
in getting the full measure of desire, and in particular of female sexuality.
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narratives of good and bad, heroes and villains. Adam Phillips 
(1997) links this dualistic logic with the fact that:
[I]n one way or another […] there are only two sexes. […] 
Starting with two sexes, as we must — described as opposites 
or alternatives or complements — locks us into a logic, a bi-
nary system that often seems remote from lived and spoken 
experience and is complicit with the other binary pairs — in-
side/outside, primary process/secondary process, sadism/
masochism, and so on — that are such a misleading part of 
psychoanalytic language. We should be speaking of paradox-
es and spectrums, not contradictions and mutual exclusions. 
(158)
Quoting David Halperin’s (1995) definition of queer as “by defi-
nition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the 
dominant” (62), Kuzniar introduces a difficulty inherent in all 
categories, suggesting the potential for queer to become another 
category of the kind it calls into question, and further that it 
depends on its relationship to a category of the normal and the 
legitimate for its existence, since outside that relationship there 
is “nothing in particular to which it refers. It is an identity with-
out an essence” (62).
Lisa Downing, introducing her chapter on perversion, also 
contrasts queer with psychoanalytic thinking on sexuality: “for 
queer theorists, especially following Michel Foucault, sexual-
ity is a constructed epistemological category that functions to 
normalize the behaviours and bodies of social subjects […] it 
is a pervasive and power-laden lie to be exposed.” For psycho-
analysts, “it is a source of truth to be tapped,” “Queer takes the 
theory of performativity as its explicatory model to account for 
the ways in which subjects learn to ‘do’ their genders and sexu-
alities.” 
She highlights and critiques the paradoxical binary thinking 
I commented on above, focusing on a pair of concepts that are 
central to both psycho-analytic and queer thinking on sexuality 
and its perverse forms — namely fixity and fluidity. She sees the 
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privileging of the idea of fluidity in queer theory as a deficiency, 
referencing Brad Epps who proposes that it is the fetish of queer 
thinking: “Privileging the concept of fluidity leads to a concomi-
tant stigmatization of the idea of fixity, establishing an unhelpful 
binary in a body of thought that usually attempts to deconstruct 
such dualities.” She argues convincingly that this imposes on 
queer thought a programmatic tyranny that runs counter to the 
epistemological and political aims of queer theory. 
Downing’s critique extends to the prescriptive tendencies 
within queer theory that I noted in Gender Trouble, remarking 
that: 
[I]t becomes a discourse in which the ghost of what it dis-
avows — normalization — returns surreptitiously in the pre-
scription to desire appropriately, plurally, fluidly and openly. 
The embalmed object of fixity haunts the queer position be-
hind the shiny fetish of fluidity that it promotes. 
The “exemplary plural subject” proposed in queer theory, ap-
pears “performing the right number of appropriately dissident 
and different sexual practices in the correctly plural and queer 
relationship configuration.”
In his mostly appreciative commentary on “Melancholy 
Gender” in The Psychic Life of Power (Butler 1997), Adam Phil-
lips makes a similar point: 
Butler [invites us] to multiply our versions of self as some 
kind of psychic necessity, as though we might not be able 
to bear the loss of not doing so. But how many lives can the 
analyst recognise in, or demand of, his patient, and what are 
the constraints on this recognition that so easily becomes a 
demand? (156)
Charles Levin (2004), in his paper “Sexuality as Masquerade,” 
discusses David Cronenberg’s M. Butterfly, a film adapted 
from a play by David Henry Hwang. It is loosely based on a 
spy scandal involving a French diplomat (M. Gallimard) who 
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was stationed in mainland China in the 1950s, and who became 
sexually involved, and obsessed with a Chinese Communist spy 
(Song Liling), a singer with the Chinese Opera. The film and the 
play, with which I am more familiar, offer a powerful explora-
tion of gender performativity and the enigma of desire.2 Song 
was actually a man impersonating a woman, and apparently 
succeeded in concealing this fact from Gallimard throughout 
their intimate relationship. Levin comments on the difficulty of 
determining “the nature of the gender relationship in the actual 
sexual encounter:
[N]ot just referring to the fact that Song is masquerading as 
a woman, which is confusing enough, but also to the much 
more profound sense in which Gallimard may be imperson-
ating a man. […] Is this a man with a woman, or a man with 
a man, or a man pretending to be a man with a man pretend-
ing to be a woman. (121)
Levin refers to the impenetrability of the psyche and the hidden 
fantasies that render the actual anatomy no more revealing of 
the truth than the costumes. It is only many years later, at the 
espionage trial, that Gallimard is forced to confront what he had 
disavowed about the nature of their relationship. At the end of 
the play and film, imprisoned for revealing state secrets, Gal-
limard commits suicide while performing the role of Madame 
Butterfly for the other inmates. Levin comments:
Having given himself over entirely to the pursuit of Song, the 
impossible realization of his unconscious sexuality, he has no 
choice in the end but to turn himself into the object of that 
sexual desire, to actually become my butterfly, and to kill the 
elusive butterfly […] himself.
2 The film M. Butterfly was directed by David Cronenberg and released in 




Our temptation to believe that the enigma inhabiting 
the soul […] can be found and resolved in a figure of the 
real world […] is very great. The logic of submitting to this 
sublime lure is to undertake, wittingly or unwittingly, the ar-
rangements for the destruction and disposal of the self and 
its social representative, the ego. (125)
What, then, can the psychoanalyst bring back to the clinic from 
the encounter with queer theory? Most centrally, I think, a re-
newed recognition of the ethical imperative of acknowledg-
ing and confronting the fact that psychoanalysis, in common 
with all institutionalized bodies of knowledge and practice, is 
embedded in a web of cultural, social and political regimes of 
power. That we are always at risk of participating in regimes of 
discipline, regulation, and control, and, through enforcing or 
upholding corrective, conventional, prescriptive and norma-
tive approaches to human subjectivity, of becoming agents of 
oppression. 
Butler’s (1997) reminder “we are never one thing or another, 
but a miscellany” (84) recalls us to Freud’s claim that the un-
conscious always speaks more than one dialect and restores 
our sense that we are not just one thing and that we have more 
than one thing to say. As Jack Halberstam (2005) observes, “The 
power of Butler’s work […] lies in her ability to show how much 
has been excluded, rejected, and abjected in the formation of 
human community, and what toll those exclusions take on par-
ticular subjects” (153).
However, while many individuals in the clinic present nar-
ratives of suffering from the oppression of sexist, homophobic, 
racist and restrictive regimes of control and authority, my view 
of what it means to be human does not permit me to hope that 
even the most benign social and political conditions will offer 
a cure for human misery. While oppressive regimes must and 
should be contested, the human subject remains fundamen-
tally tragic, subject to loss, lack and contingency. In an effort to 
evade the psychic pain of facing loss, limitation and ultimately, 
mortality, many analysands have restricted their own possibili-
231
the redress of psychoanalysis
ties through constriction and sterile repetition. To quote Adam 
Phillips (1996), “Psychoanalytic theory is a theory of the un-
bearable, of what one prefers not to know” (13).
Desire remains stubbornly elusive, anarchic, enigmatic and 
resistant to agendas of improvement. It in no way undermines 
the ethical imperative of social and political engagement to bear 
in mind the paradox that while social approval and permission 
may have a bearing on the possibilities of pleasure, desire re-
fuses to be tamed or domesticated. It continues to be tantalized 
and thrilled by what is forbidden, dangerous and subversive. As 
Katherine Bond Stockton reminds us in her chapter on jouis-
sance, “sex is queer — riddling, elusive, excessive, and estrang-
ing — for anyone, for everyone.” In the words of that bard of 
melancholy, (Leonard Cohen) “there ain’t no cure for love.”
While some women and men who engage in a range of non-
normative sexual behavior suffer primarily as a result of social 
oppression, exclusion, and often additionally from the punish-
ment inflicted internally by a cruel and harsh superego, others 
enter analysis in the hope of finding relief from the torment 
of compulsive wishes, fantasies and behavior that they find 
morally repugnant, in conflict with their ethics, dangerous, or 
conflicting with and threatening other valued aspects of their 
lives. Others suffer because the restrictiveness and fragility of a 
particular sexual scenario makes it difficult for them to enjoy a 
desired — by them — mutuality and playfulness in their sexual 
encounters.
It can be even more difficult for a self-identified homosexual 
man or woman in a satisfactory relationship to face up to and 
acknowledge the emergence of heterosexual attraction, than for 
their heterosexual counterpart. This is understandable in terms 
of what has often been the cost of acknowledging and claiming 
their homosexual identity in the first place.
The challenge for contemporary psychoanalysis must be to 
remain committed to what is unique and particular in the in-
dividual subject, to the slow and careful work of allowing her 
to symbolize in language previously unrepresented, conflict-
ual, forbidden or disavowed wishes, desires and thoughts, and 
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to face and bear the previously evaded psychic pain of lack, 
loss and limitation. What is at stake is what Heaney (1995) also 
claims for poetry, the possibility that “consciousness can be alive 
to the different and contradictory dimensions of reality and still 
find a way of negotiating between them” (xv). Psychoanalysis is 
in a unique position to “provide the conditions where,” to quote 
Heaney again, “lacrimae rerum, the tears of things, can be ab-
sorbed and re-experienced” (xv).
And the redress of which Heaney speaks is nothing less than 
“a glimpsed alternative, a revelation of potential that is denied 
or constantly threatened by circumstances” (4). Psychoanalysis, 
like poetry, speaks to “the continual need we experience to re-
cover a past or prefigure a future …. [offering] a sensation of 
arrival and of prospect” (9). When the language of psychoanaly-
sis fails me, or has becomes over-saturated, I turn to poetry to 
re-articulate where it is I want to situate myself in the uncertain 
but privileged encounter that is the analytic project — “a place 
where the co-ordinates of the imagined correspond to and allow 
us to contemplate the complex burden of our own experience” 
(10). 
Wilfred Bion (1970) reminded us that certainty is the enemy 
of psychoanalysis, and quoting another poet (John Keats) rec-
ommended the cultivation of negative capability, the ability to 
bear “being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any ir-
ritable reaching after fact or reason” (125). Poetry, like psychoa-
nalysis, may be subject to expectations or demands that oper-
ate in a different territory: “[the activist] will always want the 
redress of poetry to be an exercise of revenge on behalf of their 
point of view” (Heaney 1995, 5).
Relatively recently, the spread of new media and the inter-
net was being hailed as the development that would loosen the 
hold of repressive regimes on their subjects — acts of oppression 
could no longer be kept secret, tyranny would be exposed, and 
people increasingly free to protest. That was a grave underes-
timation of the capacity of oppressive regimes to infiltrate and 
appropriate developments in technology and society. As it turns 
out, it is considerably more efficient and cost effective, to gather 
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information via Facebook and other social media, than through 
traditional methods of surveillance. 
Many colleagues have concurred with my own observation 
that, increasingly, the sexual difficulties one encounters in the 
clinic today relate not so much to forbidden or transgressive 
desires, but to the absence or lack of sexual desire and libido. 
Under the more subtle tyranny of global capitalism, faced with 
the increasing commodification of our most intimate wants, 
needs, desires, and preferences, it might not be surprising if, 
when we are invited to choose from the menu of possibilities 
and “choices” available to us, we should say, with Melville’s Bar-
tleby, “I would prefer not to” (1987, 22).
In Bartleby, the Scrivener, Melville renders the dilemma of a 
subject so radically trapped in the tyranny of regimes of circu-
lation that from the beginning he is a spectral presence, until 
he takes his refusal to its ultimate conclusion, since there is no 
“outside” to the circuits of exchange he wishes to escape. 
Since psychoanalysis concerns itself with individual sub-
jectivity, we might hope that it can offer those with whom we 
have the privileged and unique conversation that defines the 
analytic relationship “a fleeting glimpse of a potential order of 
things beyond confusion, a glimpse that has to be its own re-
ward” (Heaney 1995, xv).
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Queer Directions from Lacan
Ian Parker
Queer functions at its most radical as an activity rather than as 
a noun, and, as many queer activists have noticed, the reduction 
to noun-form threatens to sediment what queer “is,” especially 
to sediment it in the adaptable identities that neoliberal heter-
opatriarchal capitalism now works with so well. So, “to queer” as 
an intervention, as transformational process, already transcends 
the opposition between noun and verb while refusing to rest, 
refusing to accept a transcendent position that pretends to have 
escaped that opposition. Three moments in this transformation-
al process, in a little history of queer, lead us directly to psychoa-
nalysis, perhaps back to the psychoanalysis from which it first 
sprung, but with which, against which, queer has an uncannily-
appropriate suspicious relationship.
The first moment rehearses the unravelling of binary opposi-
tions that secure sexual identity in ostensibly biologically-wired 
distinctions between “males” and “females” and in gender cat-
egories that either replicate these distinctions or surreptitiously 
confirm their value. First wave queer, which was also a sublation 
of first and second wave feminism and pulsed through third 
wave feminism, took another binary opposition that underpins 
the relationship between man and woman — that between het-
erosexuals faithful to the coupling of one of each and homosex-
uals preferring one to the other — and emptied our attachment 
to our objects of at least that potent ideological content. Lesbian 
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and gay activism underpinned much of what was queer in this 
first moment, and it also questioned what straights took to be 
“same-sex” and showed that every sexual relationship is struc-
tured and inhabited by what is “other” to it.
The second moment, already coterminous with the first for 
many authors and readers of the key queer texts, saw the im-
plications of the critique of heteronormative sex, gender and 
sexual orientation realized in political action. It has been from 
the political dynamic of queer that signifiers such as “bisexual” 
and “transgender,” to note but two, have enrolled many more 
curious allies, including from feminism and even the left, so bi-
nary oppositions that also underpin colonialism and racializa-
tion could be cracked open. This working through of queer, a 
comprehension of what had begun to be articulated which was 
grounded in practice, disturbed the opposition between “queer 
theory” and the movement which gave it body, gave it life. Pro-
liferation of queer through the academic and sub-cultural polit-
ical landscape now takes it to a third moment in which we might 
conclude what it means for us now as something rather singular, 
if not also at the same moment, perhaps, universal.
The question psychoanalysts face now, one that not everyone 
faces but which does have a bearing on what they might expect 
to find in analysis, is how to manage what is referred to in the 
Anglo-American tradition of psychoanalysis as the “boundary” 
between the inside and outside of the clinic. Are the rippling 
effects of queer as theory and practice to be channeled into first 
wave feminist demands for the rights of women, and now of 
those claiming rights as “queer” to be represented in the train-
ing of analysts and access to therapy? Are queer claims as to the 
nature of shifts in sexual orientation to be contained by second 
wave feminist arguments that what is personal is always-already 
a version of a political question? Or are the distinctions between 
clinical space and public space themselves to be queered, to be 
viewed as problematic distinctions that maintain the question-
able integrity of the individual talking about itself to one other 
supposed to know? 
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One might imagine that Lacanian psychoanalysis would 
open its doors to a queering of the boundaries that define clini-
cal space, keen to disrupt such boundaries between “inside” and 
“outside” the consulting room. A line runs through Lacan’s own 
work, from the early engagement and then reformulation of 
“intersubjectivity” to the argument that the unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other, from the “extimate” status of the object a 
to the Moebius strip as image of the shifting status of inner and 
outer domains of the subject. This line redraws the boundaries 
of psychoanalysis so that the “subject” no longer corresponds to 
the individual, and this divided subject then becomes the site 
of an act that could be that of one or two or more bodies. On 
condition that this encounter is not reduced to two, any more 
than psychoanalysis reduces itself to the therapeutic adjustment 
of one, the analysand, to what they think they know about their 
sex. 
However, the conditions of possibility that makes sex — het-
erosex, homosex, bisex, intersex — less personal are that the 
analyst is installed as subject “supposed to know” and that this 
figure is coated and then stripped of personal characteristics 
that enable the transference to work and be worked through. 
This means that the clinical “frame” is crucial to the work, and 
it is only against the frame that transgressions of it become dis-
turbing, enervating, and fruitful. A variable length session, for 
example, provokes a degree of anxiety and urgency that has 
some calculated and some unpredictable effects by virtue of its 
organization around a nominal length of time for the session 
as such. This is a conceptual practical innovation that we learnt 
from Lacan, but it does not mean that we thereby simply repeat, 
even less imitate him when we “cut” a session and thereby mark 
an opposition between the inside and outside of the clinic. We 
do not as a rule, for example, follow Lacan’s occasional practice 
of leaving the door of the consulting room open during a ses-
sion, for while this would make what goes on between analyst 
and analysand public — at least to those in the waiting area — it 
would do so in a conventional rather than queer way. 
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Psychoanalytic space actually has to mark itself out against 
a public sphere in which psychoanalysis, for some, for many, 
forms a conventionalized grammar in which individual subjects 
speak about themselves and try to define who they are. For some 
subjects in some places, there is now more psychoanalytic dis-
course outside the clinic than inside it, a discourse that satu-
rates the way we account for misdemeanors and reflect on what 
we want, that infiltrates a sense that what we do and feel are 
not what they seem and that there is something unconscious 
at play. The danger is that the success of psychoanalysis there-
by becomes its undoing, for as a discourse it then turns from 
being a clinical practice into a worldview, which is something 
that Freud warned against but which many psychoanalysts have 
been keen to embrace. It is when psychoanalytic discourse sucks 
lesbian and gay activists into it as a worldview that it takes shape 
as something normative, which is then, of course, antithetical 
to queer. This is when it also sabotages ostensibly queer-friend-
ly psychoanalysis, embedding interpretative activity in well-
meaning therapeutic support for alternative life-styles which 
then reduce ethics to what the analyst believes to be right and 
wrong. A psychoanalytic worldview may not be a bad one, but 
it is then ideology not analysis, it maintains a frame instead of 
working inside a frame to shake things up. It repeats rather than 
questions psychoanalytic discourse as such.
This psychoanalytic discourse is fractured and politically 
ambiguous, at one moment reinforcing the taken-for-granted 
sexual division of labor and pathologizing sexual orientations 
that do not correspond to that sexual division, and at the next 
disconnecting sex from gender and sexuality from sex-role so 
as to pathologize those who shut out fantasy and reclaim the 
unconscious in different forms of counterdiscourse. This is one 
reason why the queering of sexuality as a historically-constitut-
ed epistemological category “becomes a discourse in which the 
ghost of what it disavows — normalization — returns surrepti-
tiously in the prescription to desire appropriately plurally, flu-
idly and openly” (Downing, this volume). Queer theory repeats 
psychoanalytic rhetoric because it is embedded in that rhetoric 
239
queer directions from lacan
as a pre-existing discursive frame; this is what will lead some 
writers to claim that “psychoanalysis is arguably already queer” 
(Stockton, this volume), or that “Lacanian theory lies at the 
heart of much queer thought” (Bond Stockton, this volume). 
This much is evident in the oscillation between fixed point 
and free play, between “fixity and fluidity” (Downing) in queer 
discourse, a replication of conceptual anchor points in psycho-
analytic theory — the Oedipus complex, the Name-of-the-Fa-
ther — that were always in tension with the hope that the flow of 
discourse would itself provide some kind of freedom, as “talking 
cure” or “speaking well.” The attempt to recruit Donald Winni-
cott as “the father of queer theory” (Snediker, this volume), for 
example, requires that we resignify “Winnicott” after treating 
him as one of the “squiggles” for which he has become known, 
for it is only after this reconfiguration of him as a site of “onto-
logical indeterminacy” (Snediker) that it is possible to pin him 
down again somewhere else. Another attempt has its sights on 
Jean Laplanche as an unwitting avatar of queer, but it seems that 
he will not himself provide the “inexplicability, incoherence, 
volatility, and contingency” (Kuzniar, this volume) that is asked 
of him; instead, for that, we are asked to turn to a creature more 
biddable, and look to “the unconditional nature of the dog’s af-
fection of its human companion” (Kuzniar). For some it could 
be love of a good dog, or, for others, it could be love of God 
which would, it is true, bring him closer to Lacan, with or with-
out Luce Irigaray, as a “lacking that is a having,” “the wound of 
our relations but also the only hope for the lack that, fracturing 
us, allows us to touch ourselves” (Bond Stockton). The queer 
turn could, some hope, entail a celebration of “intoxication,” the 
hope that the analyst might be “drunk on love” (Farina, this vol-
ume), which would at least be better than mainstream psychoa-
nalysis in the English-speaking world which seems to be drunk 
on knowledge. 
We must now, as we have for some time with respect to psy-
choanalytic discourse, attend to queer discourse that circulates 
in the public sphere, circulates in some forms in opposition to 
psychoanalysis and in some forms intertwined with it. What 
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was said of psychiatric categories of sexual disorder — perver-
sion and suchlike — was always as important, if not more im-
portant than what psychiatrists actually believed, for what was 
said always entered into the clinic as an explanation and posi-
tion for the subject. Now the psychoanalyst needs to know what 
is said of the different “affective communities” that are available 
as symbolic forms to which the analysand may attach them-
selves, this as much as they needed to know something about 
the nature of the family. 
So, inside the clinic Lacanians refuse to feed psychoanalytic 
discourse with a series of well-rehearsed interpretations that 
whet the appetite of the analysand for more of the same, that 
merely serve to keep the unconscious busy with the rhetorical 
forms that it enjoys so much in the outside world. Psychoanaly-
sis did, once upon a time, frustrate the demands of the analysand 
for advice, and the explanations elaborated along with interpre-
tation were out of kilter with commonsense enough for them 
to queer as well as normalize the subject. Now psychoanalysis, 
paradoxically, needs to frustrate the demand of the analysand 
for more of what they already know of themselves from psycho-
analytic discourse, to “cut” that discourse and so re-mark the 
frame of the clinic in order to make it function as a queer space.
Let us turn to a clinical case to illustrate how the psycho-
analytic frame permits a number of different moves, and how 
the analyst holds the frame so that what happens is what the 
analysand makes of it. This case is one of the very few of his own 
that Lacan describes, which may in a curious way be a func-
tion of the complex boundaries he needed to draw between 
his “private” practice and “public” teaching. The case is itself 
framed by the paper in which it is contained, “The Direction 
of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power,” in which La-
can (2006[1958]) argues against directing the patient and so also 
against molding the patient to any particular predictable psy-
choanalytic discourse. 
At first sight the scenario is really quite straight, and clas-
sically psychoanalytic. An obsessional neurotic who once suf-
fered the conflicts between his parents is now impotent with his 
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mistress, but a dream then becomes the scene for an image of a 
phallus which then reenergizes him, reawakens his desire. The 
inclusion of the case in a psychoanalytic paper by Lacan is also 
very conventional. Narrative as such is reassuring to a subject, 
suturing a place for the subject from which they spin a story 
about where they have come from and where they are going. In 
psychoanalytic case reports, narrative slots us into a linear track 
which takes us from a critique and a problem to an example and 
lessons for good theory and practice. And it works all the better 
if it is the type of case that psychoanalytic readers will recognize 
and feel comfortable with. They already know what an obses-
sional neurotic is — one of the least queer characters to appear 
in the clinic — and so the clinical account replicates, in a clear 
self-contained narrative, the nature of the analysand described 
there. 
A little more detail will help us begin to unravel this account. 
Lacan tells us that this analysand had at least come to recognize 
“the part he had played in the destructive game foisted by one 
of his parents on the other parent’s desire” (526), but he does not 
tell us which parent is responsible; the issue here is that the anal-
ysand is starting to see how his desire is enmeshed in the desire 
of the Other: “He surmised his powerlessness to desire without 
destroying the Other, thus destroying his own desire insofar as 
it was the Other’s desire” (526). There has already, it seems, been 
a hystericization of the analysand, a shift from obsessional posi-
tion in the treatment and then, beyond that, a questioning of a 
typical hysteric’s attempt to put all the blame on others. Note 
that this shift of position from stereotypically-masculine posi-
tion — as obsessional neurotic — to stereotypically-feminine 
position, particularly in relation to a man, is something quite 
queer that happens in every analysis. 
The analysand appears to be well-enough versed in psycho-
analytic discourse to believe that his impotence might have 
something to do with “repressed homosexuality” and that if he 
can persuade his mistress to sleep with another man this might 
reactivate his libido. Lacan comments that he refuses to play 
along with these ideas, with “the demand for fables ... sated with 
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the truths spread by analysis itself ” (527). He does not feed this 
psychoanalytic discourse with interpretations that will satisfy 
his analysand, and in fact Lacan does not report anything he 
says at all. Perhaps he merely shrugs and demurs to agree with 
his analysand. Instead, Lacan describes a dream that the mis-
tress has the night after the analysand “suggested that she sleep 
with another man to see”: “In the dream she had a phallus — she 
sensed its shape under her clothing — which did not prevent her 
from having a vagina as well, nor, especially, from wanting this 
phallus to enter it” (527). This does the trick, for on hearing the 
dream “my patient’s powers were immediately restored and he 
demonstrated this brilliantly” (527). He performed “brilliantly,” 
Lacan says, “to his shrewd paramour,” which raises a question 
about who was performing what for whom in this little game. 
It should be said that a male analysand successfully treated 
by a male psychoanalyst for impotence with a female partner 
can be rendered into something queer. It certainly is not queer 
if gender positions are mapped directly onto the sexed bodies 
of those involved, even less so if sexual orientation is viewed 
as corresponding to those positions and bodies and as requir-
ing some kind of correspondence between them, what Lacan 
will later speak of and refuse as “sexual rapport.” How might it 
be queer? The key lies in the subversion of the subject of these 
statements about sexuality that are relayed through the repre-
sentation of the case. Not in the description or knowledge that 
we obtain from the case but in the position of the subject in 
relation to that knowledge. It is the mistress who has the dream, 
and so the phallic powers that were “immediately restored” to 
the analysand opens up yet more questions about the terms in 
which his performance of masculinity was successful. 
The phallus here is not possessed outright by the analysand, 
but is the semblance of power dreamt into being by another, 
a woman. Lacan comments that the dream and “its effect on 
my patient” was “an opportunity to get the patient to grasp the 
function the phallus as a signifier serves in his desire” (528), and 
the man is confronted with his desire to “be” the phallus — a 
normatively feminine position — rather than to “have” it, as 
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normatively masculine; the mistress’s “desire yields to his desire 
here, by showing him what she does not have” (528). We are 
therefore faced here with the separation of sexed subject from 
that which they perform “as if ” they were a sexed subject, with 
the performance and reiteration of sex as “drag,” which, remem-
ber, for queer theorists also includes the drag performance of 
men and women playing at being the men and women of their 
conventionally-assigned sex. 
The odds are that this obsessional character will himself 
stumble upon the rock of castration at some point in his analy-
sis, and this will keep him locked on the side of the man keen to 
hold on to what he has of the phallus and reassuring himself that 
even if he does not have complete mastery there is some man 
somewhere who does have it and in whose image he can keep 
himself together. Or, as subject he might or might not conclude 
from this episode that he is not the “man” he thought himself 
to be, and the space is opened up for a different outcome in 
which there is a shift from one kind of gender identification to 
another or beyond to something altogether more queer. Among 
the lessons of “The Direction of the Treatment” is that the ana-
lyst does not pretend to know how things should end up. This 
is why Lacanians do not, as a rule, interpret the transference, 
and in this case Lacan speaks instead of “exhausting […] all the 
artifices of verbalization that distinguished the other from the 
Other” (526), by which he seems to mean that the mother is 
distinguished from the father and the performance of a relation 
to one or the other is no longer for the analyst as Other in the 
“spectator’s box” (526).
 If queer operates as an ideal, whether as an identity or af-
fective community, fixity or fluidity, it will start to function 
ideologically rather than as a critique of ideology outside of the 
clinic. It will also threaten the space of the clinic itself, and this 
through recruitment of psychoanalysts who may be tempted to 
inject their own ideological suppositions into the speech of their 
analysands. This is why we do not treat Lacan as an “example” of 
a queer intervention in psychoanalysis, but rather as a discourse 
through which we might trace our own queer line, or not. Lacan 
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was no friend of feminism, but, by the same token, and partly 
as a function of the elision of feminism and femininity in most 
French psychoanalysis, no friend of normative femininity, still 
less of normative femininity inside the clinic. He is not “social” 
in his approach nor is he “anti-social,” and so Lacanian psycho-
analysis need not be mired in a peculiar binary opposition of 
those two signifiers that informs queer theory today. If Lacan-
ian psychoanalysis is treated as a clinical strategy instead of a 
worldview, then it is possible to make something radical with 
that strategy, to make of it a place where we are freer in our tac-
tics than other types of psychoanalysis, potentially a good deal 
queerer in our practice for that. 
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Queer Theory Meets Jung
Claudette Kulkarni
Introduction
I will begin by disclosing my own prejudices since they surely 
have shaped my reactions to these chapters. 
Psychological Prejudices. In spite of the sexism, heterosex-
ism, and racism that invade Carl Jung’s theorizing, I am a Jungi-
an — or, more accurately, a post-Jungian1 — and a feminist. The 
challenge for me as a lesbian Jungian has been not to defend, 
reinterpret, contort, or reformulate Jung and his theories — but, 
rather, to use Jung, often against himself, in ways that seem 
“truly Jungian” and thus, hopefully, to follow through on the 
“subversive possibility that Jung opens up” (Samuels 1989, tape) 
when we take him “beyond” himself. 
Philosophical Horizons. My reading in queer theory has been 
motivated mainly by the work of Judith Butler and has focused 
on queer theory’s usefulness in understanding LGBTQI experi-
ence in a heterosexist and genderized world. My philosophical 
prejudices derive from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, espe-
cially his approach to hermeneutics and the problem of under-
standing.
1 A term coined by Andrew Samuels (1985) “to indicate both connectedness 
to Jung and distance from him” (19). 
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Problems with Freudian Psychoanalysis. Reading Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory does not come easily to me, so the most 
challenging aspect of writing this response has been to negotiate 
the language of Freudian thought, especially as it gets morphed 
through French psychoanalysis. While I sincerely appreciate 
Freud, as most Jungians do, the language of Freudian discourse 
simply does not speak to me — as a person, as a lesbian, or as a 
Jungian. Its focus on sexuality seems too reductive and univer-
salizing, and its male-centered explanatory principles not very 
explanatory. Undoubtedly, my resistances will show as I attempt 
to engage with the viewpoints expressed in the chapters in the 
first section of this book, as will my dependence on each writer’s 
interpretation of their favored theorists. All of which leads me 
to this question: Is psychoanalysis always and only Freudian? 
That seems to be the consensus of these writers. While it might 
be true, as some claim, that Freudian psychoanalysis offers the 
only systematic theory of desire, I do not believe that Freudian 
thought equals psychoanalysis, nor that Freudian psychoanaly-
sis is capable of theorizing sexualities other than heterosexual-
ity — and I am not sure it does that very well. 
My Dilemma as a Therapist. The concept of “perversion,” as it 
is discussed in these chapters and in queer thought, often comes 
into conflict with my own current context, namely, my clinical 
work with convicted sex offenders. While the lesbian part of 
me is delighted with the idea of challenging sexual norms, the 
therapist side of me fears that this cannot be done adequately 
without addressing the issue of sexually-offending behaviors. 
While some of the writers in this volume hint at this problem, 
none address it.
Logistical Limits. With all of this as a backdrop and given 
space restrictions, I have opted to focus on the three chapters 
that deal with identity, desire, and perversion. 
Identity: A Concept in Need of Expansion
I welcome the efforts of some queer theorists, like Alice Kuzniar, 
to incorporate the unconscious into theory making. However, 
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Kuzniar’s suggested alternative to traditional Freudian theory, 
namely, the theory of Jean Laplanche, seems as problematic to 
me as the theory she wants to supplant, i.e., “the Oedipal narra-
tive of identity formation” (Kuzniar, this volume). The problem 
from my perspective is that Laplanche continues the conflation 
of sexuality with identity. Limiting identity to sex/ual/ity is actu-
ally what makes the concept of identity so justifiably vulnerable 
to queer critique. Sex/ual/ity is one vital subset of identity, but it 
sits alongside many other aspects of human existence. So, while 
the concept of das Andere would pose no problem for many Jun-
gians — since it seems to parallel Jung’s idea of anima/animus 
(the “contrasexual” other in the unconscious) — Laplanche’s 
continuation of a sexualized unconscious is as problematic as 
Jung’s genderizing of it (Kulkarni 1997). While we cannot take 
the sex out of sex/ual/ity, it does not follow that sex/ual/ity is 
only about sex. If queer “is an identity without essence” (Kuzni-
ar, quoting David Halperin), why would we restrict it to sex/ual/
ity? Laplanche’s de-genderizing of the Oedipal scene might be 
sufficient to allow “the child’s imagination” to fantasize “gender 
variation” (Kuzniar), but it still does not relativize the role of sex 
in identity formation. In fact, Laplanche’s theory seems centered 
on sex/ual/ity at the exclusion of all else. At one point, Kuzniar 
does mention the parent’s “sexual unconscious,” as if hinting 
that the unconscious might include other aspects, but she never 
makes this explicit. And is sex really so enigmatic — or do we 
make it so by our theorizing? Is homosexuality really so differ-
ent from heterosexuality (other than in defying societal norms)? 
Are all sexualities really so problematic that we need elaborate 
theories to justify every manifestation of human diversity? 
When Kuzniar argues that “all identity, seen as an attempt 
at self-centering, will necessarily be destabilized by the uncon-
scious,” she is acknowledging, perhaps inadvertently, that there 
is something there to be destabilized. She implies, however, that 
because identity is always being destabilized, attempts at identi-
ty formation are somehow fruitless. From a Jungian perspective, 
however, it is precisely these efforts at identity formation (i.e., at 
integrating split-off aspects of oneself) that make decentering 
248
psychoanalytic responses
possible. This never-ending process is, by its very “nature,” fluid. 
It becomes rigid only if one refuses to individuate, that is, when 
“the impervious ego […] clings to” old identity labels (Kuzniar). 
But the ego is not always impervious. However we conceptual-
ize it, the function we call “the ego” plays a vital role in terms of 
consciousness and reflects the individual’s capacity to differenti-
ate her/himself from the collective (something essential to feel-
ing queer). But perhaps this is a difference between the Jungian 
ego and the Freudian ego.
In any case, Kuzniar seems to settle for declaring this entire 
process a failure and turns to Jacqueline Rose for support: 
The unconscious constantly reveals the “failure” of identity. 
Because there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no 
stability of sexual identity, no position […] which is ever 
simply achieved. […] “Failure” is not a moment to be regret-
ted in identity: […] “failure” is something endlessly repeated 
and relived […] [T]here is a resistance to identity at the very 
heart of psychic life. (Kuzniar, quoting Rose)
Significantly, Rose puts “failure” in quotes, signaling recognition 
of the importance of attempting to build an identity, even if it 
is an endless process. However, where Rose claims that “there 
is no continuity of psychic life,” I contend that the endless pro-
cess she describes is the evidence of continuity; and where she 
imagines this process as “a resistance to identity,” I envision it as 
a resistance to a fixed identity, so that this resistance, paradoxi-
cally, embodies the very “essence” of identity. 
While Jung did not expound a formal theory of identity 
formation, he did posit that we come into the world with the 
seed of a personality/identity that develops/individuates over 
the individual’s entire lifetime in a never-ending movement to-
ward an ever-expanding and always “becoming” sense of self. 
This process, undergone in response to an “inner necessity” 
(Jung CW7[1970], para. 369), is fueled by the continual tension 
between the ego (the center of consciousness) and the uncon-
scious (particularly the archetypal Self — the Jungian equivalent 
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of “the Other who ‘wants’ something of me” (Kuzniar, quoting 
Laplanche) — which presses the ego into its service). For Jung, 
the unconscious is “creative in character” (CW11[1969], para. 
875), a kind of fountainhead of possibilities that are both pro-
ductive and destructive. So, while the unconscious is “other” 
in one sense — it includes unintegrated qualities that one must 
integrate in order to individuate — in another way, the uncon-
scious also is me and, so, is not so “other” at all.
My post-Jungian understanding of identity is like Butler’s 
idea of “queer”: “never fully owned, but always and only re-
deployed, twisted, queered” (Kuzniar, quoting Butler) or Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s: “continuing moment, movement, mo-
tive — recurrent, eddying, troublant” (Kuzniar, quoting Sedg-
wick). However, to assert that identity must be only fluid is prob-
lematic. As a therapist, I have seen what happens when a person 
is not grounded in a sense of ego/self/identity that is fixed/sta-
ble enough to tolerate fluidity. To deconstruct identity, one must 
first have one. To take that possibility away from others seems to 
me both elitist and disingenuous. Individuation proceeds when 
one holds the tension between what Jung calls “the opposites” 
(a concept I do not take literally but understand as a tug-of-
war between divergent forces). According to Jung, “there is no 
energy” without this tension (CW7[1970], para. 78) and holding 
it is what allows something else to emerge. So, to deconstruct 
one’s identity, one needs to hold the tension between fixity and 
fluidity. And because any identity which emerges from this is 
always already immersed in a never-ending process of adjust-
ment, change, and integration (i.e., individuation), it is full of 
possibilities. That’s the paradox. Fluidity and fixity need each 
other. The tendency of many queer theorists to resist anything 
“stable,” or “fixed” results too often in their taking positions that 
are just as normalizing, rigid, and absolute — if not quite so sta-
ble — as some of the oppressive theories they are attempting to 
deconstruct.
Kuzniar seems intent on salvaging a place for psychoanalysis 
in queer theory, asserting that psychoanalysis “adopt or develop 
hypotheses such as Laplanche’s that would help articulate why 
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one feels queer” and asking: “What new vocabulary does psy-
choanalysis need to adopt to adequately help women organize 
their fluid sexual desires?” It seems to me, however, that until 
someone explains “why” some people “choose” to be heterosex-
ual, there is no need to explain “why one feels queer.” And while 
psychoanalysis might do well to adopt a new vocabulary, I do 
not know why women need to “organize” their desires — much 
less, why they would need the help of psychoanalysis to do this. 
Finally, a comment about Kuzniar’s attempt “to draw out the 
queer implications” of queer theories via a discussion of pet 
love. In spite of my being an animal lover myself, I did not find 
this section very convincing. Love of animals certainly can be 
deeply meaningful and does not fit into any binaries that I know 
of, sexual or otherwise — but is it “queer” just because it chal-
lenges “self-definitions based primarily on sexual preference”? 
Well, that’s my point. Identity comprises more than sex/ual/ity.
Desire: our Engagement with the World
Lara Farina seems intent on finding a theory of desire that can 
adequately encompass same-sex desire. She reasons convincing-
ly that theories of desire founded on lack are problematic. How-
ever, I think she is mistaken in dismissing efforts by some queer 
theorists to rehabilitate narcissism. She claims that any theory 
based on a “longing for sameness” (Farina, quoting Leo Bersani) 
is ethically disconcerting. But why does she equate a desire for 
sameness with narcissism? There are other ways of theorizing 
sameness. Two examples: Christine Downing’s (1989) idea that 
same-sex desire be theorized on the basis of “analogy rather 
than contrast, on mirroring rather than the complementation 
of opposites” (xvii); and Jungian analyst Lyn Cowan’s (2013) re-
minder that in alchemy (a major source of inspiration for Jung 
and Jungian thought) “alchemical conjunctions may happen be-
tween ‘sames’ as well as between ‘opposites’” (2).
In any case, Farina finds the work of Elizabeth Grosz to be 
the most useful in theorizing desire. I was taken by Farina’s not-
ing that Grosz has provided “a way of thinking about desire in 
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which the body […] comes first, leading the ‘self ’ along with 
it as a current of ‘continuous excitation’ constantly remakes it.” 
This excited my post-Jungian sensibilities because it challenges 
the traditional psychoanalytic tendency to ignore the lived body 
and because it hints at an unconscious that functions dialecti-
cally, not just from the inside out. In spite of this, however, I am 
reluctant to privilege any one factor in desire, even the body. I 
want to propose instead that desire be imagined as a spectrum 
of factors and modes, including lack, and I want to cite Judith 
Butler as my authority: “I think that crafting a sexual position 
[…] always involves becoming haunted by what’s excluded. And 
the more rigid the position, the greater the ghost, and the more 
threatening in some way” (Downing, this volume, quoting But-
ler).
Like Grosz, I do not see why queer theorists would want to 
devise a unified theory of desire. If the task of queer theory is 
“the queering of desire” by “the dismantling of sexual norms” 
(Farina), that cannot be done by establishing a norm that ex-
cludes lack just because we do not like it or because it has been 
used against us. Also, to imply that desire ought to be only “pro-
ductive, rather than the result of negation” (Farina) privileges 
one side of the opposition and thus misses the possibilities that 
might be “produced” through holding the tension between 
them. 
Which brings me to the problem that any theory of desire 
faces: How to understand those forms of desire that go awry 
and take the path of sexual violence. There are “so-called sexual 
perversions,” (Farina) but there are also perverted desires, sexual 
or otherwise, what Jung calls “blind instinctuality” (CW8[1969], 
para. 108). Farina refers to this: “Of course, perverts (homosex-
uals, fetishists, pedophiles, and others) and women of all kinds 
don’t fit neatly into the most simple formulation of Oedipus.” 
But, while she comments on how psychoanalytic theory has had 
to contort itself to make room for women, male homosexuals, 
and fetishists, any similar consideration of pedophiles is no-
ticeably lacking. This is a major omission. How can we discuss 
desire and reclaim certain categories of “perverts” without ad-
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dressing those whom we, presumably, do not take along with us, 
and without acknowledging that, at times, desire is expressed 
in truly twisted ways? — that is, without exploring the shadow 
side of desire?
In comparing desire with intoxication, Farina gives us an 
enticing image of desire in its ego-dissolving mode — romantic, 
exciting, passionate — but again fails to explore the shadow side 
of this image. Instead, she conflates sobriety with pessimism 
and intoxication with Utopianism. This may be poetic, but it is 
untenable. Sobriety is not pessimistic or gloomy; it is thought-
ful and grounded. Intoxication is not poetic or optimistic; it is 
dissociated and self-centered. Of course, I am literalizing these 
states of mind whereas Farina is employing a seemingly play-
ful metaphor, intending, I presume, to evoke a mood of exhila-
ration. Like any good Jungian, I love metaphors, but this one 
seems precarious. For example, Farina critiques sobriety be-
cause it “wants fixity […] boundaries” — but doesn’t desire need 
boundaries at times? Isn’t that a problem of desire gone awry? 
She also seems to confuse intoxication with inspiration when 
she implies that intoxication somehow “make[s] room for [the] 
reader’s experience of affect.” In reality, intoxication runs rough-
shod over others, affect and all. And while I can’t speak about 
“the pessimism of Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis,” Farina’s 
suggestion that we “allow for ways in which the analyst, too, can 
be drunk on love rather than remain at a remove from the erotic 
object of analysis” seems to me to mistake drunkenness for af-
fect. As a Jungian therapist, I am not “at a remove” from my cli-
ents, nor do I see them as “the erotic object of analysis.” That, it 
seems to me, would be just another example of desire gone awry.
Perversion: Is There No Such Thing?
I rather like the idea of redeeming the word “queer.” I do not 
mind twisting it for political purposes (as Butler suggests in 
1993, 19). I do not even mind conceiving of it as “perverse,” that 
is, as “a defiant performance of excess that shows up the con-
structedness and arbitrariness of the category of the ‘normal’” 
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(Downing, this volume). What I do find troubling, however, 
is the lack of questioning related to how this subversive use 
of “perverse” can be distinguished from other uses. As some-
one who has worked clinically and fairly extensively with both 
the victims and perpetrators of sexual offenses, I would like to 
know: if everybody is queer and “desire is always perverse,” (at-
tributed by Downing to Jacques Lacan/Tim Dean), how do we 
differentiate the perversions that create victims? While I could 
argue that such behaviors are not really, theoretically, a perver-
sion of sexual desire, I could also argue that they are. And al-
though, like Jung, I resist the concept of “normal,” I do not think 
that it is sufficient simply to reclaim, resignify, and celebrate 
the term “perversion” and re-label certain behaviors as “para-
philias” without somehow addressing that other term: “normal.” 
Maybe there is no such a thing as “normal,” but there certainly 
is something “abnormal” about sexual offending! We need to 
find some way of differentiating queerly “perverse” behaviors 
from really “deviant” and “abnormal” behaviors. How else can 
we, ethically, “embrace the energies of the ‘perverse’?” In 1914, 
Jung declared that “We are not yet far enough advanced to dis-
tinguish between moral and immoral behaviour in the realm 
of free sexual activity […]. All the repulsive hypocrisy […] we 
owe to the barbarous, wholesale legal condemnation of certain 
kinds of sexual behaviour, and to our inability to develop a finer 
moral sense for the enormous psychological differences that ex-
ist in the domain of free sexual activity” (CW4[1970], para. 666). 
I believe Elizabeth Grosz is challenging us to develop that “finer 
moral sense” when she suggests that the term “queer” not be 
used to subsume all “perversions.” Sadly, Downing character-
izes Grosz’s position as “binaristic — and covertly identitarian” 
and critiques it as “a rather un-queer gesture of hierarchy-of-
oppression-building.” I think that this is an unfair rendering of 
Grosz’s position and that maligning her thinking simply evades 
her point: that the universalizing use of “perverse” lumps many 
people together who ought not be lumped together. For ex-
ample, it could be argued — perhaps misappropriating Lacan’s 
idea that because there is no gender in the unconscious, there is 
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“no ‘proper’ object of desire” (Downing) — that pedophiles are 
simply expressing a unique form of “perverse” desire. I am not 
claiming that Lacan or any queer theorists believe this. I am only 
highlighting a problem that Downing gets close to, but does not 
address: “Queer theory has always had an ambivalent relation-
ship with what — in a different discourse — would be called the 
perversions or paraphilias […]. In some ways, non-normative 
bodily practices (what I do) […] are the very stuff of queer […].” 
I only wish she had examined this “ambivalent relationship” be-
tween problematic “non-normative bodily practices” and “the 
very stuff of queer.” 
On the other hand, I very much admire how Downing chal-
lenges the tendency of queer theorists to privilege fluidity and 
stigmatize fixity, thereby propagating “a strikingly normative 
directive.” She quotes Butler to make her case against this kind 
of absolutism: “This is not to say that I will not appear at politi-
cal occasions under the sign of lesbian, but that I would like to 
have it permanently unclear what precisely that sign signifies” 
(Downing, quoting Butler). In Jungian terms, Butler is arguing 
to keep the sign (in this case, literally a sign) a symbol: 
A symbol […] [points] to something not easily defined and 
therefore not fully known. But the sign always has a fixed 
meaning, because it is a conventional abbreviation for […] 
something known. (CW5[1976], para. 180) 
So long as a symbol is a living thing, it is an expression for 
something that cannot be characterized in any other or bet-
ter way. The symbol is alive only so long as it is pregnant with 
meaning. But once its meaning has been born out of it […] 
then the symbol is dead […]. (CW6[1971], para. 816)
[It has become] “a mere sign.” (CW6[1971], para. 817)
I think this speaks also to the concern expressed by queer theo-
rists, that “as soon as an identification is taken up, that identifi-
cation stagnates into recognizable meaning” (Downing).
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Alluding to Butler’s cautionary statement (quoted above) 
about the ghost of what is excluded, Downing issues a stern 
warning: as long as queer theory excludes fixity, it “becomes a 
discourse in which the ghost of what it disavows — normaliza-
tion — returns surreptitiously in the prescription to desire ap-
propriately plurally, fluidly and openly.” She argues against the 
pathologizing of fixity and in favor of legitimizing “both plu-
rality and singularity, not in a dialectical configuration, but as 
infinitely equal and different.” While I am totally sympathetic to 
the thrust of this argument, I would point out that legitimizing 
these opposites is not the same as holding the tension between 
them because it accepts the underlying binary and thus creates 
another shadow in which ghosts can lurk.
 Downing laments that the stigmatization of fixity “persists 
in the psychiatric model” and that “[g]eneralizations about per-
sonality are adduced from facts [fixations] of sexual behavior.” 
I have no wish to defend psychiatry — and I do not know the 
source of Downing’s opinions about clinical practice — but, as a 
therapist, I can say that behaviors do indicate something about 
people and, as a therapist in a forensic unit, I can say that in 
that context and in real life “perversion” is not defined simply by 
fixity, but on the basis of criminal behaviors. Nor, in my experi-
ence, is it “variety” that has made “sexual behavior and identity 
acceptable […] in mental health discourse from the turn of the 
twentieth- to the turn of the twenty-first centuries” — though 
perhaps that is true of traditional psychoanalysis? Fixity can be 
a factor in assessing problem behaviors, e.g., it can indicate how 
difficult it will be for a person to change certain behaviors. On 
the other hand, to my knowledge, no sex offender has ever used 
“variety” as a defense.
Downing is right to critique queer theorists, including Butler, 
for demonizing fixity and idealizing fluidity, but that is not the 
only problem. Would Butler take the standpoint that “all sexual 
norms” are doubtful, and suggest that one counter them by “oc-
cupying a position that you have just announced to be unthink-
able” (Downing, quoting Butler), if we were discussing things 
like sexual violence and pedophilia? 
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Downing is persuasive when she argues that fixity be re-
stored to its rightful place as a valid psychological principle. She 
challenges psychoanalysis to question its prejudice against fixity 
and to ask itself “what investments are really at stake in making 
a symptom out of a pleasure.” That is a good question — at least 
as long as the pleasure under consideration really is not a symp-
tom. But how do we determine that? How do we know when a 
pleasure is a perversion? What is at stake, at those times, if we do 
not recognize that pleasure as a symptom?
Clinical Application and Conclusions
Although I gratefully acknowledge an intellectual debt to queer 
theory, and appreciate its power as a form of cultural critique 
and a tool for self-examination, I must admit that I remain 
doubtful of its usefulness to clinical practice — except in terms 
of shaping the attitude and thinking of the therapist. The in-
sights of queer theory can inspire the therapist to resist cultural 
imperatives and to keep an open and questioning mind. That, 
in turn, can inform how a therapist conceptualizes both the cli-
ent and the work to be done. In that sense, queer theory has a 
lot to offer to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. In other ways, 
however, queer theory frustrates me — much like it frustrates a 
good friend of mine, also a therapist, who wrote me that what 
bothers him is “the mental spinning that seems dislocated from 
the world that people live in.”2 I guess what I really yearn for are 
theories and intellectual challenges that hold the tension among 
all the various factors and concepts while staying grounded in 
the real world of people’s everyday suffering. 
So, does psychoanalytic theory have anything to offer queer 
theorists? I am not sure. Admittedly, I came to this project with 
some deep reservations about Freudian psychoanalysis and, 
while I have tried to overcome these, I find myself thinking like 
Grosz (1995), that “too heavy a reliance on psychoanalytic theo-
ry” (167) is problematic: 
2 Mickey Landaiche, private communication.
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While an immense amount of […] feminist thought, ingenu-
ity, and labor has gone into this project of stretching or ex-
tending the tolerable boundaries of male discourses so they 
may be useful for or amenable to feminist projects, the long-
term benefits of continuing to prop up or support a discourse 
which has well-recognized problems are not clear. (167)
Certainly, the writers in the first section of this book have tried 
to “both face and expose what is problematic about psychoana-
lytic discourses, and then show that these problems are not so 
overwhelming that they entail the abandonment of its frame” 
(167). But, like Grosz, I have concerns about efforts to preserve 
psychoanalytic theory and continue to grapple with this myself 
in relation to Jung: 
One cannot simply buy into a theoretical system (especially 
one as complex and as systematically conceived, in spite of its 
inconsistencies, as psychoanalysis) without at the same time 
accepting its basic implications and founding assumptions. 
[…] Problematic implications cannot be contained and pre-
vented from infiltrating those considered unproblematic. 
(168)
I especially share Grosz’s concerns “about the capacity of the 
framework of psychoanalysis to explain precisely that which it 
must exclude in order to constitute itself as a system or a dis-
course” (167). I am not arguing that anyone abandon Freud or 
his theories. I certainly have no intention of discarding Jung. 
Rather, my hope would be that queer thinkers (with or with-
out the insights of any version of psychoanalysis) focus less on 
theorizing sex/ual/ity and more on exploring meaning(s), con-
testing normative assumptions, asking provocative questions, 
challenging the institutions of compulsory heterosexuality, and 
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Queer Troubles for Psychoanalysis
Carol Owens
As a critical psychologist in Britain in the mid-1990s, I experi-
enced many of the effects that queer theory, critical feminism 
and post-structuralism had upon social science research and 
discourse theory at this time. Wide-ranging debates about ma-
terialism, essentialism, and biological reductionism revolved 
around the purloining of the human subject by mainstream 
social, psychological and biomedical science. The critical pro-
ject’s devotion to decentering the same subject, destabilizing the 
taken-for-granted, and deconstructing the practices warranted 
by the mainstream contributed to the writing of thousands of 
research articles and conference presentations, not to mention 
hundreds of books and as many careers launched in the mo-
bilization of the critical agenda. My own doctoral work on the 
examination of “compulsory heterosexuality” at the site of the 
“couple” as constituted by and within the psy-discourses was 
typical for the time. People like me were usually referred to dis-
paragingly within the mainstream as “social constructionists” or 
worse “constructivists.” We moved through our doctoral years 
occasionally caught up with dilemmas over relativism which 
would spur a whole other rake of research articles and papers 
dedicated to the declaring of the reality of death, the holocaust, 
and furniture. Some of us were labelled “critical realists” when 
we got too concerned about the political, “unreconstructed 
feminists” when we worried overly about “woman,” and unre-
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flexive allegiance to any of the great “isms” (Marx, Freud, “Fem-
in”) necessitated some serious time spent in the careful study 
and contemplation of Donna Haraway’s (2013) groundbreaking 
work Simians, Cyborgs, and Women where we would be firmly 
reminded that all knowledge is situated, all identities fractured, 
and that the “local” tops the “global” every time when it comes 
to theorizing. In general, at this time, “psychoanalysis” was at 
best a foolish word, at worst, a bad word.
However, over time, and ironically in some ways (of course), 
the ultimate modality for me of working with local, situated 
knowledge par excellence was to be the psychoanalytic clinic. In 
my reading of the six queer chapters in this book I inevitably 
“read” from that peculiar historically and subjectively fractured 
location as a former critical psychologist, critical polytextual-
ist, post-structuralist, and, psychoanalyst trained in the Lacan-
ian school. I won’t pretend now that formulating a response out 
of my reading of these essays is either straightforward (sic) or 
unproblematic. Indeed, in working on this piece I have felt pro-
voked at times into mobilizing a grand-scale defense of Lacani-
an psychoanalysis (where I think that the Lacanian baby is being 
thrown out with the bathwater of “classical [sic] psychoanaly-
sis”); occasionally wanting to address what I consider to be mis-
used or misunderstood fragments of Lacanian theory (where I 
have detected a singular, decontextualized, and/or unreflexive 
usage of concepts such as “lack” and “jouissance” for instance) 
and even moved into a position where I want to demonstrate 
precisely just how queer Lacanian psychoanalysis is (especially 
when Lacan’s theories are reduced to an improbably monolithic 
rendering, taking no account whatsoever of the reception of his 
work from the late 1960s as having consequences at theoreti-
cal, clinical, practical, and political levels [see, e.g., Soler 2014; 
Tomšič 2015]). These are the dilemmas of my “response” and of 
course even as I recognize my own desire in each of these dilem-
mas I need really to consider the elements in these essays that 
engage me in this dilemmatic trajectory. 
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First Thing: (The Game Is Rigged)
This entire project is staged: it seeks to bring together essays by 
“specialists in queer theory,” responses to these essays by psy-
choanalytic “clinicians,” and responses to those responses by 
“theorists” on a “stage” which is described as a “clinical encoun-
ter” between psychoanalytic practice and queer theory. I real-
ize that some of my difficulty here consists in my being located 
singularly and most unqueerly as a “clinician.” From that par-
ticular location I am invited to “reflect on my engagement with 
the six queer chapters and to include a clinical input if possible.” 
It occurs to me that there are inevitable tensions in play here 
and indeed that they come into being precisely because of the 
structuring of the “encounter.” What after all is being staged? 
An encounter between two sets of theories? No, since the en-
counter is between queer theory and psychoanalytic practice. An 
encounter between two sets of practices? No, since not all queer 
theorists are queer “practitioners,” not all queer theorists are ho-
mosexual or lesbian even, and not all psychoanalytic theorists 
are psychoanalytic practitioners, obviously. So there are — at 
least — some fundamental problems here of combination and 
incommensurability. And this is something which I would say 
arises out of the actual structuring of the project but then (re-)
emerges in the six queer chapters in so far as authors variously 
conflate “queer” with “homosexual” identity, psychoanalytic 
theory with psychoanalytic practice, and in their critique of 
psychoanalysis  — undifferentiated here as to theory/practice - 
demand of some homogeneous big Other of psychoanalysis that 
it come up with something that heretofore is missing.
Kuzniar, for example, in the chapter on identity emphasizes 
that the task of current psychoanalysis is not simply to acknowl-
edge the failure of previous conceptual psychic models but to 
adopt or develop hypotheses (such as Laplanche’s, for this au-
thor) that would help articulate “why one feels queer” (Kuzniar). 
At the same time though, the author remarks that it is crucial 
to keep in mind “the uniqueness of every individual’s circuitous 
path which resists generalization into a theorem.” Here is the 
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crux of the matter then: on the one hand, psychoanalysis must 
explain why one feels queer but on the other hand, the emphasis 
must be precisely on the singular queer subject, it must not at-
tempt to re-foundationalize what queer theory has de-founda-
tionalized in its critique of psychoanalytic psycho-social-devel-
opmental theories and grand narratives of sexualized identity. 
But is it a question of a reformulation on a grand-scale that is 
necessary for “psychoanalysis” in order to address this demand 
or is it rather, as Kuzniar seems to suggest later in the chap-
ter that a “new vocabulary” needs to be adopted? This demand 
amounts to something like an ontological impasse: on the one 
hand psychoanalysis must explain why some people feel queer 
and on the other hand it must not come up with any kind of uni-
versalist statement. Many psychoanalytic practitioners — and 
especially those that teach on various training courses — know 
very well the difficulties and tensions of working case by case, 
with the absolute singularity of subjectivity and resisting pub-
lic domain demands to discourse some kind of psychoanalytic 
universal. 
In what form then, can a specifically psychoanalytic dis-
course prove palatable to queer theory given this too little/
too much motif? In this vein, I was wondering to myself why 
Laplanche has proved so appealing to many queer theorists and 
to Kuzniar and Will Stockton in this collection. It occurred to me 
that Laplanche himself was someone who was keen to establish 
a new “vocabulary” of psychoanalysis, one which significantly 
re-words Freudian and Lacanian concepts in order to produce 
his own set of theories. This is perhaps also part of Donald Win-
nicott’s charm for Michael Snediker in this collection. Neither 
Laplanche nor Winnicott pushed themselves into establishing 
what we might think of as “doctrines,” however each analyst has 
become well known in terms of segments of their theories — for 
Laplanche it is often his “enigmatic signifier” that represents 
him, and for Winnicott the “good enough mother,” for instance. 
Ultimately, do we not see in this collection that parts of Lacan, 
parts of Laplanche and parts of Winnicott are press-ganged into 
service, in other words, that strictly speaking, when it comes 
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to queer theory, psychoanalysis can only ever be palatable à la 
carte?
Second Thing: (The Ethics of Transformation)
While it is true that queer theory and psychoanalysis (theory 
and practice) share an interest in subjectivity, desire, identity, re-
lationality, ethics, power, discourse and norms, it is not true that 
their interest is dedicated in the same direction, with let’s say, 
a common objective, or common interpretations. Indeed this 
isn’t even true for psychoanalysts of different traditions! Queer 
theory is a specific set of analytics put to the service of decon-
structing the constitutiveness of identities insofar as those iden-
tities become fixed and hardened entities with very real con-
sequences for living. As such, it is overtly political, concerned 
with the destabilizing of warranted practices and ideological 
discourses. It is concerned with the disturbing of monolithic 
treatments of identity, the troubling of the taken-for-granted 
vis-à-vis “identity” and causal links to behavior, and the de-
mobilizing of the so-called signs of identity in order to open 
up rather than foreclose the possibility of future significations 
(Butler 1991, 19). This account of queer theory suggests an ideol-
ogy (of course, it is anti-ideologically ideological). Ideologically 
speaking, psychoanalysis should absolutely not be invested in 
subjectivity and desire and identity and so forth with the same 
stakes as queer theory. Queerly speaking, the consequences for 
identity of “deconstruction,” “destabilizing,” and “demobilizing” 
are at the very least transformative, both at the level of subjectiv-
ity and (ideally) at the level of practice and discourse (e.g., Wat-
son 2009). Whilst the whole question (oft debated and mostly 
controversial) within psychoanalysis (and within and between 
different “schools”) of the extent to which (if any) psychoanaly-
sis may be transformative is variously contested; Lacanians take 
the rather more suspicious view that as far as psychoanalytic 
treatment is concerned, “transformations” normatized into a set 
of therapeutic objectives are always an index of a “desire to do 
good” and/or a “desire to cure.” And for those queer theorists so 
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fond of Laplanche it is worth pointing out here that he too was 
vehemently anti-programmatic declaring that psychoanalytic 
practice cannot propose an aim of practice, no matter what, oth-
erwise it risks becoming marshalled into a form of social adap-
tation. Lacanian psychoanalytic ethics insists that those analysts 
who would go about normatizing or normalizing (that is, wish-
ing to transform their patients into “happier,” “better-adjusted,” 
“more secure in their identity” patients, etc.) believe themselves 
to be working for a sovereign good — that is to say — the good 
of the patient. Indeed, as an index of our direction of the treat-
ment, whenever we find ourselves desiring to do good (accord-
ing to some transformative trajectory), it is at that moment that 
we are likely to be led astray (Lacan 1986[1959–60], 218–19).
It is but a short and terrifyingly direct move from the desire 
to transform a patient’s life according to what a well-adjusted 
(sic) analyst would seek to achieve while working for the “good” 
of his/her patient, to a kind of “thinking straight” which would 
iron out any quirks in the patient’s thinking altogether. Not even 
Freud (1951) condescended to straighten out (sic) the son of one 
mother concerned about his homosexuality. And in fact Freud 
spoke out most vehemently against those who would seek to 
transform others into “better” versions of themselves. In his 1919 
paper, “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy,” Freud 
defines the ethical dimension of the analyst as a renunciation of 
the directing of the patient’s conscience. He writes: “We refused 
most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself into our 
hands in search of help into our private property, to decide his 
fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the 
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it 
is good” (164–65). He goes on to reject the notion that psychoa-
nalysis “should place itself in the service of a particular philo-
sophical outlook on the world” and force this view upon the 
patient with the intention of improving him/her. Freud insisted 
that this would be a violence, notwithstanding the idea that it 
would be carried out with the most “honourable of motives.” 
Ethically speaking, Lacanian practice is basically at odds with 
the idea of the psychoanalytic clinic as a site of re-insertion, re-
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duplication, re-production or re-presentation of any norm, in-
cluding heteronormativity. A specifically Lacanian ethics not 
only shies away from a transformational ideology, it radically 
contests the grounds that give rise to transformative politics as 
always involving at least some degree of patronage which as-
sumes for itself the (identitarian) knowledge of what is best for 
the one it seeks to transform.
Butler has remarked that understanding gender as a matter 
of doing rather than being allows for the transformation of its 
very meaning, that performing gender “self-consciously” rather 
than unconsciously has transformative effects on “gender” and 
therefore on gendered subjectivity. I am reminded of a patient 
who told me that regarding sex she has certain difficulties. Sex 
is a performance where she attempts to indicate something to 
her sexual partner. What was it she was attempting to indicate? 
That she is a woman. I asked her if she felt she gave a convinc-
ing performance. To the partner she thought she sometimes 
did, to herself she never did. Where do you learn to perform 
“woman” I asked her. She told me: from other people, from TV: 
what sounds to make, what moves to make. “Doing” gender for 
this person hardly seems to have the transformative effects that 
Butler imagines, even for all that it is “self-conscious.” What this 
woman suffers from is not the idea that she comes up short as a 
woman, that — in the words of the song — she isn’t made to feel 
like a “natural” woman, but, rather that there is no such thing as 
natural when it comes to gender/identity, that in fact it is all per-
formance, all doing. There is no playfulness here, this is a seri-
ous kind of business after all. This kind of destitution of identity 
is increasingly seen in the contemporary psychoanalytic clinic 
(Owens 2010). A question that Lacan (1976–77) poses in his 
Seminar XXIV might thus paraphrase a contemporary predica-
ment: “How is a subject, with all his weakness, his infirmity, able 
to hold the place of truth?” (39). Besides he notes later on in the 
same seminar, we are forever wandering about in the dimen-
sion of the love of truth and that is why, he wryly remarks, the 
real continues to slip through our fingers. There isn’t in fact any 
truth about the real, since the real excludes meaning (44).
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Here, we can begin perhaps to see one of the sharp differ-
ences in “interpretation” between queer theory and (Lacanian) 
psychoanalysis: for my patient it is that “essence” itself has to be 
performed and is what fails for her. Far from sustaining any no-
tion of “woman” as emanating from her female sexed body it is 
rather that being a woman in the sexual act allows her to feel real 
[…] full stop! In the movie — The Truman Show (1988) — being 
(a) tru(e)man is obtained by doing all the things that “true” men 
do unconsciously. When Truman finally discovers the staged 
fakery of his existence and chooses to exit the stage, it is at that 
moment that we can say that he is truly a fake along with all the 
other fakes in the real world — performing self-consciously that 
is — rather than the falsely true-man he had been up until then 
in his fake world. If this is a moment that we might celebrate as 
the moment of his discovery of his authenticity, then we would 
be misguided, since his very “authenticity” resides in his know-
ing that as he leaves one show it is to enter, indeed, another. 
Third Thing: (The Trouble with Jouissance, Lack and Desire)
In the chapter on jouissance, Kathryn Bond Stockton remarks 
that psychoanalysis benefits from the conceptual engagement of 
“bliss” with queer theory and contemplation, themselves “shot 
through with psychoanalytical suggestions and perspective.” Yes 
indeed. Of course! Any self-respecting psychoanalyst should be 
reading any/all of the works Bond Stockton mentions in her 
chapter. Roland Barthes, Georges Bataille, Leo Bersani and so 
on. It is really impossible to read Bersani’s “Is the Rectum a 
Grave” (2010) without cause to really really try to think through 
and about the jouissance at stake in what he (2008) has else-
where described as “apparently suicidal and murderous behav-
ior.” And precisely, in his chapter in the book co-written with 
Adam Phillips (2008), he attempts to think it and moreover to 
come up with some kind of conceptual key which would allow 
him to reflect on the effects of a barebacking “self-divestiture” 
not merely as ego-annihilation but also as ego-dissemination 
(56). But then what I find largely un-thought in the chapter on 
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jouissance in this collection is precisely this other side of jou-
issance — suicidal/murderous, dangerous/fatal. Instead, jouis-
sance is largely reframed via Barthes’s translator as bliss and it 
is bliss we are stuck with then until the end — notwithstanding 
the rehearsing of Bataille’s visions of excess. We are told that if it 
didn’t exist, queers would invent it. Please! Liberated of its more 
painful connotations and as such from any sense of Lacan’s 
multiply nuanced glosses — it is simply wrong to present Lacan’s 
account of jouissance as only and ever “bound to mysticism” 
(Bond Stockton). Jouissance in Lacan’s hands here is sketched as 
the tragically elusive (or excessive) in the case of feminine jouis-
sance or as the tragically fantasmatic (or disingenuous) in the 
case of phallic jouissance. Stockton invites the “analytic scene” to 
venture the question of whether certain desires are more desir-
able than other more staid versions of pleasure. I would say, that 
regarding jouissance we don’t get much of a choice! Clinically, 
psychoanalysts tend to hear more about the ravages of jouissance 
than it’s “glistening,” “dark glamour of rapture” etc., and even 
that can cause a jouis-sens that itself further ravages the subject. 
We are probably mostly familiar with descriptions of jouissance 
which invariably make it a sexy topic and then it is so difficult 
for us to bear in mind all of the other practices which guarantee 
jouissance for the subject even as they herald her/his destruc-
tion (Owens 2015; 2016). Myself, I like Lacan’s (2007[1969–70]) 
definition of jouissance that he suggests in his Seminar XVII: “It 
begins with a tickle and ends in a blaze of petrol. That’s always 
what a jouissance is” (72). After all, tickling is fun up to a point, 
but nobody really wants to be tickled (burnt?) to death.
In accusing Bond Stockton above of being too blissed-out in 
her working of jouissance, I surely help to add weight to Lara 
Farina’s accusation that Freudian and Lacanian psychoana-
lysts remain too sober in their theorization of desire. Like So-
crates — she says — they remain “at a remove from the erotic ob-
ject.” The analyst rather, should be or could be “drunk on love.” 
Instead however, the analyst is sketched as a party pooper and a 
boring teetotaller. But what is this sober business about? 
270
psychoanalytic responses
First take: “Lacanian psychoanalysis preserves and even 
magnifies the role of lack in desire.” By and large, “lack” is sim-
plistically synonymous with “loss” for many critics of Lacanian 
theory. Lack — become loss, is then mobilized and marshalled 
into discourse as “tragic,” “sober,” and so on. This kind of pa-
thetic state of affairs for the human subject — who “strives (un-
successfully) to fill the void with an endless series of objects” 
is itself endless as the satisfaction of lack — were it ever possi-
ble — would cause desire to cease and with it, symbolic exist-
ence. As such we need to keep desiring desire as a way to stay in-
scribed within the symbolic. Here we can’t say that if lack didn’t 
exist, Lacan would have invented it! Let’s think about lack a little 
bit differently but where its role in desire is still preserved. Let’s 
take the “fifteen puzzle” as an example of contingency: specifi-
cally whereby it is lack itself that guarantees any form of desire, 
movement, enjoyment. The fifteen puzzle is a sliding puzzle that 
consists of a frame of numbered square tiles in random order 
with one tile missing. The object of the puzzle is to place the 
tiles in order by making sliding moves that use the empty space.1 
Quite simply, if there is no lack, there is no question of solving 
the puzzle (satisfaction), if there is no lack, there is no ques-
tion of desire, it just doesn’t arise. Those of us who witness the 
satisfaction of children at play with quest/puzzle type games 
can observe too that once the game/puzzle has become solved, 
there is a nostalgic twist: a wishing to be back at the start again. 
Desire for desire needn’t be pathologically tragic, rather, it is 
when there is the fantasy that satisfaction (with an object, with a 
theory perhaps?) could be obtained if only the right […] object/
theory could be found, that it seems to me (non-clinically and 
clinically) there is a tragic dimension.
Second take: “Psychoanalysis itself is often given the role of 
policing giddiness in queer theory” (Farina). Farina claims that 
even in Bersani and Grosz’s accounts, Freudian and/or Lacan-
ian analysis is hailed as a “necessary agent of sobriety.” Why is it 
1 I am grateful to Carlos Gomez for sharing this great demonstration of de-
sire with me in Copenhagen in 2008.
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necessary, she asks, to be sober and/or pessimistic when think-
ing about queer desire? Why is it so great (paraphrasing Ber-
sani) that aggression is theorized as inevitable for jouissance? 
In fact this is a somewhat misleading representation of Grosz’s 
comment (cited in Farina as Grosz, 1995, 242, n. 1). She doesn’t 
“hail” Lacanian analysis as a “necessary agent of sobriety”: what 
Grosz actually says is that Lacan “provides a necessarily sobering 
counterbalance” to a retrospective idealization of mother/child 
relations (my emphasis).
It is interesting to note then what Grosz (1994) says else-
where regarding the inevitable ambivalence in one’s relationship 
to one’s body, i.e., precisely what emerges as a consequence of 
the imaginary as the site of rivalrous as well as of narcissistic 
identifications. She argues, following Lacan, that the subject al-
ways maintains a relationship of love/hate towards the subject’s 
own body precisely because every body is invested with libidinal 
value. No body is ever simply or solely functional but rather, 
psychically and libidinally invested (32). The frustration and ag-
gression attendant at the “mirror phase” in Lacan are the in-
evitable experiences of firstly, the infant’s biologically premature 
helplessness when comparing itself with the gestalt image in the 
mirror, and secondly, as Lacan puts it — more or less — when 
compared with this excellent little version of the self (this little 
other/counterpart), it’s either me or her… one of us is fucked. 
We do very well indeed to heed the aggression inherent in a 
jouissance that has as its center a focus upon the body, however 
variously that body is theorized.
Last Thing:
In my response here I wanted to articulate something of the di-
lemmas of my responding in a series of interwoven moves:
By reflecting on what seems to trouble queer about psycho-
analysis in the collection and,
finding some surprising recuperations but,
not throwing out Lacan with lack and,
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finding that jouissance is not(-all) nice and,
challenging a queer = cool/psychoanalysis = fool motif as well 
as,
noticing what queer demands of psychoanalysis.
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Academic writing about psychoanalysis does not often engage 
the practice of psychoanalysis in today’s USA, or vice versa. There 
are many reasons for this, and one is always wishing there were 
more mutual interest. The canons differ; academics still read 
a lot of Freud and later continental theory, less often Anglo-
American object relations theory, and much less often, Thomas 
Ogden, Robert Stoller, Muriel Dimen, Joe Natterson, or Mark 
Leffert. In my experience, American psychoanalysts too often 
abdicate their intellectual responsibilities and the social impli-
cations thereof; too few of us regard ourselves as minds shap-
ing and being shaped by the urgent questions of our time. In 
turn, academic psychoanalytic work does not, in my view, grap-
ple closely enough with the reasons why particular people seek 
treatment, and with the ethics of responding or not responding 
to misery experienced as “personal,” that is, felt to be “inside.” 
Queer theory has, remarkably, been to-and-fro-ing all over this 
ground, in its agōn with psychoanalysis, powerfully critiquing 
it, and equally powerfully re-thinking it, finally changing policy 
and helping to usher in “an exciting [era] of discovery” of sexu-
ality’s range and resourcefulness (Roughton 2002, 757, referring 
to the first decade of the twenty-first century). The chapters 
to which I’m responding here show that the ground shared by 
queer theory and psychoanalysis is still something of a battle-
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ground, but they also show that the debate is a highly creative 
one, born of a provocatively uneasy intimacy. 
The stakes of knowledge for “the institute” or “the clinic” are, 
in truth, not identical to those that motivate the academy. The 
academy’s interest in psychoanalysis stems chiefly from the lat-
ter’s vast cultural influence. We want to know what its history 
means, why it was so influential, what were its main ideas about 
the mind, how it has changed thinking about the arts, about 
social behavior and indeed all human endeavors, for good and 
for ill. We see its power. We employ its insights as well as el-
ements of its technique in interpreting dreams and films and 
literary texts, historical catastrophes, social movements, and 
funeral rituals in distant lands. We remain, for the most part, 
committed to making knowledge, in as unconstrained a fash-
ion as possible. The clinic, on the other hand, wants knowledge 
that changes us. It wants to know which ideas, techniques and 
medication will save lives, relieve suffering, enrich our capacity 
for introspection, and deepen our understanding of our real cir-
cumstances: we’re mortal, we need other people, and yet we are 
only intermittently capable of togetherness. Moreover, “each” 
of us is in reality just a highly impressionable and constantly 
changing procession of affective, cognitive and somatic events, 
experienced as “self-states.” The clinic wants to know how these 
“truths” transform us (Snediker). 
I taught psychoanalytic theory for more than twenty years 
before I decided to train as a psychoanalyst. I went into training 
partly because I couldn’t answer my students’ questions about 
medication, substance-abuse, sexual abuse, ADHD, cutting, and 
eating disorders. I could imagine what Lacan might say about 
them—note that Lacanian or neo-Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
practiced vigorously in many parts of the world, if not so much 
in the USA — but I knew little about the vast overlapping net-
works of pharmacology, social work, inpatient and outpatient 
treatment, or the twelve-step and life-skills programs which 
currently address our addictions. However, I did know some 
things about my students’ lives. My students, straight or gay 
or transsexual, live in, or at minimum must cope with, a very 
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hard-drinking, substance-abusing, status-sensitive world of 
date-rape, overdose, suicidality, STDs, depression, anxiety, bing-
ing, and purging. Many grew up with parents who smoked pot 
or drank or fought or divorced or had to work double shifts. 
Others grew up with parents who abused prescription drugs 
(Oxycontin, Xanax) and relied on antidepressants, not psycho-
therapy, to make their feelings bearable. These students tend 
to see psychotherapy as the solution rather than the problem. 
Many were themselves (over-)medicated as children for “hyper-
activity.” They are familiar with self-destruction — as jouissance, 
as tragedy. 
And of course it gets worse: parents who abuse their children 
in every way possible; children who respond by mutilating or 
starving themselves and scratching themselves raw, or abusing 
or even killing their parents in later life, should they survive the 
latter’s post-partum depression, explosivity, drunkenness and 
cultism. These lives are not “the norm”; but they are widespread 
for all that. So there are those who suffer, from unbearable and 
yet unavoidable thoughts and affects, from uncontrollable im-
pulses. How should we (when not ourselves overbusy with suf-
fering) care (for them)?  
One of my first patients, “Jerry,” was a sex offender, schiz-
ophrenic, alcoholic (in recovery), raped at the age of sixteen, 
whose father, a lifelong alcoholic, had sexually abused his sister, 
who in turn developed multiple personality disorder and was 
taken from the home, along with the rest of the children. Jerry 
spent most of his teen years in group homes. After his father’s 
death, his mother married a man now in prison for child moles-
tation. Jerry once invited a fourteen-year-old boy to come over 
to his apartment and watch porn, and when he was subsequently 
convicted of sexual assault against a disabled eighteen-year-old 
girl, he was sent to a “treatment facility” for sex offenders. Once-
a-week psychotherapy could not do much to help him reduce 
the intensity of his sexual “urges.” What psychotherapy could do 
was to help him bear his chaos, by learning to consider alterna-
tives — ways of mattering, ways others might matter — so that 
his struggles with his jouissance might be experienced differ-
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ently. “What investments are really at stake in making a symp-
tom out of a pleasure?” (Downing). Good question. But what is 
a pleasure? Do pleasures not also involve “investments” (per-
haps “cathexes”)? Can it be a pleasure to make symptoms out of 
pleasure? Could doing so be a certain registration of the reality 
principle, or of the superego gone mad? The question of who is 
doing the making is also relevant to what is at stake in making 
symptoms. Pace Foucauldian leveling, does it make a difference 
if the symptom-maker is the sufferer, the intake specialist, the 
teen group? Foucault turned to a genealogy of “self-care” in vol-
umes two (1992) and three (1990) of The History of Sexuality for 
good reason. Care is a resonant and disturbing word. If one is a 
clinician, one is committed to caring for persons deeply hurt by 
the people who are supposed to care most about relieving their 
cares but don’t (their family, their country). The clinic is one 
of many interlinked versions (daycare centers, hospices, peer 
counseling) of the affective and somatic caring humans render 
as so many arts, rights, and responsibilities. Families retain im-
portance here, as highly overdetermined points of intersection 
and transmission in vast networks of “caring.” Care also has 
a long political history, e.g., as premodern cura, the love sov-
ereigns are supposed to show their “belovit” subjects. So does 
carelessness: Oedipus’s belief that he had solved his problems by 
leaving home brings plague to Thebes; George W. Bush’s dislike 
of having to do chores blew up as Katrina. We also hate and fear 
care. We distrust its motives; it threatens impingement. 
A number of the chapters in this collection investigate the 
caring practices that join and separate us. For Kuzniar, pets are 
“non-human object choices,” which diminish “the power of 
sexual identity categories that socially regulate the individual.” 
“Caring” assembles practices we use to do up and undo our 
shifty affiliations; it gives standing to the creature being cared 
for, and thus changes affective/political maps. (This is of course 
the import of Ronald Reagan’s well-known reluctance to fund 
AIDS research — well-known, at least, to all but Hillary Clinton, 
who, at Nancy Reagan’s funeral, forgot about the 1980s.) Per-
haps because of its longstanding commitment to “the talking 
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cure,” psychoanalysis has been slow to extend its understanding 
of attachment to nonhumans. There is the famous example of 
Lacan’s valorization of human language, but the story is really 
longer and more mystifying than that: As Bennett Roth (2005) 
points out, despite the great love Freud and other analysts have 
felt for their pets, in the analytic literature, there is a subtle ten-
dency to diminish the importance of human-pet relationships 
and accent the pathology of pet attachment. In fact, psychoana-
lytic writing leaves unexplained the quality of shared psychic 
environment between animals and humans. 
When psychoanalysis does attend to animals, all too fre-
quently it forgets the implications of “shared psychic environ-
ment”; intersubjectivity is thrown out the window and replaced 
by older intrapsychic and transference approaches, such that 
the contribution of the animal to shared experience is largely 
ignored. Increasingly, however, attempts to communicate have 
intensified; whisperers speak to horses and dogs; pugs and pus-
sycats help the elderly cope with anxiety. Lab researchers tickle 
their rats and discover rat laughter. The “animal turn” and the 
ecological sensitivity that often accompanies it have begun to 
make inroads in psychoanalytic theory too, under the influence 
of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and enactivist psychology. 
The work of Deleuze and Guattari (2002) on “Becoming Ani-
mal” (232–309) is in the nature of a response to the notion of 
identification as well as to the narrowness of Freudian under-
standings of subjectivity. If we can become human, we can also 
become animal. There is no important role for a house-pet in 
the Oedipus legend, though the Sphinx’s questioning of “man” 
would seem be relevant here.
Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex is widely regarded in 
queer theory as an attempt to shore up (and therefore re-pro-
duce) gender distinctions and distinctions between normative 
and heteronormative sex practices. If Freud gave us infantile 
sexuality and polymorphous perversity, if he pointed out the 
queer elements in all sexualities, if he proclaimed the bisexu-
ality of all humanity, acknowledged the homoeroticism of his 
friendships with men, and refused to try to turn homosexuals 
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into heterosexuals (a practice he regarded as “cruel”), nonethe-
less Oedipal teleology consigned all sucking, sniffing, tickling, 
looking, and listening to vestigial status (regression, foreplay, 
perversion), instead of regarding genital sexuality as simply one 
of many potential erotic constructs and construals — including 
fixations (Downing). 
A number of these essays criticize psychoanalysis for deploy-
ing “pathologizing identity label[s]”; the “gendered Oedipal 
scenario” still dominates psychoanalytic discourse (Kuzniar). 
If thinking about Oedipus is just part rather than the main 
event of thinking about sexuality and identity, however, I think 
it remains thought-provoking. From the standpoint of the 
clinic — and this holds true regardless of our role in eliciting 
the phenomena — incest and transgenerational sexuality are 
forms of queerness that disgust many queers and challenge the 
boundaries of queer ethics. A surprising number of people do 
not think it’s okay for a brother and sister to sleep together, even 
consensually and using protection. Defenses of pedophilia are 
rare in academic circles. The family remains a powerful delivery 
system for caring and not-caring, partly because it makes use of 
age (hence time, mortality) as well as kinship in the ways it tries 
to wrap itself around jouissance. One thing Oedipus means now: 
If we eroticize care, that is because enjoyment is designed by our 
attachments to lifesaving superpowers we can’t do without. 
Moreover, it’s arguable as to how long the sway of Oedipus 
really lasted in psychoanalysis; in fact the notion of the Oedipus 
complex is scorned by many US psychoanalytic practitioners to-
day. Its interest has been eclipsed by many new developments, 
including the challenge posed to drive theory by “deficit” models 
in self-psychology (“deficits” in self-structure replace the “con-
flicts” of drive theory and ego-psychology), and by trauma and 
attachment theory. “Intrapsychic” experience, which reached a 
certain zenith in Kleinian theory, still has many adherents, but 
relational and intersubjective models of psychical process have 
gained enormous ground over the last few decades (Snediker). 
Many of us now do our thinking with the notion of “neuro-
plasticity,” and think of plasticity and entrenchment as inevita-
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ble concomitants of each other. As Catherine Malabou (2008) 
notes, once poured into its mold, plastic does, or is, this or that, 
largely undisturbed. But it can be re-molded, with effort. Per-
haps it is because sexuality must be neuroplastically designed 
that it is both (as Freud understood) mobile and capable of fixa-
tion. Perhaps sexuality is pliable, like all the other neuronal pat-
terns in the brain that derive from experience.
The critique of ontology should not be abandoned, however. 
It keeps us from settling into complacency about our mobility. 
It remains a highly generative form of interplay between queer 
theory and psychoanalysis, as these chapters exemplify. Their 
fresh de-sequestrations of “ontology and action” open up new 
pathways of thought — from Snediker’s elegant discussion of 
“the vicissitudes of personate veracity” and the virtues of ap-
proximation, to Farina’s reflections on the erotic cast Georges 
Bataille gives to “ego-dissolving practices,” to Frommer’s (2000) 
essay on the (intersubjective) eroticizing of domination, to 
Bond Stockton’s exploration of Jean Laplanche’s “enigmatic sig-
nifier” — “in relation to the unconscious, sex […] confounds the 
discourses of sexuality that mark its presence and delimit its sig-
nificance” — and Luce Irigaray’s “failure” to fuse that enjoys pos-
sibility: “Sex, then, is fracture.” Downing rings a further change 
in her analysis of the idealization of fluidity in both queer theory 
and the Freudian discourse on perversion (God forbid that we 
should get so stuck on any one erotic prop or activity that we 
couldn’t get off without it). But can signifiers ever be pinned 
down? It has been fourteen years since Roughton (2002) looked 
forward to the renewal of “the intellectual struggle to redefine 
what we [psychoanalysts] mean by sexuality” (757). Do we keep 
on trying to define, as opposed to seeking the mastery of defini-
tion? 
In the case of perversion, we certainly need to continue rede-
fining. Some quality of obsession or ossification is still linked to 
perversion by many clinicians today: perversion is pathological 
when the need to satisfy perverse wishes overtakes all other life 
goals. Extremely risky behavior likewise indicates that Thanatos 
has come out to play. Or the pervert cannot or will not give up 
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his or her part-objects in order to reconstitute them as a lov-
ing and loveable “whole person.” Arguably, however, what gives 
these activities their life-consuming aspect is not the erotic di-
mension but the death drive, in its driven reconstructions of the 
borderline between caring and hurting: The Night Porter (1974), 
Misery (1989), One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (2012).
The death drive likes to entwine itself with highly intimate 
practices like care and sex. Is this the “fault” of care or sex? I 
think not. But is it so bad to do perverted things that we have to 
blame them on the death drive to make us feel better about get-
ting off on handcuffing someone to the radiator? Surely we don’t 
want to take all the naughtiness out of queerness. Queer theory 
struggles regularly with two wishes that are often at cross-pur-
poses: the one to undo demonization, the other to speak for jou-
issance. Sex is, or can be, fantasy-laden, furtive, slimy, painful, 
unflattering, exploitative. We want to restore dignity, or at least 
value, to a wide variety of erotic experiences, but another goal, 
not always comfortably co-aligned, is to question the very value 
of dignity. I think psychoanalysis can help with both. Bergmann 
(1974) avers, following Freud, that (re)finding and being found 
are part of every relationship (or relational style) (2). This is a 
moving and important way to think about partying in general 
and in specific the importance to many queer lives of clubs and 
cruising (which we now feel all the more keenly post-Orlando). 
But are we trying to sanitize, to tender-ize, sex clubs because 
we find in their unfamiliar familiarity the trace of a wish to be 
found? But then, orgiastic behavior really should not frighten 
psychoanalysts as often as it seems to do. As Alain Cohen once 
remarked, in a meeting of the University of California’s Psy-
choanalytic Consortium years ago, “we are not the Red Cross.” 
Lacan may be credited for noticing that Freud meant to clarify 
the always non-“pastoral” nature of our modes of enjoyment 
(or jouissance), including probity. The prominence of caring 
means now that not-caring, especially not-self-caring, behavior, 
is peculiarly, multiply, affectively invested. As Farina puts it, in 
slightly more inspiring terms than I can muster myself,
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Perhaps what “queer” theorization of desire needs is not to 
remain sober […] but to allow for ways in which the analyst, 
too, can be drunk on love […]. How splendid it would be to 
rejoin the party, sitting at the side of beauty, among all the 
others.
(I am tempted to say, with Dorothy Parker, “and I am Marie 
of Romania” — but I so approve of banqueting).1 Even the ec-
static can be understood in terms of disassociation. Sometimes 
we want to scatter or hurt our “selves.” We can’t even say the 
words “hurt our ‘selves’” without evoking pathos or pathology. 
But jouissance lies far beyond the Good or the goods, says Lacan 
(and I agree). It may be neighborly, but that’s why we think we 
need good fences, mace, and bars on the window. Or, it’s all in 
the family, but the family is always-already abject, owing to the 
dimension thereof that does not honor particular subjectivities, 
as well as the factor of entrenchment that makes its repetitions 
so compulsive. Today’s clinic must appreciate the power of at-
tachment — hence of caring and not caring — to design desires 
of widely varying consequences for the well-being of others as 
well as oneself.
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From Tragic Fall to Programmatic Blueprint: 
 “Behold this is oedipus…”
Olga Cox Cameron
In the first flush of his discoveries Freud (1900) was much given 
to inventing mottoes for himself and for this new praxis which 
both excited and disturbed him. “Flectere si nequeo superos, Ach-
eronta movebo,” he inscribes as epigraph to The Interpretation of 
Dreams: “What have they done to you poor child?” he suggests 
to Fliess as he attends to stories of shocking childhood abuse 
(Masson 1985, 289). Reading this collection of queer responses 
to psychoanalytic theory I am tempted to affix Barthes’s (1975) 
statement, “we are scientific because we lack subtlety” (61), less 
as a motto than as a caveat to the large swathes of psychoanalytic 
theory which Alice Kuzniar challenges in her opening chapter 
“Precarious Sexualities.”
It is as astonishing to psychoanalysts as to non-analysts that 
a theory predicated on the existence of the unconscious and 
therefore committed to the radical undercutting of an abid-
ing undisturbed notion of the self should have lent itself with 
such stalwartness and consistency to a version of the Oedipus 
complex which in Kuzniar’s words presumes as its telos “a stable 
fixed identity of personhood that rests solidly within a unitary 
gender role and unwavering sexual object choice directed to the 
opposite of one’s own gender.”
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How has this come about and why? I would like to approach 
these two questions from a number of angles, historical, aes-
thetic and psychoanalytic, perhaps condemning myself to a de-
gree of superficiality and overview. To do so, I will look briefly 
at this tendency firstly in Freud’s own thinking and at the later 
Lacan’s attempts to formulate a beyond of the Oedipus complex; 
secondly, in a dominant current in literary history at the time of 
Freud’s writing; then crucially at the need for psychoanalysis to 
remain alert to its own susceptibility to slippage here. 
If, passing the wine at a dinner party, one were to mention 
Oedipus, where would the conversation go? Towards Sopho-
cles or towards Freud? The stark intractability of Oedipus Rex 
and Oedipus at Colonus would be an unlikely reference in the 
jokes, anecdotes and discussion which might ensue. This in it-
self should give us pause. What had to happen for one of the 
greatest tragedies of Western literature to become traduced and 
banalized into a checklisted blueprint for heteronormative iden-
tity formation?
Far from being a narrative of identity formation Sophocles’s 
great play carves through accumulating layers of foreboding to 
etch a trajectory in an exactly contrary direction. Re-reading it 
now in the twenty-first century it is impossible not to be struck 
by the thought that it is not so much a “queer” tragedy as a trag-
edy of “queering” in the sense indicated by Kuzniar (quoting 
David Halperin): “Queer is by definition whatever is at odds 
with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant.” One of the most 
relentless narrative currents in the play is the ousting of Oedipus 
from a position of normalcy, legitimacy and dominance to that 
of arch outsider, reviled, ejected and unsupported in the piti-
less glare of universal abhorrence. The opening description of 
himself: “I Oedipus, renowned of all” (Sophocles 1938, 369), en-
dorsed by the Chorus who name him ‘first of men, king glorious 
in all ages” (370) is slowly leached of its lustre, darkened by gath-
ering horror until the point where everything that was world 
is stripped from him, and he is found to be “a pollution which 
neither earth can welcome nor the holy rain nor light” (413).
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Is the theoretical tamping of tragic import in the so-called 
Oedipus complex an almost perfect example of what psychoa-
nalysis calls repression? In one of his later seminars Lacan refers 
to the Oedipus complex as Freud’s dream, with its “classic” ver-
sion functioning as manifest content. To juxtapose the starkness 
of Sophocles’ text, the throat-constricting ferocity of its per-
formative power with the steady forward march from oral to 
anal to genital heteronormativity outlined by Freud and stolidly 
installed by classical post-Freudian psychoanalysis is indeed to 
evoke this duality, but here we should attend to Freud’s caveat 
and look for the unconscious not as lodged in either manifest 
or latent content, but in the turbulent energy of the relation be-
tween them.
What attracted Freud’s attention was indeed the power and 
subjective resonance of Oedipus Rex. “There must be something 
which makes a voice within us ready to recognize the compel-
ling force of destiny in the Oedipus,” he writes in The Interpre-
tation of Dreams (1900, 262). Musing on this will very quickly 
lead him onto the terrain of unconscious desire, but as many 
careful readers of Freud, including Derrida, Bersani, and La-
can have noted, Freud was both an extraordinarily innovative 
thinker and a nineteenth-century man, deeply immersed in the 
intellectual trends of his day and limited by the difficulty of ac-
commodating twentieth- and even twenty-first-century insights 
within the inadequate conceptual apparatus of nineteenth-cen-
tury thought. This is very visible along the axis of one of his 
favourite metaphors for designating unconscious activity, the 
fragment and the fragmentary. In The Interpretation of Dreams 
the narrative fragment is quintessential to the non-sense of un-
conscious desire, and in recent years has been brilliantly theo-
rized by Guy le Gaufey (1995) as part object which is not part 
of any object (1). But it is impossible for Freud (1896) not to 
oscillate between the implications of this ground-breaking dis-
covery and the nineteenth-century archeological excitement of 
seeing in this fragment the necessary clue to a recoverable and 
coherent completeness (193). In the “Three Essays” (1905) one 
can see how the seduction of this summative gesture comes into 
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play in his account of sexuality. Anarchic, polymorphous, per-
verse; pleasure-seeking rather than object oriented, all this wild 
enjoyment cannot be left to its own devices, but must somehow 
be “organised,” retrospectively labelled as the “components” of 
a larger whole and its energies channelled into a universally ac-
ceptable solution. Post-Freudian psychoanalysis has privileged 
this summative gesture. Lacan (1992[1959–60]) puts it well in 
his seminar on ethics: “It seems that from the moment of those 
first soundings, from the sudden flash of light that the Freud-
ian experience cast on the paradoxical origins of desire, on the 
polymorphously perverse character of its infantile forms, a gen-
eral tendency has led psychoanalysis to reduce the paradoxical 
origins in order to show their convergence in a harmonious 
conclusion” (4). This harmonious conclusion will not be queer. 
As Eve Watson (2011) convincingly demonstrated in her doc-
toral thesis, despite very impressive insights and the fact that 
his theorization of sexuality and oedipal formation changed 
considerably over the years, Freud’s ultimate bias was towards 
heteronormativity. So the assertion in the “Three Essays” (1905)
that “the exclusive sexual attraction felt by men for women” is 
as much a problem as homosexual attraction (57) will disappear 
disappointingly a hundred pages later in the postulation that 
“one of the tasks implicit in object choice is that it should find its 
way to the opposite sex” (229).
It is however extremely difficult to do justice to the breadth of 
Freud’s often contradictory thinking about sexuality and sexual 
identity. The totalizing tendency, the channelling of sexuality 
into the safe harbor of heterosexual fulfilment, though domi-
nant, is also seriously shafted by his view that there is no safe 
harbor for this anarchic force: “It is my belief that, however 
strange it may sound, we must reckon with the possibility that 
something in the nature of the sexual instinct itself is unfa-
vorable to the realization of complete satisfaction” (258), while 
his heterosexual bias, also dominant, is pushed somewhat off 
course by blurring its terms of reference; “pure masculinity and 
femininity remain theoretical constructs of uncertain content” 
(1925, 258).
289
from tragic fall to programmatic blueprint
Lacan (1992[1959–60]), speaking about the Oedipus complex 
in the late 1950s as part of his seminar The Formations of the Un-
conscious emphasized its normativing and normalizing role, but 
even in those early years of his teaching, he was scathing about a 
proposed route to fulfilment via the channelling of desire which 
he refers to as “the ideal of genital love — a love that is supposed 
to be itself alone the model of a satisfying object relation: doc-
tor love I would say if I wanted to emphasize in a comical way 
the tone of this ideology; love as hygiene” (8). Not only is this 
project tainted with an optimistic moralism, but it is in fact ludi-
crous: “To say that the problems of moral experience are entirely 
resolved as far as monogamous union is concerned would be 
a formulation that is imprudent, excessive and inadequate”(8). 
By the 1970s, possibly influenced by feminist analysands 
such as Antoinette Fouque (founder of the publishing house Les 
Femmes). Lacan (2007[1969–70]) was-somewhat(!) re-thinking 
masculinism and was writing the word “normal” as “nor-male.” 
He had also begun to question Freud’s appropriation of Sopho-
cles’s Oedipus Rex: “The Oedipus complex as it is recounted 
by Freud when he refers to Sophocles is […] Sophocles’ story 
minus its tragic component” (113). Like many interrogations of 
canonical “truth” the remarks Lacan goes on to make in this 
seminar are both startling and (once made) obvious. He draws 
a clear distinction between Freud’s theorization of the Oedi-
pus complex (alongside his other mythologies of the powerful 
murdered father such as “Totem and Taboo”) and what he was 
actually, simultaneously, hearing from his hysterical women pa-
tients. These were all stories of powerless impotent “degraded” 
fathers. Instead of attending to this and its possible implications, 
Freud seems to have been tempted by a masculinist fantasy of 
unlimited potency which he purveyed as fact. Lacan scoffs at 
this: “Above all he clings strongly to what actually happened, 
this blessed story of the murder of the father of the horde, this 
Darwinian buffoonery. The father of the horde — as if there has 
ever been the slightest trace of this father of the horde” (112–13). 
Lacan asks how this masculinist myth has been so persuasive: 
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Isn’t it an odd thing when one knows how it actually is with 
the father’s function? To be sure this is not the only point at 
which Freud presents us with a paradox, namely the idea of 
referring this function to some kind of jouissance of all the 
women, when it is a well known fact that a father barely suf-
fices for one of them, and even then- he musn’t boast about 
it. A father has with the master — I speak of the master as 
we know him, as he functions — only the most distant of re-
lationships since in short, at least in the society Freud was 
familiar with, it is he who works for everybody. (100)
Lacan seems to be suggesting here that the oedipal myth as pur-
veyed by Freud is a mask, a “master-ized” discourse (acting the 
master is to think of oneself as univocal (103) eliding the truth 
of the hysteric’s discourse which is divided into “on the one 
hand, the castration of the idealized father, who yields the mas-
ter’s secret, and on the other hand, privation, the assumption by 
the subject, whether feminine or not, of the jouissance of being 
deprived” (99). This double-hinged truth might have led him 
very far, but Freud, Lacan says, diminishes these truths by opt-
ing for what has become the Oedipus complex. Furthermore in 
the psychoanalytic theory which this diminishing has fostered, 
the elision of the tragic mainspring of Sophocles’ play has facili-
tated the bizarre troping of castration itself as the necessary and 
educative curtailment of desire preparatory to its channelling 
into normativing channels. Lacan returns us to the horror of the 
Sophoclean denouement: 
[W]hat happens to him is not that the scales fall from his 
eyes, but that his eyes fall from him like scales. Don’t we see 
Oedipus being reduced to this very object, not by being sub-
ject to castration but as I would prefer to say, by being castra-
tion itself? — namely being what remains when one of the 
privileged supports in the form of his eyes, disappears from 
him. (121)
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The history of psychoanalysis provides one instance of this 
repressive gesture. It is worth pointing out however that this 
gesture is equally visible in the history of literature, and may 
arguably have functioned as an influential backdrop to Freud’s 
thought. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century metamor-
phosis of tragic vision into Bildungsroman has been extensively 
charted. From the point of view of psychoanalysis and queer 
theory (if they can be said to share a point of view) two aspects 
of this metamorphosis may usefully be highlighted, in the first 
instance what appears to be its structural necessity, and in the 
second, its propensity to lend itself to coercive ideologies, such 
as precisely the classic heteronormative version of the Oedipus 
complex.
It is tempting to begin with the second point first (who can 
resist a rant?). Historically tragedy has been the art form which 
has most uncompromisingly engaged with the anarchic forces, 
among them sexuality, which disrupt human destiny. Shake-
spearian tragedy like the great Greek plays, bears witness to 
the radical impossibility of a sustained and benign ordering of 
desire, to the irruptive and destructive otherness which severs 
the continuities installed by social institutions. This starkness 
is profoundly anti-Enlightenment, and it is interesting to note 
that it is at the juncture which Lacan designates as that of the 
birth of modern science and of the subject of psychoanalysis, 
in other words, the seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
that literary history locates the decline of tragedy and the rise 
of the novel. Terry Eagleton (2003) rather caustically describes 
this moment as a shift from the martial to the marital, from des-
tiny to domesticity (178). There are several ways of theorizing its 
impetus, among them an analysis of the rise of a pragmatic pro-
gressive middle class. Since Lacan so emphatically links the ap-
pearance of the subject of psychoanalysis to the birth of modern 
science, one might also consider the refusal of the new scientific 
spirit to entertain the concept of impossibility. It is said of Gali-
leo that he urged his contemporaries to measure everything that 
could be measured and to render measurable that which could 
not. Tragedy is of course the domain of the impossible, and im-
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possibility is at the heart of queer theory’s non-definitions and 
athwart positionings with respect to sexuality. 
A certain type of novel on the contrary, in particular the Bil-
dungsroman, highly popular in Freud’s lifetime, thematically 
embraces possibility, progress, and self-determination, along-
side the harmonious integration of individual desire and the 
social good. As Franco Moretti (1997) puts it, this is an art form 
which tends “to make normality interesting as normality” (55). 
The Bildungsroman is classically a narrative of education whose 
teleological impetus is underpinned by some kind of reconcilia-
tory or recuperative myth permitting suffering pain or evil to 
be instrumentalized in the service of a wider social good. This 
very ancient teleological curve (Aristotle’s anagnorisis) was put 
to work in quite specific ways in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Bildungsroman, which focused to great effect on the 
complexity and individuality of its hero/heroine, tracing out 
very varied and intricate narrative paths, all of which, tended 
to fetch up on the same marital shores. As both Sigi Jottkandt 
(2005) and Martin Swales show in their masterly discussions 
of the novels of Henry James, all the singular potential of the 
protagonist’s desiring quest had somehow to recognize as its 
destination, the socialized outcomes of marriage, family and (if 
male) career. In Jottkandt’s words, 
the ultimate telos of the Bildungsroman […] lies in the way it 
promises to realize the ideal synthesis of freedom and neces-
sity, uniting under one term both individual desire (sensu-
ous impulses) and the larger social Good (an ethical or moral 
community). In marriage, the individual’s desire coincides 
with society’s law, transforming what is essentially […] an 
economic transaction into an expression of personal free-
dom. (20)
The important thing here is that this trajectory is in no way im-
posed, but freely chosen: “the marriage contract elicits voluntary 
consent to society’s limitations on the individual’s erotic free-
dom by revealing how, what appeared initially to be opposed 
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(individual desire and duty) are really one and the same thing” 
(20). How have the ideological underpinnings of this myth re-
mained so invisible for so long? Jottkandt is trenchant: 
When the protagonist leaves home and embarks on a series 
of painful adventures, only to emerge from these experiences 
with a greater sense of self and ethical destiny — when that 
is, the teleology of the Bildungsroman teaches the individual 
to sacrifice her presumptuous individuality and voluntarily 
submit to the greater Good of an ethical destiny within the 
larger social group by troping it as the realization and expres-
sion of her singular desire — the very same aesthetic ideol-
ogy is at work which makes us blind to the potentially very 
real violence that may be inflicted in the name of that social 
Good. (21) 
Indeed it is on this violence that all such idealizing tropes such 
as narratives of sacrifice and recuperation depend, as she goes 
on to say. The runaway success of this ideological torsion which 
funnels anarchic perverse polymorphous sexuality into the safe 
channels of the marriage contract is extravagantly evident in the 
millions of women who batten hungrily onto the romantic fic-
tion of Mills and Boon as the truest, most subjective expression 
of their deep desire.
The forces which create this torsion are not then to be lightly 
dismissed. The history of tragedy as an art form would suggest 
that the scandal of human desire is almost invariably tamped 
and blurred into recuperative and normalizing narrative vari-
ants. In The Birth of Tragedy (2008), Nietzsche blames Socrates 
for sanctioning these attempts to impose intelligibility and a 
kind of anodyne moral didacticism on the unruly turbulence 
of tragic form (64). In a recent discussion of the long history 
of this theory-driven dilution, Terry Eagleton (2003) rather 
witheringly suggests that “knowledge in the long aftermath of 
tragic theatre is no longer mythical or mystical but coupled to 
the groveling English values of virtue and morality, happiness 
and self-transparency” (18). The discrepancy between tragedy 
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and theories of tragedy is largely due to a jagged refusal of ame-
nability on the part of tragic truth. As another commentator 
observes; “Tragic plays, rather than bearing out the salient prin-
ciples of traditional dramatic theory resist them and withstand 
the modes of understanding they make possible” (Gellrich 1988, 
7). Eagleton, like Jottkandt, is not unaware of the ideological un-
derlay of this tendency to dilution, and is suspicious of attempts 
to press gang the disruptive destabilizing energy of tragedy into 
the muted contours of the cautionary tale.
From tragedy to Bildungsroman, from performative intran-
sigence to moralizing theories, the analogy with what has hap-
pened in psychoanalytic theory is easily sketched. And rightly 
evokes queer protest. The challenge here as Kuzniar points out 
is to psychoanalysis. It seems to me that psychoanalytic theory 
actually goes some way towards explaining its own narrative 
slippage, via its pinpointing of repression, which sometimes 
works in the direction of a kind of sedative reductionism. Part 
of this project consists in an attempt to erase or at least to of-
fer illusory solutions to the troubling enigma of sexuality. There 
are formidable, probably insuperable obstacles to reversing the 
normativing slippage from Sophocles to Freud, from Oedipus 
Rex to the Oedipus complex, since this slippage is structural and 
not simply historical. Indeed it is not even necessary to invoke 
psychoanalytic theory here since in both Greek and Shakespear-
ian tragedy, this normativing gesture frequently appears in the 
play itself as an attempt at closure. In the final moments of the 
great tragedies, the hero no longer speaks but is spoken about. 
He or she has become the object of a commentary which passes 
between chorus and audience. But it is worth pausing over the 
status of this commentary. If one looks at some of the instances 
in both ancient Greek and Shakespearean tragedy where com-
mentary is passed to the other it is a striking fact that the com-
mentary of this other is at an altogether different and radically 
inferior level to what has occurred on stage. At the moment of 
ultimate stasis, there where the audience is confronted with 
the image of Lear as he falls dead with the dead Cordelia in his 
arms, it would appear that some semblance of continuity must 
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be assured, even if this semblance is itself rendered derisory by 
the contrast between the stark grandeur of the final image and 
the plodding rhythms of the words with which Edgar closes the 
play:
The weight of this sad time we must obey;
Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say.
The oldest hath borne most: we that are young
Shall never see so much nor live so long.
(Shakespeare 1979, 1113)
As Franco Moretti (1983) points out the extraordinary dramatic 
efficacy of these lines consists precisely in “their chilling stupid-
ity, in the drastic banalization they impose on the play” (52). 
At the point of ultimate non-sense, “in the very work that has 
unhinged our trust in the meaning of words, there reappears the 
obtuse assurance of sing-song proverb and of dead metaphor” 
(52). The notion that a kind of universalizing summary could 
possibly be adequate to the catastrophic happenings we have 
just witnessed is savagely undercut by these sing-song rhythms, 
these rhyming saws, whose blind mediocrity can only indicate, 
as Moretti points out “the chasm that has opened between facts 
and words, or more properly between referents and signifieds” 
(53). While Moretti rightly sees this commentary as plodding, 
sing-song and inadequate, it is nonetheless almost always there, 
marking the need for continuity, an attempt at re-installing the 
status quo by compressing what is completely untellable: “a tale/ 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury/ Signifying nothing” 
(Shakespeare 1979, 1025) into a banalizing narrative of universal 
moral import.
The drive to restore the status quo, to cover over the lack in 
being laid bare by tragedy is, I would suggest, ultimately anxi-
ety driven, which accounts for its extraordinary tenacity and its 
capacity to reassert itself almost, one might say, regardless of 
the severity of the challenges encountered. Fiercer than the will 
to power which in fact derives from it, this flight from the non-
being which underpins our existence insists on the coherence of 
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ordered identities and the safety of a corralled and defined mo-
dus vivendi. This is as clearly visible in the great catastrophes of 
history as it is in the tragic form just discussed. As Žižek (2000) 
says of this tenacity which he calls “the Oedipal order”: “it is 
a gargantuan symbolic matrix embodied in a vast set of ideo-
logical institutions, rituals and practices” in which all possible 
dissensions and transgressions are already taken into account, 
since it is composed both of “symbolic forms and their codified 
transgressions” (314). 
Psychoanalysis exists to examine the anxiety-laden roots of 
this hegemonic will and not to let itself be co-opted and enrolled 
in its service. The facility with which this anxiety translates into 
the will to power and the brutal suppression of otherness is a 
way marker testifying to the ever-present fragility of the narcis-
sistic identifications underpinned by this violent tenacity. What 
Samuel Beckett (1987) has wonderfully called “that most neces-
sary and most monotonous of plagiarisms, the plagiarism of the 
self ” (33) should of course be put in question by psychoanalysis, 
but this plagiarism is persistent, and identity markers are never 
more categorical than when unexamined. (While writing this 
paper I heard a jubilant farmer on the radio announcing that 
his cow’s “alluring femininity” had won her first prize at the Tul-
lamore Agricultural Show!)
Lacan (1958–59) defines the unconscious in Desire and Its In-
terpretation as “this something which always puts the subject at 
a certain distance from his being, and which means precisely 
that this being never rejoins him” (Session 12/11/58, 15). How 
then can psychoanalysis position itself otherwise than athwart? 
Its history however shows it to be dangerously susceptible to 
subsumption by conformist ideologies. In his incisive and in-
sightful critique For and Against Psychoanalysis (2006), Stephen 
Frosh points to two ways in which psychoanalysis can function 
in society. One, the “positive” one focusing on what psychoanal-
ysis can offer to social values — “prescribing particular ways of 
organizing society that will produce social and individual health 
(a position that can certainly lead to progressive policies but can 
also be sucked into normative prescriptiveness of the right way 
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to be)”; the other “negative,” which refers to “its capacity to sus-
tain a critical attitude constantly exploring the underpinnings of 
the individual and the workings of the social order” ( 175). The 
work of Lacan has gone some distance along this negative axis. 
As one commentator has put it: “what has been especially in-
fluential in Lacan’s writings is the point that the imaginary and 
symbolic dimensions of psychical life are themselves the ideo-
logical carriers of culture and history” (Elliott 2005, 35).
In the most groundbreaking of all his books, The Interpre-
tation of Dreams (1900), Freud reversed the totalizing gesture 
by privileging the dream fragment and de-throning narrative 
coherence. Laplanche goes further seeing in these attempts at 
completeness and closure a defensive process, and “the guar-
antee and seal of repression” (Frosh 2006, 176). As Kuzniar has 
pointed out the so-called narrative of psychogenesis is seriously 
suspect in this regard. One of the tasks of contemporary psycho-
analysis is to disrupt its coherence, and queer theory is perhaps 
our most important ally in this venture. 
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Katrine Zeuthen and Judy Gammelgaard
Introduction
It was not without hesitation that we agreed to take part in the 
discussion initiated by the editors of this book. We are only very 
superficially acquainted with queer theory, and as clinical prac-
titioners we are not quite at ease with postmodern and post-
structuralist thinking, and thus we felt ourselves to be unfamil-
iar with the perspectives presented by those who are more well 
versed in this field.
In some ways our apprehension was confirmed when we read 
the texts, but at the same time our curiosity was piqued when we 
realized that psychoanalysis was being both used and challenged 
by deconstructive readings of the Freudian theory of sexuality. 
As we gradually familiarized ourselves with this line of thinking, 
we found several perspectives we wanted to address. Because of 
the limited space, our answers to the many interesting and pro-
vocative ideas are of course only preliminary. To this we want to 
add that we have confined ourselves to commenting on the ideas 
presented in this book and only occasionally on the ideas quoted 
in the book, many of which we are not familiar with.
The authors of this book take a postmodern, deconstructive 
approach, reading classical Freudian psychoanalysis from a cer-
tain critical perspective. Most of the authors follow the Lacanian 
and post-Lacanian return to Freud in an attempt to promote a 
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subversive and queer theory of sexuality. Lisa Downing makes 
this very explicit in her chapter, when she states that sexuality 
is the common theme of interest in psychoanalysis and queer 
theory. “In the former,” however, “it is a source of truth to be 
tapped; in the latter it is a perversion and power-laden lie to be 
exposed.” 
This lie to be exposed — according to Lara Farina — is Freud’s 
concept of the Oedipus complex, the focal point of his theory 
of infantile polymorphous sexual development. Freud saw this 
concept, so the argument goes, as a “foundational structure of 
modern Western society (which) produces the opposition of 
gender and the experience of desire as lack.” 
Later when we discuss Laplanche’s concept of “the sexual” 
we shall comment on the distinction between gender and sex 
which does not have the same bearing in most European lan-
guages where the two concepts tend to be typically expressed 
with the same word.
Furthermore, queer theorists challenge Freud’s developmen-
tal model of sexuality and not least his theory of perversion “as 
sexuality gone awry” (Downing). A prominent spokeswoman 
for this approach is Judith Butler, who combines feminist and 
queer theory to give substantial political and ideological weight 
to the concept of gender as performance rather than essential. 
Defined as performance, gender and sexuality “are a series of 
performances that habitually do us (implying that) we can turn 
around and do them back” (Downing). We can in other words 
“transform the meaning of gender by performing it self-con-
sciously, playfully and with self-awareness rather than uncon-
sciously and in ways that shore up the idea that gender ema-
nates naturally from an essentially sexed subject” (Downing). 
We wholeheartedly support Butler and others in their political 
opposition to oppressive and ideological crusades against sexual 
minorities and find the deconstruction of what is often taken for 
granted enriching. However, we also see the shortcoming of this 




While we greatly appreciate a theory of sexuality and de-
sire which escapes the binary concepts of male and female that 
haunt Western conceptualizations of gender, we want to under-
line that Freudian theory only concerns itself in a very limited 
way with gender, focusing rather on repressed, infantile sexual-
ity. We shall return to this.
While reading through the chapters of different queer theo-
retical accounts of sexuality we found ourselves caught in a di-
lemma. On the one hand, we were genuinely attracted to the 
many poetic notions of a sexuality pointing to a desire, as Kath-
ryn Bond Stockton puts it, “over the staid nature of pleasure.” 
Introducing the term “bliss” as one of the meanings of the Laca-
nian term jouissance, gives desire the touch of queering, which 
according to Farina endows it with the critical potential for 
“the dismantling of sexual norms.” More importantly it makes 
sexuality what Bond Stockton captures poetically as “sexy, in-
timate, scandalous, and bodily, while it’s evasive of capture and 
speech.” We would also willingly take part in the imagined party 
inspired by Plato’s Symposium where love, philosophy and in-
toxication are gathered in the picture of Socrates drunk in love. 
Farina hopefully transfers this picture to the analytical situation, 
wanting the analyst to be drunk in love, “rather than remain at a 
remove from the erotic object of analysis.” Analytic work could 
hardly take place if we weren’t intoxicated by love and philoso-
phy. 
However, we must respond to what Farina describes as the 
pessimism of psychoanalysis, when we are confronted with de-
scriptions of what queer means for our understanding of sexu-
ality. Queer is supposedly “wonderfully suggestive of a whole 
range of sexual possibilities” (Kuzniar, quoting Ellis Hanson) 
or according to Alexander Doty “a flexible space for expres-
sion of all aspects of non (anti, contra-) straight production and 
reception” (Kuzniar, quoting Doty). Maybe we are too serious 
or literal, but we sense in these and other attempts to delimit 
the essence of sexual queerness an idealization which contra-
dicts our experiences of the pain and suffering which many 
patients — homosexual as well as heterosexual — associate with 
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coming to grips with the unconscious part of sexuality. Alice 
Kuzniar proposes that instead of understanding the homosex-
ual, psychoanalytically speaking, as someone who has failed 
to adopt a heterosexual identity, we should instead see him or 
her as “dis-identif[ying with heterosexuality and the coercive-
ness and predictability of the oedipal ego formation all while 
acknowledging the pains it produces.” From a clinical point of 
view, this sounds like a political and ideological aim that is not 
in accordance with psychoanalysis, which abstains from defin-
ing the aims of the cure except of course for the goal of relieving 
the patient’s pain.
We find ourselves on familiar ground with the suggestions of 
Lisa Downing, Will Stockton and Kathryn Bond Stockton. To 
overcome the false dichotomy between, for instance, “fluidity” 
and “fixation” as signifying the vicissitudes of drive, we need a 
theory, as Downing argues, that dissolves both and comes up 
with a more nuanced way of thinking about the concrete ways 
people find towards pleasure. When fluidity is used as an un-
critical weapon against the psychoanalytical idea of fixation it 
may turn out to be just the other side of the coin rather than 
giving way for a dissolving of limiting boundaries.
We also need the kind of discussion we see in Will Stock-
ton’s chapter of the book which critiques psychoanalysis for its 
a-historical conceptualization of sexuality. Using Lacan and 
Laplanche to critique Foucault, Stockton shows that “Foucault 
denies the ‘reality’ of the unconscious by focusing only on sexu-
ality’s emergence as a discourse of human ‘truth.’” Thereby, he 
argues, we ignore that “sex […] is not simply discourse […], sex 
rather confounds the discourses of sexuality.”
Following Stockton we will focus the rest of our discussion 
on unconscious sexuality as the object of clinical and theoreti-
cal psychoanalytical investigation. After a brief clinical vignette 
we go on to discuss Laplanche’s reading of Freud’s concept of 
sexuality, supplementing it with a discussion of what Ruth Stein 
(1998, 2008) refers to as the excess, the poignant and the enigma 




Anna sought analysis not because of her homosexuality but due 
to the difficulties she experienced in ordinary interpersonal re-
lationships, including the give and take in her love life. The way 
to her sexual life had been very long and troublesome, from the 
moment she dimly realised that she was different from her girl-
friends in that she could not take part in their budding interest 
in and orientation towards the opposite sex. Now, while Anna 
probably did not differ from others who had to fight their way 
through the constraints of normative gender roles and was pain-
fully aware of the comprehensive constraints these norms and 
conventions imposed on her search for her own sexuality, this 
was not the main issue in the analytical situation where another 
aspect of her sexuality came up in the transference. Anna started 
analysis with what at first appeared as a strong erotic transfer-
ence. The remarkable thing about these eroticized transference 
fantasies was how stubbornly she insisted on addressing them 
to the analyst, giving reasons for the analyst’s countertransfer-
ence questions like: “what is it, she wants from the analyst?” 
In sharp contrast to Anna’s inhibitions against communicating 
about herself and sharing her thoughts and feelings with others 
including her analyst, she was remarkably open about her erotic 
fantasies, seemingly due to the pressure and vital importance of 
their meaning, which however, was not available to conscious-
ness.
Anna grew up in a family where sexuality was non-existent 
in meaning, i.e., neither visible nor mentioned. Even though 
her mother cared for the physical needs of her small daughter, 
there was an absence of libidinal investment, corresponding to 
the image of the mother of the hysterical patient described so 
incisively by Christopher Bollas (2000). A distinct modesty and 
insecurity relating to her own sexuality prevented the mother 
from normal seduction and made it difficult for her daughter 
to find her way to the erotic playfulness of the body. Finding 
no answers to her infantile curiosity about the parental couple, 
Anna turned her investigation of sexuality inwards in an at-
306
psychoanalytic responses
tempt to find the object and aim of desire in fantasy. The result 
was a kind of overheating in the inside world that complicated 
genuine reciprocity and blocked her ability to communicate in 
words. Experiencing her desire as “too much” for the other to 
meet and feeling awkward when trying to decipher the other’s 
desire, Anna was and is often desperately unhappy when her 
attempts at seduction fail. Allowing herself to address the ques-
tion of the other’s desire in a concrete way in analysis, Anna 
encountered the legitimacy of this kind of question for the first 
time.
Space does not allow us to go into greater detail about Anna. 
We want to illustrate that sexuality in the Freudian meaning of 
the term is deeply woven into the texture of mutuality; unlike 
gender, however, it is not assigned to the child in his or her up-
bringing but produced as a residue of what remains non-under-
stood in the erotic communication. This leads us to Laplanche 
and to Stein’s concepts of the excess, the poignant and the enig-
ma of sexuality.
otherness
In their attempts to explain how our sexual identity affects who 
we are, queer theorists tend to focus on society and its oppres-
sive dualistic norms of sexuality that equate sexuality with gen-
der. In our opinion the deconstructive strategy of queer theory 
focuses too one-sidedly on society when searching for answers 
to questions such as “who am I if I do not fit into these cat-
egories?” or “why do I feel queer?” In her essay, Kuzniar sug-
gests the theory of Laplanche as a possible frame for finding “a 
language to reflect feelings of disjointedness.” We think that if 
the above-mentioned questions are to be addressed in a Laplan-
chean framework we must turn to the small child and its early 
relations with important caregivers. It seems that the queer fo-
cus has lost sight of the fact that society is these primary re-
lations, which are cultural expansions of the biological womb. 
This focus is expressed most uncompromisingly by Leo Bersani 
whose work is cited by most of the contributors to this book. 
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Thus Bond Stockton refers to Bersani stating “that sex keeps 
one free from the ‘violence of relationships.’” In visualising sex 
as beyond object-choice and even personhood altogether, Tim 
Dean — quoted by Farina — follows the same line of thought 
with the aim of liberating the sexual from any kind of relation-
ship. Laplanche begs to differ.
Laplanche’s theory (1989, 1997, 1999, 2002) expands and en-
riches the focus of queer theory by turning our attention to the 
early relation between child and adult and the development of 
meaning that takes place here. He does so without losing the 
deconstructive focus characteristic of queer theory, but also 
without dissolving the creation of meaning into powerful yet 
arbitrary constructions. When the adult gratifies the child’s 
needs, the child is confronted with the adult’s desire. The child 
is seduced by the adult other through its attempt to understand 
the desire when the adult addresses the child; an address full of 
meanings that are inaccessible and thus enigmatic to the child. 
What Kuzniar calls “lack of intelligibility,” Laplanche refers 
to as an enigmatic message or signifier. There is a difference, we 
want to emphasize, between that which lacks intelligibility and 
that which presents itself as an enigma to be solved. Laplanche’s 
focus is thus the hidden and enigmatic signifier of the adult’s 
care-giving; a focus that embeds infantile sexuality in a real 
lived relation rather than surrounding it with “an aura of sexual 
mystery,” a signification that too easily leads to other and similar 
vague descriptions of sexuality as “being mystifying and unex-
plainable” (Kuzniar). Desire is directed towards what we lack, 
Farina asserts. We agree, but at the same time we want to point 
out that the specific experience of lack is always embedded in 
what we have experienced in our real and lived mother-child 
relation. The construction or translation of meaning is not arbi-
trary but has as its starting point the adult’s enigmatic signifier 
and thus the adult’s otherness, rather than sheer lack of intel-
ligibility. 
In her work on the poignant, the enigmatic, and the exces-
sive, Ruth Stein (1998) emphasizes the child’s fundamental need 
for bodily care, thus making explicit that sexuality comes into 
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existence and develops in real and lived relations. First of all 
there is a body and with it bodily excitations and sensations 
that are overwhelming or poignant (263). Secondly there is the 
enigmatic object, the caretaker “whose otherness, transmitted 
via enigmatic, unconscious, seductive messages helps the in-
fant’s psyche build itself through the infant’s efforts to ‘translate’ 
and fantasize about these messages” (2008, 47). And finally, that 
which cannot be given meaning is by Stein defined as excessive, 
in so far that “the mother’s enigmatic message vaguely attracts 
and excites the child, but it can only belatedly become symbol-
ised” (1998, 263). Often this symbolization takes place not only 
very late but is also very painful, as Anna’s story reflects. 
Anna’s relations to others and the meaning or lack of mean-
ing she experiences in these relations are marked by the enig-
matic address of the adult other as well as the adult other’s fail-
ure to answer Anna’s question: “what do you want from me and 
who am I in relation to your enigmatic address?” Stein’s concept 
of sexualization — i.e., the ability of the infant to deal with the 
painful gap between herself and the excessive adult — has been 
very useful in working with Anna, since it gives meaning to the 
powerful libidinal excitement which found a kind of solution in 
her sexual fantasies. Sexualization, thus understood, is a capac-
ity, a positive achievement and not only a defensive manoeuvre. 
Admitting that we need to add to the concept of sexuality, in-
herited from Freud, some other dimensions to take into account 
the extraordinary impact of sexuality, Stein turns to queer theory 
and the work of Georges Bataille and, as she puts it, his idea that 
eroticism by “undoing us […] is a device for carrying us beyond 
the toll of our separate individuality” (255). In Stein’s renewal 
of psychoanalytic writings on sexuality we find similarities be-
tween her approach and the many fresh perspectives expressed 
by the authors of this book. Thus we see a similarity between her 
concept of excess (2008) and the concept of bliss introduced by 
Bond Stockton. Stein, however, like Laplanche cannot envisage 
sexuality outside the relation between the subject and the other, 
even though it is both enigmatic and excessive. 
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We shall give a clinical account of how a child’s unconscious 
sexuality can be seen as a result of the communication between 
mother and child, leaving the child with an excessive sexuality 
as a consequence of his attempt to respond to his mother’s en-
igmatic messages.
Tom, Sexuality and Gender
In the analytic work with the eight-year-old Tom it became evi-
dent that what at first appears to be a story of a boy whose sexual 
identity as a boy was prevented from developing by sexual abuse 
and by his mother’s attempt to protect him, turns out instead to 
be about a child whose mother did not let him find his way to 
his own infantile sexual fantasies of what it means to be Tom in 
relation to his mother. 
A male pre-school teacher that Tom had been very attached 
to had abused Tom anally, when Tom was six years old. His con-
dition was worrisome as he suffered from chronic constipation, 
withdrew from his classmates, and stayed in his room when he 
was at home. His parents had been divorced since Tom was two 
and his relation to his mother was very close; their symbiosis 
had been reinforced by the abuse and his bad health. At the same 
time the mother was disgusted by the close relationship her son 
had had to the pre-school teacher as well as by the sexual abuse. 
The mother protected her son by shutting out the outside 
world, thus preventing him from being in the world indepen-
dently, but the world that obtained between mother and son was 
potentially threatening. To Tom, faeces were dangerous, sym-
bolizing the inverted penis and penetrating him when he held 
it back. If he let it go, he feared it would penetrate his mother, 
yet holding it back kept him at a pre-genital stage. Thus fae-
ces became identical with the penis, which mother and son 
conspired to ban from their relationship. Thus the mother was 
able to maintain a relation to her son that was without sexual-
ity. Holding back the faeces and thus his development, however, 
prevented Tom from creating social relationships with children 
of his age. 
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First of all Tom’s case is a nasty example of perverse seduc-
tion, which inflicts on the child a brutal reality that takes the 
place of the child’s infantile fantasies. These infantile fantasies 
should have carried out the work of interpreting the enigmas 
given to the child through maternal seduction. Tom was forced 
to cling to his mother who seemed simultaneously both avail-
able in reality and inaccessible. The mother repeated the trauma 
he had suffered by binding him to their relation and denying 
him the right to give their relation meaning in fantasy. Tom 
missed the moment where he should have developed his infan-
tile sexual fantasies as interplay between fantasy and reality, an 
interplay that should have separated him from the relation to 
his mother. Instead, he met his mother’s enigmatic address, an 
approach that was already filled with significance, but a signifi-
cance that was totally beyond the reach of Tom’s translations. 
Thus, Tom could neither answer his mother nor give their re-
lation a meaning of his own. Fantasy was not put to work but 
rather was locked by the mother’s gaze. Tom’s holding back of 
faeces as an inverted penis is not to be interpreted as a holding 
back of gender, but as a holding back of the mother’s enigmatic 
address and her refusal to let him give their relation a mean-
ing of his own. The faeces prevented Tom’s creation of infantile 
sexual fantasies.
Continuing the Copernican Revolution 
While we were reading the attempts of the authors of this book 
to seek out the queerness of psychoanalysis through the work of 
Lacanian and post-Lacanian analysts, we found an interesting 
article, written by Laplanche (2007), which takes us directly to 
the subject under consideration.
In this article, Laplanche presents an outline of how the triad 
of gender, sex and the sexual functions in the early history of 
the human being, suggesting that “the sexual” as such “is the 
unconscious residue of the repression/symbolization of gender 
by sex” (202). In other words, the sexual becomes the repressed 
through the societal or parental need to define gender as two-
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fold by letting biology and genital difference assign gender a 
duality. With his interest in and talent for dissolving givens in 
our understanding of what it means to be human, Laplanche 
argues that “conceptual distinctions are valid not in themselves 
but for the conflictual potentialities they conceal” (202). Binary 
distinctions often hide a forbidden middle that does not auto-
matically fit into the categories which we use and allow to define 
the world and its possible identities. Laplanche states that: “the 
question of sexual identity” is displaced “onto the question of 
gender identity” (202).
In a society with a “forbidden middle” or a lack of room for 
that which falls between false dichotomies we should focus on 
the relation between subject and object, and the difficulties 
and pain that the otherness of relating holds. How can we keep 
expanding the Copernican revolution, its unfinishedness, its 
openness? If Laplanche gives queer theory a hand we can keep 
our focus decentralized, that is to say that we can shift between 
the intersubjectivity of the child and the adult other, as well as 
between the intersubjectivity of subject and society. The Ptole-
maism or self-centeredness of the human psyche is a conviction 
acquired by the psyche itself — as is that of society. 
Queer theory opposes duality; first and foremost that which 
is founded on the argument that biology determines sexual 
identity. It argues that society leaves out categories that are 
queer — that is, not dualistic or defined by having or not hav-
ing a penis, being or not being male — and tries to capture a 
world of identities not categorized in stigmatizing dualities and 
categories. 
Such identities do not maintain dualities by falling inbetween 
them, but dissolve duality by pointing at the many ways of be-
ing that cannot be understood within the dualistic categories 
supposedly determined by biology. Queer theory points to the 
excess of sexuality by reminding us how very difficult it is to cat-
egorize sexuality in acceptably delineated dualistic definitions. 
While queer theory helps us question the categories of sex-
ual identity by turning to society, psychoanalytic theory and its 
clinical practice can help us understand how identity is embed-
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ded in the relation between the child and the adult and how 
this decentralized subjectivity is a driving force of development 
that is facilitated in the relation; that is, the relation between 
child and adult as well as the relation between analyst and analy-
sand. Psychoanalysis lets us focus on the enigmatic character of 
sexuality and helps us maintain that enigma as defined by that 
which cannot be categorized. Psychoanalysis can explain to us 
why sexuality or the sexual is not twofold or dualistic but rather 
plural or polymorph.
Works Cited
Bollas, Christopher. Hysteria. London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2000.
Laplanche, Jean. New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, trans. 
David Macey. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
———. “The Theory of Seduction and the Problem of the 
Other.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 78 (1997): 
653–66.
———. Essays on Otherness. London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 1999.
———. “Sexuality and Attachment in Metapsychology.” In 
Infantile Sexuality and Attachment, ed. Daniel Widlöcher, 
37–45. New York: Other Press, 2002.
———. ”Gender, Sex, and the Sexual.” Studies in Gender and 
Sexuality 8, no. 2 (2007): 201–19.
Stein, Ruth. “The Poignant, The Excessive and The Enigmatic 
in Sexuality.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 79 
(1998): 253–68.
———. “The Otherness of Sexuality: Excess.” Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association 56, no. 1 (2008): 43–71.
313
16
The Transforming Nexus: 
Psychoanalysis, Social Theory, and Queer Childhood
Ken Corbett
Twenty-first-century clinical psychoanalysis surely has as much 
to do with feminism, queer theory, and social philosophy as 
it does with Freudian tenets, postwar British object-relations 
theory, American ego psychology, or even modern attachment 
models. The social critique of the normal is now developing de-
velopmental theories. Questioning the rigid necessity of a nor-
mative symbolic order has led not only to rethinking human 
development, but also to the re-conception of psychotherapeu-
tic care. 
This modern frame of mind has only been articulated in a 
relatively small quarter of psychoanalysis1 (a guild of small sec-
tors), yet it reaches into virtually every mode of psychoanalytic 
practice.2 Psychoanalysts have begun to rethink life as a complex 
1 See for example, Aron and Starr (2011); Corbett (2009, 2010); Dimen (2003, 
2011); Dimen and Goldner (2005), Fairfield (2002); Goldner (2010); Harris 
(2005), Layton (2004); Rozmarin, (2010); Saketopoulo (2010); Stein (2010); 
Suchet (2010). 
2 See, for example, how Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudilliere (2004) 
incorporate social theory into their largely Lacanian inflected considera-
tions of trauma and history, and in so doing argue for modes of psycho-
therapeutic care that are outside the dictates of classical technique. Or con-
sider how Fonagy (2001) approaches the press of a social world in his most 
recent theorizing about attachment and sexuality — albeit troubled by his 
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psyche-socio-soma field, open to multiple points of reference, 
normative expectation, and inimitable relational bonds. 
Theorists now place the evolving human in an evolving rela-
tional world. They do so by leaning into bedrock psychoanalytic 
presuppositions as to the ways in which fantasy is inter-impli-
cated with embodiment and mind. Bodies and minds are seen 
as open to a range of fantastic expressions and relational dy-
namics, including traumatic intromissions, as well as, non-nor-
mative openings. If one accepts that relational dynamics create 
varying inter-subjective spaces, spaces from and through which 
humans emerge, spaces that are more or less coherent and more 
or less organizing and loving, spaces that inflect the manner of 
the enigmatic transfer of fantasies and attributes, then one also 
has to be open to considering the ways in which the evolution 
of the human is open to a range of relational organizations and 
coherence.
Further, if one also accepts that the human is never outside 
social regulation (even before birth, even in resistance), and if it 
is additionally accepted that humans are formed and constituted 
by cultural norms, then one is left to question the attribution of 
that which is called “originary.” There is no pure psychology of 
the protagonists (mother and child). There is no pure author-
ity of the past. Intromissions, both traumatic and nurturing, 
are always and already socially and historically constituted, and 
thereby open to a variety of nuance and complication (even con-
tradiction). 
failure to problematize the imagination through the social. Or look at Kul-
ish’s (2010) effort to integrate social and relational concepts into the frame 
of modern ego psychology, as she reviews modern theories of gender. Or 
consider how Straker (2006) integrates social theory into her contempla-
tion of race and hatred, specifically hate within the transference and coun-
tertransference — theorizing that rests mainly on Freudian propositions. Or 
bear in mind Tronick’s (2007) efforts to reflect on parent-child attachments 
as they are interimplicated with cultural orders. Or how Widlocher (2001), 
in conversation with Jean Laplanche, contemplates the world beyond the 
parent and infant, and how that world and the history it carries infects every 




We look now toward a wider arc of livable lives; ideality is not 
reserved for the more normative among us. And in so doing, we 
have begun to theorize lives built in-and-through social praxis 
and regulatory forces. We reflect on the anxious press of nor-
mative regulation. We consider how social orders and symbolic 
registers are enigmatically transferred in idiomatic parent-child 
relations. 
Without a theory that locates such perception and assess-
ment within the constituting frame of the social, we are left with 
no social demarcation for the clinical scene of address. We are 
left with a “neutral” analyst, who appears as if he magically lives 
outside the inside, as if he is not regulated by cultural orders and 
twisted by the drill of the normative. The ethical insufficiency 
that issues from this lack is that it leaves the therapist inade-
quately prepared to address counter-transference, and to recog-
nize if counter-resistance or counter-anxiety is being repeated 
through normative presumption, and reactive pathologizing. 
At stake here is nothing less than how we measure the well-
being of our fellow citizens. And, in turn, how we are rethink-
ing the sphere of the psychological, including the ethics and the 
modes of care that constitute the therapeutic scene of address. 
Rethinking the psychological sphere has been intertwined 
with a reconsideration of psychotherapeutic action. Focusing on 
the work of reverie and potential space has been central to these 
considerations. A premium is placed on discerning the role of 
fantasy as it builds potential space between analyst and patient. 
This technique is not distinguished from the longstanding clas-
sical mode of suspension that grounds (or more precisely un-
grounds) psychoanalytic listening. We listen with free-floating 
ears; we suspend and hover; we look toward manifest expres-
sions of the re-cathecting unconscious. 
Modern technique, however, is distinguished from classi-
cal modes of apprehending the patient in that the free in free 
floating is problematized even as it is sought. It is understood 
that no one lives outside the inside, and that fantasy, interiority, 
and relationality are always-and-already constituted by cultural 
norms — for both patient and analyst alike. The work of nor-
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mative regulation, as it regulates affective and ethical disposi-
tions, is held in view — held as regulatory force comes to bear 
(via anxiety and aggression; via attachment and security; via 
love and hate) on any narrative. The frame of psychotherapeutic 
action has also been rethought as a potential field open to both 
the patient and analyst, one that necessitates a broader based 
analysis, one that includes the relational exchange between pa-
tient and analyst, not just what has come to be called the “one 
person” psychology of the patient.3 
Transforming Nexus
I have come to think of one technical feature of this practice as 
seeking what I refer to as a transforming nexus. I move forward 
here to illustrate this process. I do so because I could not think 
about this process outside of my doubled education in psychoa-
nalysis and queer theory. The congress and accomplishment of 
this union, this potential space, if you will, seems important to 
catalogue and consider. What is more, it is suspension, the knit-
ting nexus, and the transfers that unfurl to shape this space that 
clinical psychoanalysis has to offer, as it may be similar to and/
or distinguished from queer literary, theoretical or textual ana-
lytic instruments, aims and spaces. In speaking of distinction I 
do not aim toward the differences between a text and a patient. 
Frankly, I don’t find the blunt distinction between a patient 
and a text to be productive. Yes, in the consulting room ana-
lysts are posed with the pressing reality of the other. But are we 
not also pressed by the immanence of Anna Karenina as she 
makes her way to the train station? How different is our affec-
tive range, reach, and even consequence with a patient or with 
a fictive character? Indeed, a patient may demand something 
immediate, a response that hinges on our immediate affective 
3 This technique, broadly referred to as “relational,” is open to a variety of 
technical expressions and variations. For good overviews of this tradition, 
see Mitchell and Aron (1999); Aron and Harris (2005); Suchet, Harris and 
Aron (2007); Mitchell (2003); Aron (2001); Benjamin (1997); Bromberg 
(2001); Cooper (2010). 
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resonance employed in the service of reciprocal action/speech/
interpretation. But might a fictive character also press for im-
mediacy? Fictive creations demand, pull at us, and are not so 
easily pushed aside. Our responses may be impotent (as is true 
with patients as well). We can warn Anna (I would go so far as 
to argue that we are warning her in the act of reading), but it will 
do no good. Still and all, might it be the case that our affective 
resonance and reciprocal experience found in a textual realm 
operates on a different temporal register? Does Anna come back 
to us, unknowing, unbid, as we struggle to meet the pressing 
reality of the other in the consulting room? I not only think she 
does. I am glad she does.
I take the time to make these points about texts and patients, 
because in my view there are differing and yet overlapping 
modes of reality and reciprocity: theory can be built in the re-
lational rush of reading; theory can be built through relational 
bid(s) with a patient. I do not think we can so easily cleave the 
theoretical promise and intervention of clinical psychoanalysis 
from what is gleaned through the practices of textual analyses. 
The distinction that interests me is not the patient or text, but 
the quality of the analysis brought to bear. 
The clinical/textual project of theory making is more pro-
ductively approached as we consider how the modern shift in 
analytic instrument and aim open onto considerations of in-
terpretation: modes of interpretation, interpretive technique, 
how interpretations are offered, and to what end. Are interpre-
tations offered as a way to name a gap (a discursive lack)? Or 
are they offered within a field? Might they do both? Are they 
offered in accord with well-known signposts of depth, modes 
of understanding that may dutifully repeat classical psychoana-
lytic presuppositions with too little regard for the vicissitudes of 
the human and the evolving social order? Or is the interpretive 
arc paced in an idiomatic/speculative manner (offered, not de-
clared)? Is room left for the rebounding transference? Is room 
made to play between psychic and material realities? Is depth 
found and re-found and re-found through the affect of what is 
said, and the charge of the relational bid that is made? 
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I ask these questions not because I think they distinguish 
queer theoretical textual analyses from clinical analyses. I don’t. 
I ask these questions because clinical psychoanalysis does not 
only bring a mode of knowing — a set of propositions through 
which theorists can glean philosophical positions or tenets. 
Clinical psychoanalysis also brings a mode of practice that rests 
on the action of interpretation, and modes of interpretation that 
are different from modes of knowledge. I am reluctant to know 
the other. I prefer to keep company, to play in reality — keeping 
present, where keeping present has an unexpected relationship 
to the limits of knowing. 
How one works with the limits of knowing and the action 
of play are, in my view, part of any good-enough psychoana-
lytic practice; an unknowing that affords the exploration of the 
relational possibilities to be discovered in the transference and 
counter-transference; play that opens into a mode of suspen-
sion and holding, a complex potential space that allows for and 
depends on reverie. 
An intriguing example of the tensions between knowing and 
unknowing can be found in a founding queer theory text, Mi-
chael Moon’s (1998) A Small Boy and Others, where he offers 
readings of both Henry James and Andy Warhol’s boyhoods. In 
approaching James, Moon zeroes in on repetitive themes, fan-
tasies, and scenes of repressed and enacted desires, as well as 
offering a keen reading of the social order in which James found 
himself as a boy. Through a cautiously constructed interpreta-
tive arc, Moon articulates a set of processes he holds to have 
been formative of James’s queer childhood: daring, dramatic 
uncanniness, risky weirdness, erotic offcenteredness, uniquely 
tuned perception and imitation (hypermimesis), unapologetic 
perversity, and a precocious acquaintance with grief. 
The pace of the interpretations rendered by Moon could be 
called Winnicottian. Moon takes care to stay one step behind 
James, not ahead of James. Speculation is offered not declared. 
Room is left for the rebounding transference. Suspension (play-
ing between psychic and material reality) is key here as one 
seeks to live in the complex matrix of relational potentialities. 
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In the same text, Moon moves on to contemplate Andy War-
hol’s childhood. This analysis follows not on the basis of a book 
length autobiography, but on one paragraph of one of Warhol’s 
autobiographies, a paragraph Moon reads as a screen memory, 
a condensed scene that draws on actual events but is also com-
posed of imaginary elements.
At odds with the Winnicottian pacing of his analysis of 
James, Moon approaches Warhol in a manner more in keeping 
with Melanie Klein’s determination to interpret unconscious 
processes quickly and with authority. Klein held that human life 
followed and faltered on an endogenous sadistic instinct and ag-
gressive responses to frustration. Good and bad are set up in the 
psyche and undergo a complex play of projections. The author-
ity offered here is declarative not speculative. Warhol’s memory 
is quickly named as indicative of sexually symbolic conflicts: 
castration, phallic narcissism, anality, and the primal scene. 
These interpretations may indeed be precise and direct. They 
strike me, however, as interpretive moves that leap too far, are 
hasty, and determined by the necessity of presumed sign-posts 
of depth as opposed to depth that emerges through the affect of 
what is said, and the charge of the relational bid that is made. 
Symbolic interpretations that are offered without equal at-
tention to the ways in which symbols emerge and merge with 
affect and relational exchange do not afford a more subtle and 
contingent symbolic reading. They also risk the foreclosure of 
play, reverie, and the suspended mental-freedom found therein. 
Consider here the unique and original names (the life!) Moon 
offers as he catalogues the processes that underscore James’s 
boyhood, as opposed to the stations-of-the-cross classical psy-
choanalytic vocabulary he employs in describing Warhol. 
I voice this critique with regret, because I believe these ideas 
should be a point of debate. Mrs. Klein, as she was known, would 
I am sure take issue with my position. And perhaps Moon too 
would have good grounds to challenge my assessment of his 
differing interpretive strategies. After all, Warhol was famous-
ly inarticulate, and virtually mute. Warhol could have left one 
with little interpretive room beyond the declarative. Still, there 
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is cause for debate, and in relation to a project as complex as 
theorizing queer childhoods progress can only come from this 
confrontation of opinion, and the theoretical work it compels 
us to do.
Lincoln 
I often find myself suspended. My mind rearranged through the 
reverberations of reverie. I find myself in this state with both 
adult and child patients. But at times it is made especially clear 
with child patients, as I am caught in the vista of a child’s vi-
sion and led toward a life suspended playing in reality, moving as 
children are wont to move between material reality and psychic 
reality, moving as transference and counter-transference move 
in accord with varying relational potentialities. Moving as my 
mind circles around what they may be trying to tell me about 
their experience of being socially ordered. 
The construction of this transforming nexus seems especially 
important in work with queer children. Outside a protected po-
tential space within which a queer child may become, he is left 
to construct an anxious narcissistic approximation. He is left 
in the poignant pain of foreclosed space; he is left to beckon 
the mirror. While he may be able to turn toward a shadowed 
melancholic retreat, he is given little in the way of a progressive 
push, or the license of a queer imagination, through which he 
might hope for and work toward securing more productive at-
tachments. 
I have learned, along with a number of queer children, the 
importance of establishing a reliable potential space — one that 
opens unto practice — as well as the kind of reflection neces-
sary to work through troubling states of anxiety and the shadow 
of shame. I sometimes wonder if this nexus, this place of prac-
tice — this safe return — may be the most important thing I have 
to offer the children I see. 
My clinical experience with gender queer children and their 
families has afforded me the opportunity to consider how these 
children and their parents create moments within which the 
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social order of gender is challenged. Within such moments a 
transforming nexus of gender transfer and malleability is creat-
ed. Gender is resignified through collective intersubjective fan-
tasies and terms; bonds are forged. These bonds, this challenge 
to the prevailing order, can be created through a wide range of 
relational dynamics, fantasies, material conditions, and beliefs 
(as is true for any parent–child bond). Slipping the symbolic can 
occur through freedom as well as through alienation. Moments 
of malleability open through loving protection, just as they open 
through malignant seduction. Speaking to power may follow 
mental freedom or mental anguish. How, and whether, a trans-
forming nexus is fashioned is as individual as any parent–child 
pair.
It has been my overwhelming clinical experience that those 
children who can, along with their parents, create a holding 
environment fare much better as they move into the outside 
world. Across time, this parent-child dialogic is internalized 
and comes to serve as a voice that privileges the child’s pecu-
liar ideality, offers solace in the face of normative cruelty, and 
holds out the hope these children need to imagine themselves 
otherwise. I have consistently found it to be the case that those 
children who cannot establish this holding transforming nexus 
do not fare nearly as well as they move forward into the world 
of school and others outside their family. Many permutations 
of this parent-child breakdown can occur, and many psyches 
follow. But one pattern that I have had frequent opportunity to 
analyze is of an abject young person caught in a web of loss. This 
melancholic condition is usually accompanied by self-reproach 
and self-torment.4
In my second consultation with a boy I will call Lincoln, he 
discovered that I could draw, and asked me to draw some mice, 
which I did. He colored them (six pink, one green) and cut them 
4 My capacity to think through this melancholic condition is indelibly in-
formed by Judith Butler’s (1990, 2002, 2004) work on melancholic gender. 




out. He seemed less pleased with the green mouse, which he 
crumpled but then attempted to uncrumple. He did not animate 
them, give them voice, or “play” with them per se. He held them, 
shuffled them, and admired them. At the end of the hour he 
put them under my radiator, where, as it turned out, they lived 
for the next three years. During his visits to see me over those 
years, he would immediately go to the radiator, check on the 
mice, but never move them. He always seemed pleased to find 
them, though he did not say much about them.
I pondered the mice in many ways. Were they an illustration 
of majority rule — one odd man out? The majority in this case, 
though, was pink. Was that Lincoln’s way of pushing back? Were 
the mice closeted? Was the green mouse the shunned char-
acter that would later appear in his games? Or was the green 
mouse the melancholic one — the aggrieved, the diminished, 
the shamed, the mouse crumpled by self-reproach; the one who 
could not speak his identity — the one who may paradoxically 
take refuge in suffering and, through a kind of circular insanity, 
ward off his suffering through the manic display of his differ-
ence. See me, I am green. Look away, I am crumpled. 
In the end, I found that I said little about the mice. It was 
their security that appeared to matter most, and once they were 
secured and sustained, it seemed enough. It appeared in some 
sense to be a pledge. In retrospect, it seems that sheltering the 
mice served as an opening gambit, a marker of the task at hand 
— the task of creating a secure space, one that holds but does 
not immediately or perhaps ever fully articulate a complex set of 
affects, serving instead to open unto the practice to come.
I speak of practice to denote the practice of psychotherapy, 
but also, in this case, the practice of gender. Probably the most 
salient theme that developed across Lincoln’s treatment was 
what I came to think of as “scenes of practice.” Lincoln spent 
much of his first year in treatment dressing and undressing Bar-
bie dolls, commenting on the success of Barbie’s various outfits, 
making alterations to her hair, and eventually to her clothes. 
Initially, these scenes inevitably came to chaotic and aggressive 
conclusions. Lincoln would undress the dolls hurriedly, casting 
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the clothes aside; the contents of the scene would be scattered 
and rendered “a mess.” I began to think of these scenes as the 
“mess” of shame and the curtailing wreck of practice. I also pon-
dered the ways in which these scenes could enact melancholic 
despair, remorse, and self-torment. Barbie was debased, made 
to suffer. Sadistic satisfaction was derived therein.
The dynamics of crossing and the constituting practice of 
gender are not addressed in the traditional discourse on gender 
queer children. The variety of affects and dilemmas that arise 
for the gender queer boy in his quest for social recognition are 
not examined as socially constructed or located. Rather, they are 
seen as the manifestation of a specific psychic pathology. They 
are not seen as honorable social, relational bids; they are seen as 
troubled psychic enactments. The boys are depicted as locked 
in persecutory compulsive imitations of their mothers, and in-
terpretations are aimed at these enactments, and named as the 
boys’ efforts to simultaneously express and disown their desper-
ate attachment to their mothers. 
I noted with Lincoln, as I have with other genderqueer boys, 
that the anger that emerged in the treatment was not directed at 
a traumatized and unavailable mother. The anger that emerged 
in the transference and in various play themes was anger at a 
mother (at an other) who could not consistently help him me-
tabolize his variant subjectivity.
Lincoln’s anger almost always voiced the plaint of grievance, 
what one might call the dialect of the melancholic. Complaints 
(“She’s messed up.” “Her hair is nasty.” “Her shoes are ugly.”) in-
evitably imploded, and sad rejection/withdrawal emerged (Bar-
bie was undressed and dejectedly cast aside). It was important 
to follow this character who met such rough justice and was left 
with no ally, no voice. At one juncture Lincoln spoke of the un-
clothed “messy” Barbie as a “girl who wanted too many things,” 
adding, “She deserves to be punished,” revealing yet another 
feature of the melancholic’s tendency toward self-reproach and 
self-hatred. 
Initial efforts to compare this character to Lincoln, and to 
wonder whether he too might feel the same, were met by ada-
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mant refusal. Several weeks later, though, Lincoln returned to a 
similar scene, and this time, unprompted, began to describe the 
shunned character as “tired” (“That’s why she is lying down”) 
and “mad” (“That’s why she is naked”). When asked whether she 
might not be “lonely.” Lincoln said, “She was too mad.” 
I was struck by this response, and by the ways in which it 
might capture the abjection of melancholy: “Don’t disturb my 
angry withdrawal.” “Don’t disturb my self-reproach and shame.” 
Through these emotional states the melancholic guards his lost 
love/identity. But, slowly, Lincoln approached his melancholy. 
We began to give voice to the shunned character’s sense of lone-
liness and abjection. Eventually, we could approach the shunned 
girl, and were able to redress her, comb her hair, feed her, and 
let her rest.
In my final consultation with Lincoln I had the enlighten-
ing opportunity to question him about the “harsh things” (his 
phrase) in his mind. We were drawing together, and he was 
using colored pencils to draw an underwater scene, one that I 
recognized as mimicking the world of the “Little Mermaid,” a 
character who intrigued Lincoln, as she has many of the gender 
queer boys with whom I have worked. I said that I wondered 
whether he liked Ariel only because she was pretty and had long 
hair, as he had previously indicated, or whether it might also be 
the case that he felt like her, “caught between two worlds.” Ariel 
is caught between the world of the sea and her desire to join the 
earthly world of humans. I wondered whether Lincoln might 
not feel caught between the world of boys and the world of girls. 
He sat silent for a while looking at his drawing, and then 
handed it to me. He said it was “a present.” I thanked him. I then 
suggested that sometimes presents cover pain, “kind of like a 
trick.” I went on to say that Ariel feels a lot of pain and sorrow. 
My mind was moving in at least two directions at this juncture. 
I was thinking of the gravity of the original Hans Christian An-
dersen story, of the weight of fateful decisions and how the pain 
of transformation is revealed. In order to gain her legs, the little 
mermaid agrees to endure great pain. Might this be a way, I was 
thinking, for Lincoln to express the pain of normative regula-
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tion — the price he was paying? I wondered further whether 
sometimes his “bright girl play” was not only fun, and, well, 
bright, but also a trick to disguise the anger, sadness, and pain 
that he felt. He was quick to remind me that “Ariel is happy in 
the end” — fortified as he was by the Disney camp romance that 
colors the studio’s Little Mermaid. I acknowledged that that was 
in fact true, but added that day-to-day life does not always work 
out as well as does cartoon life. He gave me one of those looks 
children often do, as if to say, “Yes, yes, you adults and your re-
ality.” He did allow, though, that sometimes he felt “sad” and 
“mad” — states that he had been so very reluctant to recognize 
earlier in his treatment, offering, in turn, some recognition that 
had the potential to move toward the accomplishment of grief 
and out of the deadlock of melancholia. 
I venture, though, that Lincoln was also pointing out that ac-
commodation does not stop with a one-way adjustment. Real-
ity bends. Many genderqueer boys seek to preserve their femi-
nine identifications, to seize moments of mobility, to join forces 
within minority communities, and to imagine their ways into a 
world where the social life of gender is more malleable. 
In that spirit, we did not move within this treatment toward 
a summarizing originary explanation. The treatment moved, if 
anywhere, toward less fixity, and toward the construction of re-
flective spaces and a social comity that can hold the probity of 
many origins. The narratives we pursued in the course of our 
work were in the service of Lincoln’s need to establish better re-
flective resonance, less self-reproach, and greater mental-free-
dom. Surely, there were other narratives. Surely, there will be 
other narratives. And just as surely there will be future recon-
textualizations, relations, and fantasmatic spaces through which 
Lincoln will reweave. 
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The Queer New Times
Rob Weatherill
“Let’s get a few things straight,” says a middle-aged man at the 
beginning of yet another fraught session, “I want you to accept 
that I am a married man; I am heterosexual and happy to be so; 
I love my wife and my children; I am good at my work. So can 
we return to what I sought these sessions for in the first place, 
namely my chronic anxiety? This is what I need to put right and 
I need your help.” Of course, this demand for the analyst to get a 
few things clear — “straight” — is precisely the issue: the analyst 
simply repeats the guiding principle about free association.
Psychoanalysis, Freud makes clear, takes the middle way. It 
simply loosens the tangled (un-straight) threads (Gr: analu-
sis — from analuein, to unloose, ana, up). It says to the analy-
sand, “we are where we are — speak!” It does not proselytize. 
And where we are is in the post-modern, a metanarrative that 
spells the end of metanarratives (Lyotard 1979); referred to as 
“Integral Reality” (Baudrillard 2005). As Chris Turner points out 
in the introduction to this work, “a reality is being produced that 
is extreme in itself, extreme in the absence of critical distance 
it grants us, in the all enveloping nature of its short-circuited, 
real-time, asphyxiating immediacy” (Turner in Baudrillard, 8). 
This virtual reality absorbs every negation without judgment. 
This creates a fundamental problem for all former modernist 
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critical movements because in the post-modern their critical 
insurgency is always being absorbed and reconciled as soon as it 
is produced. If modernity equates to loss, even tragic loss, post-
modernity represents what Terry Eagleton has referred to as the 
“loss of loss.” The post-modern subject is not even aware of loss. 
It may be no longer possible to fathom, to critique, the post-
modern because of the continuous and rapid short-circuiting, 
updating that is inherent in and essential to late capitalism. It is 
always already too asphyxiatingly close. 
Consequently, Gay Rights, for instance, is a done deal in 
many Western countries. What was significant about the Lib-
eral-Democrat Minister David Laws’s resignation in May, 2010 
was not that his landlord was his male partner, but only that he 
had fiddled his expenses. His homosexuality was not an issue. 
On the contrary, in our times that combine a pan-spirituality 
with hedonism, queer theories and strategies have moved from 
the margin to the centre. Even Catholic clergy are onboard. 
There is a flourishing gay scene within the Holy See in Rome. 
According to an undercover reporter for Panorama (monthly 
news magazine in Rome) and report by Paddy Agnew in an Irish 
Times article also dating to 2010, there have been gay parties and 
brief encounters featuring openly gay priests.
Therefore, returning to our analysand, the analyst does not 
challenge his hidden hostility to homosexuality; nor does he 
try to get things straight; nor does he endorse his allegedly het-
erosexual position. He will encourage continued free associa-
tion which will always tend to shadow this loss of loss. Precisely 
because gay rights is officially a done deal, queer theorists feel 
the need to pit a gay-queer insurgency on the straight world. So 
much so that actor Simon Callow quipped that, “the love that 
dare not speak its name has become the love that dare not shut 
up.” The chapters in this book reflect this sometimes bitter ideo-
logical struggle. Officially, the struggle is for the human rights 
of an oppressed minority; entirely reasonable in a secular soci-
ety and this is where the argument ends for the vast majority. 
However, this enervates queer academics to intensify the virtual 
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struggle in order to re-establish a critical distance which is being 
continuously absorbed by Integral Reality.
My contention here is that this ideological attack on the so-
called straight world can be profoundly anti-psychoanalytic. At 
worst, instead of a tentative freedom, polarities are generated 
and defences mobilized on every side. To blow apart “identity” 
and replace it with “fluidity,” destroys what even Žižek (2009) 
refers to as “the ultimate difference, the ‘transcendental’ dif-
ference that grounds human identity itself ” (8). Levinas (1987) 
suggests that this difference defines difference as such. He refers 
to, “an insurmountable duality,” and the “absolutely contrary 
contrary [le contraire absolutement contraire]” (85–86). Again, 
psychoanalysis takes a middle position. As Elizabeth Wright 
(2000) puts it, “in the Freudian universe of discourse, sexual 
difference can neither be reduced to a biological given nor be 
wholly constituted by social practices” (17; my emphasis). Prop-
erly speaking, analysis emphasizes division, rupture and alterity. 
Psychoanalysis is a conflict psychology — antagonism without 
resolution. 
However, if queer sexuality is defined by its inexplicability, 
incoherence, volatility and contingency, this is the sexuality best 
suited to urban, highly mobile subjects adjusted to living in late 
capitalism in the twenty-first century. Each identity is precari-
ous and must be so. However, to co-opt Laplanche in support 
of queer theory, as Alice Kuzniar does in this volume, may be 
problematic. Kuzniar goes on to refute common psychoanalytic 
clichés. The assumption that gay desire is a desire for likeness 
or sameness and therefore narcissistic, is an assumption that 
ignores, she claims, the actual differences of lived life. And any-
way, she points out, difference itself can be used defensively and 
narcissistically, like the heterosexual man who has sex with a 
woman proving that he is different to a woman. She further re-
futes the common assumption that female homosexuality arises 
regressively as a result of the father’s rejection of the daughter 
who returns to her first love, her mother. She insists instead 
upon the possibility of the “discovery of a variety and coexist-
ence of positive identifications that would explore shifting erotic 
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desires and fantasies.” She cites Jacqueline Rose’s articulation of 
the constant “failure” of identity at the heart of psychic life. And 
this seemingly impossible and felt “disjointedness” makes the 
term “queer” helpful for those trying to find a language to reflect 
on this “failure.” 
Tim Dean (2000), in Beyond Sexuality, wants to “thoroughly 
deheterosexualise desire,” and Lisa Diamond (2008) found that 
the women she interviewed, who belonged to a sexual minority, 
spoke of the radical contingency of their attractions to others, 
indicating that sexual fluidity was not just a male phenomenon. 
Likewise, Lara Farina sees Plato’s Symposium as being co-opted, 
via the universal trope of “lack” into a normative gender bina-
ry system of complimentarity. Even homosexuals “rather than 
wanting a person like themselves, are represented as wanting a 
missing piece […] their desire is structured no differently than 
heterosexual desire.” Ultimately, she notes, the Socrates/Dioti-
ma formula is: we love our opposite, the perfect, eternal form 
of beauty. Even male homosexuality, the subject of the Sympo-
sium, is the love of an older man (active/male) for the beau-
tiful youth (passive/female). Farina concludes that feminists 
and queer theorists have found in psychoanalysis “an unpalat-
able reliance” on the opposition masculine/feminine, with the 
feminine as the negation of the privileged masculine, at worst a 
death dealing absence (as in courtly love). 
The attack being mounted on all fronts is aimed at the usual 
psychoanalytic tropes: the Oedipus complex, genital supremacy, 
castration, lack, narcissism and phallocentrism. Against “lack” 
and desire based on lack, Bersani and others want to take up 
Foucault’s challenge to theorize “new ways of being together.” 
Bersani and Phillips (2008) eschew the alleged negativity of lack 
in favor of the positive correspondences of being. Rather than 
find (self-serving and therefore ultimately violent) satisfaction 
in pleasure, participants seek self-shattering intensity — new 
intimacies that embrace shock and fragmentation, rather than 
repair and redemption. They allege that tuning into another 
person’s “potential self ” avoids the ego-driven “violent games 
of selfhood” (122). They specify “virtual being” beyond the ego 
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which can reach out in love to other virtual beings, beyond gen-
der and beyond the appropriation of the other’s desire. Bersani 
is interested in how the pursuit of unprotected anal sex in high-
ly ritualized situations can be understood as a critique of fixed 
gender-based hierarchical relationality. At sex parties, a man, 
called the King of Loads because he has received the ejacula-
tions of dozens of men in one night is called a bug chaser in 
his apparent quest for AIDS, and his insemi nators are known as 
gift givers (Dean 2009). Dean and Bersani see this as unlimited 
intimacy. Phillips is open to these new forms of intimacy that 
undermine mainstream norms (Bersani and Phillips 2008, 32ff).
Paradoxical concepts like “impersonal narcissism” (97) pre-
cisely anticipate and prepare for the post-human world in all 
its drug-fuelled techno-frenzy. Phillips, however, is careful to 
warn that no one should in any way promote non-consensual 
barebacking! He has to suddenly assert the old liberal notion 
of consent as a politically-correct gesture to cover the dissolute 
violence he has just been enthusiastically advocating. This is 
rather like the suicidal patient whose total indifference to her 
own death is chilling, yet when the same patient cuts her finger, 
she rushes to the doctor in panic. Psychoanalysis as such should 
be relatively unmoved by such fashionable virtual radicalism. 
Instead, these ideological demands should be met with criti-
cal resistance, not least because of radicalism’s absolutely cool 
congruence with the contemporary atonal capitalist world and 
its loss of loss. Queer theory is all of a piece with what Virilio 
(2007) has characterised as the Dromosphere, the sphere of ac-
celeration around the earth, with its cry of everything right now, 
“where everything crashes together, telescoping endlessly […] 
into this proximity that has nothing concrete about it except its 
infectious hysteria” (100).
However, there are theorists whose contributions are closer 
to a necessary clinical openness. Michael Snediker in his chap-
ter, for instance, co-opts Winnicott to the cause. In Winnicott, 
“doing and being differently solicit queer theoretical attention, 
since the distinction between the two is a gendered one.” Re-
ferring to Hamlet, as well as persons in clinical practice unable 
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to feel real, Snediker says, “The sense of one’s inauthenticity or 
self-depletion signals a psyche’s queer stumbling.” And to Sedg-
wick’s queer little gods, Snediker links Winnicott’s omnipotent 
infant, “beholden less to ideology or hegemony than to aesthetic 
fragility”; the infant god, fused with the mother, whose needs 
are met before he knows it. And where even the lack implied in 
“good enough,” “definitionally soars far beyond enough’s own 
limited expectations.” Psychoanalysis and queer theory might 
learn from Winnicott’s squiggle game in terms of ontological 
indeterminacy. “How to withstand the desire for completion…
[and] the eventually generous gift of its own motivated or hap-
pily self-abandoned incompletion.” What will one give to the 
other in the squiggle game? The play of what Snediker calls the 
“nearliness” of being a person, an incoherence which cannot 
help but lean on a fiction of coherence. This nearness is insepa-
rable from “Winnicottian spaciousness,” the transition space, 
the necessary space to be approximate. Even language (and La-
can’s unconscious structured like a language) becomes playful 
with the joke with humor, with its “confluence of lucidity and 
surprise.” What characterises the squiggle game is its humility 
and its barely existing. 
We could learn much from François Roustang (2000), who 
also privileges being and becoming over doing and knowing. 
The symptom, he suggests, is a “narrow cyst,” a blockage, a par-
tial lifeless residue and “the key is to learn the tricks and de-
tours that allow the symptom to return to the totality of the psy-
che — this is to restore the symptom to the general circulation of 
psychic life, by drawing it out of its narrow cyst in which it had 
become trapped” (99). By speaking in the analytic setting, the 
symptom is brought back from isolation, signalled by anxiety, 
and enabled to rejoin the circulation, the “fluidity” of life. Where 
queer theorists place stumbling, dislocation, queerness and so 
on, Roustang following Kierkegaard, places anxiety. “Anxiety is 
always present,” wrote Kierkegaard, “as the possibility of a new 
state” (cited in Roustang, 99). “What psychoanalysis produces, 
and what makes it invaluable, is the return of the psyche to the 
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dream state […] the coming into being of the individual totality 
of the soul” (100). 
Roustang takes his cue from Freud, understanding Freud’s 
style to exists in three registers, the analytical, rhetorical and po-
etic. He must be analytic so as not to exclude himself from the 
burgeoning scientific community, to develop coherent theories 
about the unconscious and so on as well as the need to con-
stantly critique his developing work; rhetorical to persuade his 
readers and win them over to his cause; finally, poetic because 
he realized that the poets had said everything before him. Be-
yond the analytic, while including it, Roustang celebrates the 
mythological Freud. Psychoanalysis, according to Roustang, 
attempts “to uncover what Freud called the other scene […]. 
This is [ultimately] the scene of unalienated subjectivity, the one 
where life appears as suffering — a suffering that defines singu-
larity because the manner in which we suffer is incommunica-
ble, the thing to which we hold most dearly because it is the very 
essence of ourselves” (69). Queer theorists, on the other hand, 
tend to reject suffering or lack by trivializing and stigmatizing 
it as part of some heterosexist plot rather than understanding it 
as intrinsic to Being.
Michel Henry (1993), who quipped contra Lacan, “The un-
conscious is destructured like an affect,” emphasized that, “Life 
never actualizes itself, never enters the finite locus of light. It 
stays entirely out of it, in the immediation of its self-omnipres-
ence” (63). Life overflows any representation in its autoaffection. 
Henry makes a radical distinction between representation and 
life. Life cannot represent itself. Therefore, in our terms here: 
life is queer; representation is straight. Henry is thus set against 
structuralism and post-structuralism as the basis for psychoa-
nalysis. Psychoanalysis fails to make the crucial distinction be-
tween representation and its radical Other, namely, affectivity. 
The Freudian concept of the unconscious has two fundamen-
tally different meanings: the first pertaining to representations 
(present to consciousness or not); the second, to affects and af-
fectivity or drive derivatives — more generally, part of the con-
336
psychoanalytic responses
tinuous upwelling of life itself and its inevitably hidden move-
ment towards force and action in the world. 
Life is disturbance, disequilibrium, proximity, suffer-
ing — more than the fluidity that queer theorists celebrate. The 
power that produces the dream, the joke, the slip, the commercial 
product, etc., is not the power of representational consciousness 
or of the universal code, but pure excess. This power opens onto 
representation’s wholly Other. The Freudian unconscious, ceas-
ing to be merely the formal negation of the quality “conscious-
ness,” takes on a life of its own, aiming at the very possibility 
of action — force, energy, power, madness, ultimately the death 
drive and what Baudrillard calls “Symbolic Exchange.” Psychoa-
nalysis, with its current focus on language, shows all the signs 
of being afraid of life. As Henry says: “Freudianism accounts 
for life only to liquidate it” (313), and “Psychoanalysis is the soul 
of a world without soul, the spirit of a world without spirit”(7).
What Henry is (re)claiming for psychoanalysis is the imme-
diacy of the Real as irrecuperably closer to us than the equivo-
cations of language, ideology or the repressive distractions and 
displacements of the code. Language cannot contain the anar-
chic plot, which is elicited by silence, by the disorganising effects 
of free association, by “unspeaking” (deparole), by the evolving 
ambivalent passions of transference and countertransference. 
A balance of forces emerges, a hidden order of ruse, chal-
lenge, game, suggestion, seduction, simulation, where each is 
hostage to the other: over-exposed, out of phase, out of sync, 
at risk — sub-jectum. “To catch the secret of our being,” Henry 
asserts, “[w]e must hack back through a forest of symbols to 
find the great paths along which drives have tried to discharge 
themselves and by which life has tried to be rid of itself […] 
exploded and dispersed across the ek-stasis of time” (325–26). 
Against the notion of a system, or, any kind of Idealism, Henry 
pits auto-affirmation, hyperpower, silence, immanance, pres-
ence, and suffering. Each subject is an ungraspable singularity, 
refusing registration and exposition while appearing to acqui-
esce (Winnicott’s false self), playing the speech games and the 
castration games of loss and the “depressive position,” all these 
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apologies for living, while being disturbance (the imprisonment 
of which is neurosis), while being obsessed, being moved, to the 
point of outpouring.
With Henry and Roustang, as well as Winnicott, we have the 
other non-structuralist version of psychoanalysis that comes 
nearest to queer theory in its attempts to burst through differ-
ence and erase lack. However, as Freud (1933[1932]) very reluc-
tantly makes clear again and again, civilization itself depends on 
some renunciation (180). Attempting to escape this leads to the 
in-civility of the contemporary life. Without difference, we are 
at the degree zero of sex. The brief history of sexuality is thus at 
an end. 
However, Kathryn Bond Stockton reminds us, via Foucault’s 
History of Sexuality, that sex did not even exist (as a discourse) 
prior to the nineteenth century. Ours is the only civilization to 
have discussed sex in intimate detail and even made therapies 
out of it! Foucault thus queers any essentialist or trans-historical 
reading of sexuality per se. However, Stockton acknowledges 
that beyond any psychoanalytically essentialist reading of sexu-
ality, Lacan still regarded sexuality at a limit point beyond sense, 
meaning and discourse. In other words, as Stockton says, “by 
historicizing sexuality as if there were nothing outside of dis-
course, Foucault misses the Lacanian point that sex itself is not 
simply and solely discursive” (emphasis added). Stockton takes 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 20 to illustrate this limit point, or gap be-
tween the symbolic and the real, between discourse and its re-
mainder, an opacity that is hard to translate and that remains an 
enigma. This where we should locate Germain Greer’s forthright 
comments about transgender women: “Just because you lop off 
your d**k doesn’t make you a ******* woman” (Saul 2015). 
Philip Larkin said that sexual intercourse began between the 
lifting of the Chatterley ban and the Beatles’ first LP. The con-
servative Irish Catholic politician, Oliver Flanagan, asserted, 
there was no sex in Ireland before television. Thus, for civiliza-
tions and individuals, what we call sexuality (what Henry calls 
life) ceases to be opaque at a certain key moment and thus be-
comes transparent and therefore potentially controllable. But as 
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a statement of professed not-knowing, President Mahmoud Ah-
madinejad asserted in 2007 in Columbia University, “In Iran we 
don’t have homosexuals like in your country,” he said, to laugh-
ter and boos from the audience. “In Iran we do not have this 
phenomenon. I don’t know who’s told you that we have this.” 
Finally, applying Baudrilliard’s (and Noailles 2005) well 
known triptych, Illusion/Real/Simulation, might serve as a 
necessary situating of queer theory in the history of sexuality. 
Illusion is the domain of appearances, prior to meaning and 
thought. Here, what we later term sexuality is opaque and enig-
matic, without truth or reality. It does not exist. At once threat-
ening and primal, life (Henry), this enigma is at the same time 
enchanting and playful (il-ludere), prior, that is, to its growing 
real-isation and disenchantment. The Real of sexuality (not to 
be confused with the Lacanian Real), is the heyday of sexuality 
proper, maybe the golden age of sexuality, but also the begin-
ning of the end of sex. Sex becomes thoughtful, meaningful and 
truthful, registered, classified, normalized, managed and scien-
tifically controlled à la Foucault. Psychoanalysis has been central 
in this development. As Baudrillard (1990) says, “Freud abol-
ished seduction in order to put in place a machinery of interpre-
tation and sexual repression” (57). Sex is objectified, subjectified, 
repressed, and sublimated, broken down into its elements, all to 
reduce its seductive power of illusion, sin and superstition and 
bring it into the domain of health and safe functioning. Baudril-
lard (2007) speaks of “the incredible racism of truth” (42). Final-
ly, at the most advanced stage, via Simulation, sex is perfected 
by becoming hyper-real. It surpasses itself hastening towards its 
end, by dissolving binaries, referents, essences, and becoming 
contingent, random, and recreational in a veritable explosion 
of hyperactivity. Sex like everything else goes 24/7. Baudrillard 
sees this as a partial return to Illusion and meaninglessness, by 
way of Illusion’s revenge on it realisation. But it is not a return, 
but rather a hyper-realization, an excess of knowing, meaning, 
and interpretation. Here are all the ideological tropes of queer 
theory. Sex is neutralized via diffusion and diffraction within 
Integral reality thus turning a-sexual, virtual, and clithonic. This 
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is the era of “total self-seduction,” the era of “a digital Narcissus 
instead of a triangular Oedipus” (Baudrillard 1990, 175). Thus, 
we might usefully heed Lacan’s (2005[1969–70]) warning in his 
seventeenth seminar: “A long time ago I observed that for the 
sentence of old father Karamazov, ‘If God is dead, then every-
thing is permitted’, the conclusion that forces itself upon us in 
that the response to ‘God is dead’ is ‘Nothing is permitted any-
more’” (120; my emphasis).
The Freudian clinic invites a loosening, not unbinding (Un-
bindung); fluidity but not superconductivity; remembering, re-
peating and working through, not consolation. Any agenda per 
se, gay or straight, radical or conservative, will be used by the 
analysand’s resistance to end the work of analysis. And insofar 
as we are always already allegedly within a “scared straight” cul-
ture, that also needs loosening. The middle-aged man should 
connect his severe anxiety with his rigidity and loosen both. 
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Towards a Clinical and Conceptual Metistopia
Dany Nobus
It was not exactly Freud’s birthday, but on April 27, 1995, the em-
inent French psychoanalyst André Green (1995) delivered the 
“Sigmund Freud Birthday Lecture” at the Anna Freud Centre 
in London under the title “Has Sexuality Anything To Do With 
Psychoanalysis?” In the opening sections of his paper, Green 
explained that his provocative question had been prompted by 
a twofold observation. On the one hand, he had noticed how 
since the mid-1980s sexuality had all but disappeared as a “ma-
jor concept” and a “theoretical function of heuristic value” from 
the psychoanalytic literature, with the exception of “the ever 
problematic topic of feminine sexuality.” On the other hand, 
he had ascertained how practicing psychoanalysts, when pre-
senting case material, were more inclined to focus on the ego, 
inter-subjectivity and destructiveness, for example, rather than 
the role played by sexuality in the mental economy of their pa-
tients. In light of these considerations, and wishing the founder 
of psychoanalysis well for his birthday, Green went on to em-
phasize the value and significance of a thorough re-appraisal of 
Freud’s key contributions to the psychoanalytic study of sexu-
ality — libido, the Oedipus complex, genitality, the vicissitudes 
of the drives (Eros and Thanatos), narcissism — subsequently 
responding to his own call in the 1997 monograph The Chains of 
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Eros (2000) by newly integrating these and other notions into a 
hierarchical “erotic chain,” starting from the drive and ending in 
language and sublimation. 
Over the past seventeen years, quite a few psychoanalytic 
scholars and practitioners have echoed and amplified Green’s 
words, and quite a few others have taken them sufficiently seri-
ously to formulate various responses, and re-inject some sexu-
ality into the allegedly de-sexualized body of psychoanalysis, 
as exemplified especially within the object-relations tradition 
(Budd 2001; Litowitz 2002; Dimen 2003; Lubbe 2008). Much 
could be said about the validity of Green’s aforementioned ob-
servations, yet what concerns me, here, is rather the relevance of 
the response, which entails nothing less than a re-appreciation 
of Freud’s original contributions, nothing more than what La-
can (2006[1955]) would have described during the 1950s as a 
mandatory “return to Freud.” If, as Green (1995) contended, “to-
day’s sexuality is not Freud’s sexuality” (880), what is the point 
of rekindling Freud? If psychoanalysis is to be rescued from ex-
tinction, on the assumption that it still has something to offer to 
contemporary debates on sexuality, why not start with its con-
temporary incarnations, despite their alleged de-sexualization 
of the mental sphere, because they may deservedly be regarded 
as constituting a better starting point than Freud’s “outdated” 
conceptual paradigm? By way of “day dream,” Green wondered 
whether Freud would have come up with the same theory had 
he been born in 1956, inventing psychoanalysis around the age 
of forty, immediately stating that the “answer would probably 
be no” (871). So how are we to accept, then, the reinvention of a 
theory and an associated clinical practice that even its inventor 
would not deem acceptable anymore? Today’s sexuality is not 
Freud’s sexuality. It is not Klein’s, Lacan’s or even Green’s. And if 
the problem regarding the observed absence of sexuality in psy-
choanalysis is addressed by re-inserting the classic Freudian ter-
minology (libido, drive, fantasy, sublimation, etc.) into its ailing 
corpus, the resulting picture is likely to appear as distinctively 
bland compared to the richness and complexity of the experi-
ences, possibilities, performances, technologies and terminolo-
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gies with which the still relatively young twenty-first century is 
equipping the human sexual condition. Sexuality may have lit-
tle to do with psychoanalysis anymore, but a simple “return to 
Freud” may very well result in psychoanalysis having little to do 
with sexuality anymore, that is to say it may very well lead to 
psychoanalysis becoming sexually illiterate (Herdt 2007).
Discussions concerning the cultural relativity of psychoanal-
ysis aside, shouldn’t we at least expect, then, that it takes account 
of the changing face(book) of sexuality? Isn’t a certain sexual ag-
giornamento of psychoanalysis required in order to prevent the 
theory (and its practitioners) from losing track of the Zeitgeist? 
It is worth pointing out, here, that some queer theorists have 
had no qualms drawing on (Lacanian) psychoanalysis in order 
to enrich and advance their own vocabulary. For example, in his 
polemical book No Future, Lee Edelman (2004; 2011) launched 
a searing diatribe against the ideological investment of the child 
as the guardian of human futurity, from the perspective of the 
deathbound, anti-futuristic image of the so-called “sinthomo-
sexual,” a self-identified gay man (homosexual) who identifies 
with and is bound by a point of lethal jouissance (the Lacanian 
sinthome) (Lacan 2005[1975–76]). Psychoanalysis itself, howev-
er, has been remarkably impermeable to the ever-changing and 
expanding, twenty-first century sexual lexicon. If psychoanaly-
sis still wants to have anything to do with sexuality, shouldn’t it 
start upgrading its conceptual software package, if not its entire 
operating system? The reader is no doubt expecting the answer 
to be a resounding “yes.” And so it will seem rather odd if I sug-
gest otherwise.
It goes without saying that psychoanalysis (as a theory, 
practice and method of inquiry) should engage with and re-
flect upon our new sexual realities, yet this does not mean that 
it should adopt all the associated terminologies and ideologi-
cal principles. Psychoanalysis does not have to become queer 
theory or enter deep into the dungeons of our contemporary 
sexual subcultures in order to survive or maintain its respect-
ability. As Javier Sáez (2005) has argued in an astute assessment 
of the strained relationship between psychoanalysis and queer 
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theory, were psychoanalysis to regularly update its sexual vo-
cabulary in keeping with changing social realities, or ideologi-
cally align itself with socio-cultural trends, values and institu-
tions, this would drive the theory and practice (at best) into 
passive responsive mode and (at worst) towards a new form of 
intellectual propaganda. Psychoanalysis should not just be the 
recipient of newly established sexual wisdom, let alone align 
itself uncritically with either mainstream (normative) or criti-
cal (non-normative) discourses on sexuality. Instead, it should 
continue to play an active part in the critical elaboration of this 
very wisdom, its normative as well as its non-normative aspects, 
through the advancement of its own formulae and ideas. In a 
sense, this is what Lacan (1998[1972–73]) managed to do dur-
ing the late 1960s and ’70s, when he defined the logical opera-
tions of sexuation, proclaiming that “there is no such thing as a 
sexual relationship,” that “woman does not exist,” that “hetero-
sexual, by definition, is the one who loves women, regardless 
of sex” (Lacan 2001[1972], 467) and, even, that psychoanalysts 
themselves are a sinthome (Lacan 2005[1975–76], 135). In addi-
tion, were psychoanalysis to improve its sexual literacy by as-
similating and integrating the new lexicon, this in itself would 
not preclude these terms, and their associated practices, being 
re-excluded by way of pathologization.
In order to appreciate, then, the critical contribution that 
psychoanalysis may still make to the study of human sexuality, 
given the current state of affairs in the realm of sex research, 
gender studies and queer theory, it is imperative to start from 
a delineation of the various constitutive components that have 
been identified and discussed under this heading. Sexuality 
must include the anatomo-physiology of the sexed body. These 
biological areas of “sex,” comprising the internal and external 
structures of the so-called reproductive system and the associ-
ated categories of “male” and “female” have always constituted 
a privileged hunting ground for male medical doctors, which 
no doubt explains why for centuries the female sexed body was 
described as isomorphic to the male, the clitoris was not “dis-
covered” until the mid-sixteenth century (Laqueur 1990, 64–65; 
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Andahazi 1999) and the possibility of female ejaculation contin-
ues to divide the scientific community (Blackledge 2003, 198–
210). With the ascendancy of sexology in Germany and France 
at the end of the nineteenth century, the medical study of the 
sexed body was supplemented with the social, anthropological 
and clinical investigation of human sexual behavior, with an 
emphasis on the forensic-psychiatric significance of its “aber-
rant” forms. To this dual picture of the sexed body and its sexual 
behavior (erotic practices), a new component was added during 
the late 1950s and ’60s, when John Money (1955) and Robert J. 
Stoller (1968) coined the notion of (core) gender(-identity/role), 
in order to account for a human being’s intimate awareness of 
being masculine or feminine, and the way in which this con-
scious realization affects the individual’s performance of a par-
ticular social role. With this introduction of “gender,” another 
new element was added to the tableau vivant of human sexual-
ity, seemingly emphasizing the hitherto underrated importance 
of subjective experience. However, few debates within the newly 
created “gender studies” have been more virulent than that con-
cerning the exact status and precise origin of gender. Paraphras-
ing Judith Butler (1990), one feels inclined to say that gender 
equals trouble, certainly for the individual who has to live with 
it, but perhaps even more for the poor scholar who wants to ex-
amine it. Yet gender does not complete the picture. Since Freud, 
and perhaps even to a large extent owing to Freud, our vision 
of human sexuality has further expanded with the inclusion of 
two additional factors: object-choice and fantasy. Of these two 
components, object-choice has no doubt attracted most interest, 
both within and outside the psychoanalytic movement, because 
it concerns the vexed issue of sexual orientation, i.e., a human 
being’s positioning on the axis of homosexuality versus hetero-
sexuality. The role of fantasy, on the other hand, has rarely been 
debated outside psychoanalytic circles, perhaps because psy-
choanalysis is one of the few practices providing access to the 
study of sexual fantasies, and even then discussions tend to be 
descriptive, explanatory and categorizing rather than attuned to 
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the functionality and “logic” of fantasizing within the human 
sexual experience. 
Human sexuality is thus made up of at least five different 
components: the sexed body, sexual behavior (erotic practices), 
sexual identity (gender), object-choice (sexual orientation), and 
fantasy-life. Each of these components stands in a meaningful 
relation to each of the other components, without any pre-de-
termined unilateral causal connections. Whatever essentialist 
researchers may have tried to prove over the past hundred years 
or so, the sexed body does not determine sexual identity. Bio-
logical maleness or femaleness do not automatically trigger a 
sense of masculinity or femininity respectively, as is proven by 
the numerous accounts of people feeling that they were born 
with the “wrong body” and therefore opting to “transition” to 
a sexed body that is congruent with their gender. Likewise, the 
sexed body and sexual identity (even when they are “congru-
ent”) do not condition sexual orientation: a biological female 
with a strong sense of femininity does not by definition become 
heterosexual, and a biological female with a strong sense of 
masculinity does not by definition become a lesbian. Also, sexu-
al orientation does not dictate sexual behavior: a self-identified 
homosexual man is not by definition more interested in pedo-
philia or sado-masochism. And sexual fantasy depends neither 
on sexual identity nor on sexual orientation: a homosexual 
man with a strong sense of femininity may very well entertain 
heterosexual fantasies in which he occupies the role of a male 
chauvinist macho character. Moreover, existing configurations 
may change over time, and depending on the sexual context and 
relational setting: a woman’s seemingly established heterosexu-
ality may be challenged quite unexpectedly and dramatically 
in response to her sudden falling in love with another woman 
(Diamond 2008). And with the emergence and proliferation of 
what I like to call “E-sexuality,” existing sexual constellations in 
the real social space have become balanced against new, alterna-
tive sexual arrangements in cyberspace: someone’s sexual iden-
tity may differ depending on where the social network in which 
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he is moving is actually situated; off-line sexual identity does 
not necessarily translate into an identical on-line sexual identity. 
Hence, what we are dealing with, here, is a set of components 
that does not represent a unified whole, for which there is no 
“normal” distribution, neither in the medical nor in the statisti-
cal sense, whose interrelations do not follow any preconceived 
paths, and which seems to be developing all the time. Instead of 
reducing the interactions between the various components of 
human sexuality to a series of predictable, mechanical, normal 
(average, ordinary) and pathological (eccentric, extraordinary) 
relationships, which is what many psychoanalysts have tended 
to do over the past century, it befalls upon psychoanalytic prac-
titioners, theorists and scholars to appreciate these interactions 
in their irreducible unpredictability. At various points in his 
career, Freud referred to the vexed issue of the “choice of neu-
rosis” (Neurosenwahl), that is to say the problem as to why an 
existing psychic economy develops into one particular direction 
rather than the other (1909, 240; 1911, 224; 1925, 36). Why, Freud 
wondered, does a particular male child whose Oedipal drama 
encompasses all the necessary pre-conditions for the emergence 
of a fetishistic sexual practice become homosexual instead, 
and most boys simply surmount castration anxiety (1927, 154)? 
Why does one girl’s penis envy trigger a masculinity complex, 
whereas in another girl it elicits mature femininity (equaling 
motherhood, in Freud’s book), and sexual inhibition in yet an-
other (1933[1932], 129–30)? Sometimes Freud conceded that his 
explanatory powers were failing him in order to elucidate these 
issues, at other times he conjured up the deus ex machina of the 
constitutional predisposition, which evidently begged the ques-
tion.
Rather than employing this apparent failure of Freud’s intel-
lect as an argument for discrediting its foundations, I believe 
it is much more appropriate to designate it as a cardinal psy-
choanalytic discovery. Freud was confronted, here, with the 
unpredictability of human development and this, more than 
anything else, is what the notion of “choice” intends to convey: 
not so much the formative power of conscious agency as the 
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transformative ability of the unconscious to steer a given po-
tential through a multitude of different options. In this context, 
“choice” does not reflect psychological “freedom of choice,” but 
a logical selection amongst the plethora of available elements 
and the pleiad of possible relations between these elements. In 
attributing this logical process to the workings of the uncon-
scious, one might still entertain the idea that it is determined, 
constructed, controlled by the socio-symbolic system to which 
the subject is alienated, and which Lacan (1988[1954–55] dubbed 
the Other (235–47). Yet one should not forget, here, that the un-
conscious itself cannot be determined, so that any suggestion of 
a determination by the unconscious inevitably entails the inde-
terminacy of this very unconscious and its formations. If psy-
choanalytic interpretation is capable of demonstrating, in ret-
rospect, the unconscious determination of the manifest dream 
content, it is not able to determine the subsequent twists and 
turns of this determining unconscious. Psychoanalysis may ex-
plain why a particular dream has occurred, but it cannot predict 
whether this dream will re-occur, even less what the manifest 
content of future dreams will be made of. 
In its recognition of “choice” as a synonym for the irreduc-
ible unpredictability of human development, including the way 
in which the various components of sexuality connect and re-
connect over time, a psychoanalytically informed theory and 
practice of human sexuality may constitute a true “queer” al-
ternative to each and every, ideologically dubious effort at rig-
id categorization, but it may simultaneously also enrich more 
complex approaches such as Anne Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) de-
velopmental systems model, through its central emphasis on 
the determining yet indeterminable quality of the dynamic un-
conscious. The problem, of course, is that psychoanalysis itself 
has often been reluctant to accept the variations, diversity and 
unpredictability of human sexuality as what constitutes its ac-
tual norm. More often than not, psychoanalysis has endeavored 
to prescribe as “normal” a certain symbolic law of castration 
and an associated sexual order upon our subjective experience 
of sexuality, all the while pathologizing and marginalizing cer-
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tain identities, orientations, fantasies and behaviors. In essence, 
this symbolic law (and the associated sexual order) is that of the 
Oedipus complex, which regards the recognition of sexual dif-
ference between man and woman as the necessary precondition 
for the normal (healthy) development of sexuality. In refusing to 
renege on the importance of sexual difference, psychoanalysts 
have regularly pathologized whole swathes of human sexuality, 
from homosexuality to fetishism, from anal intercourse to sado-
masochistic relationships. Ironically, in unreservedly promoting 
sexual difference as the source and origin of normal sexuality, 
psychoanalysts themselves have done nothing more than reiter-
ating (and imposing) a sexual principle of sameness, gathering 
and unifying human beings under the “same difference,” which 
allows them to be classified, unified and homogenized.
This is what I would call the “homotopia” of psychoanalysis, 
which represents its body of knowledge as a locus of sameness 
and its own “sexual identity” as a phallic, normative and often 
normalizing doctrine whose epistemology leads to homo- and 
other phobias. Against this “homotopia,” which could also be 
understood with reference to Lacan’s logic of “male sexuation” 
in Seminar XX, it would be tempting to reclaim psychoanalysis 
as a Foucaultian “heterotopia,” according to Lacan’s (1998[1972–
73]) formulae for “female sexuation” (78–89). In a “heterotopia,” 
there is no such thing as identification, neither on the side of 
the doctrinal body of knowledge, nor on the side of those who 
fall under its spell. Much like “women” and the “Other jouis-
sance” in Lacan’s formulae, the “heterotopia” is characterized 
by flux, fluidity, flexibility, liquidity — precisely those char-
acteristics which contemporary queer theorists hold dear as 
non-normative, emancipatory principles of human sexuality. 
A “heterotopic” psychoanalysis would no doubt be in the best 
position, then, to join hands with queer theory, in its conceptual 
framework as well as its clinical practice, attuned as it would 
be to the de-stabilization of sexual difference and any other 
hegemonic oppositional binary. If we take Lacan’s formulae of 
sexuation seriously, the “heterotopic” strategy would also entail 
a de-masculinization and de-phallicization of psychoanalysis, in 
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favor of its “feminization” and possibly its critical defamation. 
“She is called woman (on la dit-femme),” Lacan proclaimed “and 
defamed (diffâme)” (85).
The problem with this outlook, and in a sense also with queer 
theory — as Lisa Downing has argued so persuasively in this vol-
ume — is that its celebration of fluidity may very well lead to the 
re-pathologization of fixity, that is to say to the marginalization 
of those identities, orientations, fantasies and behaviors that ap-
pear as subjectively immutable, either within or outside a (het-
ero)normative paradigm. Put differently, a “heterotopia” does 
not exclude the pathologization of non-fluidity, of repetition, 
of sameness, identity, which are as much part of the potentiali-
ties and indeterminacies of human sexuality as fluidity. To argue 
that psychoanalysis should and can only ever be “heterotopic,” 
and is therefore somehow by definition queer if it is to be truth-
ful to the premises that have supported its clinical and theoreti-
cal edifice, thus misses the very point that I have been trying to 
make, insofar as it fails to acknowledge, as a fundamental and 
therefore “normal” principle, the irreducible unpredictability of 
the human sexual experience — its apparent fixities as well as its 
ostensible flexibilities.
What I propose, then, in order to ensure that psychoanalysis 
still has something to do with sexuality, and without compro-
mising on Green’s original call for a return to Freud, is neither a 
psychoanalytic “homotopia” nor a psychoanalytic “heterotopia,” 
but a clinical and conceptual “metistopia” — a proteiform “post-
queer” place whose epistemic parameters and body of knowl-
edge are eternally shifting and changing, and which accommo-
dates fluidity as much as fixity.1 In its “metistopic” surroundings, 
psychoanalysis would not operate from any established source 
of wisdom, whether conservative or liberal, gay-negative or gay-
positive, but act upon what Lacan (2013[1971]) called a “knowl-
edge in failure” (savoir en échec) (329), which implies that it 
1 “Metis” is Homer’s most common epithet for Odysseus in the Odyssey. It is 




would approach each and every event in the sexual realm with-
out prejudice and preconception, but with a spirit of discovery, a 
sense of wonder, and possibly a touch of irony. It would also im-
ply that every attempt at situating psychoanalysis, clinically as 
well as theoretically, at the highest level of intellectual profundi-
ty would by definition be doomed to fail — not in the actual at-
tempt as such, but in the objective to keep psychoanalysis within 
the boundaries of its own discourse. There is no guarantee that 
a “metistopic” psychoanalysis would make the discipline more 
respectable, yet historically some of the most significant psycho-
analytic contributions were precisely those that did not com-
mand social or scientific respect.
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“you Make Me Feel Like a Natural Woman”: 
Thoughts on a Case of Transsexual Identity Formation 
and Queer Theory
Ami Kaplan
This chapter is about a male to female transsexual1 individual 
and some contemplation about her life through the lens of 
queer theory. I will introduce her shortly, but first I will out-
line my psychoanalytic orientation and clinical stance in regard 
to transgender clients. My psychoanalytic theoretical position 
is both Freudian (from an Ego Psychology perspective) and 
based in Object Relations. Within Object Relations, I am most 
informed by Winnicott and Fairbairn. I don’t subscribe to any 
psychoanalytic or environmentally-based etiology theories that 
include such explanations of transsexualism as a defense against 
homosexuality; based on the mother’s emotional state; stem-
ming from insecure attachment to the mother or other prob-
lems in the family dynamic (Greenson 1966; Bak 1968; Green-
acre 1969; Stoller 1970; Ovesey and Person 1973; 1976; Coates 
1990). The type of work I do with these individuals takes a non-
pathologizing stance and does not try to figure out how they 
1 I use the term “transsexual” to denote individuals who feel their gender 
to be that of the non-natal sex and who desire to some degree to have the 
bodies of their non-natal or opposite sex. I use the term “transgender” to 




became transgender. Rather it centers on helping gender variant 
individuals be who they authentically feel themselves to be.
As a lesbian analyst with a more androgynous gender iden-
tity, I might be more sensitive to queer issues and less likely to 
pathologize non-mainstream identities and behaviors. My ap-
proach is not necessarily at odds with mainstream Ego Psychol-
ogy with its interest in ego functioning, strengths and weakness-
es. In addition, Ego Psychology’s emphasis on the ego function 
of synthesis does lend itself to thinking about the transgender 
experience, where often body dysphoria and anomalous social 
experiences must be tolerated for long periods of time. One 
might assume a case with transgender issues could be easily 
embraced by queer theory; however, I chose this case because 
it highlights areas where queer theory is both in sync with and 
problematic for this particular patient. It should be noted that 
I am not formulating a theory of transsexualism, rather I am 
describing work and offering ideas about a particular patient. 
The title suggests an intersubjective construction to a transsex-
ual’s gender identity. This refers to “mirroring” provided by the 
therapist and others who interact with Jenny as a woman and 
to the development of interpersonal skills developed in a social 
context. Work with this patient involved dealing with bias and 
stigma and negotiating shifts in relationships with family and 
partners. Therapy involved support for Jenny as she negotiated 
these tasks, as well as dealing with her feelings of having grown 
up with gender variance. Much of the therapy involved helping 
the patient construct and solidify a new gender identity to her-
self and the outside world.
James/Jenny2: history and Presenting Problems
I refer to James as both male and female in this chapter depend-
ing on how he or she was presenting at the time being discussed. 
James presented as a fifty-six-year-old genetic Caucasian man 
2 Names and some identifying data have been changed to protect James’s 
identity.
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who contacted me as a therapist known to work with gender 
issues in order to explore his wish to be and live as a woman. 
He presented as a tall thin man dressed in business casual, with 
graying hair. He seemed somewhat awkward and self-effacing, 
smiling frequently and laughing in a sort of way that seemed to 
say, “don’t take anything I say too seriously.” I later understood 
his manner as a defense against shame of his gender variance. 
He struck me as educated, “old-fashioned,” and shy. It became 
apparent early on that he avoided conflict and preferred not to 
draw attention to himself. He worked at middle-management 
level in a large New York firm. He is in a long-term relation-
ship with a woman, who until recently did not know about his 
gender variance. He has children from a previous marriage and 
currently lives with a girlfriend.
Initial topics of concern to James included whether or not 
to go “full time” (transition to living as a women full time), his 
partner’s ambivalence about his transition, coming out to family, 
shame about being transgender, and finding times and places to 
dress and be Jenny. James frequently voiced a (quite unrealistic) 
wish to be able to transition without anybody noticing: “well, if 
I just do it gradually enough maybe people wouldn’t really no-
tice,” she would say with a little laugh, but it was clear to me that 
this was a real wish. I could feel Jenny’s sadness, bewilderment 
and anxiety at being such a private person and having to face 
being an object of interest.
As a child, James’s own understanding and consciousness 
of his gender variance was limited. He was mostly alone, shy 
and timid. He felt himself to be different from other boys with 
some awareness that he had certain feminine attributes which 
he understood as problematic as they drew attention to his be-
ing different. He alternated between being overweight and un-
derweight as a teenager in an attempt to correct what he thought 
of as a feminine body.
Much of James’s unconscious material had to do with 
shame. It could be seen outwardly in his extreme shyness and 
social awkwardness. Goldberg (1991) describes characteristics 
of shame as “a shrinking away from one’s full presence in the 
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world” and a “depleted sense of personal identity” (4). Jenny’s 
wish to be “public” hasn’t kept pace with lessening feelings of 
shame around her gender variance contributing to feelings of 
awkwardness and insecurity.
As a young adult James remembers being semi-conscious of 
his gender variance but he did not let himself dwell on it. He 
had no words for what he was experiencing. As a teenager and 
adult, James would cross-dress at times when he could, telling 
himself that “this was just something I like to do now and then.” 
His wife “caught” him cross-dressing once and said she would 
divorce him if he continued with it. He hid it from her and his 
children. He describes having achieved satisfaction in the role of 
a nurturing father. He understood this as having been enough to 
sustain him during those years and the urge to cross-dress was 
lessened, although he still did it when he could, at times only 
putting on lipstick while alone in his car.
When James did decide to transition part-time he did it 
without first discussing it with his current partner “Kelly” in any 
depth. He simply began to take hormones he bought over the 
Internet and to accumulate and wear more women’s clothing. 
This and other behaviors alerted me to what I believe is a signifi-
cant problem — the state of James’s object relations; specifically 
the lack of emotional intimacy, avoidance of conflict and the 
lack of depth in general in his communications with his part-
ner and others. In fact, James has no close personal friends or 
colleagues outside of Kelly. It’s possible that he didn’t have the 
mental space to develop better object relations due to his having 
had to struggle with gender dysphoria alone throughout most 
of his life. For many transgender people (and for this person 
in particular) a good deal of psychic space is used up in deal-
ing with the internal struggle of having an ego-dystonic gender 
assignment and body. The individual is both consciously and 
unconsciously preoccupied with the struggle, leaving fewer psy-
chic resources available for such things as developing interper-
sonal skills, noticing and reacting to the feelings of others and a 
myriad of other maturational functions. Kelly had ambivalence 
over the transition. She was no longer attracted to James, and 
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missed his masculine attributes such as body hair and more an-
gular body. James was also upset at having lost Kelly as a lover, 
but didn’t see any way to repair the situation.
The Concreteness of Identity as Necessary
Jenny embraces a traditional female identity that is almost ste-
reotypical. When it is possible for her to do so she likes to wear 
skirts, sandals, earrings, French tip nails, makeup and jewelry. 
Jenny has constructed and wishes to embrace her vision of the 
female identity to its fullest. Certainly gender expression may 
fluctuate and often does after a period of transition; however, 
the identity of the moment must be taken with all due serious-
ness and respect, even if it does not end up as the ultimate or last 
gender identity. As with many trans people who are first tran-
sitioning, the gender expression can have a stressed and exag-
gerated feel to it. Raine Dozier (2005), a sociologist from Seattle 
Washington, comments on this phenomenon from his inter-
views with eighteen FTM (female-to-male) transgender people: 
“when sex characteristics do not align with gender, behavior be-
comes more important to gender expression and interpretation. 
When sex characteristics become more congruent with gender, 
behavior becomes more fluid and less important in asserting 
gender” (297).
The first issue grappled with in therapy was James’ struggle 
to know to what extent he wished to transition. In the beginning 
of therapy, James reported “dressing” at least once a weekend 
and going out in public. These outings were very important to 
him and James often focused on relating them in detail. She of-
ten described what she wore, where she went, whether she was 
“read” or not (seen as a transsexual), her comfort level, etc. Jen-
ny was engaging in “exploration” as described by Bockting and 
Coleman (2007, 185–208). In their “Developmental Stages of the 
Transgender Coming Out Process,”3 they note that “exploration 
3 The five stages are: 1. pre-coming out: crossdressing and “transgender feel-
ings” but not the naming of the feelings; 2. coming out and acknowledging 
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is the stage of learning as much as possible about expressing 
one’s transgender identity now that the secret has been revealed 
[…] ending social isolation […] developing interpersonal skills 
through the newly adopted identity with peers, friends and 
family” (193). In addition, “exploration includes explicit experi-
mentation with gender roles and expressions. This allows the 
transgender individual to find his or her identity (who am I?), 
and the most comfortable way to express it (how can I best ac-
tualize or express my gender identity?), often through trial and 
error” (193).
At the point in time I am writing about, Jenny was at the 
beginning of her transition and embraced a gender identity 
that was decidedly at one end of a gender continuum. Being 
at the extreme end can be seen to be somewhat problematic 
with some of the tenets of queer theory. Erin Calhoun Davis 
(2009), a sociologist from Cornell College in Iowa writing on 
transgender people and queer theory notes that, “identity has 
also been posited as something oppressive that individuals need 
to ‘move beyond’” (101). A recurring theme in queer theory is 
the problem with gender binary and the associated labels of 
“man” and “woman.” Bornstein (1994) notes that identifying as 
“male” or “female” perpetuates “the violence of male privilege” 
(74). Iain Morland (2009), in a piece on intersexed individuals, 
states that, “the identity claims ‘male’ and ‘female’, when made 
by people with non-intersexed anatomies, are morally indefen-
sible because they constitute a commitment to the descriptivism 
that disenfranchises intersexed individuals” (45). Kathryn Bond 
Stockton, in her chapter, notes “two terms, ‘man’ and ‘woman’, 
that many queers would now regard as absurdly blocky, even 
totalizing, in their absence of further and finer specifications.” 
The list of examples could go on and on.
How then do we understand this patient who wishes to em-
brace the label of “woman” given queer theory’s privileging of 
gender fluidity and problems with the gender binary? I would 
suggest that despite queer theory’s problems with labeling and 
to self; 3. exploration; 4. intimacy; 5. identity integration.
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binary gender labels, a stage of presenting with a non-fluid gen-
der expression plays an important role in solidifying identity for 
this transitioning woman. Concepts such as gender queer, gen-
der fluid, a-gender, etc., only came into public consciousness in 
the 1990s and as such, transsexualism was previously thought of 
in terms of the gender binary, that is, of women transitioning to 
be men or men transitioning to be women. The developmental 
objective in queer theory of moving beyond the gender binary 
has had the unfortunate side effect of tainting “binarism” as 
somehow unacceptable, even though it has important meaning 
and use for some people.
Mirroring of the Emerging Self
James has a history of being attracted to women. He had a few 
sexual encounters with men during college. In describing them, 
James’s comment was a lackluster “it was OK,” “it was really not 
that satisfying… I’m more into women.” However, James added 
that he is “open to both sexes.”
In transitioning James (Jenny) started seeking out men “you 
know, admirers,” she would call them — these are men who are 
attracted to and seek out trans women, or male to female trans-
sexuals. I wanted to understand the meaning of Jenny’s going 
out on “dates” while still in a relationship. Did she want to leave 
Kelly? Did she wish to have a male partner? I think Jenny her-
self did not know the reasons other than having a strong desire 
to experience the world as a woman and have that mirrored or 
reflected back. Jenny discusses the dates with men as follows:
I like how they make me feel. They pursue me, they give me 
attention as a woman, and that feels good, they take the lead, 
after a first date I was going to just shake hands and maybe 
kiss the guy on the cheek, but he grabbed me and gave me a 
“full-on” kiss on the mouth. It was OK, I didn’t find him at-
tractive, but I liked his taking the lead.
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In musing on a future date Jenny said: “I’m going to get dressed 
up for him, I like that, and they appreciate it, and if it leads to 
sex, that’s OK, I’ll go along with it, but its not really what I’m 
looking for, its more just for the experience of being out and 
dressed.”
In short, Jenny’s object choice at this point is not so much 
about whom she is attracted to but rather who treats her and 
thereby helps her to feel the most like a woman. The experienc-
es help her to “construct” the female identity of Jenny. Dozier 
(2005) comments on object choice in interviews with eighteen 
FTM (female to male) trans people:
Respondents also challenge traditional notions of sexual 
orientation by focusing less on the sex of the partner and 
more on the gender organization of the relationship. The re-
lationship’s ability to validate the interviewee’s masculinity or 
maleness often takes precedence over the sex of the partner, 
helping to explain changing sexual orientation as female-to-
male transsexual and transgendered people transition into 
men. (297)
Others have written about similar phenomena. Diamond 
(2008) suggests the person rather than the gender of the per-
son is the most important factor in desire for sexual minority 
women. Gagne and Tewksbury (1998, 92) note that the personal 
gendered state of mind during sex was of greater significance 
to male-to-female (MTF) transgender individuals than the ac-
tual sex of the partner. For some transgender individuals, the 
events of transitioning and changing so many things about one-
self may, by association, act to give personal license to explore 
change in areas previously repressed or denied such as in sexual 
object choice.
Jenny’s felt gender identity and the outward performance of 
the female gender helps her to construct and stabilize her iden-
tity as a woman while at the same time its exaggerated nature is 
an indicator of her current insecurity about it. The repetition of 
these “dates” allows her to practice and to be “mirrored” (in the 
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Winnicottian sense) in her new role. At first the inner state and 
later the outward performance were tenuous and their emer-
gence has had to be nurtured, mirrored, and confirmed. In addi-
tion, positive mirroring by the analyst was extremely important 
due to the negative mirroring Jenny presumably experienced by 
her parents. Working backwards from the level of shame Jenny 
has about being transsexual; it can be assumed that her parents 
reflected back to the young child negative judgments and ap-
praisals of James’s gender expression. The disapproval helped to 
form the basis of a part of the self that was disassociated or re-
pressed, namely her female self. When the female self was finally 
granted permission to emerge, one can reasonably expect there 
to be great ambivalence about it. The therapist’s positive mirror-
ing of the emerging female self is both healing and necessary for 
ameliorating what could be understood as Jenny’s “internalized 
trans-phobia.” Jenny’s new identity is in part constructed with 
the help of others, i.e., intersubjectively. This can be seen in her 
need for the positive feedback and interplay of the other, be it 
companion or analyst.
I have mentioned shame several times in this account and 
made some suggestions as to its origin. The analysis and work-
ing through of shame for this patient was vitally important 
because of its debilitating effect on good object relations and 
on self-esteem. By “good” object relations, I am referring to 
the ability to have mutually satisfying relationships and to be 
wholly present or oneself in a relationship. This of course is very 
difficult to do when one is in hiding (and ashamed of) such a 
large part of oneself as one’s gender. Shame results in alienation, 
feeling oneself to be unlovable, unwanted, embarrassed and in-
ferior. The most typical reaction is withdrawal from interaction 
or the development of a “false self.” Certainly any transgender 
individual who has kept their gender variance hidden has some 
experience of the “false self.” In addition, because of the with-
drawal or presentation of false self, the gender variant person 
has less time practicing good interactions with others when pre-
senting the authentic self.
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Queer theory is helpful in pointing out the awkwardness and 
imprecision of signifiers such as “straight,” “gay,” and “bisexu-
al,” which do not begin to address the complexity and subtle-
ness of each individual situation. Queer theory benefits Jenny, 
transgender individuals and psychoanalysts in one obvious and 
significant way in that it advances society’s awareness and ac-
ceptance of gender identities, expressions and sexualities out-
side of the hetero-normative. It has an important part to play in 
informing psychoanalytic practice by continuing to point out 
areas where we are making unhelpful assumptions about what 
is “normal” or desired for our patients.
Jenny, and other transsexual individuals in the process of 
transitioning may have a strong need to claim the label of “man” 
or “woman” which can be counter to queer theory’s anti-iden-
titarian politics. Queer theory’s “nonnormalizing energetic tra-
jectories” (Downing) are contrary to Jenny’s wanting to appear 
normal. Lee Edelman (2004) states that “queerness can never 
define an identity; it can only ever disturb one” (17). That works 
well if one is perfectly secure and comfortable with an identity, 
but not so well when one is desperately trying to consolidate a 
gender identity, as with this particular individual.
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Sexual Difference: From Symptom to Sinthome
Patricia Gherovici
“We speak therein of fucking, and we say that it’s not working 
out” (Lacan 1998[1972–73], 32). Without splitting hairs, Lacan 
bluntly summed up what people talk about when they are on 
the analytic couch. If all what we talk about on the couch is 
sex, nothing much has been discovered in psychoanalysis since 
Freud and Lacan. Freud’s major revelation that the unconscious 
is at root sexual is confirmed in our current practice. It is not 
just that, as Lacan has noted, one hears that something is wrong 
with sex. Consider the case of one of my analysands, Melissa, a 
twenty-four-year-old female, who felt that her analysis was pro-
gressing because she was “feeling pretty stable and calmer.” She 
added however that “at the end of the day” she always felt anx-
ious. “Perhaps it’s this recurrent thinking, this unrelenting ques-
tioning,” she added. Her problems, she knew, were about rela-
tionships. The trouble was not just her mother, looming large 
and overwhelming, or her father, weak and slightly perverse, but 
her current boyfriend, who overwhelmed her with his affection. 
“I want to figure out what Mike means to me. Sometimes I ex-
perience a sense of happiness because I love him; it can be really 
wonderful. Sex can be good but as soon as he expresses how 
much he loves me, I have only regret.” Fundamentally, his love 
and support did not bring her satisfaction but rather a sense 
of loss and emptiness. “His intense admiration for me is over-
whelming. As if I were cut off from him or myself. Something 
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keeps me from connecting with him.” Melissa had a suspicion 
about what the problem was: “It is the issue of seeing other peo-
ple, but it does not seem worthwhile.” 
She had a confession to make: “I have had a couple of dreams 
in which I had wild sex with this guy. I felt as if I had betrayed 
Mike. His feelings for me are so monogamous; he has not been 
interested in anyone else. There again one can see in which ways 
we are so different. I have to accept the fact that I have desires; I 
may have dreamt about sex with a man, but in fact I have been 
wanting to be with a woman.” That she had not acted upon those 
wishes nevertheless made her feel guilty for a transgression that 
had only taken place on her dreams. “What’s wrong with me? I 
do love Mike. I do value our relationship. I wish I didn’t fanta-
size about other people. […] I will have to make a choice about 
the relationship.” Was her guilt justifiable? “Mike talked in such 
an emotional tone. When I heard him talk like that I cried, and 
almost immediately I felt distant. […] I fear it will become the 
devouring love I have for my mother.” Separation from her first 
love had a cost: “I forged my own way outside my relationship 
with my mother by acquitting my own sexuality.” Melissa was 
operating in the shadow of fear. “It is scary for me to have sexual 
desire for Mike. He is the main focus of my sexual attention. 
What feels really scary for me is that I haven’t had any real re-
lationship with a woman but this is part of my sexuality. It is 
really confusing. I would not identify as lesbian but I do not 
really know if I am really myself with Mike.” Identity does not 
resolve the issue of desire for Melissa. Eventually, the logic of the 
unconscious takes hold and makes itself explicit in questions of 
sexual difference: 
What’s the difference between men and women? My mother 
would say that gender is societal. How much do I disagree? 
Men and women are different. Yes, there are women who are 
masculine and men who have feminine sides. But still this 
is very confusing for me […]. I feel attraction to both men 
and women. It is physical […]. I think that’s how I know; this 
physical attraction to women is not going to go away. I also 
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have emotional and intellectual attractions to women. Being 
around women feels right. What is the source of the attrac-
tion? It has to do with issues of gender and sexuality […]. 
As a variation on this universal theme, what follows is some-
thing quite familiar to psychoanalysts, an old question about 
sexual identity with a new twist: “How can I accept Mike’s love? 
I feel dirty being sexualized by him. Actually, being with him is 
strange for me. I did feel comfortable with my sexuality before 
him. My sexuality was not a source of shame or anxiety. Maybe 
the issue is: am I straight or bisexual?” Are Melissa’s statements 
motivated by a desire to understand an issue about gender and 
sex, or does she simply confuse object choice with identity poli-
tics? Is she bisexual because she fantasizes about having an affair 
with a woman? When she asks: “Am I straight or bisexual?” is 
she asking in fact: “Am I a man or a woman?” If that is the case, 
then the traditional question of sexual identity that we find at 
the core of hysteria is shifting from a question of gender identity 
(“Am I a man or a woman?”) to one of sexual orientation (“Am 
I straight or bisexual?”). Melisa’s comments seem to remap the 
whole terrain of sexual politics (compulsory heterosexuality, 
sexual choices, monogamy, love, reciprocity in relationships, 
attachment, sexual prejudice). She becomes aware of her boy-
friend’s love and while she admits that she is happy with him, 
this realization makes her experience regret and it is then that 
she questions her sexuality. Melissa become distant, or, as she 
puts it, “cut off from him or myself.” Does her reference to being 
“cut off ” echo old Freudian ideas about castration anxiety and 
penis envy? Can her account replay the classic Oedipal familial 
scenario of identifications and rivalries? Does she question her 
sexual identity as a phobic reaction to intimacy? Is her sexual 
ambiguity a strategy that defends her from desire while cancel-
ling out the mother? If, as she stated, she forged a way out of a 
“devouring” relationship with her mother, “acquitting my own 
sexuality,” can we say that her uncertainty about her sexuality 
is a sort of father substitute (a stand in for a name or no! which 
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separates mother and child)? Are contested notions like phallic 
attribution and castration still valid tools in clinical practice?
Melissa’s predicament, which is not uncommon, can be un-
derstood within the parameters of what Lacan (1966–67) called 
“the big secret of psychoanalysis” (Session 12/4/67). The secret is 
that “there is not such a thing as a sexual act,” a dictum which 
tries to delineate the impossibility of a perfect sexual union be-
tween two people. Far from being harmonious, the sexual act 
is always a blunder, a mangled action, a failure, reminding one 
of the inconsistency of one’s relation to sex. Lacan’s later vari-
ation of the formula as “there is not such a thing as a sexual 
relationship” (1991[1969–70], 134; 1998[1972–73], 9) provides 
a condensed formulation of the sexual illness of humankind. 
Something about sex is intractable; it resists assimilation, it dis-
rupts meaning. 
Melissa is not the only case I have met of someone who 
seemingly breaks away from the paradigm of social conformity 
to so-called gender. An analysand came to see me with count-
less questions, since despite being a happily married woman, 
she had become restless, then had had sex with a woman — just 
once. This was just because, as she said, she wanted to find out 
how a woman’s skin felt like, and also how it smelled. Was this an 
issue of identification since she admired and wanted to resemble 
the seductive, aggressive woman whom she had had sex with? 
Was she fascinated with an idealized femininity that would help 
her define her sexual identity on the basis of sexual practice? Or 
was she “done with men,” as she once blurted out exasperatedly 
and had she, at last, followed her true desire? 
I could also mention here the analysand who ran away from 
a marriage proposal from a man she thought she was in love 
with to rush into the arms of a lesbian friend, whom she claimed 
she was not even erotically attracted to. There was another de-
clared feminist analysand who defined herself as bisexual but 
never had a sexual encounter with a woman. She detested make-
up and “girly” things and insisted that she wanted to be loved 
for who she really was, without being “objectified by a male,” 
but then she appeared smitten by a boyfriend who told her al-
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most offensively that she should wear sexy clothes. Moreover, he 
was constantly comparing her to other women he was ogling. 
All these cases seem to be variations on a universal theme: the 
inconsistency of the relation of the subject to sex. Their agents 
seem to position themselves in a zone of sexual ambiguity, 
which forces us to rethink how we define sex and sexuality. We 
can contrast them with other cases that hinge more explicitly 
around issues of sexual attributes and seem to operate according 
to a binary of complementary opposites. Thus I treated a trans 
man who was deeply unhappy in his sexual life because in not 
having a penis, he believed he lacked a body part that was uni-
versally desired by all women and that would warrant their sex-
ual enjoyment. There was also a new patient who explained that 
in the past someone like her would be thought of “as a man with 
a mental problem but that it’s just the opposite, I am a woman 
with a physical problem.” I have dealt elsewhere (2010) with the 
case of an analysand who said she had “the worst birth defect a 
woman can have, I was born with a penis and testicles” (190–93).
Psychoanalysis, with Freud, reveals the challenge of assum-
ing a sexual positioning. As noted by Lacan (1981[1964]), Freud 
“posit[s] sexuality as essentially polymorphous, aberrant” (176). 
Freud “perverted” sexuality when he separated the drive from 
any instinctual function and described its object as “indifferent,” 
that is, not determined by gender. Here, in my view, Laplanche’s 
faithfulness to Freud is crucial. The normative slant in psychoa-
nalysis, which has led to troubling standards of normalcy like 
elevating the genitals to the status of fetish organs of a mature 
heterosexual genitality or the pathologization of homosexuality, 
are post-Freudian deviations based on what Lacan (2006[1958]) 
aptly qualified as “delusional” notions of normalcy, an “absurd 
hymn to the harmony of genital relations” that have nothing to 
do with the reality of sex (507).
Any Sexual Identity Is Failed
To further contextualize our discussion, let’s say that the sub-
ject’s assumption of a sexual identity is always symptomatic 
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because it is related to what psychoanalysts call the phallus — a 
defective tool to negotiate the Real that eludes us. Perhaps those 
analysands who confuse object choice with identity are search-
ing for a totalizing answer that introduces a paradox: they ask 
whether they are straight or bisexual as if the simple fact of pos-
ing the question would mean that they are neither; but if they 
are neither, they feel obligated to choose what they are. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, as the mirror stage il-
lustrates, identity is an artificial construct that results from im-
aginary identifications with an “other” who grants a “sense of 
self.” As Tim Dean (2000) notes, “Human sexuality cannot be 
construed as in any way as the result of the mirror stage” (191). 
Identity relies on the assumption of an image and is something 
that eventually may come to an end during psychoanalysis be-
cause the subject emerges exactly where identity fails. In a well-
known passage, Rose (1986) writes: 
The unconscious constantly reveals the “failure” of identity. 
Because there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is not 
stability of sexual identity, no position for women (or for 
men) which is ever simply achieved. Nor does psychoanaly-
sis see such “failure” as a special-case inability or an indi-
vidual deviancy from the norm. […] [T]here is a resistance 
to identity at the very heart of psychic life. (90–91)
Rose’s emphasis on the “failure” of identity is central because it 
contradicts the usual reading of “lack” as a loss or as an injury 
that women would have suffered and that men would fear. Lack 
is neither a negative “wound” due to the loss of an object, nor a 
deficiency, but rather a productive force. All subjects must con-
front and assume their lack; furthermore, the Lacanian subject 
is subjectivized lack. Such a lack carries several effects on the 
subject — it divides the subject; desire is born through lack and 
can never be finally fulfilled. I reiterate the importance of desire 
over identity because the desiring subject is produced by the 
impact of language on the materiality of the body — the subject 
of desire does not emerge from identifications with the moth-
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er, the father, or a signifier, but precisely when identifications 
stop working. In fact, identity is far from being stable because 
the foundational identification of the subject is with a signifier, 
which means, identification with difference (a signifier desig-
nates one thing in opposition to others). Due to the equivocal 
nature of language, identification is not unifying but rather it 
creates a split that eclipses the subject. As a result, I will depart 
from Farina’s contention that theories of desire rooted in lack 
would understand “non-normative” forms of sexuality as exclud-
ed from sexual norms — assuming that they are “missing some-
thing” that supposedly a “normate sexual subjectivity” would 
posses. “Normality” is a questionable construct, a compensatory 
symptom, a norm of mal (evil) or the norm-of-the-male (norme 
mâle) as Lacan (2007[1972]) would say, playing with the fact that 
in French male norm and normal are identically pronounced, 
thus radically rejecting the notion of a normal sexuality.1 How 
subjects relate to their sexual bodies is determined by the way 
they relate to lack: this is what psychoanalysis calls castration 
(another name for the “norm-male”). For psychoanalysis, a rela-
tion to lack will provide the foundation for diverse structures of 
desire, whether neurotic, perverse, fetishistic, or homosexual. 
We note here that perversion is taken as a structure and not as 
sexual practice. Downing’s discussion of perversion in this col-
lection makes evident that even though queer discourse and 
psychoanalytic discourse may enrich each other there may be 
unsurpassable chasms. Maybe the “The Woman does not exist” 
(Lacan 1998[1972–73], 7) of Lacan cannot compare with the “the 
category woman does not exist” of Monique Wittig (1992, 15). 
Dean (2000) argues well that Lacan “meets” queer theory but 
this meeting is not an overlap. Psychoanalysis may be queer but 
it is not queer theory. 
1 Interview with Françoise Wolff at the Belgian television on “The great ques-
tions of psychoanalysis.” MK2 video cassette under the title: Jacques Lacan, 
conference at Leuven followed by an interview with Françoise Wolff also 
known as “Jacques Lacan Speaks” (Lacan 2007).
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Sexual Difference and the Paradoxes of the Formulas of Sexuation
For psychoanalysis, sexual difference is not a norm but a real 
impossibility, which is to say, it is a limit to what is sayable and 
thinkable; it is a failure of meaning. Our relationship to the 
body is structured by the symbolic system of language, yet lan-
guage lacks a signifier to signify sexual difference. To compli-
cate things further, sexual difference is neither just the body (as 
biological substrata) nor the psychic introjections of the social 
performance of gender (as a socially constructed role). Neither 
the perspective of biological essentialism nor that of social con-
structivism have been able to solve the problem of unconscious 
sexual difference. Since sexual difference is neither sex nor gen-
der, sex needs to be symbolized, and gender needs to be em-
bodied. This unconscious sexual reality about which the subject 
has no knowledge, i.e., does not know what is to be a man or a 
woman; it is a reality that psychoanalysis presupposes. Femi-
ninity or masculinity are both failed positions from which we 
inhabit our sexual bodies.
Lacan maps the implications of this in his formulas of sexua-
tion. The formulas reiterate the dictum “there is no such a thing 
as a sexual relation” (1966–67, Session 12/4/67; 1998[1972–73], 9) 
which means that there can be sexual encounters between peo-
ple, not between complementary beings, if any encounter takes 
place it is between partial places of the body, thresholds of local-
ized jouissance. We are speaking bodies, that is, beings inhabited 
and exceeded by language. Language makes jouissance (a shat-
tering mix of pain and pleasure) forbidden, setting limits and 
obstacles in the trajectory towards the full realization of desire. 
To answer Farina’s question: “Why is it ‘great’ that we theorize 
aggression as inevitable for jouissance?” Because jouissance is 
experienced in the body in ways that cannot be signified, the 
body is transformed — the organism becomes a body of jouis-
sance, a body of excesses resonating in the organic body.
With the sexuation formulas, Lacan is challenging a model 
of gender as a binary relation between two positive, represent-
able and complementary terms. In fact he was grasping the im-
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possible relation between sexuated beings of any gender. This is 
another way of saying that for the unconscious there is no repre-
sentation of the female sex, that the unconscious is monosexual 
or homosexual; there is only one signifier for both sexes, the 
phallus. Tim Dean (2000) observes that, “it is not so important 
that the phallus may be a penis, or in Judith Butler’s reading, a 
dildo, as it is a giant red herring” (14). As such, the phallus is 
clearly a misleading clue comparable to the use of smoked her-
rings to mislead hounds following a trail. To pun somewhat on 
the phrase, I would like to suggest that the phallus is less a red 
herring than a “read” herring — in fact, like gender, it is subject 
to interpretation, and it will always be read like a text. As Bond 
Stockton remarks, following Copjec, the Lacanian axiom “there 
is no sexual relation” speaks to a radical antagonism between 
sex and sense. We should keep in mind that sexual difference 
is intractable, and castration appears as a partial answer to this 
deadlock. For psychoanalysis, castration, lack, woman, phallus 
are ways of representing something that cannot be represented 
because they belong to the Real.
Can psychoanalysis talk about sexual difference without a 
direct reference to the notion of “phallus”? It would be just as 
impossible, Morel (2006) notes, to talk about Freudian sexual-
ity without referring to sexual difference. However, to avoid the 
trappings of phallocentrism, we can make use of several psycho-
analytic concepts that are not sexed and help define sexuality, 
such the unconscious, repetition, transference, object a (cause 
of desire and surplus jouissance) and symptom. Lacan returns 
to many of Freud’s concepts and reformulates them, first in his 
elaboration of the dominance of the Name-of-the-Father in the 
Oedipus complex, and later, going beyond the Oedipus complex 
and proposing a new form of the symptom, which he called sin-
thome (2005[1975–76]). The sinthome is a way of reknotting in 
the psychic structure what has been left unknotted because of 
the father’s failure. This applied to the case of James Joyce but 




In order to think about sexual difference without a direct refer-
ence to the phallus, I propose to follow Lacan’s later theory of 
the sinthome. As Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger (2002) argues, it 
allows us to grasp the impossible relation between the sexes (91). 
Since the sinthome is not a complement but a supplement, it is 
a vehicle for creative unbalance, capable of disrupting the sym-
metry. The sinthome is what helps one tolerate the absence of the 
sexual relation/proportion (Lacan 2005[1975–76], 101). In con-
trast, the phallus is an obstacle. It is nothing other than a failed 
answer to the conundrum of sexual difference. This difference 
cannot be fully grasped (it is just speculation constructed on the 
real of the impossibility of a sexual rapport). 
In this context, the clinical example of one analysand, whom 
I will call Ari, is helpful. Ari is a biological female who has had 
“top” surgery (breasts removed), prefers the pronoun “they” and 
takes testosterone. Ari is manipulating their body to transform 
it into a surface with an undecided readability: What they want 
is to pass as neither male nor female, thus rejecting altogether 
the phallus as a signifier of difference. If, according to phal-
lic signification, we write two sexes with one signifier, Ari de-
nounces the aporia of sex by refusing to be seen as either. The 
phallus is exposed as just a parasite, the conjunction of an organ 
and the function of language (speech). Ari elevates “the limp 
little piece of prick” (15) to the status of art and supplements it, 
transforming physical appearance into the art of divination. It is 
true that the phallus, often confused with the limp little prick, 
is not much more than a signified of jouissance that sexual dis-
course transforms into a signifier. 
Certainly in some cases, sexual identity is of the order of the 
sinthome; it is acquired as achieving a reknotting of the three 
registers of the real, symbolic, and imaginary. Then, the sin-
thome shapes the singularity of an “art,” a technē that reknots a 
workable consistency for the subject; this movement can best be 
evoked by saying that it moves the subject from a certain con-
tingency to absolute necessity. Taking into account the complex 
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relationship that transsexuals have to their body — they often 
say that their souls are trapped in a body of the wrong (opposite) 
sex — I claim that an art similar to that of actual artists, if not 
necessarily with the genius of Joyce, can be found in transsexual 
artificiality. In some cases, it gives birth to an art that, I argue, is 
tantamount to a creative sinthome. This can be clearly observed 
in Jan Morris’s (1986) sex-change memoir Conundrum where 
Morris describes her trajectory as an inevitable, predestined act, 
as if the sex change had always been bound to happen (168–69).
One can see why her sinthome was necessary: it was neces-
sity itself. A sinthome is what does not cease to be written. Thus 
Morris writes: “I see myself not as man or woman, self or other, 
fragment or whole” (191). Her continuing ambiguity is not a “so-
lution” but a tolerable, permanent questioning, she can make 
do with: “What if I remain an equivocal figure?” (191); “I have 
lived the life of man, I live now the life of woman, and I shall 
transcend both — if not in person, then perhaps in art…” (190). 
In Morris’s case, the sinthome has produced less a “woman” 
than a “woman of letters.” Since sexual difference is real and 
resists symbolization, it creates a symptom, but this symptom 
is something that cannot be rectified or cured; it is neverthe-
less something with which every subject must come to terms. 
In Lacan’s formulation of the sinthome, the idea of the symptom 
acquired a new meaning. The sinthome is a purified symptom; 
it remains beyond symbolic representation and exists outside 
the unconscious structured as language. In this sense, the sin-
thome is closer to the real. Lacan reached the final conclusion 
that there is no subject without a sinthome. Lacan’s contention 
that there is no sexual relation entails that there is no normal 
relation, and therefore that the relationship between partners is 
a “sinthomatic” one. 
I argue that in, what I provisionally call a push-towards-
writing, a movement or passion that is often observed in trans-
sexuals, the body finds its anchor in the sea of language. Many 
people who feel trapped in the wrong gender do experience the 
drive to write, to produce a text that narrates their experience, 
offering a testimony to their stories of transformation. It is in the 
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writing of the sex change memoir that a final bodily transforma-
tion takes place, when the body is written. 
The sinthome is a form of writing that offers a new relation 
to the body based on the possibility of assuming a sexual posi-
tioning without the phallus as absolute norm. The sinthome is a 
creation ex nihilo: “It is by this [the lack] that I try to meet the 
function of art, what is implied by what is left blank as fourth 
term, when I say that art can even reach the symptom” (Lacan 
2005[1975–76], 18). The sinthome engages the lack but castration 
is vanquished; the constant weaving and unweaving of creation 
has nothing to do with the Oedipus complex or the phallus; it 
is even free from the Other (the Other may be just a semblance, 
someone’s own personal myth). The sinthome creatively makes 
up for deficiencies linking body, ego, flesh, gender, jouissance, 
and subjectivity. 
As we hear everyday in our clinical practice, the relation 
between the sexes is a screw-up (ratage) (Lacan 1998[1972–73], 
121), and there is only a relation to the extent that it is sympto-
matic. This contention entails that there is no normal relation, 
and therefore that the relationship between partners can only be 
a “sinthomatic” one. This is because, in sexuality, the subject ap-
pears as a sinthome for another subject. It is at this anti-norma-
tive juncture that Queer Studies finally meets psychoanalysts.
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A Plague on Both your houses
Stephen Frosh
It is tempting to suggest that the staging of an encounter in this 
book has served mainly to dramatize the incommensurability of 
psychoanalysis and queer theory. Perhaps there are really two 
separate theaters, one in which queer celebrations of disruptive-
ness goes on, and one in which psychoanalysts and psychother-
apists try to bring order to confusions of desire, identity and 
identification. Lisa Downing articulates one of the key opposi-
tions in focusing on perversion: 
For clinical psychoanalysts, perversion is sexuality gone 
awry; the failure of the subject to attain adult genitality. 
For queer theorists, on the other hand, perversion may be 
construed as a defiant performance of excess that shows up 
the constructedness and arbitrariness of the category of the 
“normal,” and it is centrally implicated in queer’s rejection 
of the meaning of identity in favor of the politics of practice.
She is careful here, despite her affiliation to the queer theater, 
but the clinicians have their own worries. “Queer theory engag-
es with the judgmentalism about sexual performances, and it 
can deploy a counter-judgement, a prejudice against prejudice!” 
exclaims Bob Hinshelwood, who is also troubled by the obses-
sive Lacanianism of much queer psychoanalytic thought. Where 
are relationships, where identity built out of identifications? 
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Carol Owens identifies a misrepresentation of the apparent 
parallels between queer and psychoanalysis which leads readers 
to believe they have much in common. Not so, she thinks: 
While it is true that queer theory and psychoanalysis (theory 
and practice) share an interest in subjectivity, desire, identity, 
relationality, ethics, power, discourse and norms, it is not true 
that their interest is dedicated in the same direction, with let’s 
say, a common objective, or common interpretations.
Aligning themselves with each other results, she thinks, in radi-
cal misreadings, particularly over jouissance (blissful misread-
ings, we might say): “We are told that if it didn’t exist, queers 
would invent it. Please!” And for some on the psychoanalytic 
stage, queer simply misses the point about what caring for pa-
tients means; that is to say, it fails to recognize reality. Katrine 
Zeuthen and Judy Gammelgaard, anxious enough about the en-
counter (“In some ways our apprehension was confirmed when 
we read the texts”), take the “maybe I’m old-fashioned” route: 
Maybe we are too serious or literal, but we sense in these and 
other attempts to delimit the essence of sexual queerness an 
idealization which contradicts our experiences of the pain 
and suffering which many patients — homosexual as well as 
heterosexual — associate with coming to grips with the un-
conscious part of sexuality.
Queer theory opposes the normativeness of psychoanalytic 
concepts. Psychoanalysis accuses queer of throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater — or at least, in Owens’s words, there 
are places where “the Lacanian baby is being thrown out with 
the bathwater of ‘classical (sic) psychoanalysis’.” For the “classi-
cal” group, whoever they may be, one problem is queer theory’s 
tendency to reiterate binaries it appears to be opposed to: mas-
culine–feminine transmigrates into heterosexual–homosexual; 
fluidity–fixity becomes another paean to the superiority of one 
side (fluidity) over the other. The consequence of this last point 
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is particularly interesting and is well analyzed by Lisa Downing 
in her critique of how “Privileging the ideal of fluidity leads to 
a concomitant stigmatization of the idea of fixity, establishing 
an unhelpful binary (fluidity or fixity) in a body of thought that 
usually attempts to deconstruct such dualities.” Promoting sex-
ual fluidity — which as she knows is a truism in mental health 
work — leads to disparagement of those who enjoy fixity, repeti-
tion and sameness, the limited practice of sex time after time; 
yet why should this be excluded from the queer celebration of 
multifariousness and sexual variation? A nice paradox, indeed, 
here recognized by one of the players on the queer stage, appar-
ently throwing a line across to the other theater. 
Perhaps we are back in the terrain of a debate about continu-
ous revolution. From the perspective of psychoanalysis, let us 
assume for a moment that the Freudian revolution was a real 
one and that everything changes as a consequence, leading not 
only to the saturation of culture by psychoanalytic discourse 
(as Ian Parker has repeatedly shown to have occurred, and does 
so again here) but also to a change in the extra-discursive do-
main, maybe even in the “real world” (it is too scary not to use 
these quotation marks). Freud turned things upside down and 
inside out; sexuality became “mal-normed” as Lacan once put 
it; discourses of and on the unconscious proliferated and the 
boundary between rationality and irrationality became blurred. 
Previous accounts of human subjecthood, and perhaps the ex-
perience of it too, were disrupted and queered. However, like 
most things, having made its revolution, psychoanalysis so-
lidified, stagnated, found pragmatic solutions to bureaucratic 
necessities, created formal institutions, fought for its survival, 
made compromises to sustain a presence in the world of psy-
chotherapy. It even seems that there is a strong inverse rela-
tionship between the radical subversiveness of psychoanalytic 
theory and the freedom of its institutional practices. That is, the 
more threatening is their theory of sexuality, the more focused 
psychoanalysts themselves have been on creating organizational 
cultures that are mired in conservatism and conformism, as if 
they had to protect themselves against the fall-out from their 
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own daily encounters with unconscious life. Analytic abstinence 
was not enough; dress codes straightened out, ideologies hard-
ened; bourgeoisification intensified. The resistance of many psy-
choanalysts to the depathologizing of homosexuality is famous, 
and relevant; along with a strong tendency, born of the individ-
ualism of much psychoanalysis, to back away from progressive 
political concerns. 
On the other hand, when pushed to extremes we might also 
have to bear in mind that resistance to outrageous irrationality 
is not necessarily a sign of psychic rigidity. For instance, even 
the much-criticized ego psychologists of post-Second World 
War America may have had more integrity than Lacanian and 
leftist critiques have often allowed. Whilst ego psychology con-
centrated on that side of psychoanalysis that stresses the neces-
sity for control of unconscious impulses and adaptation to soci-
ety and hence seems clearly at odds with radical social critiques 
(e.g., Marcuse 1955; Frosh 1999), it can also be understood as 
an honest response to the destructive explosion of irrational-
ity embodied in fascism and Nazism. That is, despite its many 
and obvious limitations, we should not be too single-minded 
about pillorying ego psychology’s attempt to reinstate rational-
ity as a moral force, given the historical context out of which it 
emerged. However, something more general is at stake here: not 
just ego psychology as a mode of conformist psychoanalysis, but 
the tendency for the most demanding, most difficult ideas of 
psychoanalysis to give way to a kind of conformist moralism, a 
common sense which one might argue it is precisely the task of 
psychoanalysis to disrupt. 
At this point, queer theory can enter the fray as a new(ish) set 
of discourses “from the margins” that unsettles the psychoana-
lytic scheme. Ian Parker tries to maintain the value of such an 
unsettled psychoanalysis by refusing the tendency of Lacanian-
ism to become too much of a system. Instead, he wants to hold 
onto its status as practice, as a way of doing things — or prefer-
ably, undoing them:
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If Lacanian psychoanalysis is treated as a clinical strategy in-
stead of a worldview, then it is possible to make something 
radical with that strategy, to make of it a place where we are 
freer in our tactics than other types of psychoanalysis, poten-
tially a good deal queerer in our practice for that. 
Abe Geldhof and Paul Verhaeghe, also Lacanians, are on the 
same lines when they claim, “What is really queer, is jouissance. 
In the last resort the whole discussion about gender and queer 
is nothing but a defense against the queerness of jouissance and 
the contingencies of life.” Contingencies, unsettling practices: 
these are refusals to be brought into line with any pre-existing 
orthodoxy, whether that of psychoanalysis or queer theory it-
self. In this regard, it is noteworthy that what endears Jean 
Laplanche to some of the queer theorists is the enigmatic sig-
nifier and the disruptive presence of otherness that goes along 
with it. This is an important acknowledgement of the relevance 
of the theory of otherness to the construction of the subject, 
but as Carol Owens comments it might also miss the point that 
Laplanche “was vehemently anti-programmatic declaring that 
psychoanalytic practice cannot propose an aim of practice, no 
matter what, otherwise it risks becoming marshalled into a form 
of social adaptation.” This aspect of Laplanche is perhaps central 
and is an aspect of his critique of the narrativism of much psy-
chotherapy — by which he seemed to mean the attempt to create 
a meaningful story that would integrate the various strands of 
a person’s suffering and consequently make that suffering more 
comprehensible and survivable. Of course this is a worthwhile 
“caring” aim; as a clinical practitioner, Laplanche (2003) knew 
that. But, he wrote:
The fact that we are confronted with a possibly “normal” and 
in any case inevitable defence, that the narration must be 
correlated with the therapeutic aspect of the treatment, in no 
way changes the metapsychological understanding that sees 
in it the guarantee and seal of repression. (29)
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In opposition to this “reconstructive, synthesising narrative vec-
tor” he identified the truly “analytic vector, that of de-transla-
tion and the questioning of narrative structures and the ideas 
connected to them” (29). 
Perhaps maintaining a broad idea of a “de-translating” ana-
lytic vector might be a way of thinking about these necessarily 
failed encounters. We would like the bringing together of psy-
choanalytic practice and queer theory to produce something 
new, an enlivened psychoanalysis, a deeper and less simplisti-
cally celebratory queer theory. But it cannot happen: they are 
in radically different places. The limit of what can be achieved 
has to be that of a bumping up against each other that pushes 
each one off course; more generally, we might wish a kind of 
“plague on both your houses” in the positive sense, resonant 
of the “bringing the plague” that Freud apocryphally promised 
America. That is to say, despite the danger that each approach 
will defensively close itself off in the face of the other’s critique, 
psychoanalysis and queer theory need to actively needle each 
other and be destabilized from some other marginal place, or 
else they will each solidify still more into the kinds of orthodoxy 
that their own theoretical tenets would decry.
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There is something amiss. On that much queer theory and psy-
choanalysis agree. For both of these ways of engaging with the 
world, the dominant, normative, regulations of sexual life are a 
lie. Freud (1908) spoke of the “injustice” of expecting one form 
of sexual behavior from us all. “It is one of the obvious social 
injustices [eine der offenkundigen sozialen Ungerechtigkeiten],” 
he wrote in his essay “‘Civilised’ Sexual Morality and Mod-
ern Nervous Illness,” “that the standard of civilisation should 
demand from everyone the same conduct of sexual life” (192). 
Except, he added, the injustice is normally wiped out by diso-
bedience — Nichtbefolgen — or non-observance of the norm. 
The psychoanalytic subject is restless. She puts up a fight in her 
dreams. Nor is her rebellion restricted to the night time alone. 
She has thoughts she does not share. Sometimes she herself does 
not know what these are. Even in the putative calm of the day, 
when everything is meant to be safe, she can be surprised by 
herself. Such moments may allow a moment of escape from the 
norms that bind her — the norms of civilization which, as we see 
from his essay’s title, Freud was careful to put in scare quotes. 
But these moments, inklings of another unconscious life, might 
also trail behind them ways of being which she would prefer 
not to know or to forget. Whatever her sexual orientation, this 
is likely to be the case. There is no clear or easy resting place in 
the mind. Fluidity, plasticity — the catch-words of recent theo-
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ry — do not halt on request. The way-stations may be enticing or 
bleak. You cannot turn the unconscious into a manifesto (which 
is why Freud disagreed with the surrealists). For psychoanalysis, 
it is axiomatic that we never fully know who we are.
For a long time now I have been interested in what theory 
can “do.” I am part of a generation who believed that mining 
the radical potential of psychoanalysis would have the power 
to shift the terrain of what was thinkable in social and sexual 
life. I still hold that belief. On this there is always more work to 
be done, especially in a climate increasingly hostile to psychoa-
nalysis, where drugs and cognitive-based therapy are the offi-
cially sanctioned — dangerous and/or vacuous — approaches to 
mental life. But, for me, the belief in the transformative power of 
psychoanalysis was always accompanied by the recognition that 
there was something in its way of thinking which is recalcitrant 
to the world of knowledge. Psychoanalysis offers its own diag-
nosis of why, in the field of sexuality, there will always be some-
thing which refuses to submit to our political demands — why 
sexuality will never do or be what we want. In the early days 
of “psychoanalysis and feminism” — the title of Juliet Mitch-
ell’s path-breaking book of 1974 (2000) — some feminists felt 
that the force of sexuality had the power to disrupt the order of 
things, that in the confrontation between a scandalous uncon-
scious and an ego deluded by its own seeming coherence, it was 
the ego — along with the heterosexual imperative — that would 
break (for psychoanalysis the ego is of course already broken, 
“split” to use Freud’s own term). Juliet Mitchell was not one of 
them. She was far more interested in how patriarchy traced its 
lines indelibly across a woman’s sexual life (an emphasis which 
if anything increased in her preface to the 1990 edition of her 
book). 
But something of that early energy seems to have made its 
way into queer theory — Freud’s polymorphous perverse infant 
now reappearing as queer (although only one essay in this col-
lection actually talks of a “queer child”). As if the aberration 
of sexuality was isomorphic with the work of theory, or theory 
at work, as if the two — equally insistent, troublesome — were 
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somehow the same thing. The conceptual boldness, the eupho-
ria, then becomes its own testament to what the theory is try-
ing to describe, to legitimate or release (the gash of bliss would 
be the best example here). This is theory roused by itself, as a 
path — if not the path — to freedom. And yet it often seems to 
me that something has gone missing. Half the psychoanalytic 
story is being left behind. Most simply, the ugliest part. In this 
struggle of unconscious against ego — or in one formulation 
here, “queer” versus “ego” — the agency of the mind that polic-
es our identities, the superego, has disappeared. The battle has 
been won before it has truly begun. There is no hint of the sa-
distic force of social identifications — the cruel inner watchman 
of the soul. There are few references to psychic pain. Queer per-
formativity is mostly stripped of the melancholia and abjection 
in which Judith Butler became so careful to embed it. Splitting, 
denegation, foreclosure, denial, or even repression, one after the 
other the insignia of how we struggle with our inner world ap-
pear to have been dropped. What is left of the whole repertoire 
used by psychoanalysis to describe the shifting forms of identity 
and loss of identity whereby we try, and fail, to exert psychic and 
sexual mastery over ourselves?
Failure is, I realize, key. “Failure,” I wrote in 1983 in lines 
quoted several times here, “is something endlessly repeated and 
relived moment by moment throughout our individual histo-
ries,” there is a “resistance to identity at the very heart of psy-
chic life” (2005, 91). I could not have anticipated then how this 
moment would be taken up at a cost, allowed of course by my 
own words, that failure would come to be aligned with resist-
ance as if there were no gap between them. Failure thus becomes 
a form of protest, before the discomfort, the anguish of failure, 
has barely had a chance to be heard (to put it another way, in 
the very moment it surfaces, failure re-represses itself). Reading 
the essays in this collection, I repeatedly get the impression that, 
for a politics of psychoanalysis, this was, and is, the deal — the 
more unsettling concept of failure has to be absorbed, allayed 
somehow, by its more political blood sister, resistance (“a more 
productive resistance” in Alice Kuzniar’s words). But resistance 
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is not only political, as I have had occasion more recently to 
explore — perhaps as a way of returning to, taking issue with, 
my own earlier formulation, although, till writing this, I had not 
made the link. For resistance too is freighted with ambiguity: 
a fight-back against oppression; but also, as Freud increasingly 
recognized, obduracy (another form of militancy), the mind’s 
best defense against any demand that it might transform itself 
(Rose 2007). Which is the more powerful? Our revolt against 
the world’s inhumanity, or our tenacity in holding onto the 
identities — even if we hate them — which we believe we have 
constructed for ourselves? Is the psychoanalytic unconscious 
on the side of freedom? If we look around the world, for ex-
ample, at the more enduring and violent fantasies of national 
identification — which has been the increasing focus of my 
own work — it seems not. This must surely be the question of 
any psychoanalytically informed politics, the question around 
which the encounter between queer theory and psychoanalysis 
must be staged. But only, I believe, if we do not purport to an-
swer the question too fast.
There are of course essays here in which this issue is central. 
The account of the post-surgery trans-gendered subject haunted 
by a body no medical intervention can sublate; or the story of 
another transgender patient who is not queer enough — his/her 
desire being not to escape “the drill of the normative” (to cite 
Ken Corbett’s suggestive phrase in another essay) but to give it 
a more acceptable shape; or the stories of the patient whose suf-
fering exceeds her social oppression, even if bound to that same 
oppression, as the flood of conflicting impulses overflow the 
heart. Think of Anna O, the first psychoanalytic patient, trapped 
at home with her dying father by a world that knows no other 
destiny for women, body steeled and frozen in protest, but who 
cannot reconcile her rage with her grief. I see all these moments 
as cautions — hence the value of this volume — against a psychic 
idealization of queer. What does it mean, for example, to de-
scribe the unconscious as a “psychic wardrobe of potential iden-
tities” from which, at any moment throughout the day, I select 
who I will “be”; or to suggest, via what is for me a misreading 
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of Jean Laplanche, that the child’s fantasy of seduction — seed-
bed of potential violence, of the fraught bonds of love, in Jessica 
Benjamin’s expression — is in itself queer? If queer is a form of 
relation to otherness, why would it be immune from the agonies 
of recognition — of embrace and revulsion — through which 
our reckoning with the other takes place?
These points are made by several of the clinical essays but I 
do not think it helpful to see this as a clash between theory and 
the consulting room. The more regulatory forms of psychoanal-
ysis — on which many of these essays are rightly angry — forms 
which have not, to my mind, been attentive enough to the of-
ten conflicting nuances in Freud, still need to listen to queer 
theory. While for me, queer theory — once it enters the domain 
of psychoanalysis — can only be strengthened by engaging with 
the darker places of the psyche, where our capacity for transfor-
mation thwarts itself. Perhaps the relationship between queer 
theory and psychoanalysis — vital, uncomfortable, testy — has 
still not gone far enough.
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Taking Shelter from Queer
Tim Dean
“Psychoanalysis may be queer but it is not queer theory,” ob-
serves Patricia Gherovici, in a sentence that encapsulates the 
central tension structuring Clinical Encounters in Sexuality. As 
the chapters in this volume demonstrate, psychoanalysis looks 
different from a queer perspective, often disorientingly so. Yet 
even as the potential queerness of psychoanalysis is teased out 
and highlighted, some minimal difference between the two re-
mains. What to make of that difference — indeed, what to make 
of various small differences — exercises all of the contributors 
in one way or another, eliciting a range of responses, from the 
intrigued and engaged to the disturbingly phobic. 
Occasionally the narcissism of minor differences threatens 
to derail these encounters by turning difference into opposi-
tion — as, for example, when Rob Weatherill claims that queer 
theory’s “ideological attack on the so-called straight world can 
be profoundly anti-psychoanalytic.” Feeling attacked, perhaps 
outnumbered, the analyst perceives difference through an im-
aginary schema that frames the queer and the psychoanalytic as 
enemies. Never mind that queer functions as a critique of nor-
malization (not as an “attack” on the “straight world”), Weath-
erill’s paranoid response ignores all subtleties of distinction in 
the face of an overwhelming onslaught: “It is always already too 
asphyxiatingly close. Consequently, Gay Rights […] is a done 
deal in many western countries. […] [Q]ueer theories and strat-
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egies have moved from the margin to the centre,” he claims. To 
give any space, any rights whatsoever, to the queers risks being 
completely overrun by them; loosening repression even slightly 
will open the floodgates to sexual chaos.
Given the perception of threat, it is important not — I repeat, 
not — to listen to what the “other side” is saying. Above all, one 
must stop his ears, lest any unwonted seduction occur inadvert-
ently. Some of the analysts, especially the men, are astonish-
ingly good at not listening. Lacanians Abe Geldhof and Paul 
Verhaeghe, along with the Kleinian R.D. Hinshelwood and the 
relational analyst Ken Corbett, all manage to avoid referring to, 
much less engaging, any of the contributors to whom they’re os-
tensibly responding. With the exception of Corbett, these guys 
even succeed in keeping all queer theoretical works out of their 
bibliographies, thereby maintaining a strict univocal purity. It is 
so much easier to be certain about where one stands on messy 
issues, such as those involving sexuality, when he does not have 
to acknowledge the voices or the claims of others.
“Certainty is the enemy of psychoanalysis,” writes Ann Mur-
phy (quoting Wilfred Bion), in her thoughtful response. As 
I’ve suggested, framing any issue in terms of “the enemy” tends 
to imaginarize difference, polarizing matters within a binary 
framework that constrains thinking and meaningful exchange. 
One nevertheless appreciates the point that Murphy is making 
here. It is not queer theory that is “the enemy” of psychoanalysis 
but precisely the kind of certitude that would position the for-
mer as such. The trouble with certainty, from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, is that it too readily functions as a defense against 
the alterity of the unconscious; certainty represents both a prac-
tical and an ethical problem. When it comes to sexuality, certi-
tude may be understood as a predictably symptomatic response 
to what several contributors eloquently describe as the irreduc-
ibly enigmatic dimension of sex. This is often, though not al-
ways, the case with Lacanian accounts of sexuality, which tend 
to couple their unwavering pronouncements about sex with 
projections concerning “the psychotic’s certitude” or that of “the 
399
taking shelter from queer
pervert” (it is the pervert’s alleged certainty about how to enjoy 
that is a problem, never the analyst’s) (Dean 2008).
The trouble with certitude as a defense against otherness 
needs be differentiated from the problematic of fixity that Lisa 
Downing tackles in her chapter on perversion. Justifiably skep-
tical about how queer theory’s anti-essentialist commitment 
to sexual fluidity risks re-pathologizing erotic fixity, Downing 
wants to clarify from a different angle the crucial distinction be-
tween sexual identities and sexual acts. It is the fixity of identity, 
not that of any consensual pleasure-giving practice, that creates 
problems. Queer theory’s critique of identity derives primarily 
from Michel Foucault’s (1978) analysis of how, during the nine-
teenth century, erotic acts became construed as so many indices 
of discrete sexual identities. Reading an identity — or a defini-
tional “structure of desire” — from any erotic act is an intrinsi-
cally normalizing gesture. As I’ve argued elsewhere, the queer 
critique of identity shares something fundamental in common 
with psychoanalytic critiques of the ego as a defensive structure. 
This is all well and good, until our acknowledgement of the 
mobility of unconscious desire gets twisted into a normative 
prescription about sexual fluidity that re-pathologizes fixed 
erotic investments. What I find especially compelling about 
Downing’s intervention is her directing our attention away 
from the obsession with sexual identities to a renewed focus on 
erotic acts and their attendant pleasures. To the volume’s various 
discussions of pleasure, I would add the caveat that translating 
pleasure too quickly into jouissance risks relegating erotic pleas-
ure to the domain of potential pathology. How do we adjudicate 
when sexual practice has gone beyond the pleasure principle 
and is tarrying with the death drive? How much pleasure is 
too much and who decides? The readiness with which certain 
of the contributors misrecognize sexual pleasure as a form of 
harm — as if non-normative pleasures were almost invariably at 
someone else’s expense — might prompt reconsideration of how 
such misrecognitions themselves enact harm through the vio-
lence of stigmatization. When, for example, Claudette Kulkarni 
writes that, “maybe there is no such thing as ‘normal,’ but there 
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certainly is something ‘abnormal’ about sexual offending!” we 
need to think about how psychoanalysis is being conscripted 
to the project of policing sexuality by segregating its manifesta-
tions into normal and abnormal. The concept of the abnormal 
cannot exist without that of the normal; indeed, the burden of 
queer theory is to demonstrate, in order to challenge, the perva-
siveness of social normalization. Kulkarni’s specious claim that 
“there is no such thing as ‘normal’” may represent little more 
than a contemporary meta-ruse of normalization.
This problematic is framed especially cogently by Dany 
Nobus when he registers how “psychoanalysis itself has often 
been reluctant to accept the variations, diversity, and unpredict-
ability of human sexuality as what constitutes its actual norm.” 
To accept that variation is the norm requires, in tandem with 
a psychoanalytic perspective, some consideration of how social 
normalization actually works. Queer theory draws on the work 
of French medical historian Georges Canguilhem (1991) to dis-
tinguish statistical norms from evaluative norms and to show 
the troubling effects of conflating one with the other. A statisti-
cal norm describes mathematical averages in a population — for 
example, most men are heterosexual, or most North Americans 
are overweight — without commenting on the norm’s desirabil-
ity. Rather than descriptive, however, an evaluative norm is pre-
scriptive; it articulates a normative ideal. We need not consider 
how evaluative norms feed into the superego to see how con-
flating them with statistical averages already creates problems. 
Nobus reminds us that even if, statistically speaking, most men 
identify as heterosexual, this tells us nothing about the ethical 
desirability of heterosexuality, the range of forms these men’s 
sexual practice and relations may take, or their unconscious fan-
tasies. Beneath the façade of normality lie fantasies whose ec-
centricity make a mockery of the very notion of sexual identity. 
Together psychoanalysis and queer theory permit us to grasp 
how oxymoronic the idea of sexual orientation actually is. No 
small measure of its pleasure comes from the capacity of sex to 
disorient.
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But what happens when sex disorients the paradigms 
through which we aspire to comprehend it? Psychoanalysis 
risks “becoming sexually illiterate,” Nobus warns, when it de-
clines to pay attention to “each and every event in the sexual 
realm without prejudice and preconception.” It may be easier to 
suspend one’s lingering prejudices than to approach sex without 
preconceptions. The danger is that psychoanalysts and psycho-
analytically-oriented critics will interpret unfamiliar manifesta-
tions of eros either as unequivocally pathological, on one hand, 
or as totally intelligible according to established hermeneutic 
frameworks, on the other. In both cases, what we witness is psy-
choanalysis stopping its ears against — and hence refusing to 
encounter — the sexually alien. It is because so much pertain-
ing to sex remains unconscious that sexuality persistently ap-
pears as opaque, enigmatic, alien, and queer. Every interpretive 
framework that makes sense of sex — whether through Oedi-
pus, Antigone, or some other paradigm — risks annihilating the 
alien quality of sexuality by way of hermeneutic normalization. 
Much of my own work has been devoted to exploring how its 
alien aspect renders human sexuality fundamentally imperson-
al, insofar as unconscious mental life exceeds individual person-
hood. Once the unconscious is taken into account, we can no 
longer really justify thinking about sex as interpersonal. Each 
person in a sexual encounter relates to an unconscious fantasy, 
to an imaginary image, or to an enigmatic signifier before he or 
she relates to the other person(s) present. Psychoanalysts know 
that their patients’ relations to them are heavily mediated (there 
is always a “third” accompanying the analytic couple), and this 
is even more the case at moments of physical intimacy, when 
what may appear as unmediated bodily contact remains medi-
ated by invisible formations that are at once unconscious and 
historical. 
Enigmas from the sexual past haunt the gay bar’s darkroom 
as much as they permeate the marital bedroom, and only the 
willfully ignorant persist in believing that sex takes place be-
tween couples. To take the unconscious into account enables 
one to appreciate how the group, not the couple, represents the 
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sexual paradigm of psychoanalysis. It is like those moments in 
pornography when the camera pulls back to reveal that around 
two naked bodies stands a room full of people. Everyone is try-
ing to ignore the extra bodies in the room but, like the uncon-
scious, they continue to function irrespective of our awareness 
or belief in their existence. When it comes to sex, the uncon-
scious is less like Baltimore in the early morning (as Jacques 
Lacan once said) than it is like a San Fernando Valley porn set. 
The limitation of the analogy is that, by appealing to an image of 
whole bodies rather than partial figures, it risks re-personalizing 
the eminently impersonal qualities of the unconscious. And it 
is because no image can capture the unconscious that sexuality 
and identity remain perpetually at odds. This does not mean, 
however, that psychoanalysts and queer theorists have to be at 
odds. Clinical Encounters in Sexuality initiates so many conver-
sations that it offers a rich repertoire of possibilities for getting 
creative with the differences that divide and connect us.
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Courageous Drawings of Vigilant Ambiguities
Noreen O’Connor
My aim is to elucidate ways in which analysts have responded 
to the challenges of queer theorists. Working with the operative 
distinction of analyst and queer theorist I draw out their shared 
vigilance of reductive classifications of foundational aesthetic, 
epistemic, ontological, ethico-political specifications of subjec-
tive/intersubjective relationships. 
Corbett succinctly expresses the clinical ambiance of con-
temporary psychoanalysis in his first sentence describing the 
pivotal relationships between different models of analytic praxis 
and social critiques of normality. By “leaning” toward the gener-
ative grounding soil of psychoanalytic originality practitioners 
explore ways in which fantasy inter-implicates the body-subject 
and thereby challenge dualisms of mind/body, language/think-
ing. Psychoanalytic space is delineated as a place in which the 
enigmatic dynamism of transferences of fantasies and attributes 
highlight the courageous listening/speaking ethos present in the 
rigorous work of contributors to this book, namely, encounters. 
Analysis opens horizons of varying inter-subjective spaces and 
times for the emergence of individual speaking of a body-sub-
ject in their relational complexity (Ellis 2008, 187; 2010, 65–66). 
This relational throwness into the implicit and explicit, con-
scious-unconscious resourcefulness of our common language(s) 
draws us out of the obsessionality of our egocentricity and moves 
us towards openness to the unexpected. Theories of human psy-
404
responses to psychoanalytic practices encountering queer theories
chic lived experiences and their vicissitudes are formulated in 
socio-cultural contexts with their inevitable aesthetic, ethical, 
ontological, epistemological, which influence specifically meth-
odological presuppositions (O’Connor 2010, 2). 
Cultural Differences: Psychoanalyses?
Hinshelwood maintains that the history of welfarism in Britain 
implicitly influences perceptions of the individual as part of a 
maternal nurturing culture. This has facilitated the development 
of object-relations psychoanalysis which, he argues, is always a 
matter of relations, furthermore, psychology is inevitably social 
psychology. Are relationships constituted by interactive psy-
chologies or by different ways in which we speak, listen, hear 
one another?
Abe Geldhof and Paul Verhaeghe argue that all of gender/
queer theorizing is a defense against the queerness of Lacan’s 
conceptualization of jouissance — “queer is a new shelter for 
castration.” Beyond gender/queer specifications there are the 
contingencies of life irreducible to any Hegelian legacies of bi-
nary oppositions whether of body/soul or man/woman. Human 
subjectivity is not specified by any psychology, rather “selfhood” 
occurs through a series of linguistic shifts from imaginary 
identifications through fissures which insert us into the sym-
bolic order of culture. As for example in recurrent recourse to 
myths: “Antigone can be productively analysed as symptomatic 
of hegemonic regimes of race and gender in which the nexus of 
sovereignty, state, law, and biopolitics […] [operate together]” 
(Chanter 2011, 130). 
Ian Parker’s encounters with queer theorists conclude with 
his reflections on the operatively constraining binarisms of queer 
theory. He argues in favor of Lacan’s directive against moulding 
the patient to any predictable psychoanalytic discourse. He re-
fers to a clinical case in which Lacan holds the psychoanalytic 
frame enabling the male analysand to shift “from stereotypical-
ly-masculine position — as obsessional neurotic — to stereotyp-
ically-feminine position […] [hysterical attempt to put all the 
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blame on others] […] is something queer that happens in every 
analysis.” 
Lacanian Phenomenology? 
Dany Nobus argues that ongoing critical contributions of psy-
choanalysis to the study of human sexuality “must include the 
phenomenology of the sexed body.” He distinguishes different 
components: “the sexed body, sexual behavior (erotic practices), 
sexual identity (gender), object-choice (sexual orientation), and 
fantasy-life. Each of these components stands in a meaningful 
relation to each of the other components, without any pre-de-
termined unilateral causal connections.” Crucially Nobus holds 
that configurations can change over time. He concludes with a 
call to a “post-queer” place, not derivative of foundational truth 
claims, but opening shifting epistemic parameters which “act 
upon what Lacan called a ‘knowledge in failure.’” For him this 
implies approaching every sexual event with a spirit of wonder 
and discovery. 
How can we hear the implicit as well as the explicit question-
ing in the nuanced speaking of our patients if we stop wonder-
ing about the limits of our own convictions? To wonder about 
our relationships with our clients/analysands for example, not 
just in terms of countertransference, developmental assump-
tions, or the matheme(atic) elusiveness of petit objet a? Our in-
vestment in the play of archetypes?
The relationship between the theory, the story, and the nar-
rator is commonly conflated in a univocal voice, that is, the ana-
lyst’s presentation of “the case study.” Different narrative strat-
egies work with different assumptions. For every compelling 
interpretation of material, there are others which are equally 
valid. In recounting the relationship the storyteller analyst testi-
fies to the triumph of psychoanalytic method in its clarification 
of the analysand’s hitherto defeats in the face of woeful life. In 
the finitude of mortality can we speak of any “identity” of our 
fleeting selves? Psychoanalysis powerfully challenges the notion 
that we can fully control our desires, despairs, feelings, images, 
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fantasies, loves, hatreds. With its emphasis on the interplay of 
psychic conscious/unconscious, psychoanalysis charts the lim-
its of freedom and choice in our process of individuation. 
For psychoanalysis the play of motivations are constellated 
by identifications which are described in the play of Sophoclean 
metaphors. They are explained by the variability of conscious/
unconscious conflictual dynamisms of causes and reasons. Ann 
Murphy focuses on the centrality of repetition in our attempts 
to evade the psychic pain of “facing” loss, limitation, the con-
tingency of mortality. What about the individuation, for exam-
ple, of a person who is addicted and driven to distraction to 
find solace in that which is destroying them? This is the kind 
of question that guided Freud’s thinking on neurosis in terms 
of his elaboration of the relationship between two principles 
governing mental functioning — the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle. Freud interprets subjective identity in terms of 
explanations of motivations that aim for identifications sought 
during the Oedipal stage of development and are reverberatively 
present/absent throughout one’s life (O’Connor and Ryan 2003, 
240–41). Murphy’s encounter with queer theory alerts her to the 
clinical risks of participating in prescriptive normative regimes 
that are oppressive and betray a psychoanalytic practice which 
focuses on the unique poēsis of the individual. 
Clinical/Textual Reverie
For Ken Corbett, clinical analyses evince different modes of 
knowing, interpretative actions which generate the unconscious 
transferential space of play between him and his patients, in 
this case queer children. His drawing of a number of mice for 
Lincoln which was left under the radiator, deeply shared and 
without discussion or reference, evokes the complexity of his 
different ways of speaking, including gesturally, his own patient 
presence to the melancholic abjection of his patient whose an-
gry withdrawal was protecting his “lost love/identity.” Corbett 
argues that the conflicts, dilemmas, of a queer gender boy des-
perate for social recognition are not explained by a specific psy-
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chic pathology in which “They are not seen as honorable social, 
relational bids; they are seen as troubled psychic enactments.” 
His clinical aim is to “keep company,” keeping present in play 
with its unexpected relationships to the limits of knowing. 
 In her readings of queer theorists, Ami Kaplan questions cri-
tiques of man-woman binarisms. James grew up with the confu-
sion and secrecy of gender variance deeply ashamed of his wish 
“to be and live as a woman.” In their therapeutic work together 
Kaplan focused on the unconscious shame, the alienation which 
had isolated him. His transition to stereotypical female identi-
fication involved negotiating different relationships with fam-
ily, partners, who had thought they knew who “he” was. Jenny 
grappled with social/personal stigma. Kaplan acknowledges the 
crucial importance of queer theory for its critique of heteronor-
mative renderings of gender, sexuality while also questioning 
its anti-identitarian politics. Jenny needed to have relationships 
with others as the female she felt herself to be: a woman. This 
emphasis on respect for an individual’s struggle to speak is ech-
oed in Kulkarni’s “Queer Theory Meets Jung.” Reflecting on re-
sponsiveness to the speaking of Others, she yearns for “theories 
and intellectual challenges that hold the tension among all the 
various […] concepts while staying grounded in the real world 
of people’s everyday suffering.” 
Focusing on recurrent neurotic questioning of one’s desire, 
Patricia Gherovici wonders whether her patient Melissa is con-
fused about object choice or identity politics. She reflects that, 
“the subject’s assumption of a sexual identity is always sympto-
matic because it is related to what psychoanalysts call the phal-
lus — a defective tool to negotiate the Real that eludes us.” Fol-
lowing Lacan, she argues that identification eclipses subjectivity 
in the sense that rather than being somebody for someone we 
“represent a signifier for another signifier.” Using the metaphor 
of “reknotting” of the registers of the Real, Imaginary, and Sym-
bolic, Gherovici places the notion of sexual identity with that 
of sinthome, that is, a “purified symptom,” and claims that its 
ontological existence is beyond the unconscious structured as a 
language. It creatively “makes up for deficiencies linking body, 
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ego, flesh, gender, jouissance, and subjectivity” in the sense that 
it exists outside the unconscious structured as a language. She 
concludes that relations between sexes is constituted as sympto-
matic. This anti-normativity is the meeting place of queer stud-
ies and psychoanalysis. 
Does Psychoanalysis Ever Let Go?
The haunting melody playing through Rob Weatherhill’s “Queer 
New Times” is not evocative of consolation but of remembering, 
repeating, and working-through. Weatherhill challenges queer 
theories which trivialize suffering as part of a heterosexist plot 
rather than intrinsically vital in its variable instantiation, aim-
ing beyond limits of rational transparency, logic, hermeneutics, 
rhetoric, structuralism. Along with both queer theorists and 
analysts, Weatherill points to the limits of language either as an 
excess of knowing or as the anarchic cut of free associations. 
Roustang (2003) argues that the speaking of the symptom in 
the analytic session expresses an isolation, anxiety which can 
existentially move someone from the prison of a repetitive pre-
sent towards a future of new possibilities. I refer to the origi-
nality emergent in analytic speaking/responding as the an-ar-
chic dynamism of psychoanalysis: “The face-to-face is a saying 
that in being said at each moment breaks the definition of that 
which it says, and breaks through the totality that it embraces” 
(O’Connor 2010, 55). 
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Psychoanalysts and queer theorists both know that the ques-
tions we ask shape the kind of data we discover. Psychoanalysts 
since Sigmund Freud have asked often, “Why are some people 
homosexual? What causes this sexual attraction?” They have 
not asked so often, “Why do people hate and fear homosexuals? 
What causes this irrational emotional reaction? What causes the 
destructive and often delusional fear and hatred of gay men and 
lesbians?” This is odd, since homosexuality itself has harmed 
no one, whereas hatred and persecution of homosexuals has 
damaged many lives. It is also odd because the understand-
ing of prejudice has been a fundamental aim of psychoanaly-
sis throughout its history. The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 
1900) was not only a landmark in the science of unconscious 
processes; it was also a relentless airing of and protest against 
the prejudice towards Jews in Freud’s time. Psychoanalysis is the 
science of the irrational, and hence it is the field most suited to 
address the irrational fear and hatred of homosexuality that we 
call homophobia. 
Jeremy Clarke (2011) tells the following anecdote:
At a recent conference held at the Institute of Psychoanaly-
sis, in London, during lunch, a group of senior training an-
alysts were chatting: “What does the Kleinian group think 
about teenage abortion these days?” Well, we don’t assume 
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the young woman is solely motivated by murderous and 
destructive instincts any longer, though that will come into 
it, of course… Ah… But now gay marriage — that really is 
against the facts of life.
What are the facts of life? Many psychoanalysts, sometimes not 
knowing much about the latest facts of sexology and other so-
cial sciences, rely on their common-sense notions of a healthy 
life. Often unconsciously, they amalgamate their upbringing, 
commonly held views of the culture, and religious beliefs into 
a view of how life should be lived and what constitutes mental 
health and psychopathology.
Is heterosexuality inherently pathological? Please read that 
sentence ten times without dismissing it. You may find eventu-
ally that it is no more sensible or ridiculous than the much more 
common question: Is homosexuality inherently pathological? 
I call this the test of “bias reversal” (Blechner 1993): taking a 
potentially prejudicial statement and turning it upside down, 
either by reversing genders or substituting the dominant group 
for the group that is the object of prejudice, thereby revealing 
unnoticed bigotry. Are white people inherently less intelligent 
than black people? Is terrorism against infidels inherently a 
characteristic of Christianity? Such questions highlight the es-
sentially irrationality and bias of our “common-sense” preju-
dices. Both homosexuality and heterosexuality give pleasure, 
can be integrated into loving relationships, and harm no one. 
Why then do many people, psychoanalysts included, hate and 
fear homosexuals? What is the root of homophobia?
All of us are potentially prejudicial, and we are all better at 
observing the prejudice we experience as victims than the preju-
dice we perpetrate on others. People who have written author-
itatively about the roots of prejudice against their own group 
nevertheless can express acute prejudice against other groups, 
employing the same psychic mechanisms that they have identi-
fied in others. For example, Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel (1996) 
decried the essential narcissism of homosexuality as a denial of 
difference. Yet Chasseguet-Smirgel, a Jewish, French psychoan-
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alyst married Béla Grunberger, her Jewish, French psychoana-
lyst. This is an example of the “gender fetish” (Blechner 1998) 
so prevalent in psychoanalysis — the obsessive and exaggerated 
attention to the gender of someone’s romantic partner, to the ex-
clusion of so many other factors of equal or greater importance. 
Therefore, I have proposed (1995) that we give prefixes to the 
terms “heterosexuality” and “homosexuality.” What we usually 
call “homosexuality” should be called “gender homosexuality.” 
Many other significant factors can be concordant or different 
in any couple, including age, social class, nationality, ethnicity, 
religion, profession, sexual behavior preference and others. Any 
one of them could be a prefix, such as “age heterosexuality or 
age homosexuality.” The prefixes “hetero” and “homo” could be 
used to convey that you are attracted to people who either share 
certain characteristics with you (“homo”) or differ from you in 
that way (“hetero”). Chasseguet-Smirgel, while a gender-heter-
osexual, was a religion-homosexual, a profession-homosexual, 
and a nationality-homosexual. We have no reason to consider 
any of those homosexualities to be inherently pathological, any 
more than we should consider gender-homosexuality to be 
pathological.1 
Psychoanalysis has provided us the tools to identify the de-
fensive process behind such gross pejorative generalizations: 
they are projections of self-judgement onto a member of a 
group perceived as outsiders, a psychic operation described viv-
idly in pre-psychoanalytic times by Jesus: “And why beholdest 
thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not 
the beam that is in thine own eye?” (Matthew 7:3). The psycho-
analytic literature has many discussions of projection in rela-
tion to anti-Semitism, (e.g., Ackerman 1947; Grunberger 1964; 
Chasseguet-Smirgel 1988) but relatively few discussions of pro-
jection in relation to homophobia (Corbett 2001). As a general 
principle, if the object of hatred and prejudice is excluded from 
a group’s dialogue, then erroneous, even psychotic prejudices 
1 See Kernberg (1975) and Segal (1990) for similar demonstrations of projec-
tive mechanisms with respect to self- and other-prejudice. 
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can be sustained by the group. The shared projective defense be-
hind much psychoanalytic homophobia could go unchallenged 
and unanalyzed only as long as the object of that projection was 
kept out of the psychoanalytic dialogue. Hence the importance 
of including gay men and lesbians in the scholarly and clini-
cal community of psychoanalysts. By excluding open gays and 
lesbians from participation in the psychoanalytic community, 
psychoanalysts prevented their own cure from anti-homosexual 
prejudice.
Another unconscious source of homophobia is religion. The 
word “perversion” has its roots in religion. In the Oxford English 
Dictionary, “perversion” is defined as: “turning the wrong way; 
turning aside from truth or right; diversion to an improper use; 
corruption, distortion; specifically, change to error in religious 
belief.” This definition highlights the trouble with the concept 
of perversion. In orthodox religion, there is a right way to do 
things, and if you do things differently, even if it makes you hap-
py and you do not harm anyone, you are still wrong, perverted 
and sinful. Many clinicians have bought into such a translation 
from sin to psychopathology, even if the connection between 
pathology and sin is not fully conscious. This has caused a lot 
of clinical mischief and a good deal of suffering for patients. It 
may be that if the clinician thinks perversion, the clinician is 
also implicitly thinking, “I know the right way to behave.” Not 
just the right way for me to behave, but the right way to behave. 
There is an identifiable progression that has characterized 
much psychoanalytic and psychiatric thinking about the “psy-
chopathology” of groups that suffer prejudice (White 2002; 
Blechner 2009). It starts with an acceptance of society’s stand-
ards and an identification of the distress and dysfunction of the 
individual as a problem inherent in the individual. Gradually 
(often too gradually), there is recognition that the individual 
may be suffering not from an inherent, intrapsychic neurosis, 
but from persistent perversion of living caused by unbearable 
requirements of surviving societal oppression. There is then a 
second, intermediate stage in which some theorists identify this 
maltreatment, and a growing recognition that the individual’s 
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problems can be cured not by intrapsychic change, but rather by 
changing the individual’s relation to society. Finally, there is the 
third stage, in which there is recognition that for the ultimate 
removal of psychopathology, society itself must change.
In its early years, psychoanalysis was at the cutting edge of 
this progression. Freud bravely noted the damage done by sex-
ual repression, sexual hypocrisy, sexually transmitted diseases 
and sexual abuse of minors. Freud (1905) was indeed a queer 
theorist as well as a psychoanalyst. He scandalized Vienna with 
his proposition that in our unconscious we are all quite queer 
(“polymorphously perverse” may be a more scientific term for 
“queer”). Freud’s observations led to vast changes in society, a 
revolution that is still in progress (see Brill 1913). But over the 
years, especially in the mid-twentieth century, psychoanalysis 
as a whole abandoned its progressive role and became increas-
ingly an enforcer of traditional values, valorizing the supposed 
normality of middle-class stereotypes. Women who wanted 
equal rights with men were told they had penis envy. Men who 
had sexual relations with other men were seen as pathological. 
Women who had as many sex partners as men were diagnosed 
as nymphomaniacs. It is possible that psychoanalysis could be 
rejuvenated today by becoming a more queer theory than ac-
ademic queer theory, as it once was. In order to achieve this, 
psychoanalysis needs to apply its own tools to its own defenses. 
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Transgender, Queer Theory, and Psychoanalysis
Susan Stryker
The inclusion of trans*1 material in this collection of essays on 
the encounter between psychoanalysis and queer theory neces-
sarily raises the question of the relationship of trans* to queer, as 
well as trans* to psychoanalysis. 
The five essays that deal explicitly with trans* issues — Gh-
erovici, Corbett, Kaplan, Weatherill, and Geldhof and Ver-
haeghe — each approach these matters somewhat differently. 
Weatherill makes only passing, and transphobic, mention of 
transgender women when he approvingly quotes Germaine 
Greer’s gratuitously vulgar dismissal of such individuals’ claims 
to social existence: “just because you lop off your dick doesn’t 
make you a fucking woman.” For Geldhof and Verhaeghe, trans* 
positions are “extreme representatives” of a queer social move-
ment that seems “to refuse the classical distinction between man 
and woman.” For Kaplan, “trans” represents a benign albeit lim-
1 The asterisk after “trans” is an increasingly favored lexical strategy for in-
dicating the variety of suffixed words and concepts to which trans might 
be prefixed: not only -gender, or -sexuality or -vestism, but also -species, 
-genic, -racial, or -national. It derives from the search-term symbol for a 
Boolean wildcard operator, i.e., a placeholder standing in for any string of 
search characters. It is gaining popularity precisely because it avoids, on the 
one hand, a welter of identitarian labels, and, on the other hand, opens up 
new affinities rooted in movements across categories. In subsequent usages 
of the term “trans” throughout this essay, the asterisk may be omitted but is 
always implied.
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iting investment in fixed gender identities that is counterposed 
to the supposed fluidity, and desirability, of queer gender expres-
sion. Though he does not use the trans* nomenclature, Corbett’s 
nuanced discussion of “queer childhood” is attuned to those 
moments “in which the social order of gender is challenged,” 
and in which a “transforming nexus” of gender mallability is 
created that allows for gender’s resignification through collec-
tive intersubjective fantasies between queer children and their 
significant others. For Gherovici, transness and homosexuality 
both address, in nonheteronormative ways, the imperative to 
assume a psychical position in relation to the question of sexual 
difference; they are divergent yet equally viable sinthomes, or an-
swers to the unavoidable riddle of how the Real, Imaginary, and 
Symbolic registers might be knotted together. 
Each author deals with the relation of transness to queer the-
ory, rather than queer identities, somewhat differently as well. 
For Gherovici, queer theory is an expansive intellectual under-
taking that includes trans* within its purview, and that enables 
a productive distinction between homosexual and transgender 
subjectivities. Corbett accords queer theory, along with femi-
nism and social philosophy, a central role in contemporary 
psychoanalysis alongside its foundational Freudian tenets; he 
finds in this happy confluence of perspectives a set of insights 
into gender’s contingency and variability that is eminently ca-
pable of positively recognizing and accommodating trans* gen-
der non-conformities. Kaplan offers a less robust account of 
queer theory, equating it with a critique of gender binarism that 
points out the “blockiness” of such categories as man, woman, 
gay, straight and bisexual; transgender, which she equates with a 
greater investment in categorical fixity and a less flexible mode 
of inhabiting the categories through which social life is lived, 
therefore falls outside queer theory as she understands it. Geld-
hof and Verhaeghe, who consider queerness to be merely a de-
fense against castration, expend no energy engaging with what-
ever critical-political-social correlates might follow from what 
they presume to be an inadequate (and ultimately indefensible) 
position. Weatherill uses transgender off-handedly, via Greer, 
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merely to illustrate his point that the failure to acknowledge a 
Lacanian distinction between the Symbolic and the Real results 
in error: a point he deploys to critique Foucault (and thus by ex-
tension to critique queer theory) for acting as if the discourse of 
sexuality does not somehow inevitably falter against the opacity 
of the Real. 
And yet, for all their differences, all these authors elide dis-
tinctions that might be drawn between queer theory and/or 
trans* theories — or even to acknowledge that such a trans* the-
oretical field might exist. Over the past quarter-century, trans* 
studies has become a thing in itself, and has positioned itself as 
a sometimes overlapping/sometimes separate, sometimes com-
patible/sometimes contestatory field vis-à-vis queer theory.2 
There is an explicitly psychoanalytic body of work within trans* 
studies — Jay Prosser, Patricia Elliot, Gayle Salamon, Sheila 
Cavanagh, and Shanna Carlson come to mind as salient exam-
ples3 — that is referenced within the present collection only in-
directly. Another “clinical encounter” between such scholarship 
and psychoanalysis would undoubtedly produce a different set 
of conversations, equally compelling as the queer ones collected 
here.4 
Drawing a few pertinent distinctions between trans* and 
queer seems to be in order. To a significant extent, the concept 
of queerness has come to be associated primarily with homo-
sexual feelings (however we might understand the relationship 
of these feelings to psychical dispositions towards masculinity 
2 See, for example, on the formation of transgender studies as a distinct field, 
Stryker and Whittle (2005); Stryker and Aizura (2013).
3 For transgender studies work that explicitly addresses or makes use of psy-
choanalytic theory, see, first, Prosser (1998), as well as a spate of more recent 
work: Salamon (2010); Elliot (2010); Cavanagh (2010); and Carlson (2010).
4 The interdisciplinary academic journal TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly 
will publish a special issue on “Transgender and Psychoanalysis,” currently 
scheduled as vol. 4, no. 4 (2017). Psychoanalytic clinicians and theorists who 
have written non-dismissively, or in non-psychopathologizing ways, about 
transgender psychical phenomena include Adrienne Harris, Virginia Gold-
ner, and Oren Gozlan. See also Jacqueline Rose’s (2016) excellent, psycho-
analytically informed overview of transgender theorizing and literatures.
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or femininity, or to the question of sexual difference). The exist-
ence of homosexual feelings is rarely doubted. Transgender feel-
ings, on the other hand — feelings that one’s socially assigned 
gender is in some profound sense inappropriate or unsuitable 
for oneself, or that one’s embodiment does not communicate the 
intelligibility of one’s sense of self to others and must therefore 
be transformed — still often tend to be trivialized, ridiculed, 
explained away, or denied as such. Such feelings are really im-
possible because there is no such thing as a “core” gender iden-
tity (as critics of Stoller [1975] would have it), really a mistaken 
and politically suspect notion that can be corrected through a 
progressive pedagogy about sex-role stereotyping (as too many 
feminists to count are wont to say), really a fraudulent represen-
tation based on conscious deception (as the “panic defense” of 
transphobic murders frames it), really (in some psychoanalytic 
interpretations) a narcissistic flaw, or really a psychotic error 
about the ontological givenness of biological sex dimorphism 
and the psychical necessity of assuming a symbolic position in 
relation to that dichotomy.
Trans* studies, as opposed to queer studies’ focus on ho-
mosexual desire, takes as some of its starting positions that 
“transgender feelings” are real, that agnosticism is an adequate 
stance regarding their origins, and that skepticism is the best 
stance regarding any monocausal etiology offered of them; that 
understanding the sources and implications of these feelings is a 
non-trivial pursuit that can offer substantive critiques of episte-
mological and discursive frameworks that marginalize, deny, or 
dismiss such feelings and perceptions; and that psychopathol-
ogy offers an extremely reductive and impoverished framework 
for addressing the questions of how these feelings emerge, how 
they are to be lived, or what is to be done about them at both the 
individual and societal levels. 
The limitations and promises of psychoanalysis for address-
ing transgender phenomena fall out along the lines sketched 
above. On the one hand, psychoanalysis has more often than 
not proven itself painfully maladept in dealing with the class of 
problems that transgender feelings present without resorting to 
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pathologizing interpretations; it has not offered the same clarity 
or utility to trans* subjects, movements, or social projects that it 
has lent to feminism, gay liberation, or (homo)queer modes of 
life. On the other hand, as a supple analytical method for both 
intellectually comprehending and therapeutically intervening in 
the complex processes of psychical life, psychoanalytic theory 
and practice nevertheless harbor a potential for understanding 
transgender issues and apprehending their “truth” that has yet 
to be fully or routinely realized. Judith Butler’s early work on 
“gender trouble” and “bodies that matter,” so foundational for 
much contemporary trans* theorizing, is a feast that seems not 
to have been consumed by most psychoanalysts. 
Taking the nonpathological reality of transgender subjectiv-
ity as a starting point, and reading out from there to more gen-
eral conditions, puts pressure on, and demands the reworking 
of, such psychoanalytic concepts as sexual difference, masculin-
ity, femininity, desire, castration, and lack. Trans* critique can 
thus perhaps revise currently orthodox psychoanalytic accounts 
of subjectivity, while also directing our attention toward the 
emerging technocultural contours of (post)human bodies and 
subjects yet to come, in which the psychical imperative to take 
up a position of sexual difference and be a sex might come to 
be understood as something other than a scene of compulsory 
heterosexuality. Why must the hetero- of sexuality be grounded 
only in naturalized and ontologized binary categories of “man” 
and “woman” that are conceived as incommensurable, and not 
in some more expansive notion of difference? As Deleuze and 
Guattari have proposed: not two sexes, but n-sexes.
Kaplan’s clinical approach to working with trans* clients is a 
hopeful token of a psychoanalytic future capable of accounting 
for transness non-psychopathologically: she asks “how might 
the person concerned best live?” rather than attributing sick-
ness to their difference; she avoids etiological questions and 
sectarian interpretations of symptoms, and establishes instead 
empathetic connections between analyst and analysand based 
on shared insights into non-heteronormativity. Corbett simi-
larly “follows” the exploratory psychodynamic movements of 
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his patients within the facilitative therapeutic environment he 
creates, witnessing and seeking to understand their potentially 
queer gender-transformative work, rather than prescriptively 
leading them toward hetero-gender-normative outcomes. 
Geldhof and Verhaeghe, on the other hand, offer nothing 
of use for a prospective psychoanalysis premised on trans-de-
pathologization. Their construction of a hierarchy of deviance 
along a trans/homo continuum reproduces and extends an 
interpretative lineage that can be traced at least as far back as 
Krafft-Ebing, who construed sexualis metamorphosis paranoica 
as the most extreme version of a psychosexual inversion whose 
milder forms included homosexual desire. In the transsexual 
case study Geldhof and Verhaeghe offer, that of Lacan’s patient 
“Michel H,” they interpret the analysand’s demand for genital 
surgery as a “radical” refusal of difference which is “very perni-
cious for the subject,” and to which the analyst “shall therefore 
never subscribe.” It merits pointing out that Lacan himself, in 
his account of the “trans-sexualist jouissance” of the psychotic 
subject in the Schreber case, noted that the “Question Prelimi-
nary of Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” (1958) was that 
of transference, which raises in turn the correlative question of 
counter-transference.5 I, speaking as a transsexual subject who 
apparently functions non-psychotically in the Symbolic register, 
yet who has experienced precisely that surgical operation at the 
level of the “real body” that Geldhof and Verhaeghe say must be 
avoided at all cost, feel compelled to ask: who seems more likely 
than whom to be seeking shelter from the threat of castration? 
It is the denial of the psychical viability of post-operative trans-
sexuality, and the analysts’ motivated refusal to recognize the 
efficacy of a surgical solution, that can best be characterized as 
a defense. 
5 “[T]his question that is preliminary to any possible treatment of the psy-
choses is a question that introduces, as we see, the conception to be formed 
of the handling, in this treatment, of the transference” (Lacan 2001[1958], 
245).
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As Gherovici demonstrates, however, Lacan can in fact be 
deployed in support of other analytical positions on transgen-
der issues. In noting that any subject’s assumption of a sexual 
identity is always symptomatic precisely because the phallus, in 
relation to which the subject must take a position, is “a defec-
tive tool to negotiate the Real that eludes us,” Gherovici opens a 
space of possibility in which a transsexual desire for reworking 
and resignifying embodiment is of a kind with all other desire. 
Because all sex must be symbolized, and all gender embodied, 
the “problem” of transgender identification is no different than 
the “problem” of non-transgender identification: all subjectiv-
ity emerges into language precisely where identification fails. 
Transgender, in Gherovici’s account, is just another technical 
art, one more creative solution among others, for tying the Bor-
romean knot that holds the embodied subject together.
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The Psychoanalysis That Dare Not Speak Its Name
Ona Nierenberg1
In the opening essay of Love In A Dark Time: Gay Lives from 
Wilde to Almodovar, Colm Tóibin refers to Borges’s essay “The 
Argentine Writer and Tradition” to describe the position of exile 
as a condition for creation, for the possibility of the emergence 
of the new. Tóibin situates gay literary figures alongside the Jew-
ish, Argentine, and Irish artists that Borges refers to, underlin-
ing that the place of estrangement, of foreignness, is the sine qua 
non for speaking at the limits of the sayable. While certainly not 
sufficient, extra-territoriality is absolutely necessary to affect a 
break with the mortifications referred to by Freud (1926a) as 
“the compact majority” (274).
Psychoanalysis, Freud’s creation, is born of exile, wanderings 
from the disciplines with which it shares borders (psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology, sociology, literature, poetry) while 
remaining entirely Other to them (Fuks 2008). As Freud con-
ceived it, psychoanalysis shatters received notions of subjectiv-
ity, and by definition, sexuality, subverting the idolatry of com-
mon sense, pseudo-science and morality. Its originality was to 
bring into being a new realization of being human which marks 
a rupture from psychiatry and medicine. This break is not a so-
cial/historical contingency; it marks the specificity of the Freud-
1 Special thanks to Salvatore F. Guido, PhD for the conversations that led to 
this commentary.
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ian field, where the truth of the divided subject undermines 
supposed knowledge and its limits. That is why encountering 
the pronounced antipathy towards psychoanalysis amongst so 
many of the queer theorists writing in this volume should give 
us pause. While surely it would be problematic to find an ideal of 
harmonious coupling, a complementary pair (i.e., “queer theory 
and psychoanalysis”), it is also unsettling to find such mistrust, 
disparagement and anger based on “the familiar psychoanalytic 
tropes” (Weatherill).
It is evident that many of the clinical psychoanalysts writing 
here who are oriented by a Freudian/Lacanian formation do not 
recognize their work in a theory and practice described as nor-
malizing, pathologizing, and denigrating by queer theorists such 
as Downing, Snediker, Bond Stockton, Kuzniar, and Farina. 
How can we think about this méconnaisance, with psychoanaly-
sis repeatedly identified with suspicion and hostility? Equally 
curious is the identification of Freudian or Lacanian ideas that 
would seem to be well-suited to the ideology of queer theory 
with other psychoanalytic thinkers. For example, Kuzniar’s as-
siduous avoidance of acknowledging Freud as the discoverer of 
the unconscious and her misguided generosity in bestowing this 
honor upon Jean Laplanche. Furthermore, we should question 
what motivates her to identify Nancy Chodorow as the psy-
choanalytic source for the idea that heterosexuality should be 
analyzed as critically as homosexuality, when this is practically 
a verbatim quote from Freud’s “Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality” (1905). Of course, we must include in our query the 
occurrence of completely false identifications, for example, Fa-
rina’s idea that the “Electra Complex” is part of the Freudian 
corpus and her assertion that, for Freud, the Oedipus complex 
is “solvable.”
Here we find a series of “missed encounters” between Freud-
ian psychoanalysis and queer theory, and such “misses” are most 
telling (and for a psychoanalyst there is no “telling” without the 
“missing”). What is revealed, among other things, is the endur-
ing impact of the vexed history that marks the troubled relation-
ship between institutionalized psychoanalysis and homosexual-
429
the psychoanalysis that dare not speak its name
ity. It is my proposition that this revenant haunts every effort by 
queer theorists to work with psychoanalysis, preventing queer 
theory from potentially finding a way through its impasses and 
logical contradictions with respect to identity.
Incalculable suffering to countless men and women took 
place in the name of psychoanalysis, and this must never be for-
gotten. However, what is equally essential to remember is that 
there is a distinction between the Freudian field and the insti-
tution of psychoanalysis, the latter being a construction made 
possible only by the rejection of the exilic essence of Freud’s 
creation. It is resistance to psychoanalysis as Freud conceived 
it that led to petrifying and dogmatic psychoanalytic institu-
tions, which is why Lacan cried for the necessity for a return 
to Freud. In my opinion, the future of any possible encounter 
between psychoanalysis and queer theory rests upon our rigor 
in upholding the differences between Freud’s invention and the 
resistances through which the institution of psychoanalysis took 
place. This contrast has been kept in the foreground by some 
notable theorists who have done significant work on the ques-
tion of the history of psychoanalysis and homosexuality, i.e., 
Henry Abelove (1986), Tim Dean and Christopher Lane (2001), 
Élisabeth Roudinesco (2002), Kenneth Lewes (1988). Clinical 
Encounters in Sexuality provides us with another valuable op-
portunity (never once and for all) to underline that the virulent 
homophobia that stains the history of psychoanalysis is a symp-
tom of the rejection of Freud’s strange invention. Ironically, by 
effacing the distinction between Freudian psychoanalysis and 
the institutionalization of psychoanalysis, queer theorists would 
situate themselves on the same side as those who pathologized 
homosexuality in the name of psychoanalysis by expelling what 
is most radical to Freud.
The reprobate discourse and practices that designated ho-
mosexuality a pathology cannot be separated from the effort to 
provide psychoanalysis with a home in the field of medicine, 
to suture the cut that constituted its birth. Freud observed the 
difficulty of those who called themselves psychoanalysts to re-
main stateless, on the side of uncertainty and the unknown: 
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“Sometimes I am amazed that analysts themselves should not 
be radically changed by their relation with analysis,” he wrote 
in a letter to LaForge (Bourguingnon 1991, 27). As early as 1914, 
Freud expressed his great disappointment that the resistances 
to psychoanalysis that were once external became internal to its 
organization, and he recognized this as a far greater peril. Cer-
tainly, this reactionary direction was not the one Freud intended 
for the psychoanalytic movement.
Often characterized by his supposed pessimism, Freud was 
perhaps far too optimistic in calling his creation “the plague” 
during his one and only visit to America in 1909. The power-
ful immunological response that arose here took the form of 
suppressing psychoanalysis by domesticating it, insisting that 
it belonged to the land of medicine. While Freud (1926b) un-
waveringly held that psychoanalysis is unequivocally Other 
to medicine and cannot be mapped on to a medical model of 
treatment, the Americans made clear that they fundamentally 
renounced the alterity of the Freudian thing by restricting the 
practice to medical doctors. Although the question of lay analy-
sis appears to be about who can (or cannot) practice psychoa-
nalysis, it is actually the kernel of truth that reveals what psy-
choanalysis is. “A profession of lay curers of souls who need not 
be doctors and should not be priests” was one of Freud’s poetic 
descriptions of the odd path that refuses the illusory mastery 
of scientism or religion (Meng and Freud 1963, 126). The crisis 
over lay analysis, which reached a head in the 1920s had dire 
consequences for instutionalized psychoanalysis’s relationship 
to homosexuality.
Among the many reasons Freud named medicalization as 
one of the greatest resistances to psychoanalysis was his aware-
ness that his radically novel theory of human sexuality diverged 
completely from the medical conception (Nierenberg 2007). 
Whereas medicine considered human sexuality to be the fruit 
of an instinct, a sign of the continuity between human beings 
and nature, Freud discovered a peculiarly human foundation 
to sexuality that is characterized by a rupture with the “natu-
ral” order of things. The mythology of the drive allows for no 
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human subject, no speaking subject, to escape the exigencies 
of “deviant” sexuality. All are subject to the drives’ cacaphony, 
subverting any ideal of sexual harmony in human life. One of 
the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, according to 
Lacan, the drive marks the impossibility of any biological real 
to function as a guarantee of desire, object, or sexuation. Where 
the parlêtre, the “speaking-being,” is concerned, all aspects of 
sexuality are equally curious. The drive annuls any necessary 
link between homosexuality and psychopathology, as Freud’s 
well-known position vis-à-vis homosexuality makes clear.
The borderline status of the drive, “lying at the frontier be-
tween the mental and the physical” (Freud 1905, 182), belonging 
neither to one side nor the other, proved nearly impossible to 
sustain after Freud’s death. But without this concept, that founds 
the “out-of-sync-ness” between the human order and supposed 
“biological reality,” there can be no psychoanalysis. Once the 
strangeness of the drive was replaced by ego-psychology’s term 
“instinctual drive” (an oxymoron in Freudian terms), it opened 
the way for the return to the idealization/naturalization of re-
productive heterosexuality and its complement: the patholo-
gization of homosexuality. While Freud was able to leave be-
hind the certainties of “normalcy and deviance,” his followers 
retreated to this pernicious paradigm with all-too-well-known 
disastrous consequence.
While the chapters in Clinical Encounters in Sexuality re-
veal that psychoanalysis and queer theory have taken diver-
gent paths, they share an inescapable and painful inheritance. 
However, any encounter between the two will prove difficult if 
the institutionalization of psychoanalysis is taken for the all of 
psychoanalysis. For the necessary mourning of the past to take 
place, this distinction must be made. It is by way of the “not-all” 
that we may reinvent the clinic of Otherness and the ethics of 
exile.
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de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1991.
Dean, Tim and Christopher Lane. “Introduction.” In Homosex-
uality and Psychoanalysis, eds. Tim Dean and Christopher 
Lane, 3–42. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Freud, Sigmund. “Address to the Society of B’nai Brith” (1926a). 
In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, vol. 20, trans. James Strachey in collabo-
ration with Anna Freud and assisted by Alix Strachey and 
Alan Tyson, 271–76. 1959; rpt. London: Vintage, 1999.
———. “The Question of Lay Analysis — Conversations with 
an Impartial Person” (1926b). In The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 20, 
trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud and 
assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 183–258. 1959; rpt. 
London: Vintage, 1999. 
———. “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” 
(1914). In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, trans. James Strachey in 
collaboration with Anna Freud and assisted by Alix Stra-
chey and Alan Tyson, 3–66. London: Vintage, 2001. 
———. “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905). In 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigumund Freud, vol. 7, trans. James Strachey in collabora-
tion with Anna Freud and assisted by Alix Strachey and 
Alan Tyson, 1–162. 1953; rpt. London: Vintage, 2001.
Fuks, Betty. Freud and the Invention of Jewishness. New York: 
Sea Horse/Agincourt, 2008. 
Lewes, Kenneth. The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexu-
ality, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
Meng, Heinrich, and Ernst Freud, eds. Sigmund Freud: Psy-
choanalysis and Faith: Dialogues with Reverend Oscar Pfister. 
New York: Basic Books, 1963.
433
the psychoanalysis that dare not speak its name
Nierenberg, Ona. “The Lay and the Law: Legislating the 
‘Impossible Profession.’” Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture and Society 12, no. 1 (2007): 65–75.
Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Psychoanalysis and Homosexuality: 
Reflections on the Perverse Desire, Insult, and the Paternal 
Function.” Interview with François Pommier. Journal of Eu-
ropean Psychoanalysis 15 (2002). http://www.psychomedia.
it/jep/15/roudinesco.htm.
Tóibin, Colm. Love in a Dark Time: Gay Lives from Wilde to 
Almodovar. London: Picador, 2010.

CoVER IMAGE
T h E R E  C A N 
B E  N o 
A R G u M E N T S

437
on the Not-Meanings of Karla Black’s  
There Can Be No Arguments
Medb Ruane
We expect to be able to recognize what we see in the visual field 
but visual experience occurs around a void, an emptiness, over 
which the artist places semblants. In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
(2008[1959–60]), Lacan likened this to a vase that puts a skin 
around a hole and veils the open sewer beneath. A “nothing” 
becomes a “something.” An object is made to exist (148–49).
The marked and voided spaces around Karla Black’s sus-
pended piece There Can Be No Arguments play with fullness and 
emptiness, not only as background for the works in space she 
makes. The marks are written on the rim of the Real. They are 
not about metaphor or producing meaning. Strip meaning or 
the hope of it away and an encounter emerges. She dresses and 
addresses a void. 
This nothing in particular that characterises it in its signify-
ing function is that which in its incarnated form characteris-
es the vase as such. It creates the void and thereby introduces 
the possibility of filling it. Emptiness and fullness are intro-
duced into a world that by itself knows not of them. It is on 
the basis of this fabricated signifier, this vase, that emptiness 
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and fullness as such enter the world, neither more nor less, 
and with the same sense. (Lacan 2008[1959–60], 148–49)1
Here, everyday materials with no monetary value or status 
transform into things of beauty. Polythene, powder paint, plas-
ter and thread create billowing gossamer wings that gently float 
materials into air. Must we interpret it? No. Her title says that 
there can be no arguments and so we find ourselves also sus-
pended between the will-to-language and the bodily events of 
looking, moving towards and around it, resisting the urge to 
touch it because there’s a prohibition on a nearby sign. 
Seen on this book’s cover, the bodily aspect of our encoun-
ter with Black’s work is mistranslated into a different genre and 
instead the work appears front-on as a two-dimensional image 
projected from a single-perspective geometral point. It is made 
to fit a master discourse with different rules. 
The work still sings. You could be watching the draperies on 
an Empress’ gown — or discarded plastic sheeting arranged by 
benevolent chance. Its curtain-like possibilities bring to mind 
the contrasting story of Zeuxis and Parhassios, first told by Pliny 
(De Naturalis Historia, Bk. 35, c. 36), who competed as masters 
of illusion to see whose painting looked most real. Birds actually 
tried to peck Zeuxis’s painted grapes yet Parrhassios trumped 
him by painting a veil whose surface was so inviting that Zeuxis 
himself, according to Lacan (1998[1964]), “turned towards him 
[Parhassios] and said, Well, and now show us what you have 
painted behind it. By this,” Lacan continues, “he showed that 
what was at issue was certainly deceiving the eye (tromper l’œil). 
A triumph of the gaze over the eye” (108; 111ff.).  
Read clinically rather than aesthetically, the gaze is counter-
intuitive in that it functions not at the level of the visible but 
in terms of modes of satisfaction around which subjectivities 
emerge. Down in the clinic, the object a, the agent of discourse, 
1 While Western culture rejects chipped or broken vases (fantasy of whole-
ness), Japanese culture practices the art of kintsugi as a way of valuing bro-
kenness and imperfection by marking the chips/fractures. 
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acts on the divided subject whose relationship with the object 
of jouissance is completely veiled. The veil is drawn by the func-
tioning of the master signifier (S1) and of knowledge relating to 
it (S2). In artworking, however, the relationship of the object a 
is to knowledge directly, not to a master signifier via a divided 
subject. 
This distinction leads us to realize some key differences be-
tween the work of the artist and the work of the clinician. With 
a neurotic subject, repression teaches us that loss determines the 
object’s mode of functioning such that the object functions as a 
lost object and precipitates desire. But in art generated through 
sublimation rather than by repression (whatever the artist’s 
subjective structure), the object functions as having been re-
covered, not lost. Art, then, involves recoupment that is about 
regaining the object and getting rid of the loss by putting the 
loss in the Other.2 By contrast, a neurotic subject puts the object 
in the Other and lives with the loss. 
What both subjects share, notably, is the push-to-normaliza-
tion coming from the Other — from contemporary life, culture 
and, especially, science. That mentality assumes that all human 
activity and behavior can be classified on a scale of one to ten 
and adjusted to better fit its norm. This psychologized model 
based on means, medians and modes recognizes no place, no 
point, outside its own scales. We, not it, must adjust. 
Does any subjectivity wholly fit one of the (initially) fifty-one 
then fifty-eight (and increasing) so-called gender assignations 
set by Facebook? Does any assignation actually speak truthfully 
to our singular beings? The question for encounters like ours is 
2 Black said: “[I]t’s a bit of a Pyrrhic victory, in that perhaps too much is lost 
to consider it particularly worthwhile. I feel like the pure joy and/or beauty 
of the experience of the material world (in terms of color and light and 
actual stuff) that my work emerges out of, and also the joy and beauty of the 
human interaction with that (the raw creativity) gets more and more lost. 
This happens not only as it all gets closer to being formed into a physical 
object, but also as it goes through the mincer of language via explanation 
and instruction” (Hunter, May 2013).
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of subjectivities and how they come to be one by one, one on 
one, not on a statistical scale. 
Traditional art norms would not accommodate practices 
such as Black’s. Within contemporary visual culture, she is con-
fronted by historical canons that still persist, even when out-
dated and demonstrably untrue. In her revised introduction to 
Women, Art and Society (2007), Whitney Chadwick said that 
her own earlier (1990) questions had shifted and were now 
linked to issues of sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, as well 
as gender. She quoted Harmony Hammond, who identifies as 
lesbian and feminist: 
I see art-making, especially that which comes from the mar-
gins of the mainstream, as a site of resistance, a way of inter-
rupting and intervening in those historical and cultural fields 
that continually exclude me. A sort of gathering of forces on 
the borders. For the dominant hegemonic stance that has 
worked to silence and subdue gender and ethnic difference 
has also worked to silence difference based on sexual prefer-
ence. (13)
“Sexual preference” is about subjectivities, not about conscious 
choice or essentialist biologistic destiny. There are no univer-
sals. Bodies are sexuated one by one, each in their own way. 
Yet Black’s interventions have been lampooned dismissively for 
what some call their “feminine” features, especially her colors 
(peaches, pistachios, pinks, paler pastels) and often fragile ma-
terials (chalk dust, eye-shadow, nail varnish, fake tan, body fra-
grances, even toothpaste). To spell it out, the clear implication is 
that color divides naturally into masculine and feminine (with 
gravitas attaching to the former) and that you can’t use the same 
materials for “Art” as for your own body. If you do, it’s not Art. 
Black’s retort at the 2011 Venice Biennale names the problem: 
“Why do people call it feminine? Because it is light, fragile, pale? 
Because it is weak, impermanent? When you start going to work 
on it you realize how ridiculous the description is. How can a 
work of art be feminine?” (Higgins 2011). 
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To be “feminine,” a work of art would have to be governed 
by an Ideal, that is, a universal. Despite G.W.F. Hegel’s (1975) 
long-ago warning that the Ideal of Art was on the wane, Ideals 
have governed previous historical moments with the object a 
veiled by a master signifier and works of art subjuncted to them. 
The Ideal functioned as a guarantee that the work was Art — and 
an implicit assurance that the void, abyss, Thing, was not only 
masked but did not pose a threat. This master signifier idealized 
oppositions such as man–woman, masculine–feminine, strong–
weak, and more. Worse, such categories were considered natu-
ral, as part of the order of things, and were enforced by a series 
of segregations that either pathologized or exiled rogue signi-
fiers or practices (Canguilhem 1989; Foucault 1989). 
In Black’s practice, as in other contemporary work, both are 
untied from the object. The object presents as Real without ref-
erence to a signifier or to images and shapes, that is, without 
necessary reference to symbolic-imaginary registers. This mate-
rial writing emerges not from the place of the “private ego,” as 
Hal Foster (2012) named it (771).3 We can call it a transcription 
that de-psychologizes artworking by resubjectivating it through 
the mechanism of sublimation. It is a message from the uncon-
scious that is not unconscious because it is formed. 
Through her work, then, the artist reveals something about 
the relationship between an object of jouissance and knowledge 
in contemporary times. For in the contemporary clinic, the ob-
ject a is now increasingly untethered from the master signifier, 
that is, from the guarantees of the ego-ideal and ideal ego and 
their imaginary negation of the abyss. The subject is left with no 
guarantee. 
Dissenters — there are many to contemporary art — will say 
that art like this is “rubbish.” This is manna for anyone who 
recalls Freud’s work on infantile sexuality and how the body’s 
waste is structured as objects of satisfaction. “Rubbish” here can 
stand for feces (“shit”) and, as Freud (1908) remarked, “every-
3 See also Krauss (1994). On materiality, see Lacan (1987[1971]).
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body is familiar with the figure of ‘shitter of ducats’” (174). Some 
rubbish, then, strikes gold.
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Reflections on the Encounters between Psychoanalysis 
and Queer Theory
Eve Watson1
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality brings together two altogether 
different disciplines that address the field of human sexual-
ity: clinical psychoanalysis and queer theory. This encounter is 
underpinned by the centrality of sexuality to both disciplines 
and the crucial nature of psychoanalytic theory to queer the-
ory’s theorization of gender and sexuality. Beginning with Sig-
mund Freud, psychoanalysis has a long history of turning to 
other fields such as philosophy, art, literature, linguistics, sci-
ence, mathematics, and religion to develop and differentiate its 
major themes. This collection adds the work of queer theory 
to this list of co-conspirators addressing the question of what 
it is to be uniquely human, especially important today in light 
of the homogenizing effects of globalization, marketization and 
digitalization. Queer theory proffers a breadth of critical think-
ing about contemporary sexuality, mechanisms of bio-power 
1 I am deeply grateful to Noreen Giffney for her input into this Afterword via 
discussion, debate, and co-reflection together of the various themes. 
  A version of this Afterword was discussed at the 14th Annual APW (Affili-
ated Psychoanalytic Workgroups) Conference, hosted by Lacan Salon, Van-
couver which took place on August 27–29, 2016 in Vancouver, bc, Canada. 
I am grateful to the participants of the conference for their comments and 
questions, which helped me to extend and develop my ideas.
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and regimes of normativization for psychoanalysts to address 
themselves to. Queer theory’s use of psychoanalysis is critical 
to its Foucault-inspired project of critically exploring desire, 
pleasure, identity and the social fabric itself. Psychoanalysts, for 
their part, offer psychoanalytic theory, clinical practice and the 
extraordinary value of the clinical vignette, the psychoanalytic 
tool par excellence. In addition, theorists of psychoanalysis and 
sexuality bring their insights to bear on this “queer” marriage 
between psychoanalysis and queer theory for readers to add to 
their experience of the book. 
As outlined in more detail below, the book shows that this 
“queer” marriage produces fascinating points of critical overlap 
and a fecundity of border significations between queer theory 
and psychoanalysis that inspire, provoke, disquiet and compli-
cate contemporary thinking about sexuality. What emanates 
from the book’s chapters is an uneasy relationship between 
queer theory and psychoanalysis. This unease is important, rev-
elatory and open to analysis, which I frame in light of my own 
background in Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as an interdis-
ciplinary affiliation with queer theory. I propose that the some-
times uneasy encounters, which bring to the fore discord and 
friction as well as amity and congruity, can be framed as a series 
of problematics concerning the horizons of dichotomization 
relative to both fields, specifically how each field has approached 
what Patricia Elliot (2010) describes as the “two disabling di-
chotomies,” that is, “between the biological and the social” and 
“between the normal and the pathological” (103). 
The question of “disabling” or entrenching dichotomization 
refers to the reductionism of attributing difference in binaries 
of essentializing biological cause or oppressive social construc-
tion, and in terms of the normal or the pathological. For psy-
choanalysis, these binarizing dichotomizations fail to capture 
what it means to be human because psychic life involves uncon-
scious dynamics that are not reducible to either the biological or 
the social but involve elements of both. Moreover, the normal/
pathological binary is sacrilegious to psychoanalysts (103) given 
the Freudian attribution that conflict, polymorphous perver-
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sion, phantasy, and suffering and constitutive of human sub-
jectivity. Deviations by psychoanalysis from the refusal of these 
“disabling” dichotomizations underpin some of the complica-
tions and unease in the relationship between queer theory and 
psychoanalysis. On the part of queer theory, the theorization 
of social constructs in oppressive and immutable terms and the 
elision of the role of the unconscious and the body in human ex-
perience has reinforced rather than loosened dichotomization, 
which some queer theorists in the collection address variously 
and with a commitment to dialogue and critical debate. 
I have assembled these complications into a trio of organizing 
currents. First, there is the importance for queer theory of dif-
ferentiating between Lacanian psychoanalysis and “neo-Freud-
ianism” and its influence on institutionalized psychoanalysis 
during the inter-and post-World War Two decades. Neo-Freud-
ianism is recognized by its adherence to, rather than its refusal 
of, normal/pathological and biological/social dichotomizations. 
Secondly, I explore the implications of this for understandings 
of sexuality and clinical practice and for differentiating contem-
porary psychoanalysis from this painful history which is char-
acterized by reprehensible practices of normativity and contin-
ues, in my opinion, to impact relations between psychoanalysis 
and queer theory. In this, I invite queer theory to risk seriously 
engaging with Lacanian psychoanalysis as one mode of interro-
gating tendencies towards reductive binarizations. Thirdly, the 
book makes an intervention in acknowledging gay and lesbian 
analysts and institutionalized homophobia that is a component 
feature of the history of psychoanalysis. That psychoanalysis 
became a co-conspirator and reflected society’s persecution of 
homosexuality throughout the middle and late decades of the 
twentieth century demonstrates that psychoanalytic attitudes 
and theories are not immune from the cultures in which they 
are formulated (Drescher 2008, 454). This invokes the neces-
sity for psychoanalytic clinicians to continue to engage with and 
challenge the wide field of normalization that characterizes the 
socio-cultural fabric, which psychoanalysis is inescapably part 
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of. I will return to each of these three points in more detail after 
briefly exploring each chapter’s contribution. 
The Encounters: Productions, Provocations and Remainders
In the book’s first section, queer theorists employ the work of 
Freud, Lacan, Laplanche, Irigaray and Winnicott to put concepts 
such as identity, desire, jouissance, perversion, masculinity, fem-
ininity, gender, signifier, and drive under the microscope and 
trouble the category of “normal” and so-called “truths” of sex. 
Strongly evident throughout this section is the queer aim of de-
constructing all binaries including masculine–feminine, desire–
identity, heterosexual–homosexual, object choice–gender iden-
tity, and fixity–fluidity. What unfolds in these six chapters is a 
panoply of thinking that aims at subverting notions of progress, 
rationalism, essentialism, narrativization and scientism that 
predictably and inevitably telescope to a point of normativity. 
Alice Kuzniar opens the queer theory chapters with a focus 
on the force and importance of das Andere, “an internal oth-
erness” in human sexuality. Exploring the category of queer as 
non-identitarian within what Jacqueline Rose describes as the 
unconscious revelation of the “failure” of identity and with key 
references to Jean Laplanche, Kuzniar celebrates queer’s “mul-
tiplicity, incoherence, transitoriness and impossibility.” She cri-
tiques the Oedipal model for presuming a fixed and stable telos 
of gender identity and also contemporary consumerist culture 
in which “identity serves the purpose of controlling, commodi-
fying, and marketizing the subject.” For her, pet love demon-
strates that it is a “quality” rather than object choice that draws 
us to the other. She argues that psychoanalysis must confront 
the failure of previous conceptual psychic models and develop 
new hypotheses to explain queer. For Lara Farina, the aim of 
queering the field of desire is a matter for her of “critical eth-
ics” and her interrogation of Plato’s Symposium, which decenters 
the ideal of complementarity and privileges desire as emanating 
from lack, is an ideal text for a theorization of same-sex desire 
that also holds out promise “for a queer injection of past narra-
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tives into present ones.” She interprets lack as “lack of a compli-
mentary other” and assesses whether Lacan’s interpretation of 
lack and his theory of sexual difference ends up re-inscribing 
the importance of gender complementarity in ascribing lack 
to the feminine. She proposes that psychoanalysis “loosen up” 
and become less sober on desire, in the manner of Plato’s drink-
ing party. Kathryn Bond Stockton also seeks to disentangle the 
ideal of sexual complementarity by extending the connection 
between jouissance and sexual pleasure. Using the work of Iriga-
ray, she critiques Lacan’s assignation of jouissance as opaque and 
mystical, preferring the term “bliss” against the “staid nature” 
of its Lacanian psychoanalytic conception. She considers the 
key role of Lacanian theory at the heart of much queer thought 
especially in conceiving of desire and pleasure but nonetheless 
critiques Lacan’s “tragic tone” about desire’s relation to lack, pre-
ferring the “subtleties and vibrancy” of bliss against pleasure. 
Lisa Downing takes psychoanalysis to task for its orthodoxy 
about fixation in perversion and for “making a symptom out 
of a pleasure,” as well as queer theory for not harnessing bet-
ter the energies and “athwartness” of perversion. She critiques 
both the psychoanalytic category of perversion which she ar-
gues is narrowly defined by the Freudian notion of “fixity,” and 
also cautions against the dangers of normativity creeping into 
the queer project by overinvesting in “fluidity” and de-specify-
ing all sexual identity labels. This could result in a tyranny of 
prescribing fluidity, thus ironically making it ideological, tau-
tological and normative and reducing its perverse possibilities. 
Michael Snediker aims at a possible ethics “freed of normativ-
ity” and catalyzes Winnicott’s ontological thought and aesthetic 
practice alongside the queer theory of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
to opine on a queer pedagogy that would imbue psychoanalysis 
with “an exegetical language as mutational as the unconscious’s 
own fitfulness.” Preferring aesthetics to desire, he imputes an 
ethical turn in Winnicott’s work in allowing movement away 
from sense towards “inhabiting a space of not-knowing” that 
would have the effect of undoing closed spaces of ontology and 
action. He proposes an aesthetic unconscious epitomized in 
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Winnicott’s squiggle game that “imagines as ontological inde-
terminancy.” Will Stockton aligns himself with both Foucault’s 
historicist approach to sexuality and Lacan’s conception of sex 
as always falling outside of discourse insofar as there is a radical 
discontinuity between sex and sense in order to clarify a psy-
choanalytic approach to sex and discourse that could be use-
ful to historicizing sexuality. He criticizes Foucault’s elision of 
the role of the unconscious in aligning everything to discourse 
but also favors Foucault’s work for better illustrating symbolic 
inscription. In his reading of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 20 and in 
deconstructing the “normative” narrative process and reading 
Shakespeare awry he puts the position of readers and their sex-
ual positioning under scrutiny, and utilizing the work of Joan 
Copjec, implicates in sexual positioning the gap between dis-
courses of sexuality and the real of sex. 
In the book’s second section, the psychoanalytic responses 
to the queer theory chapters demonstrate a breadth of psycho-
analytic thinking, practices and responses to the provocations of 
the queer theorists. All of them bear witness to the enduring im-
portance of sexuality in the psychoanalytic clinic and the inclu-
sion of a wide variety of clinical vignettes reveals ways in which 
sexual conflict, disturbance and questioning are conveyed and 
symbolized between analysand and analyst. Some analysts in-
terpret the implications of “queer” provoked in them and others 
consider those structures whereby certain subjects are rendered 
“normal” and “natural” through the production of perverse and 
different others by rigid thinking, certain narrative practices 
and by inattention to the workings of the unconscious in de-
sire and identity. Some of the psychoanalytic responses express 
a commitment to the importance of the function of difference 
in human subjectivity and express concern about the impress of 
“fluidity” in eliminating all difference and categorization. 
In the first of the psychoanalytic responses, Bob Hinshel-
wood proposes that when it comes to our subjectivity, we re-
quire something that keeps us together, holds the possibilities 
together. Whether we call this an identity, a non-identity, a core, 
a trait or a signifier is secondary to the requirement that as hu-
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man beings, we require something that both differentiates us 
and singularizes us. Therefore to adopt a strategy of fluid sexual 
identity may be problematic “by undermining some more foun-
dational sense of stability and inner security.” He remarks on 
the judgmentalism of queer theory and proposes that it requires 
“a stronger theory of prejudice.” For Paul Verhaeghe and Abe 
Geldhof, queer for them is located in “the silence of being” and 
the jouissance of the body insofar as the body is always heteros, 
that is, strange and antithetical to symbolization. They argue 
that as a discursive practice, a practice of naming that refuses 
the classical distinction between man and woman, queer in fact 
replaces the classical sexual dichotomy with a new one: queer/
straight. Thus, queer is another name for jouissance and the re-
fusal of castration. They take issue with the proclamatory nature 
of queer theory and argue, “if somebody wanted to be really 
queer, then he would have no reason to prove it.” Ann Murphy 
welcomes the ethical imperative that queer theory proffers to 
psychoanalysis to question and interrogate the systems of power 
that suffuse all institutionalized bodies of knowledge and prac-
tice, including psychoanalysis with “institutionalized rigidity” 
and regimes of discipline, regulation and control. Against this, 
she emphasizes the enigmatic nature of desire, which is charac-
terized by its intransigence to “agendas of improvement.” Taking 
up Bion’s assertion that certainty is the enemy of psychoanalysis, 
she argues that psychoanalytic ethics is cultivated by its inexo-
rable emphasis on the singularity of the individual subject and 
the articulation of psychic pain and its attendant lack, limitation 
and conflict. 
Ian Parker focuses on the history of the queer movement 
from its initial links to psychoanalysis and its move against tra-
ditional binary categories, to its current status as a verb connot-
ing movement, a doing, restlessness. Employing a case study of 
Lacan’s, he proposes that what is queer is the “subject” who does 
not correspond to and exceeds both the “individual” and the ob-
ject of the case study. While the private and non-public nature 
of the psychoanalytic clinic is one thing, it is incumbent upon 
psychoanalysts to attend to queer discourse that circulates in 
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the public sphere, to know the “affective communities” to which 
analysands attach themselves, but to avoid being ideologically 
mired in what Carol Owens describes as an ethically suspect 
“transformational ideology.” Owens problematizes queer misuse 
and misunderstanding of fragments of Lacanian theory and also 
critiques the book’s “staging” of the encounters. The “staging” 
destines the book to be an inevitable series of missed encounters 
that ultimately condemn psychoanalysis to an “ontological im-
passe” between a demand to reformulate old categories of sexual 
identity with the consequence of re-formulating psycho-social-
developmental theories and grand narratives that queer theory 
deconstructs. In her chapter, Claudette Kulkarni, with a post-
Jungian lens, questions the centrality of sexuality to the queer 
deconstruction of identity. For her, the value of queer theory 
lies in inspiring the therapist to resist cultural imperatives and 
keeping an open mind. For her, “fluidity and fixity need each 
other” and she worries that the queer tendency to resist all sta-
bility and fixity results in promoting another kind of normaliza-
tion and rigidity. Through her work with sexual offenders, she is 
reluctant to reduce the specificity of the category of perversion 
when it comes to sexually-based offenses and is troubled by the 
queer reluctance to distinguish the “subversive” use of perver-
sion from its other uses. 
Aranye Fradenburg recognizes a gulf between the stakes of 
knowledge that motivate the clinic and those that motivate the 
academy, and notes that American analysts often abdicate their 
intellectual responsibilities and related social implications and 
don’t pay enough attention to the urgent questions of our time. 
In her consideration of the problematics of categorization in the 
field of sexuality for psychoanalysis, she proposes that psychoa-
nalysis must keep redefining perversion and critique all ontolo-
gies. For her, Oedipus continues to play a part in the prohibi-
tion of transgenerational sexuality and she also highlights the 
many interlinked versions of caring practice that families, the 
psychoanalytic clinic and queer theory investigate and transmit. 
Olga Cox Cameron reflects on the (hetero)normative telos of 
the Oedipus complex and Freud’s “often contradictory think-
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ing about sexuality and sexual identity” that Lacan reformu-
lated into his idea of the “nor-măle,” which is a “master-ized” 
discourse. Lacan’s renewal of Freud’s Oedipus complex was as 
necessary as it was prescient. She explores the coercive ideolo-
gies and more closed narrative practices developed in the post-
Shakespearean era that informed Freud, and similar to Will 
Stockton, implicates otherness and incoherence to the render-
ing of desire in Shakespearean tragedy. 
For Kathrine Zeuthen and Judy Gammelgaard, a focus on 
unconscious sexuality as “what remains non-understood” chal-
lenges the transgressive aptitude of queer theory due to its over-
emphasis on gender fluidity and non-Laplanchian equivocation 
of gender and sexuality, which elides the enigmatic, plural, and 
polymorph nature of sexuality. For both of these child analysts, 
the enigmatic nature of sexuality leaves it prone to exceeding its 
categorization. While they acknowledge that queer theory helps 
them to question the categories of sexual identity by turning 
to society and its effects and striations, they express concern at 
the queer idealization of sexual queerness which does not cor-
respond with their experience of the pain and suffering in their 
patients caused by their “queerness.” Ken Corbett also considers 
the importance of the social critique of the normal, in particular 
in considering how social orders and symbolic registers are “en-
igmatically transferred in idiomatic parent-child relations.” His 
relational approach highlights the clinical importance of rever-
ie, space and fantasy and like Ann Murphy he prefers “the spec-
ulative to the declarative” when it comes to analytic practice. 
His clinical vignette with a queer child shows the importance of 
openness and non-judgment in analytic practice when it comes 
to proffering up the field of symbolization in matters sexual.
Rob Weatherill makes the case that psychoanalysis takes a 
middle position between biological essentialism and social con-
structionism in its gesture to both the body and the Symbolic’s 
role in subjectivity. Against queer efforts to “burst through dif-
ference and erase lack,” psychoanalysis emphasizes division, 
rupture and alterity and therefore goes beyond the queer ac-
claim of pleasure, Bersani’s “correspondences of being” and the 
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vicissitudes of the sexual act. He insists that what is queer is not 
so much fluidity but life itself and specifically, life’s disturbance, 
proximity and suffering. The tendency of queer theorists to re-
ject suffering or lack by stigmatizing it “as part of some hetero-
sexist plot” is to try to reduce everything sexual to representa-
tion that is for Weatherill, a narrow and “straight” enterprise. 
Dany Nobus takes the view that Lacan’s later work is useful in 
approaching contemporary forms of sexuality. Taking Andre 
Green’s assertion that “today’s sexuality is not Freud’s sexual-
ity,” he proposes dephallicizing and demasculinizing sexuality 
according to the terms of Lacan’s formulae of sexuation, and 
argues that in its recognition of “choice” as a synonym for the 
“irreducible unpredictability of human development,” a psycho-
analytically-informed theory and practice of human sexuality 
may constitute a true “queer” alternative to every ideological ef-
fort at rigid categorization. 
In her chapter, Ami Kaplan expresses both support for queer 
theory’s interrogation of the category of “normal” and concern 
at its objective of moving beyond the gender binary, which she 
argues has had the unfortunate effect of tainting “binarism” as 
unacceptable even though it has an important meaning and use 
for her clients. She argues that transsexuality’s reliance on gen-
der identification challenges some tenets of queer theory’s em-
phasis on fluidity. In her case study of a transsexual patient, she 
traces her non-pathologizing approach which incorporates in-
sights from ego-psychology to support the patient’s self-identifi-
cation which allows her to navigate a place in the world. Patricia 
Gherovici, through a series of clinical vignettes, reflects on the 
contemporary clinic and the kinds of questions about sexual-
ity raised by analysands. Stressing the importance of desire over 
identity and the dis-unifying nature of identity, she attests that 
neither biological essentialism nor social constructivism has 
been able to solve the problem of unconscious sexual difference. 
She questions whether contested notions like phallic attribution 
and castration are still valid tools in clinical practice and pro-
poses Lacan’s notion of the sinthome as a mode of creating and 
understanding a sexual identity. 
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The chapters in the book’s third section offer an array of 
thoughtful and critical responses from writers and specialists in 
sexuality studies and psychoanalysis to the encounters between 
the psychoanalysts and queer theorists. This section includes 
provocations inspired by the book’s encounters, reflections on 
the relationship between psychoanalysis and culture and prob-
lematics of psychoanalysis as Weltanschauung, the nature of 
homophobia, further considerations of transsexuality and the 
distinction between institutionalized psychoanalysis and Laca-
nian psychoanalysis. 
Stephen Frosh reflects on elements of the incommensura-
bility of psychoanalysis and queer theory and takes up the di-
lemma of psychoanalysis’s cultural influence and its potential to 
become a worldview, against the concern that queer theory fails 
to care about what people actually say and fails to recognize the 
reality of sexuality in people’s lives. His analysis of ego-psychol-
ogy indicates the importance of locating it within its historical 
context and that it is indicative of the tendency within psychoa-
nalysis for what is most radical to sometimes give way to “to a 
kind of conformist moralism,” which psychoanalysis is tasked 
with contesting. Nonetheless he stakes a claim for bringing to-
gether psychoanalysis and queer theory to produce something 
new — “an enlivened psychoanalysis and a deeper and less sim-
plistically celebratory queer theory.” Jacqueline Rose queries the 
queerness of queer’s relation to otherness, as well as the belief in 
the transformative power of psychoanalysis, which she states is 
mediated by its way of thinking that “is recalcitrant to the world 
of knowledge.” Thus, psychoanalysis is positioned to provide a 
diagnosis of the resistance to acceding to political demands and 
why sexuality always exceeds what we do and what we want. 
For her, the question of “resistance” is one of the book’s themes 
which she proposes functions to overwrite and appease “failure” 
which is also the psyche’s strongest defense against any demand 
to transform itself. Like Frosh, she sees a value in queer’s influ-
ence in psychoanalysis by engaging with the “darker places of 
the psyche” where our capacity for transformation is limited. 
Tim Dean critiques the scope of the psychoanalytic responses, 
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which range from “the intrigued and engaged to the disturb-
ingly phobic.” He draws attention to the importance for psy-
choanalysis of considering how social normalization works and 
warns that all hermeneutic frameworks, including the Oedipus 
paradigm, make intelligible and normalize the opaque, enig-
matic, alien and queer that is unconscious sexuality. For him, 
Clinical Encounters in Sexuality proffers more possibilities than 
not for creatively working with the differences that divide and 
connect psychoanalysis and queer theory. 
 In her meditative remarks, Noreen O’Connor principally 
addresses the psychoanalytic responses and the incitements 
inspired in her by them. She views the symptomatic relation 
between the sexes as the anti-normative meeting ground of psy-
choanalysis and queer theory. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that 
desire, love, hatred and fantasy are outside of conscious control 
and it also privileges “self-hood” which emanates “from imagi-
nary identifications through fissures which insert us into the 
symbolic order of culture.” She argues that psychoanalysis, with 
its emphasis on the dynamics of the unconscious/conscious, 
specifies the limits of freedom and choice available to us. For 
Mark Blechner, psychoanalysis as “the science of the irrational” 
and with the tools to identify the defensive process behind pejo-
rative practices, is the field best suited to address homophobia. 
He interprets the exclusion of gays and lesbians from partici-
pation in the psychoanalytic community especially in the mid-
twentieth century, which was counter to Freud’s progressivism, 
as an exclusion from their own cure of “anti-homosexual preju-
dice.” He calls for psychoanalysis to rejuvenate itself by applying 
its own tools to its own defenses. In her consideration of Clini-
cal Encounters in Sexuality through the prism of transgender, 
Susan Stryker queries the elision by queer theory of transgen-
der studies in its focus on homosexual desire, and also by psy-
choanalysis which has historically interpreted transgender psy-
chopathologically as “narcissistic flaw” and “psychotic error.” 
This has resulted in a poverty of thinking and practice, and a 
plethora of ignorance and politically suspect pedagogy. Stryker 
nonetheless asserts the potential for a psychoanalytically supple 
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theory and practice that would better understand transgender 
issues and get closer to their truths. It is because all sex must 
be symbolized and all gender embodied for everyone that the 
supposed “problem” of transgender identification is ultimately 
no different from that of non-transgender identification, insofar 
as every subject is charged with assuming a psychical position 
in relation to the question of sexual difference. Ona Nierenberg 
considers the implications of the mistrust of queer theory to-
wards psychoanalysis that emerge in the book and proposes that 
institutionalized psychoanalysis’ troubled relationship to homo-
sexuality “haunts every effort by queer theorists to work with 
psychoanalysis.” She proposes that drawing out the distinctions 
between the institutionalization of psychoanalysis and all psy-
choanalysis, meaning the breadth of psychoanalysis as a theory 
and practice distinguished by different schools of thought, is 
critical for the necessary mourning of the past to take place and 
for the sake of future encounters. 
uneasy Encounters: Interpreting Differences in Coming Together
Underpinning the book’s vigorous and fascinating dialogues, 
debates, tensions, disagreements and disjunctions is the ques-
tion of the relationship between queer theory and psychoa-
nalysis. This relationship is one that is challenged both by the 
weight of history and the difficulties of “interdisciplinarity,” in 
other words, the problematic of finding common ground be-
tween two disciplines without each diluting the other. There is 
a further challenge in that both disciplines are oriented to the 
question of “otherness” and “queer” in humanity, but not in 
the same way. For queer theory, the question of otherness and 
queer is interrogated via political and socio-cultural regimes of 
dichotomization that cultivate modes of normativity and non-
normativity. By contrast, psychoanalysis interrogates the ques-
tion of otherness in terms of unconscious desire and its radically 
“other” status that emanates propitiously in parapraxes and in 
the linguistic figurations and (de)formations of speech acts. As 
Tim Dean (2000) puts it “from a psychoanalytic perspective, the 
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queer is not opposed to the normal, but fissures it from within” 
(245). Yet in spite of these differences, the collection’s encoun-
ters between two heterogeneous approaches that differently ad-
dress the inalienable “other” and the “queer” in humanity show 
a commitment to discovery, confrontation and revelation. One 
revelation is a pervasive sense of unease between psychoanalysis 
and queer theory and parsing, contextualizing, and understand-
ing this unease is an important step in enriching and extending 
the relationship between the two fields. 
First, it is necessary to differentiate between Lacanian psy-
choanalysis and modes of “institutionalized psychoanalysis” 
and “neo-Freudianism” that deviated from the psychoanalytic 
“refusal” of dichotimization. “Neo-Freudianism” was comprised 
of followers of Freud who reinterpreted Freud’s doctrine, par-
ticularly his theory of sexuality, and advocated a theory of ad-
aptative neo-Freudianism. These theorists were persuaded that 
subjecthood was the product of the social environment as well 
as biology, and focused their attention on the importance for 
the ego of being conflict-free and adapting to the external world 
(see also Nierenberg 1999). They constituted what Elisabeth 
Roudinesco (1997) describes as “Freudianism’s great shift to the 
west” in the inter- and post-War decades (195), comprising psy-
chiatrists and psychologists who were almost all European in 
orgin and principally located in the United States. They founded 
the schools of self-psychology and ego-psychology with its links 
to followers of Anna Freud in the United Kingdom. Their es-
tablishment was supported by psychoanalysis becoming popu-
lar and a “mass ideology” in America and in Europe, especially 
France, and by the International Psychoanalytic Association’s 
(IPA) facilitation of the establishment of neo-Freudianism (293).2 
2 The rise of neo-Freudianism within institutional psychoanalysis can be 
linked to the election of the psychiatrist Leo Barteimer as president of the 
IPA in 1949, succeeding Ernest Jones who had been president since 1932 
(Roudinesco 1997, 193). This was followed by the ego-psychologist, Heinz 
Hartmann, who headed the IPA Central Executive during the fifties (245) 
and the rise of other influential neo-Freudians such as Heinz Hartmann, 
Rudolf Loewenstein, Ernst Kris, and Irving Bieber in leading psychoana-
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Within the neo-Freudian revisionist project, Freud’s theory 
of the polymorphously perverse drive was supplanted by ap-
proaches focusing on the ego, such as Anna Freud’s ego psy-
chology, which emphasized the regulation of the unconcious 
by the ego, along with the addition of the notion of strong de-
velopmental lines and adaptational logic which added norma-
tive assumptions to psychoanalytic technique (Frosh 1999, 89). 
American ego-psychologists such as Heinz Hartmann and Erik 
Erikson sought “to convert psychoanalysis into a general psy-
chology” (93) and focused on the “adaptive properties of the 
ego that sometimes seemed to make such ‘adaptation’ a bio-
logical imperative” (90). A plethora of psychoanalytic writings 
emerged that categorized homosexuality, lesbianism, and bisex-
uality in non-normative terms that psychoanalytic technique 
and treatment should intervene on (Bergler 1944, 1958; Bieber 
1962; Greenson 1964; Hartmann 1961; Socarides 1962, 1988). 
These approaches, along with the official psychiatric catego-
rization of homosexuality as a mental illness in 1952 and 1968 
(DSM-I, 98, 121; DSM-II, 44) resulted in an enshrining of heter-
normativity in theory and practice in Anglo-American and Eu-
ropean psychoanalysis up until the early 1990s, when leading 
psychoanalytic organizations, due to fierce internal pressure 
from gay and lesbian members, agreed to incorporate anti-prej-
udicial policies in practice and training.3 These heteronorma-
tive policies had disastrous effects on gay, lesbian and bisexual 
training candidates who were excluded from training unless 
they lied about or obfuscated their sexual orientation, and on 
lytic institutions. The publication of a plethora of neo-Freudian writings in 
international psychoanalytic publications such as the Psychoanalytic Study 
of the Child, American Journal of Psychoanalysis, and International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s also supported its 
rise in prominence. See Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, “Comments on 
the Formation of Psychic Structure” (1946) and “Notes on the Theory of 
Aggression” (1949); Bieber, “A Critique of Libido Theory” (1958); Socarides 
“The Function of Moral Masochism” (1958).
3 Homosexuality was not declassified as a mental disorder until 1973 and 
it was replaced by the term “ego-dystonic homosexuality” in the DSM-III, 
which was published in 1980 (DSM-III, 281). 
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analysands who were treated with normativizing methods. Real 
lives and living bodies were impacted and traumatized by the 
prescriptive ethos of these models (O’Connor and Ryan 1993; 
Roughton 2002; Frosh 2006). It is the unacknowledged effects 
of this trauma that imprint queer analysis of psychoanalytic dis-
course and practice with what Hinshelwood in his chapter calls 
“a prejudice against prejudice.” Queer prejudice, judgmentalism 
and calls for psychoanalysis to be less conservative and rethink 
its theory are, in effect, indicative of a spectral return of the re-
pression of Freud’s (bi) and (homo)sexuality by this version of 
post-Freudian psychoanalysis. This repression symptomatically 
returns in the writings of queer theorists as a revenant of the 
past, haunting queer theory with remnants of the social abjec-
tion and historically prejudicial status of queers (see also Nier-
enberg). 
The obliteration of the revolutionary potential of Freud’s the-
ory of sexuality by his revisionist successors can be traced across 
a twofold development: the misreading of his theory of the drive 
and the abandonment of his concept of bisexuality (Watson 
2011, 58; Nierenberg 1999). The Freudian notion of bisexuality, 
which traces the drive’s “freedom to range equally over male 
and female objects” (Freud 1905, 145–46, n. 1) and it represents 
the child’s initial ignoring of sexual difference, is little short of 
revolutionary. Like the concept of the drive, it undermines the 
idea of an essentially deterministic link between biological sex 
and object and it explodes the possibility of any easy alignment 
of libidinal traits along genderized lines. But Freud’s unwilling-
ness to define bisexuality and his preference to leave it concep-
tually incomplete explains the almost total abandonment of the 
concept by his psychoanalytic successors. The misreading of the 
Freudian drive as “instinct” lent the new approaches support 
for the principle of the biological origins of the foundation of 
sexuality and from this was mapped the movement from child 
to adult along developmental or maturational models. In effect, 
the dividedness of the subject that Freud postulates at the centre 
of his theory of sexuality, revealed in its “bisexuality” and in the 
persistence of a non-adaptational perverse drive, was refused by 
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the adaptive logic propounded by some of his revisionist succes-
sors (Watson 2011, 60, 69). 
But perhaps the most significantly ambiguous element in 
Freud’s work is his conception of the Oedipus complex and this 
is taken up by a number of writers in Clinical Encounters in Sex-
uality including Kuzniar, Farina, and Cox Cameron. On the one 
hand, there is the notion that the unconscious is neither rigid 
nor universally determined, i.e., the notion of the “plasticity” 
and diversity of all of the mental processes and their “wealth 
of determining factors” (Freud 1913, 123). On the other hand, 
a slippage occurs whereby culturally-determined standards of 
gendered desire filter into Freud’s account so that a certain kind 
of identity produces a certain kind of desire, e.g., masculine 
identity produces a desire for the feminine (Freud 1900, 260–
64). The child’s desire for the mother, which Lacan reconcep-
tualizes as the other way around, as the mother’s desire for the 
child which is dangerous and necessitates a solution from a fa-
ther figure to intervene on this duality, is strongly configured by 
Freud around the son and hardly ever about the daughter (Ver-
haeghe 2009, 18–19). Lacan (2007[1969–70]) went on to renew 
Freud’s Oedipus with his linguistically-driven metaphor of the 
Name-of-the-Father and later, the sinthome, describing Freud’s 
Oedipus complex as his “dream” (117). The Oedipus complex 
comprises the analysand’s phantasmatic elaborations of the 
drives, often in dreams, which explains the ubiquity and impor-
tance of dreams. Freud’s (1905) Oedipus complex is ultimately 
rooted in a struggle exemplified in the “Three Essays” where he 
expounds on the ubiquity of the drives and polymorphous per-
version while also maddeningly asserting that “one of the tasks 
implicit in the object-choice is that it should find its way to the 
opposite sex” (229) (see also Cox Cameron). Yet for all of Freud’s 
ambivalences, I argue that he was infinitely more radical than 
normative in his conceptualization of sexuality. There is for me 
both challenge and reward in reading Freud with critical open-
ness as his theory of the drive ultimately refutes the traditional 
dichotomies of biological/social and normal/pathological by 
encompassing all of those spectra.
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What is refused/repressed under certain conditions returns 
and this collection proffers a means for a “return” and a work-
ing-through of past traumas and pain by way of its encoun-
ters and dialogues. It is to be expected that this will be neither 
easy nor tranquil. I suggest that an acknowledgement akin to 
a mourning by queer theorists will help to work through the 
long-standing effects of normativizing approaches of twentieth-
century psychoanalysis, notably those influenced by the neo-
Freudian traditions. Symptoms, Freud (1905) wrote, “constitute 
the sexual activity of the patient” (163) and are understood as 
the return of repressed sexual impulses and ideas. Indications of 
this unmourned trauma emerge in the book’s queer scholarship 
in which Lacanian psychoanalysis, which tended not to pervert 
Freud’s ideas into normative sexual ideals and broke with the 
institutionalization of psychoanalysis, is construed identically 
to approaches that treated homosexuality on the basis of pathol-
ogy. Other indications emerge in the queer calls for psychoa-
nalysis to update its concepts, including the Lacanian concepts 
of desire and jouissance. Still other indicators are locatable in 
the curious fact of queer theorists failing to give Freud credit 
for his ideas and bestowing the honours on Jean Laplanche and 
Nancy Chodorow instead (see Nierenberg), and also in some 
queer theorists’ unwonted reliance on interpretations of psycho-
analytic texts rather than reading directly what psychoanalysts 
say themselves. 
A mourning of this revisionist and normativizing legacy is 
also necessary for psychoanalysis. The leading worldwide in-
stitutions of psychoanalysis, the International Psychoanalytic 
Association (IPA) and the American Psychoanalytic Associa-
tion (APsaA), have since the early 1990s introduced impor-
tant changes and recommendations within their respective or-
ganizations to prohibit practices of heteronormativity.4 But the 
4 In 1991, in response to a potential discrimination lawsuit, the APsaA 
(American Psychoanalytic Association) adopted a sexual orientation non-
discrimination policy regarding the selection of candidates. This was re-
vised in 1992 to include the selection of faculty and training analysts as well. 
Committees were established to assess areas of antihomosexual bias and 
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mere fact of including gays and lesbians as training candidates, 
members and supervisors and prohibiting prejudice does not go 
far enough towards working-through its own exclusionary and 
painful history. As Roughton (2002) puts it in an assessment of 
APsaA, 
We have overcome discrimination. That part is finished. We 
are now a gay-friendly organization that embraces lesbians 
and gay men as candidates, teachers, curriculum planners, 
supervisors, training analysts, committee chairs, editorial 
board members, researchers, authors, colleagues, and orga-
nizational leaders. 
Yet questions linger about how we could have been so 
wrong for so long and about where we go from here in re-
thinking our concepts of sexuality. Some individual mem-
bers retain their doubts about the appropriateness of it all, 
and more are still troubled about delinking homosexuality 
and psychopathology, at least in some patients. (13–14) 
While homosexuality has become a topic for scientific pro-
grams and newsletters of the major psychoanalytic organiza-
tions, Roughton (2008) posits that full implementation of the 
policy will require an ongoing process of re-associating, which 
I argue is one that is also a mourning process. He further sug-
gests that by remembering together, analysts can diminish their 
collective and individual dissociations of this unsavory element 
of psychoanalytic history. Until that happens, these dissocia-
tions will trouble psychoanalysis and the relative absence of gay 
and lesbian voices, which still characterizes psychoanalysis, will 
continue. Some of the responses in this book acknowledge and 
affirm this painful legacy. 
work with institutes, as well as transform attitudes policies and curricula 
(Hoffman et al., 2000; Roughton 1995, cited in Drescher 2008, 452). The 
IPA did not address the issue of homosexuality until 1998 even though gays 
and lesbians were excluded from its institutes (Roughton, 1998). It instated 
a non-discrimination policy, approved in 1999. See https://www.ipa.world/
IPA/en/IPA1/Procedural_Code/Non_Discrimination_Policy.aspx.
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The wide representation of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the 
book is, in my opinion, indicative of Lacan’s (2006[1958])non-
alignment with neo-Freudian and revisionist models of psy-
choanalysis. He publically opposed all models that promulgated 
normativity as antithetical to the aims of psychoanalysis and his 
vociferous criticism of mid-20th century ego-psychology for 
promising to bring the “whole secret of sexuality to light” (612) 
is perhaps even clearer in his (2000[1955–56]) assertion that “the 
great secret of psychoanalysis is that there is no psychogenesis” 
(7).” The analyst’s neutrality forbids him/her from taking sides 
with any norms and rather than defending or attacking these 
norms, it is the analyst’s role to expose their incidence in the 
subject’s history. He also took aim at the psychoanalytic field’s 
increasing emphasis on biology in specifying sexual difference 
and in the application of a developmental telos in framing the 
subject, furiously writing that “if that is what psychoanalysis is, 
there is precisely nothing that could be further from psychoa-
nalysis in its whole development, its entire inspiration and its 
mainspring, in everything it has contributed, everything it has 
been able to confirm for us in anything we have established” (7). 
Lacan’s theory of unconscious desire specifies the primacy 
of desire over the fundamentally secondary nature of sex acts, 
gender relations and sexual orientation. I propose that it is one 
of the strongest anti-normative psychoanalytic conceptual tools 
available to queer theorists (Watson 2009; Dean 2000). Desire 
is indicated by objet a, an expressly Lacanian concept circum-
scribing a radical lack that is constituted at the level of the body, 
a causal gap that is anterior to the advent of the symbolic chain 
of language. It falls outside of the field of representation and is 
literally what falls outside of the mirror-image during the first 
assumption by the child of the identity “I” in the mirror. This 
sex-less and non-gendered object cause of desire is ultimately 
ungraspable.5 How subjects position themselves in relation to 
5 The partial drive-ridden objet a is a nucleus or kernel of the Real that founds 
the gap in which desire is constituted. We come into being as desiring be-
ings in the gap of what we lack. Lacan states that “this object ought to be 
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the object cause of desire and to jouissance entails a process of 
identification which Lacan (1999[1972–73])) calls “sexuation” 
(78–89). The positing of the existence of unconscious desire is 
the “queerest” of psychoanalytic concepts as Lacan’s subject of 
desire, founded by the objet a, moves beyond Freud’s notion 
of object-choice by leaving gender out of it. In this, Lacan ef-
fectively frees desire from normative heterosexuality — that is 
from the pervasive assumption that all desire, even same-sex 
desire is heterosexual in so far as it flows across both mascu-
line and feminine positions (Watson 2009). That is what Lacan 
(1999[1972–73]) means by his assertion that “when one loves it 
has nothing to do with sex” (25). Thus, as Dean (2000) puts it, 
it is because the psychoanalytic alignment of sex with the un-
conscious makes sexuality refractive, non-adaptive and also 
perverse that it is likely to be of interest to queer theory (244).   
Adding to this, sexuality for Lacan is of the order of the Real, 
which destines it to limits, impasses and dead ends in acceding 
to symbolic mediation.6 The Symbolic is interposed on the Real 
which mediates the traumatic effects of sex and the Real of the 
drive, meaning that we emerge “languaged” but paying the price 
of separation from “being” and the Real of sex and the body 
which are destined thereafter to remain “extimate.” This Real of 
sex, this sexual unconscious, is key to Lacan’s (1999[1972–73])
axiomatic principle: “there is no such thing as a sexual relation-
ship” (57) meaning there is no stable basis, no relation of one-
ness and rapport possible between men and women and the rea-
son for this is the absence of any singular signifier of difference 
conceived by us as the cause of desire […] and the object is behind desire” 
(Book X: Anxiety, Session 16 January 1963, 2).
6 In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the three orders of the Real, Imaginary, and 
Symbolic make up realm of human subjectivity. The Real is outside of rep-
resentation, the Symbolic is the order of language and symbols, and the 
Imaginary is the order of the image. Symbolic mediation, which is speech 
and language, offers distance from the Real and mediates its effects in ways 
that the narcissistic image cannot. This traumatic Real, which is the part of 
the drive that cannot be represented, takes a leaf out of the Freudian uncon-
scious by constantly undermining all sexual and social identities (see Lacan 
1999[1972–73], 95).
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between the sexes which would make gender identification sta-
ble. Thus the Real constantly undermines and resists adaptation 
and is stubbornly recalcitrant to all norms (Dean 2000, 244). 
The absence of a sexual relation or “non-rapport” between 
men and women explains why culture does not function 
smoothly. Every culture has a strategy for managing sexual dif-
ference and providing self-identities and facilitating different 
ways of mutual interdependence with other subjects and the 
objects of their desire. Ultimately, the lack in the sexual relation 
calls for a social link with myriad denials and quests that en-
circle it (Ragland 2002, 252). Queer theory, none the least in its 
contributions to this collection, helps to reveal these denials and 
quests by refracting dominant socio-cultural ideological trends, 
points of impasse and knotty bifurcations in the big Other of 
contemporary sexuality that render certain subjects as “normal” 
and “natural.” Queer theory, in its resistance to definition and 
in the ubiquity of its application, symptomatizes how sex and 
desire elude language. Lisa Duggan’s (1992) description of queer 
captures this idea. She writes that rather than an identificatory 
position per se; queer seeks a positionality vis-à-vis the norma-
tive and attempts to offer “the promise of new meanings, new 
ways of thinking and acting politically — a promise sometimes 
realized, sometimes not” (11).
The impossible nature of sexuality’s reducibility to language 
and writing emerges in Clinical Encounters in Sexuality not only 
in the uneasy relationship between clinical psychoanalysis and 
queer theory, but in the lacunae revealed in any encounter be-
tween sexuality and discourse. Our light-handed editorializa-
tion of the chapters leaves in unadulterated points of alignment 
as well as theoretical, conceptual and discursive discontinuities. 
This is designed to refract rather than disguise the points of 
non-encounter between the two disciplines, and between sexu-
ality and its writing. This locates this project, to invoke Foucault 
(1981), in a practice that “understood like this does not reveal 
the universality of a meaning but brings to light the action of an 
imposed scarcity” (73). Throughout the book, sexuality is shown 
to be irreducible to a writing and something always slips away 
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and remains ungraspable. To put this another way, “the sexual 
relationship doesn’t stop not being written,” (Lacan 1999[1972–
73], 94). The fact that we are speaking-beings makes sexuality 
impossible to reduce to discourse, language and a sexual en-
counter between two people. It always remains outside (it “ex-
ists”) which has the effect of causing us to talk and write about 
it ad infinitum. In figuring rather than configuring the gaps and 
oppositions that inevitably ensue when sex and writing come 
together, Clinical Encounters in Sexuality follows a logic of dif-
ference that aims at opening up rather than closing down.
Conclusion
Does this book succeed in opening up and “queering” the pitch 
of contemporary sexuality? I think it does. The queer theory 
chapters proffer a significant engagement with contemporary 
thinking on sexuality, notwithstanding that psychoanalysts 
have been turning to and resonating with queer theory since the 
1990s (Drescher 2008, 452). In engaging with and challenging 
the wide field of normalization through a critical engagement 
with intersectionality, queer theory offers a frame for psychoan-
alysts to explore and critically assess the crucial facets of culture 
and society that impinge on the clinic, and by extension hold a 
spotlight to their own positions and assess biases and areas of 
unease in matters sexual. As Jack Drescher puts it, “the history 
of psychoanalytic attitudes towards homosexuality reinforces 
the impression that psychoanalytic theories cannot be divorced 
from the political, cultural, and personal contexts in which they 
are formulated” (452). Some of the psychoanalytic responses 
in this book show anxiety and apprehension about the queer 
provocations, indicating that homosexuality, “queerness” and 
the non-normative continue to provoke and cause unease. 
In this collection, “queer” as a signifier rooted in prejudice 
is reworked to return the “gays/gaze” to psychoanalytic dis-
courses with the aim of challenging and ultimately overturning 
prejudice. I suggest that this would benefit from more working-
through and mourning on both sides. Some analysts take this 
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up by reflecting on the fact that for all of its centralization of 
sexuality in human life, theory and practice, sexuality has fallen 
out of favor in the clinic. Hinshelwood, for example, decries that 
in Kleinian psychoanalysis “the psychoanalysis of sexuality has 
become secondary, or at least contingent on the analysis of nar-
cissism, personal identity, and the relatedness to others.” Nobus 
similarly asserts that contemporary (Lacanian) psychoanalysis 
“risks becoming sexually illiterate” if it doesn’t become more 
wide-ranging and contemporary. A question of normativity is 
suggested in tendencies towards categorization in published 
material. Psychoanalytic approaches to transsexuality, for ex-
ample, are characterized by a dearth of vignettes and those that 
appear tend to categorize it broadly in terms of psychosis and its 
intractability and untreatability (Limentani 1979; Safouan 1980; 
Millot 1990), which Gherovici, Kaplan and Stryker go some way 
to addressing. In this, queer theory’s accusation of a nascent 
conservatism in psychoanalysis hits a mark and is a reminder of 
the necessity for psychoanalytic clinicians to continue to engage 
with and challenge the wide field of normalization. 
In its most fundamental formulations, I agree with Tim Dean 
(2000) that “psychoanalysis is a queer theory” (268), even if its 
history has not always supported that. Psychoanalysis can prof-
fer a theorization of models of normativity and challenge them 
to theorists, activists and clinicians who are interested in effect-
ing social change. While social change is not the express aim of 
psychoanalysis, its interrogation of norms as a function of the 
organization and “civilization” of the drives, and as a mode of 
historically and socially organizing “difference,” provides a tool 
for conceiving of norms as contingent, contestable and change-
worthy. Thus I hope this collection functions as a reference and 
study text for analysts and clinical trainees, and as a teaching 
text for academics and students of queer theory and sexuality 
studies. 
It is laudable that this collection is characterized by more 
than just conflict. There is enough common ground and shared 
history to dialogue and disagree and deepen the commitment 
to putting normativity under the microscope. Psychoanalysis 
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and queer theory would agree that the Freudian Oedipal model 
is insufficient to explain the varieties of social relations today. 
The question of conflict is related to the question of the super-
ego and is something to be alert to. Where, Jacqueline Rose asks 
in her chapter, is the superego in queer thinking? This is also 
broached by Bob Hinshelwood. In this book, it is projected into 
the “normal” other, the boring ordinary other who doesn’t enjoy 
and doesn’t take absolute pleasure, in some ways the pessimis-
tic other of psychoanalysis. This queer projection ends up being 
tautological and categorizing of psychoanalysis, in the calls for 
psychoanalysis to “loosen up” and be less “sober.” It may be help-
ful to reflect on the dissimilarity of the question of difference 
and the question of binarization. All binaries are the refusal of 
the non-rapport which is Lacan’s idea that the oneness and har-
mony promised by sexual union is inherently impossible. Thus 
binaries are attempts to suture over uncertainty, inexistence and 
impossibility with a frame of dichotomization, not a frame of 
difference. Incorporating difference involves accepting the non-
compatibility of the other. Queer theory also aims to overturn 
and discredit binaries but it must work hard not to reintroduce 
other binaries, the most entrenched binary being of course the 
normative and the queer. To be attentive to difference is to sub-
scribe to the sexual “non-rapport,” which is the impossibility of 
any binary to solve the problem of sex. 
For readers of this collection, I hope that the book’s encoun-
ters, which reveal a diversity of thought and practice, as well 
as deep wounds, disagreement and unease, are provocative and 
critically engaging. For new practices and thought to emerge, a 
process of working-though traumas, conflicts and denials must 
occur, as well as a commitment to a ceaseless practice of inter-
rogation of key tenets and formulations; this to be done with a 
spotlight on the role and effect of the contemporary zeitgeist in 
contemporary thought and practices. This is why an interdisci-
plinary engagement is so important, because it gives perspective 
on the discourses underlying the thought and practices of single 
disciplines, thereby opening up the space for reflection. Without 
that, the ground for critical interrogation and the possibilities 
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for the creative and new are precluded. An aim of this book, 
with the help of its readers, is to plough the furrow of possibility 
of what has yet to be thought and said in the complicated and 
contested field of human sexuality. 
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